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The	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  is	  articulated	  at	  the	  level	  of	  political	  theory,	  is	  deployed	  by	  liberal	  
democratic	  institutions,	  and	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  the	  political	  discourse	  of	  mass	  communications.	  
Minority	  groups,	  it	  is	  argued,	  are	  paradoxically	  claiming	  purported	  rights	  that	  are	  unsupported	  
by	  the	  values	  upon	  which	  the	  claimants	  base	  their	  claim.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  minority	  claims	  are	  
made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  rights	  secured	  by	  a	  liberal	  democracy;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  claims	  
undermine	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  liberal	  reasoning—the	  same	  reasoning	  that	  legitimizes	  the	  rights	  
on	  which	  the	  claims	  are	  made.	  	  The	  self-­‐referential	  implications	  of	  this	  paradox	  are	  as	  follows:	  
Either	  the	  minority	  claim	  negates	  its	  own	  justification	  or	  the	  underlying	  justification	  renders	  the	  
claim	  moot.	  	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  charge	  of	  paradox	  effectively	  puts	  an	  end	  to	  the	  conversation	  by	  
dismissing	  minority	  rights	  claims	  before	  they	  are	  properly	  understood.	  	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  first,	  come	  
to	  terms	  with	  political	  dialogues	  in	  which	  the	  charge	  of	  paradox	  occurs	  and	  second,	  to	  
overcome	  the	  stultifying	  effects	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  through	  a	  deliberative	  approach	  
to	  negotiating	  the	  concept	  and	  content	  of	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  Evaluating	  the	  claims	  of	  
minorities,	  I	  will	  argue,	  requires	  a	  dialogue	  that	  can	  adapt	  to	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  dialogue—
an	  inclusive	  deliberative	  process	  that	  gives	  formal,	  procedural	  and	  substantive	  recognition	  to	  
the	  worldviews	  of	  minority	  cultures	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	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  “Genius	  means	  the	  power	  of	  rendering	  paradoxes	  as	  platitudes.”1	  
Précis	  
The	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  what	  I	  call	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  	  It	  will	  be	  shown	  that	  this	  
paradox	  is	  articulated	  at	  the	  level	  of	  political	  theory,	  is	  deployed	  by	  liberal	  democratic	  
institutions,	  and	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  the	  political	  discourse	  of	  mass	  communications.	  	  Put	  
simply,	  it	  is	  a	  way	  of	  dismissing	  minority	  rights	  claims	  before	  they	  are	  properly	  understood.	  	  
Minority	  groups,	  it	  is	  argued,	  are	  paradoxically	  claiming	  purported	  rights	  that	  are	  unsupported	  
by	  the	  values	  upon	  which	  the	  claimants	  base	  their	  claim.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  minority	  claims	  are	  
made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  rights	  secured	  by	  a	  liberal	  democracy;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  claims	  
undermine	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  liberal	  reasoning—the	  same	  reasoning	  that	  legitimizes	  the	  rights	  
on	  which	  the	  claims	  are	  made.	  	  The	  self-­‐referential	  implications	  of	  this	  paradox	  are	  as	  follows:	  
Either	  the	  minority	  claim	  negates	  its	  own	  justification	  or	  the	  underlying	  justification	  renders	  the	  
claim	  moot.	  	  Either	  way,	  the	  charge	  of	  paradox	  effectively	  puts	  an	  end	  to	  the	  conversation.	  	  	  
	   It	  is	  my	  aim	  to	  first	  observe	  dialogues	  in	  which	  the	  charge	  of	  paradox	  occurs	  and	  then	  to	  
show	  that	  the	  charge	  of	  paradox	  is	  unhelpful	  when	  grappling	  with	  the	  vexed	  matter	  of	  special	  
rights	  for	  minority	  groups.	  	  By	  stifling	  political	  dialogues	  about	  minority	  rights	  the	  charge	  of	  
paradox	  unjustly	  justifies	  dismissing	  what	  may	  be	  legitimate	  claims.	  	  The	  charge	  of	  paradox	  
presupposes	  a	  particular	  approach	  to	  evaluating	  rights	  claims	  that	  does	  not	  always	  successfully	  
negotiate	  the	  plurality	  of	  worldviews	  constitutive	  of	  a	  modern	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  The	  minority	  
rights	  paradox	  is	  not	  merely	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  logical	  structure	  of	  claims;	  it	  is	  a	  dialogical	  
model	  consisting	  of	  the	  minority	  claim,	  the	  response	  to	  the	  claim	  and	  the	  minority	  rejoinder.	  	  
Minority	  groups	  argue	  that	  liberal	  institutions	  exert	  a	  cultural	  bias	  against	  them	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  
it	  is	  their	  culture,	  to	  which	  they	  have	  a	  right,	  at	  stake	  in	  their	  claims.	  	  Evaluating	  the	  claims	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Isaiah	  Berlin,	  ‘Berkley’s	  External	  World’	  (1947),	  from	  the	  unpublished	  lectures	  in	  The	  Isaiah	  Berlin	  Virtual	  Library,	  
http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/lists/nachlass/berkeley.pdf,	  in	  Henry	  Hardy	  ed.,	  The	  Isaiah	  Berlin	  Virtual	  Library	  




minorities,	  I	  will	  argue,	  requires	  an	  on-­‐going	  political	  dialogue	  that	  can	  adapt	  to	  the	  participants	  
in	  the	  dialogue;	  that	  is,	  an	  evaluation	  process	  that	  gives	  formal,	  procedural	  and	  substantive	  
recognition	  to	  the	  worldviews	  of	  minority	  cultures	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  However,	  
claims	  justified	  by	  appeals	  to	  cultural	  values,	  beliefs,	  traditions	  or	  practices	  are	  highly	  
problematic.	  	  	  
It	  is	  difficult	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  culture,	  let	  alone	  what	  role	  cultural	  
ideals,	  values	  or	  practices	  should	  play	  in	  the	  justification	  of	  rights	  claims.	  	  Intra-­‐cultural	  
consensus	  occurs	  rarely	  (if	  ever)	  and	  questions	  about	  who	  can	  or	  cannot	  legitimately	  claim	  
cultural	  membership	  further	  complicate	  claims	  that	  appeal	  to	  the	  beliefs	  or	  values	  of	  a	  culture.	  	  
Despite	  the	  controversial	  nature	  of	  culture	  and	  its	  justificatory	  role,	  cultural	  justifications	  
continue	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  political	  dialogues	  about	  rights.	  	  Particularly	  problematic,	  and	  
increasingly	  common,	  are	  claims	  put	  forward	  by	  minority	  groups	  who	  are	  characterized,	  from	  
within	  or	  from	  without,	  as	  non-­‐liberal.	  	  Given	  that	  minority	  claims	  are	  often	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  a	  distinction	  between	  liberal	  and	  non-­‐liberal	  worldviews,	  getting	  around	  the	  paradox	  seems	  
to	  require	  a	  political	  process	  that	  can	  accommodate	  deeply	  different,	  even	  divergent,	  
worldviews.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  a	  deliberative	  politics,	  or	  to	  be	  more	  precise,	  a	  specific	  articulation	  
of	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making,	  offers	  a	  means	  to	  successfully	  navigate	  pluralist	  associations	  in	  
intercultural	  dialogues	  about	  rights.	  
Recently,	  in	  the	  last	  twenty	  years	  or	  so,	  democracy	  has	  taken	  a	  deliberative,	  or	  what	  
some	  call	  a	  discursive,	  turn.	  	  It	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case	  that	  voting	  is	  the	  central	  concern	  of	  
democratic	  theory	  or	  arrangements;	  instead,	  democratic	  authenticity	  is	  now	  found	  in	  the	  web	  
of	  communications	  that	  constitute	  a	  political	  dialogue	  between	  citizen	  and	  citizen,	  citizen	  and	  
state.	  	  The	  notion	  of	  politics	  as	  a	  dialogue	  is	  now	  widely	  accepted;	  however,	  there	  is	  a	  great	  
deal	  of	  disagreement	  with	  regard	  to	  what	  form	  that	  dialogue	  takes,	  or	  should	  take,	  in	  a	  modern	  
liberal	  democracy.	  	  In	  part	  two	  of	  this	  thesis	  I	  survey	  some	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  accounts	  of	  
deliberative	  democracy	  in	  order	  to	  recommend	  what	  a	  deliberative	  decision	  making	  process	  
should	  look	  like	  if	  it	  is	  to	  facilitate	  intercultural	  dialogue.	  	  Deliberative	  reasoning,	  I	  will	  contend,	  
is	  not	  dependent	  upon	  liberal	  principles	  or	  the	  necessary	  priority	  of	  individual	  rights;	  
consequently,	  a	  deliberative	  approach	  to	  political	  decision-­‐making	  shows	  promise	  as	  a	  means	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to	  accommodate	  an	  on-­‐going	  dialogue	  between	  divergent	  worldviews	  in	  political	  decision-­‐
making.	  	  	  
Context	  &	  Themes	  
It	  is	  the	  inclusive	  nature	  of	  deliberation	  that	  makes	  it	  a	  good	  candidate	  for	  dialogues	  about	  
minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  Such	  inclusion	  is,	  in	  part,	  a	  necessary	  response	  to	  the	  pluralism	  and	  
diversity	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  types	  of	  freedoms	  endemic	  to	  modern	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  Of	  
course,	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  include	  claims	  based	  on	  non-­‐liberal	  worldviews,	  
poses	  significant	  and	  worrisome	  problems	  for	  a	  nation	  built	  upon	  and	  stabilized	  by	  liberal	  
principles.	  	  However,	  I	  will	  agree	  with	  those	  who	  would	  say	  the	  threats	  posed	  by	  alternative	  
worldviews	  are	  often	  based	  on	  misrepresentations	  of	  difference	  as	  opposition	  rather	  than	  
innocuous	  or	  complementary	  difference.2	  	  	  
The	  complications	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  promise	  of	  pluralism	  are	  central	  to	  
contemporary	  political	  theory,	  particularly	  the	  literature	  of	  liberalism.	  	  How	  does	  a	  liberal	  
nation	  find	  legitimacy	  across	  boundaries	  of	  religion,	  culture	  and	  ethnicity	  when	  the	  tenets	  of	  
those	  comprehensive	  worldviews	  are,	  in	  some	  cases,	  mutually	  exclusive	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  
criterion	  of	  legitimacy?	  	  The	  question	  has	  been	  framed	  and	  reframed	  by	  theorists	  such	  as	  Rawls,	  
Taylor,	  Kymlicka,	  Benhabib,	  Barry,	  Waldron,	  Appiah,	  Nussbaum,	  Tully,	  Ivison,	  Young,	  Gutmann	  
and	  Thompson3	  (just	  to	  name	  a	  few),	  who	  have	  all,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  responded	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  Amy	  Gutmann’s	  introduction	  to	  Multiculturalism:	  Examining	  the	  Politics	  of	  Recognition,	  ed.	  Amy	  Gutmann,	  
25-­‐73,	  (New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  for	  a	  helpful	  distinction	  between	  anti-­‐liberal	  groups,	  who	  
are	  opposed	  to	  liberalism,	  and	  non-­‐liberal	  groups	  whose	  worldviews	  are	  different	  but	  not	  opposed	  to	  liberalism.	  
3	  Anthony	  Appiah,	  "Identity,	  Authenticity,	  Survival:	  Multicultural	  Societies	  and	  Social	  Reproduction,"	  In	  
Multiculturalism:	  Examining	  the	  Politics	  of	  Recognition,	  ed.	  Amy	  Gutmann,	  149-­‐164,	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  1994);	  Brian	  Barry,	  Culture	  and	  Equality,	  (Cambridge:	  Blackwell,	  2001);	  Seyla	  Benhabib,	  "The	  
Democratic	  Moment	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Difference,"	  In	  Democracy	  and	  Difference:	  Contesting	  the	  Boundaries	  of	  
the	  Political,	  ed.	  Seyla	  Benhabib,	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Amy	  Gutmann	  and	  Dennis	  
Thompson,	  Democracy	  and	  Disagreement,	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Duncan	  Ivison,	  
Postcolonial	  Liberalism,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002);	  Will	  Kymlicka,	  Liberalism,	  Community	  and	  
Culture,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1989);	  Martha	  Nussbaum,	  Women	  and	  Human	  Development:	  The	  
Capabilities	  Approach,	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000);	  John	  Rawls,	  Political	  Liberalism,	  Expanded	  
Edition,	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2005);	  Charles	  Taylor,	  "Conditions	  of	  an	  Unforced	  Concensus	  on	  
Human	  Rights,"	  In	  The	  East	  Asian	  Challenge	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  eds.	  Joanne	  Bauer	  and	  Daniel	  A.	  Bell,	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999);	  James	  Tully,	  Strange	  multiplicity:	  Constitutionalism	  in	  an	  age	  of	  diversity,	  (New	  
York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995);	  Jeremy	  Waldron,	  "Indigeneity?	  First	  Peoples	  and	  Last	  Occupancy?"	  New	  
Zealand	  Journal	  of	  Public	  and	  International	  Law,	  no.	  1	  (2003):	  55-­‐82;	  Iris	  Marion	  Young,	  Inclusion	  and	  Democracy,	  
(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000).	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tensions	  within	  the	  liberal	  picture	  between	  the	  equality	  of	  citizens	  and	  pluralism.	  	  Some	  appeal	  
to	  the	  idea	  of	  normative	  agreement	  on	  essential	  values	  that	  supersede	  other	  types	  of	  
disagreement.	  	  Others	  look	  to	  a	  set	  of	  core	  principles	  about	  which,	  it	  is	  argued	  or	  asserted,	  
there	  can	  be	  no	  reasonable	  disagreement.	  	  Others	  focus	  on	  procedural	  normativity	  and	  the	  
promise	  of	  fairness	  as	  a	  means	  to	  settle	  disagreements	  between	  divergent	  comprehensive	  
worldviews.	  	  It	  is	  not	  my	  aim	  to	  proffer	  one	  articulation	  of	  the	  question	  as	  the	  ‘right’	  one,	  or	  to	  
suggest	  that	  one	  approach	  is	  the	  ‘right’	  approach	  to	  democratic	  arrangements	  across	  the	  
board.	  	  	  
Instead,	  I	  focus	  squarely	  on	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox,	  the	  questions	  it	  raises,	  and	  
draw	  upon	  an	  array	  of	  literatures	  not	  often	  considered	  together—anthropology,	  law,	  
education,	  conflict	  resolution,	  politics	  and	  philosophy—to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  
paradox	  and	  how	  a	  deliberative	  process,	  constituted	  in	  a	  particular	  way,	  gets	  around	  the	  
paralyzing	  effects	  of	  the	  paradox.	  	  I	  will	  not	  offer	  a	  defence	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  as	  either	  
the	  best	  description	  of	  contemporary	  liberal	  democracy	  or	  as	  the	  prescription	  for	  the	  failings	  of	  
liberal	  democratic	  institutions.	  	  My	  focus	  is	  an	  injustice	  that,	  I	  will	  argue,	  occurs	  on	  multiple	  
levels	  of	  association	  in	  modern	  liberal	  democracies—an	  injustice	  fuelled	  in	  part	  by	  unfailing	  
adherence	  to	  certain	  presuppositions.	  	  The	  process	  of	  unpacking	  the	  content	  and	  concepts	  
deployed	  in	  political	  dialogues	  that	  take	  the	  form	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  brings	  
background	  presuppositions	  forward	  and	  raises	  important	  questions	  about	  those	  
presuppositions.	  	  	  	  
Cultural	  minority	  groups	  face	  an	  uphill	  struggle	  on	  two	  fronts.	  	  First,	  as	  political	  actors	  
they	  are	  often	  weakened	  due	  to	  relatively	  small	  numbers	  (and	  in	  many	  cases	  depressed	  
economic	  circumstances)	  and	  second,	  as	  a	  distinct	  culture	  with	  distinct	  values,	  beliefs	  and	  
practices	  their	  reasoning	  is	  often	  misrecognized	  as	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  claims	  being	  made.	  	  As	  a	  
result,	  the	  minority	  group	  who	  is	  already	  marginalized	  by	  the	  system	  is	  expected	  to	  overcome	  
the	  paradox	  by	  translating	  reasons	  for,	  and	  justifications	  to	  support,	  their	  claims	  into	  
acceptable,	  liberal,	  terms.	  Non-­‐liberal	  minorities	  respond	  that	  this	  burden	  is	  particularly	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oppressive	  because	  it	  unjustly	  delegitimises	  their	  worldview	  and	  any	  claims	  made	  from	  within	  
their	  conceptual	  framework.4	  	  	  
Similarly,	  religious	  minority	  groups	  argue	  that	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  adequately	  express	  the	  
thrust	  of	  their	  arguments	  in	  liberal	  terms.	  	  Interestingly,	  religious	  minorities	  do	  not	  arouse	  
much	  sympathy	  from	  the	  liberal	  political	  establishment,	  perhaps	  because	  religious	  reasons	  can	  
be,	  and	  have	  been,	  used	  to	  support	  all	  sorts	  of	  oppression.5	  	  From	  the	  subordinate	  status	  of	  
women	  to	  the	  condemnation	  of	  all	  sorts	  of	  secular	  practices,	  the	  religious	  (of	  a	  certain	  stripe)	  
and	  the	  liberal	  (of	  a	  certain	  type)	  stand	  in	  opposition	  to	  one	  another,	  each	  claiming	  to	  have	  not	  
only	  the	  right	  answer	  to	  complicated	  social	  and	  political	  issues,	  but	  also	  the	  right	  way	  to	  find	  
the	  right	  answer.	  	  The	  claims	  of	  non-­‐liberal	  cultural	  minorities	  are	  often	  put	  forward	  in	  similar	  
non-­‐liberal	  terms;	  however,	  they	  have	  received	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  political	  recognition—
perhaps	  because	  cultural	  minorities,	  in	  many	  cases,	  are	  considered	  the	  oppressed	  rather	  than	  
the	  oppressor.	  
In	  recent	  years,	  cultural	  minorities,	  particularly	  Indigenous	  peoples,	  have	  been	  given	  
increased	  opportunities	  to	  protest	  the	  historical	  injustice	  of	  colonialism	  and	  the	  resulting	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  For	  example,	  religious	  fundamentalists	  opposed	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  legislation	  in	  Canada	  on	  two	  fronts.	  	  In	  the	  
media,	  there	  were	  moral	  arguments	  based	  on	  biblical	  principles	  (My	  favourite	  quote:	  	  “In	  the	  bible	  it	  says	  ‘Adam	  
and	  Eve’,	  not	  ‘Adam	  and	  Steve’	  eh.”)	  	  However,	  the	  legal	  case	  was	  couched	  in	  terms	  of	  rights	  with	  the	  following	  
question,	  “is	  section	  1	  of	  the	  proposal,	  which	  extends	  capacity	  to	  marry	  to	  persons	  of	  the	  same	  sex,	  consistent	  
with	  the	  Canadian	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms?”	  	  Religious	  groups	  argue	  that	  significant	  features	  of	  their	  
claims	  are	  lost	  in	  translation.	  	  "Reference	  re	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage,"	  www.cbc.ca,	  December	  9,	  2004,	  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/samesexrights/2004scc079.wpd.txt	  (accessed	  March	  3,	  2010).	  	  	  
5	  The	  differences	  and	  similarities	  between	  culture	  and	  religion	  are	  controversial	  and	  complicated.	  	  See	  Sue	  
Mendus,	  “Should	  Religion	  be	  Special?”	  www.york.ac.uk/politics,	  (2011)	  http://www.york.ac.uk/politics/our-­‐
staff/sue-­‐mendus/	  (accessed	  November	  2011).	  	  Mendus	  looks	  at	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  assumption	  that	  religious	  
beliefs	  or	  convictions	  are	  a	  choice	  and	  as	  such	  are	  distinct	  from	  beliefs	  or	  convictions	  that	  are	  brought	  about	  by	  
membership	  in	  a	  particular	  cultural	  group.	  	  Individuals,	  it	  is	  thought,	  can	  choose	  to	  join	  or	  leave	  a	  religious	  group	  in	  
a	  way	  that	  individuals	  cannot	  choose	  to	  join	  or	  leave	  a	  particular	  culture.	  This	  argument	  seems	  to	  presuppose	  a	  
significant	  level	  of	  detachment	  from	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  a	  significant	  lack	  of	  detachment	  from	  cultural	  beliefs	  that	  
seems	  impossibly	  general	  to	  do	  any	  work	  in	  dialogues	  about	  minority	  rights.	  	  It	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  that	  the	  devout	  
do	  not	  see	  their	  religious	  convictions	  as	  a	  choice,	  while	  other	  churchgoers	  leave	  morality	  for	  Sunday	  morning	  and	  
spend	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  week	  engaging	  in	  all	  sorts	  of	  intemperate	  behavior.	  	  	  It	  is	  also	  the	  case	  that	  individuals	  who	  
move	  from	  one	  culture	  to	  another	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  significantly	  changed	  by	  the	  experience.	  	  Some	  migrants	  
adopt	  new	  values	  and	  take	  on	  new	  way	  of	  speaking,	  a	  vernacular	  and	  even	  accent	  consistent	  with	  their	  new	  home,	  
while	  others	  barely	  learn	  to	  speak	  the	  new	  language	  of	  their	  environment	  and	  hold	  fast	  to	  the	  traditions	  of	  their	  
upbringing.	  	  Choices,	  it	  seems,	  are	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  recognition	  of	  difference	  whether	  that	  difference	  is	  
cultural	  or	  religious	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  tell	  us	  anything	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  choice,	  or	  the	  capacity	  to	  choose.	  I	  
will	  take	  a	  close	  look	  at	  the	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  cases	  of	  cultural	  claims	  and	  religious	  claims	  and	  
the	  role	  those	  similarities	  and	  differences	  play	  in	  minority	  rights	  claims	  in	  chapter	  1.3.	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and	  political	  oppression.	  	  There	  is	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  destruction	  of	  Indigenous	  civilizations	  was	  
unjust	  and	  that	  the	  descendants	  of	  those	  broken	  civilizations	  deserve	  a	  leg-­‐up,	  special	  rights	  
and	  privileges,	  to	  overcome	  the	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  the	  injustice.	  	  However,	  in	  deliberating	  
what	  form	  compensation	  or	  special	  privileges	  should	  take,	  arguments	  are	  levied	  against	  self-­‐
proclaimed	  non-­‐liberal	  cultural	  minorities—that	  special	  recognition	  for	  minority	  rights	  claims	  
threatens	  civil	  and	  political	  liberties.	  	  These	  threats	  are	  good	  reason	  to	  look	  closely	  at	  the	  claims	  
and	  their	  implications	  for	  a	  functioning	  liberal	  democracy;	  however,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  a	  
potential	  threat	  is	  not	  reason	  enough	  to	  dismiss	  minority	  rights	  claims	  before	  the	  thrust	  of	  the	  
claim	  and	  its	  implications	  have	  been	  given	  due	  consideration.	  
There	  is,	  what	  could	  be	  called,	  an	  imperializing	  tendency	  in	  Western	  rights	  discourse;	  a	  
propensity	  to	  subject	  everyone	  to	  the	  moral	  authority	  embodied	  in	  the	  content	  of	  a	  Western	  
conception	  of	  rights.6	  	  However,	  some	  have	  observed	  that	  the	  abstracted	  rationality	  of	  
universal	  human	  rights	  discourse	  is	  far	  from	  neutral,	  and	  has	  often	  been	  used	  to	  privilege	  
economic,	  rather	  than	  altruistic,	  aims.7	  	  Is	  there	  a	  deep	  connection	  between	  liberalism’s	  claim	  
of	  neutrality	  and	  the	  imperializing	  tendency	  of	  rights	  discourse?	  	  Does	  this	  imperializing	  
tendency	  unjustly	  marginalize	  non-­‐liberal	  nations	  and	  groups	  in	  political	  discourse?	  	  If	  the	  
political	  agenda	  is	  determined	  by	  those	  reasons	  that	  are	  pre-­‐determined	  to	  be	  legitimate	  
political	  reasons,	  then	  the	  reasons	  of	  cultural	  or	  religious	  minorities	  who	  do	  not	  consider	  
themselves	  liberal	  or	  who	  do	  not	  consider	  liberal	  reasoning	  the	  source	  of	  political	  legitimacy,	  
may	  be	  marginalized	  by	  the	  allowable	  agenda	  in	  liberal	  democratic	  processes.	  	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  
intra-­‐national	  groups	  who	  challenge	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  political	  agenda	  they	  say,	  is	  inherently	  
conservationist	  and	  ultimately	  oppressive.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  is	  what	  James	  Tully	  calls	  the	  “empire	  of	  uniformity”	  which	  he	  observes	  and	  describes	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  3	  of	  
Strange	  Multiplicity—an	  authoritarian	  tendency	  of	  some	  contemporary	  political	  theorists	  to	  characterize	  questions	  
about	  diversity	  in	  terms	  of	  constitutional	  uniformity.	  	  “The	  constitution	  lays	  down	  the	  fundamental	  laws	  which	  
establish	  the	  form	  of	  government,	  the	  rights	  and	  duties	  of	  citizens,	  the	  representative	  and	  institutional	  relation	  
between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  governed,	  and	  an	  amending	  formula”	  as	  if	  (and	  this	  is	  the	  important	  bit)	  the	  
system	  was	  impartial	  with	  regard	  to	  alternative	  systems	  and	  therefore	  the	  universal	  system	  of	  rights.	  	  Strange	  
multiplicity:	  Constitutionalism	  in	  an	  age	  of	  diversity,	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  59.	  
7	  Onuma	  Yasuaki,	  “Toward	  an	  Intercivilizational	  Approach	  to	  Human	  Rights,”;	  Abdullahi	  An-­‐Na'im,	  “The	  Cultural	  
Mediation	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  The	  Al-­‐Arqam	  Case	  in	  Malaysia,”;	  and	  Inoue	  Tatsuo,	  “Liberal	  Democracy	  and	  Asian	  
Orientalism,”	  In	  The	  East	  Asia	  Challenge	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  eds.	  Joanne	  R.	  Bauer	  and	  Daniel	  A.	  Bell,	  (Cambridge:	  




Responses	  to	  this	  sort	  of	  challenge	  vary,	  but	  the	  broad	  strokes	  run	  something	  like	  this:	  A	  
non-­‐liberal	  agenda	  is,	  by	  its	  very	  nature,	  illegitimate	  in	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  and	  therefore	  
whatever	  coercion	  occurs	  is	  justified.	  	  I	  agree	  that	  an	  anti-­‐liberal	  agenda	  is,	  in	  a	  liberal	  
democracy,	  an	  illegitimate	  enterprise	  and	  there	  are	  cases	  where	  extremist	  groups	  overtly	  claim	  
rights	  as	  some	  sort	  of	  weapon,	  and	  that	  often	  these	  claims	  are	  hopelessly	  internally	  
inconsistent.	  	  I	  set	  these	  cases	  aside	  and	  focus	  on	  much	  harder	  cases,	  cases	  where	  groups	  are	  
not	  espousing	  anti-­‐liberal	  sentiments;	  these	  are	  groups	  who	  consider	  their	  worldview	  as	  
something	  other	  than	  a	  liberal	  worldview—different	  but	  not	  necessarily	  opposed	  to	  key	  
features	  of	  liberalism.	  	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  the	  mistaken	  conflation	  of	  non-­‐liberal	  with	  anti-­‐liberal	  
rests	  on	  presuppositions	  not	  only	  about	  the	  political	  situation,	  but	  also	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  
degree	  of	  difference	  between	  peoples	  of	  various	  religious,	  cultural	  or	  ethnic	  backgrounds.	  	  
These	  presuppositions	  shape	  the	  thematic	  framework	  of	  the	  thesis—they	  include	  a	  particular	  
view	  of	  cultural	  relativism,	  of	  universal	  political	  values	  and	  of	  public	  reason.	  	  Within	  this	  
framework,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  the	  coercive	  effects	  of	  these	  presuppositions	  and	  evaluate	  the	  
legitimacy	  of	  those	  impositions	  on	  religious,	  cultural	  and	  ethnic	  minority	  groups.	  	  The	  questions	  
of	  legitimacy	  raised,	  I	  will	  argue,	  point	  to	  a	  deliberative	  approach	  to	  decision-­‐making	  as	  a	  means	  
to	  successfully	  integrate	  a	  plurality	  of	  worldviews	  and	  the	  concomitant	  diversity	  of	  ideals,	  
beliefs	  and	  values	  in	  an	  inclusive	  political	  dialogue	  about	  minority	  rights.	  	  
The	  Argument	  
The	  argument	  follows	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  problem/solution	  format.	  	  I	  will	  not	  to	  presume	  to	  put	  
forward	  the	  solution;	  instead,	  I	  recommend	  a	  promising	  approach	  to	  the	  problem.	  	  Chapters	  
one	  and	  two	  unpack	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox—what	  it	  is;	  who	  suffers	  and	  
what	  sort	  of	  conditions	  reinforce	  the	  stultifying	  effects	  of	  the	  paradox.	  	  In	  response,	  chapters	  
three	  through	  five	  forward	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  paradox	  and	  a	  move	  toward	  a	  more	  just	  approach	  
to	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  Finally,	  in	  chapter	  six,	  I	  revisit	  some	  of	  the	  practical	  examples	  used	  
throughout	  to	  assess	  the	  real	  world	  implications	  of	  the	  approach	  I	  have	  put	  forward.	  
Chapter	  one	  achieves	  two	  aims.	  	  First,	  it	  is	  an	  exposition	  of	  the	  social	  and	  political	  
conditions	  in	  which	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  occurs	  and	  second,	  it	  is	  an	  exposition	  of	  the	  
paradox	  itself	  in	  theory	  and	  in	  practice.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  claims	  of	  minorities	  whose	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worldview	  is	  notably	  different	  from	  the	  majority	  worldview	  are,	  in	  important	  cases,	  erroneously	  
interpreted	  and	  then	  dismissed	  as	  paradoxical	  reasoning.	  	  There	  are	  many	  variations	  on	  this	  
theme,	  but	  the	  basic	  structure	  runs	  something	  like	  this:	  	  A	  minority	  group	  objects	  to	  a	  public	  
policy,	  institution	  or	  law	  because	  it	  violates	  a	  particular	  right	  they	  are	  entitled	  to	  as	  citizens	  of	  a	  
liberal	  democracy.	  	  	  The	  response,	  from	  a	  liberal	  democratic	  institution	  for	  example,	  is	  that	  the	  
public	  policy	  they	  are	  objecting	  to	  is	  necessary	  to	  protect	  the	  right	  which	  is	  necessary	  to	  
legitimate	  the	  claim;	  hence,	  the	  minority	  group	  is	  paradoxically	  opposing	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  
support	  their	  claim.	  	  The	  minority	  group	  then	  responds	  that	  by	  denying	  the	  claims,	  the	  state	  
interferes	  (unjustly)	  with	  their	  worldview.	  
	   Claims	  to	  culture	  are	  a	  vexed	  matter,	  in	  part,	  because	  there	  is	  healthy	  scepticism	  about	  
the	  degree	  of	  difference	  between	  worldviews	  and	  what	  sorts	  of	  differences	  constitute	  
legitimate	  reasons	  to	  support	  political	  claims.	  	  	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  political	  dialogues	  often	  take	  
the	  shape	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  when	  discursive	  conditions	  severely	  limit	  the	  degree	  of	  
difference	  possible	  between	  worldviews.	  	  When	  political	  institutions	  are	  shaped	  by	  a	  particular	  
idiom	  they	  may	  functionally	  exclude	  the	  claims	  of	  some	  minority	  groups	  because	  their	  
worldview	  differs	  significantly	  from	  the	  majority.	  	  In	  practice,	  examples	  will	  show	  that	  the	  
degree	  of	  cultural	  difference	  necessary	  to	  legitimate	  claims	  is	  very	  close	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  
difference	  that	  makes	  the	  claims	  appear	  paradoxical.8	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  content	  of	  minority	  
rights	  claims	  are,	  in	  some	  cases,	  reduced	  to	  fit	  the	  paradox	  because	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  
that	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  is	  not	  adequate	  to	  capture	  the	  full	  range	  and	  
force	  of	  certain	  types	  of	  minority	  rights	  claims—i.e.	  claims	  that	  appeal	  to	  the	  beliefs,	  values	  or	  
practices	  of	  a	  culture	  as	  a	  reason.	  	  
Coming	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  sort	  of	  cultural	  difference	  required	  to	  legitimate	  claims	  
requires	  challenging	  the	  wholesale	  rejection	  of	  cultural	  relativism.	  	  If	  we	  can,	  over	  time,	  come	  
to	  understand	  different	  schemes	  by	  acquiring	  new	  concepts,	  then	  unintelligibility	  only	  holds	  if	  
we	  are	  confined	  to	  the	  concepts	  we	  have.	  This	  sort	  of	  stasis,	  however,	  does	  not	  reflect	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  It	  would	  be	  odd	  to	  defend	  the	  idea	  that	  cultural	  difference	  itself	  legitimates	  claims.	  	  The	  locus	  of	  legitimacy	  is	  not	  
found	  in	  the	  fact	  of	  difference;	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  would	  be	  just	  as	  odd	  to	  say	  that	  cultural	  difference	  itself	  renders	  
claims	  illegitimate.	  	  Chapter	  1	  explores	  cases	  of	  institutional	  bias	  that	  operate	  as	  if	  the	  fact	  of	  cultural	  difference,	  
rather	  than	  the	  content	  of	  the	  difference,	  is	  an	  appropriate	  measure	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  or	  illegitimacy	  of	  claims.	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nature	  of	  culture,	  languages	  or	  practices	  of	  interpretation.	  	  The	  on-­‐going	  processes	  of	  
evaluating	  the	  results	  of	  interpretation	  and	  extending	  resources	  as	  needed	  to	  facilitate	  
intercultural	  understanding	  supports	  a	  much	  greater	  degree	  of	  potentially	  intelligible	  cultural	  
difference	  and	  as	  such,	  I	  contend,	  makes	  conceptual	  room	  for	  the	  level	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  
necessary	  to	  support	  special	  rights	  claims.	  	  	  
	   This	  then,	  represents	  the	  first	  step	  in	  getting	  around	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox,	  to	  
acknowledge	  the	  fluid	  nature	  of	  culture,	  conceptual	  schemes	  and	  cultural	  difference	  such	  that	  
they	  are	  viewed	  on	  a	  continuum	  which	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  interpretation	  of	  what	  is	  
thought	  to	  be	  un-­‐interpretable	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time.	  	  The	  next	  step	  is	  exploring	  the	  content	  
of	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  How	  can	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  claims	  that	  appear	  to	  undermine	  the	  
principles	  on	  which	  they	  are	  based?	  	  In	  chapter	  two,	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  term	  ‘non-­‐liberal’	  as	  
it	  applies	  to,	  and	  is	  applied	  by,	  minority	  groups	  offers	  insight	  into	  the	  conceptual	  conflicts	  at	  
play	  in	  the	  paradox.	  	  
When	  minorities	  (of	  a	  certain	  type)	  make	  claims	  of	  non-­‐liberalness,	  they	  are	  not	  merely	  
opposing	  liberalism	  understood	  as	  a	  political	  system	  that	  places	  limits	  on	  state	  interference	  by	  
protecting	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals;	  they	  are	  positioning	  their	  worldview	  as	  distinct	  from	  a	  
package	  of	  traditions,	  beliefs,	  values	  and	  practices	  endemic	  to	  the	  institutions	  of	  liberal	  
democracies.	  	  The	  institutional	  biases	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  liberal	  package,	  it	  is	  argued,	  unjustly	  
threaten	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  they	  are	  meant	  to	  guarantee.	  
Non-­‐liberal	  minority	  groups	  wish	  to	  distinguish	  themselves	  from	  the	  liberal	  majority	  on	  
many	  fronts.	  	  I	  focus	  on	  three,	  individualism,	  justice	  and	  property.	  	  	  In	  the	  liberal	  tradition,	  the	  
concept	  of	  justice	  is	  oriented	  to	  the	  individual;	  in	  contrast,	  for	  the	  non-­‐liberal	  groups	  I	  will	  focus	  
on	  in	  chapter	  two,	  justice	  of	  the	  many	  is	  a	  social	  and	  relational	  concept.	  	  In	  addition,	  
entitlements	  and	  duties	  extend	  beyond	  human	  relationships	  to	  a	  natural	  world	  imbued	  with	  
intentional	  beings	  constitutive	  of	  a	  functioning	  moral	  system.	  	  It	  will	  be	  shown	  how	  this	  type	  of	  
worldview	  is	  different	  from	  the	  majority	  worldview,	  and	  how	  those	  differences	  make	  the	  
arguments	  of	  a	  minority	  group	  whose	  worldview	  is	  so	  constituted	  appear	  unreasonable.	  	  	  
The	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  rests	  on	  the	  presupposition	  that	  a	  paradoxical	  argument	  is	  a	  
badly	  reasoned	  argument;	  however,	  I	  am	  not	  convinced	  that	  it	  is	  always	  the	  appropriate	  means	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of	  evaluating	  the	  strength	  or	  weakness	  of	  an	  argument.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  reasoning	  at	  play	  is	  
misrecognized	  as	  inconsistent	  because	  the	  standard	  of	  evaluation	  is	  inadequate	  to	  capture	  the	  
thrust	  of	  the	  argument.	  	  There	  is	  the	  presumption	  that	  liberal	  thinking	  is	  the	  correct	  way	  to	  
think,	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  alternative	  reasoning	  styles.	  	  The	  binary	  opposition	  of	  the	  liberal,	  non-­‐
liberal	  distinction	  makes	  the	  claims	  of	  minority	  groups	  look	  paradoxical	  rather	  than	  
reasonable.9	  	  However,	  the	  presumption	  of	  pre-­‐eminent	  reasoning	  has	  shaky	  foundations.	  	  If	  
liberalism	  cannot	  justify	  its	  ahistorical	  status	  as	  the	  product	  of	  reason;	  then,	  liberalism	  is	  one	  
theory	  among	  many	  and	  as	  such	  can	  be	  viewed	  in	  terms	  that	  reveal	  the	  paradoxical	  nature	  of	  
essentially	  liberal	  ideas.	  	  Hence,	  the	  dichotomy	  between	  paradoxical	  and	  reasonable	  breaks	  
down	  as	  an	  inadequate	  means	  to	  evaluate	  the	  strength	  or	  weakness	  of	  an	  argument	  shaped	  by	  
a	  particular	  worldview.	  
In	  part	  one,	  it	  will	  become	  clear	  that	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  is	  a	  conversation	  stopper.	  	  
Whether	  the	  dialogue	  is	  between	  two	  minority	  groups	  or	  between	  a	  minority	  group	  and	  the	  
state,	  the	  charge	  of	  paradox	  poisons	  the	  well	  in	  that	  it	  characterizes	  the	  claim	  under	  scrutiny,	  
and	  perhaps	  the	  claimant,	  as	  unreasonable.	  	  Once	  cast	  in	  an	  unreasonable	  light	  the	  claims	  and	  
claimants	  find	  themselves	  excluded	  from	  political	  dialogue.	  	  What	  is	  needed	  is	  a	  political	  
decision-­‐making	  apparatus	  that	  can	  function	  inclusively	  with	  regard	  to	  minority	  rights	  claims	  
and	  in	  doing	  so,	  offer	  not	  only	  substantive	  recognition	  of	  worldviews,	  but	  also	  a	  mechanism	  
through	  which	  the	  contested	  nature	  of	  liberal	  political	  practice	  finds	  expression	  in	  political	  
activity.	  	  In	  part	  two,	  I	  explore	  a	  deliberative	  approach	  to	  political	  decision-­‐making	  as	  a	  process	  
through	  which	  groups	  with	  different	  worldviews	  can	  engage	  in	  a	  reasonable	  political	  dialogue.	  
In	  order	  to	  escape	  the	  paradox	  model,	  I	  will	  argue,	  a	  political	  dialogue	  must	  function	  
inclusively	  with	  regard	  to	  way	  claimants	  shape	  their	  claims,	  their	  reasoning	  and	  the	  
reasonableness	  of	  the	  claimants,	  and	  their	  political	  identity.	  	  Part	  two	  is	  organized	  around	  these	  
three	  requirements:	  	  Dialogical	  inclusion,	  public	  reason	  and	  political	  identity.	  	  In	  response	  to	  
these	  requirements,	  the	  dialogical	  character	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  is	  shown	  to	  support	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  It	  is	  not	  only	  that	  culture	  is	  perceived	  as	  static,	  it	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  humans	  all,	  without	  exception,	  share	  the	  same	  
fundamental	  moral	  concerns,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  liberalism	  captures	  those	  concerns	  means	  that	  liberalism,	  by	  
implication,	  is	  reasonable.	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conditions	  of	  pluralism	  necessary	  to	  get	  around	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  and	  promote	  
reasonable	  dialogue	  between	  groups	  with	  different	  worldviews.	  	  	  
Chapter	  three	  begins	  with	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  accounts	  of	  deliberative	  
democracy.	  	  What	  emerges	  is	  a	  picture	  of	  deliberation	  as	  an	  inclusive	  process—inclusion	  is	  
necessary	  to	  legitimate	  the	  outcomes	  of	  political	  processes;	  however,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  
that	  not	  all	  accounts	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  are	  the	  same.	  	  Deliberative	  theories	  are	  
importantly	  differentiated	  by	  the	  priority	  and	  relationship	  between	  the	  various	  features	  of	  
deliberation.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  type	  of	  dialogue	  needed	  to	  overcome	  the	  minority	  rights	  
paradox	  must	  function	  inclusively	  on	  multiple	  levels;	  however,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  inclusion	  is	  
problematic.	  
On	  some	  deliberative	  accounts,	  claims	  that	  make	  consensus	  impossible	  are	  legitimately	  
excluded,	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  from	  the	  deliberation.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  deliberating	  
minority	  rights	  asks	  for	  a	  different	  type	  of	  deliberative	  process	  in	  which	  consensus	  does	  not	  
legitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes;	  instead,	  legitimacy	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  freedom	  and	  autonomy	  of	  
the	  deliberative	  participants.	  	  If	  consensus	  were	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  a	  deliberation,	  it	  would	  be	  
a	  different	  type	  of	  dialogue	  all	  together.	  	  The	  process	  would	  become	  an	  enquiry	  and	  take	  on	  the	  
character	  of	  a	  truth	  commission.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation,	  to	  
make	  a	  decision,	  requires	  a	  pre-­‐deliberative	  commitment	  on	  the	  part	  of	  participants	  that	  
promotes	  cooperation,	  but	  is	  not	  dependent	  on	  consensus	  to	  come	  to	  a	  legitimate	  decision	  on	  
the	  issue	  under	  deliberation.	  
Chapter	  four	  takes	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  inclusive	  public	  reason.	  	  Some	  accounts	  of	  
deliberation	  give	  priority	  to	  reason	  and	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  claimants	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
substantive	  equality;	  however,	  this	  may	  raise	  significant	  problems	  for	  the	  minority	  groups	  
affected	  by	  the	  paradox.	  	  When	  reasonableness	  sets	  limits	  on	  the	  character	  of	  deliberative	  
participants,	  individuals	  may	  be	  unjustly	  excluded.	  	  When	  standards	  of	  reasoning	  constrain	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  claims	  can	  be	  structured,	  minority	  groups	  may	  be	  unjustly	  denied	  equal	  status,	  
access	  and	  influence.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  will	  suggest	  it	  is	  equality,	  not	  reasonableness,	  which	  limits	  an	  
inclusive	  deliberation	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  tied	  to	  one	  particular	  idiom,	  particular	  
argument	  form	  or	  conceptual	  framework.	  	  Through	  equality,	  the	  inclusive	  public	  reason	  of	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deliberative	  processes	  makes	  room	  for	  alternative	  worldviews,	  reasoning	  styles	  and	  content	  in	  
political	  decision-­‐making.	  
There	  are	  accounts	  of	  deliberation;	  however,	  that	  seem	  to	  rest	  on	  liberal	  principles	  and	  
therefore	  public	  reason	  is	  inevitably	  shaped	  by	  the	  background	  conditions	  of	  liberalism.	  	  	  I	  will	  
argue	  that	  while	  certain	  principles	  may	  underpin	  deliberative	  reason,	  those	  principles	  need	  not	  
function	  to	  exclude	  claims	  made	  from	  alternative	  frameworks	  nor	  impose	  the	  content	  of	  liberal	  
principles	  on	  deliberative	  participants.	  	  Hence,	  a	  deliberative	  process	  can	  be	  functionally	  
independent	  of	  liberalism	  and	  offer	  a	  means	  to	  negotiate	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  dialogue	  
between	  liberal	  states	  and	  minority	  groups	  who	  espouse	  worldviews	  other	  than	  liberal.	  	  The	  
priority	  of	  equality,	  gives	  shape	  to	  an	  inclusive	  dialogue	  with	  regard	  to	  divergent	  reasons,	  
reasoning	  styles;	  however,	  the	  question	  of	  inclusion	  and	  identity	  remains.	  
Chapter	  five	  takes	  on	  one	  of	  the	  more	  controversial	  features	  of	  deliberation,	  its	  
purported	  transformative	  power.	  	  Deliberating	  over	  an	  issue,	  it	  is	  argued,	  makes	  citizens	  better	  
citizens.	  	  For	  some,	  the	  idea	  that	  deliberation	  can	  significantly	  alter	  individuals	  is	  simply	  
implausible.	  	  For	  others,	  the	  worry	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  participants	  will	  be	  
changed	  for	  the	  better.	  	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  deliberations	  can	  have	  a	  
negative	  impact	  on	  identity.	  	  Members	  of	  a	  minority	  group,	  for	  example,	  might	  be	  persuaded	  to	  
adopt	  majority	  perspectives	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  welfare	  of	  their	  own	  group.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  
the	  harmful	  effects	  of	  the	  transformative	  feature	  are	  problematic	  when	  transformation	  
becomes	  a	  requirement	  of	  the	  process	  such	  that	  a	  deliberation	  is	  only	  legitimate	  if	  participants	  
are	  transformed.	  	  	  
When	  legitimacy	  is	  dependent	  on	  a	  comprehensive	  notion	  of	  transformation	  certain	  
groups	  or	  individuals	  are	  illegitimately	  excluded.	  	  A	  lesser	  degree	  of	  transformation	  occurs	  in	  
reasonable	  deliberations,	  but	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  legitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes.	  Deliberative	  
legitimacy,	  independent	  of	  transformation	  and	  distanced	  from	  reasonableness,	  is	  dependent	  
upon	  the	  equality	  of	  participants.	  	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  by	  taking	  character	  and	  disposition	  out	  
of	  the	  process,	  there	  is	  inadequate	  recognition	  of	  identity	  in	  decision-­‐making—that	  individuals	  
and	  groups	  must	  relegate	  their	  worldview	  to	  the	  backbenches	  in	  order	  to	  participate	  in	  the	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deliberation.	  Such	  a	  deliberation	  would	  functionally	  exclude	  reasons	  based	  on	  identity	  claims	  
and	  consequently	  subvert	  the	  degree	  of	  inclusion	  necessary	  to	  get	  around	  the	  paradox.	  
In	  response,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  identity,	  understood	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  package	  of	  
traditions,	  values	  and	  beliefs,	  is	  very	  much	  a	  part	  of	  the	  deliberative	  process	  I	  have	  put	  forward.	  	  
Not	  as	  a	  fixed	  ‘reason’	  to	  support	  claims	  but	  as	  an	  explanatory	  standpoint	  indispensable	  to	  
expanding	  the	  epistemic	  resources	  of	  the	  deliberative	  process	  to	  include	  alternative	  
worldviews.	  	  Deliberating	  rights	  claims	  gives	  recognition	  to	  identity	  because	  it	  is	  a	  process	  that	  
calls	  upon	  all	  the	  relevant	  resources	  available	  regarding	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  	  Attributes	  of	  identity	  
such	  as	  character,	  reasonableness	  and	  disposition	  are	  considered	  resources	  rather	  than	  
features	  of	  an	  individual	  or	  group	  that	  determine	  their	  suitability	  to	  participate	  in	  political	  
dialogues,	  or	  the	  suitability	  of	  their	  reasons	  or	  reasoning	  styles.	  	  
Revisiting	  key	  examples	  in	  chapter	  six	  shows	  how	  tensions	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  
paradox	  are	  relieved	  by	  adopting	  this	  deliberative	  approach	  to	  political	  decision-­‐making	  by	  
promoting,	  rather	  than	  stifling,	  political	  dialogue	  between	  divergent	  worldviews.	  	  When	  the	  
decision-­‐making	  process	  is	  no	  longer	  predicated	  on	  presumptions	  of	  universal	  correctness,	  
alternative	  reasons,	  reasoning	  styles,	  and	  ways	  of	  understanding	  the	  world	  become	  public	  and	  
are	  able	  to	  carry	  political	  force	  through	  deliberative	  processes.	  
Some	  argue	  that	  deliberative	  theory	  asks	  too	  much	  of	  the	  citizenry;	  that	  deliberation	  is	  
not	  so	  much	  a	  political	  process	  as	  it	  is	  a	  theoretical	  ideal—an	  ideal	  that	  has	  little	  to	  offer	  the	  
practical	  reality	  of	  political	  arrangements	  in	  modern	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  It	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  
to	  defend	  the	  practical	  efficacy	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  or	  even	  to	  suggest	  that	  deliberation	  
is	  superior	  to	  aggregative	  procedures.	  	  Like	  many	  other	  deliberationists,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  
deliberative	  processes	  are	  appropriate	  in	  all	  circumstances.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  a	  deliberative	  
process	  is	  a	  type	  of	  political	  dialogue	  that	  can	  negotiate	  the	  concept	  and	  content	  of	  minority	  
rights	  claims	  framed	  in	  alternative	  worldviews	  and	  as	  such	  is	  a	  way	  around	  the	  minority	  rights	  
paradox.	  
The	  very	  conceptual	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  emerges	  are	  
brought	  under	  scrutiny	  through	  deliberative	  processes	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  those	  conditions	  become	  
an	  object	  of	  the	  deliberation	  rather	  than	  a	  dialogical	  constraint.	  	  Deliberation,	  understood	  in	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this	  way,	  makes	  room	  for	  alternative	  worldviews,	  reasoning	  styles	  and	  content	  in	  political	  
decision-­‐making.	  	  Inclusive	  political	  deliberation,	  as	  I	  will	  present	  it,	  generates	  the	  space	  
necessary	  to	  recognize	  reasons	  and	  reasoning	  from	  divergent	  worldviews	  in	  political	  decision-­‐
making.	  	  The	  paradox,	  once	  reinforced	  by	  opposition,	  is	  overcome	  by	  first	  recognizing	  the	  
pluralist	  nature	  of	  political	  association	  and	  second,	  engaging	  the	  content	  and	  concept	  of	  
minority	  rights	  claims	  through	  inclusive	  deliberations.	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Part	  1:	  	  The	  Problem	  
At	  first	  blush,	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  seems	  to	  rest	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  certain	  claims	  
undermine	  the	  system	  of	  rights	  without	  which	  the	  claimant	  would	  have	  no	  basis	  to	  make	  the	  
claim.	  	  Without	  rights,	  the	  minority	  would	  have	  no	  political	  voice	  at	  all,	  no	  basis	  on	  which	  to	  
make	  a	  claim	  against	  the	  state.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  central	  problem	  with	  rejecting	  freedom	  as	  a	  
civil	  value	  is	  that	  one	  must	  be	  free	  to	  reject	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Of	  course,	  to	  refute	  a	  rights	  
claim	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  rights	  are	  ascribed	  by	  an	  authority	  that	  is	  beyond	  question	  is	  to	  render	  
the	  system	  of	  rights	  impotent	  in	  the	  face	  of	  tyranny.	  	  	  
The	  thrust	  and	  parry	  of	  these	  arguments	  is	  broad	  and	  blunt	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part	  
uninteresting.	  	  This	  sort	  of	  trivialization	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  depth	  and	  breadth	  of	  what	  I	  
contend	  is	  a	  multifaceted	  problem	  that	  raises	  many	  questions:	  	  What	  sorts	  of	  claims	  are	  
interpreted	  as	  paradoxical?	  	  What	  reasons	  are	  given?	  	  What	  sorts	  of	  reasons	  are	  reasonable?	  	  
Who	  are	  the	  claimants?	  	  Who	  can	  speak	  for	  a	  worldview?	  	  What	  role	  should	  claims	  of	  difference	  
play	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making?	  	  Is	  there	  politics,	  theory	  or	  practice,	  without	  paradox?	  	  In	  
these	  first	  two	  chapters,	  I	  unpack	  the	  problem	  of	  minority	  rights	  in	  response	  to	  the	  charge	  of	  
paradox	  as	  it	  occurs	  in	  contemporary	  political	  dialogues.	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Chapter	  1:	  	  The	  Minority	  Rights	  Paradox	  
In	  a	  liberal	  democracy,	  members	  of	  minority	  groups	  have	  rights.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  they	  are	  the	  
rights	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  as	  such	  are	  no	  different	  than	  the	  rights	  afforded	  to	  all	  citizens.	  	  In	  
other	  cases,	  the	  members	  of	  a	  minority	  are	  given	  special	  rights	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  membership	  in	  
a	  particular	  group.	  	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  discussion	  is	  a	  paradox	  that	  emerges	  in	  claims	  about	  rights	  
of	  the	  second	  type.	  	  	  
There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  literature	  devoted	  to	  the	  difficulties,	  misunderstandings	  and	  
even	  misrepresentations	  brought	  about	  by	  cultural	  difference.	  	  Colonial	  anthropologists	  
notoriously	  interpreted	  foreign	  cultures	  through	  the	  loaded	  lens	  of	  their	  own	  worldview	  and	  in	  
doing	  so	  produced	  decidedly	  biased	  research	  data.10	  	  Today,	  the	  social	  sciences	  operate	  in	  a	  
different	  way.	  	  There	  is	  the	  recognition	  that	  when	  the	  object	  of	  study	  is	  humans,	  i.e.	  beings	  
aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  being	  studied,	  behaviours	  are	  altered	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  
under	  scrutiny.	  	  In	  addition,	  anthropologists,	  sociologists	  and	  the	  like	  no	  longer	  presume	  that	  
they	  can	  completely	  abandon	  their	  own	  worldview	  and	  the	  biases	  associated	  with	  it.	  	  The	  best	  
they	  can	  do	  is	  be	  aware	  of	  those	  biases	  and	  try	  (imperfectly)	  to	  filter	  them	  out.	  	  This	  turn,	  away	  
from	  an	  outmoded/overly	  rigorous	  conception	  of	  objectivity,	  has	  raised	  questions	  about	  how	  
we	  understand	  the	  nature	  and	  degree	  of	  cultural	  difference.	  	  All	  too	  often,	  presumptions	  about	  
cultural	  difference	  underpin	  claims	  about	  the	  value	  of	  culturally	  relative	  reasoning	  without	  
looking	  at	  the	  problem	  of	  relativism	  itself.	  	  
	   	  To	  begin	  this	  chapter,	  I	  look	  at	  a	  particular	  objection	  levied	  against	  the	  idea	  of	  
relativism	  and	  the	  role	  this	  notional	  position	  plays	  in	  minority	  rights	  disputes.	  	  The	  minority	  
rights	  paradox	  occurs	  at	  multiple	  levels	  of	  political	  association—between	  nations,	  most	  notably	  
in	  the	  East-­‐Asian	  debate	  over	  human	  rights;	  between	  sub	  national	  minority	  groups	  and	  liberal	  
democratic	  nations;	  and	  even	  between	  two	  minorities	  situated	  within	  a	  liberal	  democratic	  
nation.	  	  Although	  there	  are	  examples	  of	  the	  paradox	  in	  international	  cases	  that	  are	  instructive,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  See	  Clifford	  Geertz,	  chapter	  5	  of	  Available	  Light:	  Anthropological	  Reflections	  on	  Philosophical	  Topics.	  (Princeton:	  




the	  focus	  of	  this	  discussion	  is	  minority	  cases	  that	  occur	  intra-­‐nationally.11	  	  Put	  simply,	  it	  is	  a	  way	  
of	  interpreting	  minority	  rights	  claims	  that	  makes	  it	  very	  easy	  to	  deny	  those	  claims	  by	  putting	  an	  
abrupt	  end	  to	  the	  political	  dialogue.	  	  	  
Minorities,	  it	  is	  argued,	  are	  paradoxically	  claiming	  purported	  rights	  that	  are	  unsupported	  
by	  the	  values	  upon	  which	  the	  claimants	  base	  their	  claim.	  	  However,	  minority	  groups	  respond	  
that	  liberal	  institutions	  exert	  a	  cultural	  bias	  on	  them	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  their	  culture,	  to	  which	  
they	  have	  a	  right,	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  claim.	  	  Through	  examining	  a	  series	  of	  cases,	  I	  explore	  various	  
instances	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  in	  the	  political	  discourse	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  societies	  
(the	  United	  Kingdom,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada)	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  bringing	  the	  
theoretical	  underpinnings	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  claims	  supported	  by	  culturally	  
relative	  reasons	  and	  reasoning.	  	  	  
To	  begin,	  I	  will	  introduce	  a	  model	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  in	  1.1	  and	  explore	  what	  
types	  of	  claim	  are	  characterised	  as	  paradoxical.	  	  I	  look	  primarily	  at	  cases	  where	  the	  charge	  of	  
paradox	  stifles	  political	  dialogues	  before	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  dialogue	  have	  come	  to	  an	  
acceptable	  level	  of	  understanding.12	  	  The	  minority	  rights	  paradox,	  I	  will	  argue,	  is	  complicated	  by	  
a	  way	  of	  looking	  a	  cultural	  difference	  in	  which	  we	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  conceptual	  relativism.	  	  
If	  we	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  conceptual	  relativism,	  the	  implication	  is	  that	  we	  cannot	  make	  sense	  
of	  justifications	  relative	  to	  alternative	  cultural	  frameworks.	  	  The	  result,	  I	  will	  argue,	  is	  an	  idiom	  
in	  which	  cultural	  difference	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  as	  modest	  and	  local	  rather	  than	  significant	  
and	  deep.	  	  In	  this	  anti-­‐relativist	  idiom,	  the	  claims	  of	  minorities	  whose	  worldview	  is	  notably	  
different	  from	  the	  majority	  worldview	  are	  interpreted,	  and	  often	  dismissed,	  as	  paradoxical	  
reasoning.	  	  Hence,	  this	  idiom	  hampers	  efforts	  to	  generate	  the	  political	  space	  for	  oppressed,	  
disenfranchised	  or	  otherwise	  marginalized	  minority	  groups	  who	  may	  have	  a	  legitimate	  claim.	  	  	  
In	  1.2,	  I	  challenge	  the	  wholesale	  rejection	  of	  cultural	  relativism.	  	  If	  we	  can,	  over	  time,	  
come	  to	  understand	  radically	  different	  worldviews	  by	  acquiring	  new	  concepts,	  then	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  research	  for	  international	  applications,	  particularly	  in	  East-­‐West	  relations,	  are	  not	  
addressed	  directly	  in	  this	  thesis	  but	  are	  definitely	  worthy	  of	  further	  research.	  
12	  In	  general,	  an	  acceptable	  level	  of	  understanding	  is	  a	  level	  of	  understanding	  that	  facilitates	  the	  accommodation	  of	  
alternative	  worldviews	  in	  the	  political	  arrangements	  of	  modern	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  A	  closer	  examination	  of	  what	  
is	  meant	  by	  ‘acceptable	  level	  of	  understanding’	  and	  reasons	  in	  support	  of	  accommodating	  alternative	  worldviews	  




unintelligibility	  only	  holds	  if	  we	  are	  confined	  to	  the	  concepts	  we	  have.	  This	  sort	  of	  stasis,	  
however,	  does	  not	  reflect	  the	  nature	  of	  culture,	  languages	  or	  practices	  of	  interpretation.	  	  The	  
on-­‐going	  processes	  of	  evaluating	  the	  results	  of	  interpretation	  and	  extending	  resources	  as	  
needed	  to	  facilitate	  intercultural	  understanding	  supports	  a	  much	  greater	  degree	  of	  potentially	  
intelligible	  cultural	  difference	  and	  as	  such	  leaves	  room	  for	  the	  level	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  
necessary	  to	  support	  special	  rights	  claims.	  	  However,	  this	  level	  of	  cultural	  difference	  does	  not	  
always	  find	  recognition	  in	  political	  processes.	  	  When	  political	  institutions	  are	  shaped	  by	  a	  
particular	  idiom	  they	  may	  functionally	  exclude	  the	  claims	  of	  some	  groups	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  
worldview.	  	  	  
Minority	  groups	  argue	  that	  liberal	  institutions	  exert	  a	  cultural	  bias	  on	  them	  and	  they	  
have	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  liberal	  culture	  is	  superior	  to	  their	  own.	  Finally,	  in	  1.3,	  I	  look	  at	  
cases	  where	  liberal	  democratic	  institutions	  characterize	  minority	  rights	  claims	  as	  paradoxical.	  	  
These	  cases	  illustrate	  the	  problem	  of	  exclusion—that	  only	  the	  claims	  of	  groups’	  and	  individuals	  
that	  fall	  within	  a	  particular	  idiom	  are	  given	  full	  recognition	  by	  liberal	  democratic	  institutions.	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  recognition	  has	  dialogue-­‐ending	  implications,	  that	  is,	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  
ends	  the	  dialogue	  because	  the	  minority	  claim	  is	  thought	  to	  employ	  faulty	  reasoning.	  	  	  
1.1	  	  The	  Self-­‐defeating	  Nature	  of	  Appeals	  to	  Culture	  
In	  general,	  paradoxical	  thinking	  is	  erroneous.	  	  The	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  occurs	  in	  natural	  
language	  arguments	  and	  it	  is	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  internal	  inconsistencies	  of	  an	  argument.	  	  
Examples	  include	  arguments	  where	  the	  premise	  contradicts	  the	  conclusion,	  or	  more	  
complicated	  situations	  where	  the	  implications	  or	  presuppositions	  of	  the	  premises	  contravene	  
the	  conclusion.	  	  Teasing	  out	  the	  implications,	  presumptions,	  embedded	  assumptions	  or	  values	  
of	  any	  given	  statement	  can	  be	  difficult	  even	  for	  individuals	  operating	  in	  the	  same	  worldview	  
and	  in	  the	  same	  language.	  	  Add	  the	  complexities	  of	  intercultural	  communication,	  where	  beliefs,	  
values,	  ideals	  and	  languages	  do	  not	  map	  neatly	  onto	  one	  another	  and	  the	  difficulties	  increase.	  
What	  is	  the	  Minority	  Rights	  Paradox?	  
There	  is	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  claim	  cultural	  or	  religious	  minorities	  make	  about	  public	  institutions,	  
laws	  or	  policies	  that	  is	  interpreted	  as	  paradoxical	  thinking.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  claims	  of	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cultural	  or	  religious	  minorities	  are	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  rights	  secured	  by	  a	  liberal	  democracy;	  
on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  claims	  undermine	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  liberal	  reasoning—the	  same	  
reasoning	  that	  legitimizes	  the	  rights	  on	  which	  the	  claims	  rely.	  	  The	  self-­‐referential	  implications	  
of	  this	  paradox	  thwart	  the	  claims	  of	  minority	  groups	  in	  the	  following	  ways:	  	  The	  minority	  claim	  
negates	  its	  own	  justification	  or	  the	  underlying	  justification	  renders	  the	  claim	  moot.	  	  	  
A	  common	  theoretical	  articulation	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  is	  found	  in	  discussions	  
about	  group	  rights.13	  	  Sub-­‐national	  groups,	  such	  as	  Aboriginals	  belonging	  to	  the	  First	  Nations	  of	  
Canada,	  challenge	  the	  sovereign	  authority	  of	  the	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  majority	  whose	  ancestors	  
acquired	  the	  land	  from	  Indigenous	  peoples	  through—what	  now	  are	  collectively	  recognized	  as—
unjust	  means.	  	  Aboriginals	  claim	  that	  individual	  rights	  are	  not	  protecting	  their	  people,	  their	  
communities	  or	  their	  cultural	  heritage.	  	  Greater	  autonomy	  from	  the	  state	  in	  the	  form	  of	  self-­‐
governance,	  it	  is	  argued,	  will	  strengthen	  Aboriginal	  identity,	  community	  ties	  and	  cultural	  
traditions.	  	  The	  right	  to	  sovereignty	  as	  a	  group	  is	  necessary	  to	  restore	  their	  social,	  political	  and	  
economic	  status.14	  	  However,	  the	  notion	  of	  sub	  national	  autonomy	  for	  the	  First	  Nations	  raises	  
fears.	  	  	  The	  attribution	  of	  group	  rights,	  it	  is	  thought,	  may	  threaten	  individual	  rights.	  
When	  a	  minority	  makes	  a	  sovereignty	  claim	  as	  a	  group,	  to	  claim	  autonomy	  from	  the	  state,	  
they	  are	  making	  a	  claim	  that	  limits	  state	  interference	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  state	  can	  no	  longer	  
protect	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals	  within	  the	  group.15	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  group	  is	  committed	  to	  
respecting	  human	  rights	  is	  irrelevant,	  the	  possibility	  of	  intra-­‐cultural	  hegemony	  creates	  the	  
space	  for	  a	  group	  to	  violate	  rights	  of	  the	  individual	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  protected.	  	  In	  this	  
way,	  it	  is	  presumed	  that	  a	  non-­‐liberal16	  minority	  could	  use	  culturally	  relative	  justifications	  to	  
deny	  individual	  rights	  claims.17	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  See	  Will	  Kymlicka,	  Multicultural	  Citizenship:	  A	  Liberal	  Theory	  of	  Minority	  Rights,	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1996).	  
14	  In	  This	  is	  not	  a	  peace	  pipe:	  towards	  a	  critical	  Indigenous	  philosophy,	  (Toronto:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  2006),	  
Dale	  Turner	  examines	  the	  relationship,	  past	  and	  present,	  between	  the	  Aboriginal	  First	  Nations	  and	  the	  Canadian	  
state.	  	  
15	  See	  Peter	  Jones,	  “Group	  Rights	  and	  Group	  Oppression,”	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  7,	  no.	  4	  (1999):	  353-­‐377.	  
16	  The	  identifier	  non-­‐liberal	  and	  the	  role	  it	  plays	  in	  minority	  rights	  dialogues	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  chapter	  2.	  	  In	  general,	  it	  
refers	  to	  groups	  that	  do	  not	  consider	  themselves	  beholden	  to	  what	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  a	  foreign	  tradition—the	  
liberal	  rights	  tradition.	  	  	  
17	  Respect	  for	  elders,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  culturally	  relative	  justification	  that	  may	  contravene	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals	  
if	  the	  elders	  determine	  how	  individuals	  are	  to	  vote	  in	  a	  free	  election.	  	  The	  rights	  of	  women	  are	  under	  threat	  in	  a	  
culture	  that	  does	  not	  recognize	  marital	  rape	  as	  a	  crime	  against	  the	  individual.	  	  Religions	  that	  prevent	  their	  
	  20	  
	  
The	  concern	  that	  intra-­‐cultural	  values	  or	  practices	  might	  override	  individual	  rights	  is	  
buttressed	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  claims	  to	  group	  rights	  themselves	  are	  internally	  inconsistent.	  	  In	  his	  
discussion	  about	  the	  East-­‐Asian	  debate	  over	  Human	  Rights,	  An-­‐Na’im	  articulates	  the	  
inconsistency	  this	  way:	  	  A	  non-­‐liberal	  minority	  stands	  to	  gain	  the	  most	  from	  the	  universality	  of	  
rights	  because	  universality	  prevents	  the	  liberal	  majority	  from	  imposing	  its	  own,	  culturally	  
justified,	  agenda	  onto	  the	  minority.18	  	  The	  universality	  of	  rights	  is	  necessary	  to	  protect	  the	  
smallest	  minority,	  the	  minority	  of	  one,	  yet	  minority	  rights	  claims	  seek	  to	  contravene	  the	  
universality	  of	  rights	  by	  making	  a	  group,	  rather	  than	  an	  individual,	  the	  rights	  bearing	  unit.19	  	  
Without	  the	  universal	  extension	  of	  rights	  to	  all	  persons	  equally,	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  minority	  would	  
have	  no	  basis	  for	  their	  claim.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  paradoxical	  for	  a	  minority	  group	  to	  insist	  on	  the	  
priority	  of	  group	  rights.	  	  	  
The	  paradox	  emerges	  in	  another	  way	  when	  individuals	  appeal	  to	  cultural	  or	  religious	  
difference	  to	  justify	  claims.	  	  Gary	  McFarlane,	  for	  example,	  a	  Christian	  marriage	  councillor	  
refused	  to	  counsel	  homosexual	  partners	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  homosexuality	  ran	  contrary	  to	  his	  
religious	  beliefs.	  	  McFarlane	  lost	  his	  position	  for	  refusing	  services	  and	  subsequently	  filed	  suit	  for	  
wrongful	  dismissal.	  	  When	  the	  case	  came	  to	  court,	  the	  former	  Archbishop	  of	  Canterbury	  Lord	  
Carey	  called	  for	  a	  special	  panel	  of	  judges	  with	  a	  "proven	  sensitivity	  and	  understanding	  of	  
religious	  issues"	  to	  hear	  the	  case.20	  	  Lord	  Justice	  Laws	  had	  some	  harsh	  words	  for	  this	  request,	  
which	  was	  soundly	  denied.	  
We	  do	  not	  live	  in	  a	  society	  where	  all	  the	  people	  share	  uniform	  religious	  beliefs.	  The	  
precepts	  of	  any	  one	  religion	  –	  any	  belief	  system	  –	  cannot,	  by	  force	  of	  their	  religious	  
origins,	  sound	  any	  louder	  in	  the	  general	  law	  than	  the	  precepts	  of	  any	  other.	  If	  they	  did,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
members	  from	  receiving	  life	  saving	  blood	  transfusions	  on	  ideological	  grounds	  are	  interfering	  with	  the	  individual	  
member’s	  right	  to	  life.	  
18	  An-­‐Na’im,	  "The	  Cultural	  Mediation	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  The	  Al-­‐Arqam	  Case	  in	  Malaysia,"	  The	  East	  Asia	  Challenge	  for	  
Human	  Rights,	  eds.	  Joanne	  R.	  Bauer	  and	  Daniel	  A.	  Bell,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  150.	  
19	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  rights	  are	  universal	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  only	  individuals	  can	  be	  
right	  bearers;	  however,	  if	  we	  recognise	  both	  groups	  and	  individuals	  as	  bearers	  of	  universal	  rights	  we	  must	  also	  
recognise	  that	  they	  may	  conflict.	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  conflict	  is	  brought	  about	  by	  a	  notion	  of	  human	  rights	  as	  universal	  
rights	  because	  they	  are	  rights	  belonging	  to	  all	  humans	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  human.	  	  Minority	  rights	  are	  of	  a	  different	  
kind,	  belonging	  to	  the	  members	  of	  a	  group	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  membership	  in	  the	  group,	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
sovereignty	  claims,	  belonging	  to	  the	  group	  rather	  than	  the	  individuals	  in	  the	  group.	  	  Either	  way,	  the	  presumption	  is	  
that	  group	  rights	  (the	  kind	  of	  rights	  minority	  groups	  are	  calling	  for)	  might	  contravene	  inalienable	  human	  rights.	  
20	  The	  Guardian,	  "Christian	  counsellor	  loses	  court	  fight	  over	  sacking,"	  guardian.co.uk.,	  April	  29,	  2010.	  




those	  out	  in	  the	  cold	  would	  be	  less	  than	  citizens	  and	  our	  constitution	  would	  be	  on	  the	  
way	  to	  a	  theocracy,	  which	  is	  of	  necessity	  autocratic...	  the	  State,	  if	  its	  people	  are	  to	  be	  
free,	  has	  the	  burdensome	  duty	  of	  thinking	  for	  itself.21	  
	  
This	  argument	  is	  a	  classic	  slippery	  slope;	  the	  first	  step	  is	  the	  formal	  recognition	  of	  religious	  
reasons	  in	  determining	  public	  policy.	  	  The	  tension	  between	  rights	  based	  reasoning	  and	  religious	  
reasoning	  is	  characterised	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  constitutional	  democracy	  and	  autocracy;	  
thinking	  for	  one’s	  self	  versus	  subordinating	  one’s	  reason	  to	  a	  particular	  doctrine.	  	  If	  a	  particular	  
doctrine	  were	  to	  determine	  the	  general	  law,	  then	  the	  general	  law	  would	  threaten	  individual	  
freedom.	  	  	  
Not	  all	  religions	  condemn	  homosexuality;	  therefore,	  if	  the	  general	  law	  supported	  the	  
precepts	  of	  this	  particular	  religion,	  it	  would	  then	  impinge	  on	  the	  religious	  freedoms	  of	  those	  
religious	  persons	  who	  endorse	  same	  sex	  relationships.	  	  The	  call	  for	  ‘religious	  sensitivity’	  in	  this	  
case,	  then,	  is	  not	  understood	  as	  a	  call	  for	  sensitivity	  to	  religion	  generally,	  but	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  
precepts	  of	  this	  particular	  religion.	  	  Hence,	  the	  appeal	  to	  religious	  freedom	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  
McFarlane’s	  actions	  is,	  paradoxically,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  attempting	  to	  influence	  public	  policy	  in	  
such	  a	  way	  that	  threatens	  religious	  freedom,	  the	  very	  right	  on	  which	  the	  claim	  is	  based.	  
There	  are	  many	  variations	  on	  this	  theme,	  but	  the	  basic	  structure	  is	  as	  follows:	  
The	  minority	  claim:	  
I	  claim	  that	  public	  policy	  a	  (institution,	  law,	  etc.)	  violates	  my	  right	  x.	  
Therefore,	  my	  right	  to	  x	  is	  unjustly	  constrained	  by	  public	  policy	  a.	  
	  
The	  response:	  
Public	  policy	  a	  is	  required	  to	  protect	  right	  x.	  
Therefore,	  by	  opposing	  public	  policy	  a,	  you	  paradoxically	  oppose	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  
exercise	  right	  x.	  
	  
When	  looking	  at	  this	  formulation,	  the	  suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  minority	  group	  is	  simply	  employing	  
faulty	  reasoning	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  blundering	  into	  the	  paradox.	  	  The	  self-­‐referential	  paradox	  is	  
one	  of	  the	  stronger	  objections	  that	  can	  be	  levied	  against	  any	  argument.	  However,	  the	  
attribution	  of	  paradox	  presupposes	  that	  parties	  evaluating	  the	  argument	  agree	  about	  the	  
constitution	  of	  logical	  consistency;	  that	  this	  internal	  consistency	  trumps	  other	  considerations;	  




and	  as	  such	  is	  the	  appropriate	  means	  to	  evaluate	  the	  strength	  or	  weakness	  of	  the	  claim	  under	  
scrutiny.	  	  Agreement	  of	  this	  type	  is	  not	  as	  common	  as	  it	  might	  seem	  and	  concerns	  arise	  when	  
complicated	  issues,	  with	  significant	  social	  and	  political	  implications,	  are	  simplified	  and	  
dismissed	  as	  paradoxical	  despite	  deep	  disagreement	  about	  standards	  of	  logical	  consistency	  or	  
the	  presuppositions	  on	  which	  the	  paradox	  rests.22	  
When	  looking	  at	  actual	  cases,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  claimants	  involved	  and	  their	  arguments	  
are	  not	  always	  so	  easily	  dismissed.	  	  Not	  because	  they	  should	  not	  be	  dismissed,	  not	  because	  the	  
state	  is	  under	  some	  kind	  of	  moral	  obligation	  to	  take	  the	  claims	  seriously	  (although	  there	  may	  be	  
moral	  obligations	  in	  some	  cases).	  	  The	  claims	  should	  not	  be	  dismissed	  because	  fitting	  the	  
argument	  into	  the	  paradox	  model	  does	  not	  capture	  the	  main	  thrust	  of	  the	  argument	  or	  the	  
social	  and	  political	  force	  of	  the	  claims	  made.	  	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  better	  explain	  the	  reasoning	  
behind	  the	  argument,	  minority	  groups	  often	  appeal	  to	  the	  following	  type	  of	  rejoinder:	  
Complying	  with	  public	  policy	  a	  requires	  me	  to	  oppose	  my	  worldview.	  
Therefore,	  the	  state	  unjustly	  interferes	  with	  my	  worldview	  by	  imposing	  public	  policy	  a.	  
	  
The	  notion	  of	  culturally	  relative	  justification	  has	  received	  increasing	  attention	  in	  political	  theory	  
as	  a	  means	  to	  include	  and	  empower	  disenfranchised	  minorities	  in	  political	  discourse.	  	  This	  sort	  
of	  approach	  presupposes	  significant	  difference	  and	  overcoming	  difference,	  it	  is	  thought,	  is	  
necessary	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  meaningful	  political	  dialogue.	  	  	  
Whether	  your	  point	  of	  view	  is	  from	  inside	  or	  outside	  the	  group,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  
characterize	  a	  minority	  group	  as	  unique—distinct	  from	  the	  majority	  and	  from	  other	  minority	  
groups.	  	  The	  identity	  of	  any	  given	  group	  expresses	  itself	  through	  the	  package	  of	  traditions,	  
language,	  practices,	  values	  and	  beliefs	  that	  set	  the	  members	  of	  that	  group	  apart	  from	  other	  
groups.	  	  Of	  course,	  worldviews	  are	  not	  actually	  distinct	  entities,	  one	  worldview	  may	  have	  many	  
things	  in	  common	  with	  another,	  and	  a	  worldview	  is	  certainly	  not	  static,	  it	  is	  a	  way	  of	  seeing	  and	  
talking	  about	  the	  world	  that	  may	  change	  over	  time.	  	  	  
Despite	  the	  difficulties	  with	  descriptions	  and	  boundaries,	  mass	  society	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  
organized	  along	  group	  lines;	  statistical,	  social	  and	  political	  groups	  have	  significant	  influence	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Both	  parties	  may	  agree	  that	  internal	  inconsistency	  is	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  reject	  an	  argument;	  but	  they	  may	  disagree	  
as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  argument	  is	  internally	  inconsistent.	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public	  policy.	  	  Theorists	  like	  Ivison,	  Hendrix,	  Tully23	  and	  others	  argue	  that	  minority	  groups,	  
Indigenous	  peoples	  for	  example,	  who	  hold	  a	  distinct	  worldview,	  are	  unfairly	  burdened	  when	  
they	  have	  to	  defend	  their	  prima	  facie	  claim	  to	  homelands	  using	  foreign	  concepts	  and	  languages	  
in	  political	  systems	  ideologically	  foreign	  to	  their	  worldview.	  	  What	  is	  required,	  in	  cases	  like	  
these,	  is	  the	  recognition	  of	  claims	  that	  appeal	  to	  values	  or	  ideologies	  that	  may	  be	  significantly	  
different	  from	  majority	  norms.	  	  This	  raises	  important	  questions	  about	  what	  sort	  of	  differences	  
matter,	  and	  why;	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  subject	  is	  growing.	  	  But	  these	  questions	  can	  only	  come	  
about	  if	  first,	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  significant	  contrast	  between	  conceptual	  frameworks	  of	  
different	  cultures.	  
Davidson’s	  Paradox	  
The	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  is	  complicated	  by	  a	  notional	  position,	  perhaps	  most	  deftly	  
articulated	  by	  Davidson,	  in	  which	  we	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  conceptual	  relativism	  and	  since	  
conceptual	  schemes	  are,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  discussion,	  cultural	  frameworks	  by	  another	  
name,	  the	  problem	  is	  this:	  	  If	  we	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  cultural	  relativism,	  we	  cannot	  make	  
sense	  of	  justifications	  framed	  relative	  to	  alternative	  cultural	  frameworks.	  	  Yet	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  
recognition	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  is	  necessary	  to	  support	  some	  types	  of	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  
The	  worry	  is	  that	  minorities,	  whether	  they	  be	  oppressed,	  powerful	  or	  marginalized,	  who	  are	  
unable	  to	  reframe	  their	  claims	  in	  the	  majority	  paradigm	  are	  unjustly	  excluded	  from	  engaging	  
the	  political	  authority	  to	  which	  they	  are	  subject.	  	  
Within	  a	  particular	  worldview,	  certain	  reasons	  are	  considered	  good	  reasons	  to	  support	  a	  
claim,	  but	  those	  reasons	  are	  not	  respected	  in	  the	  same	  way	  from	  the	  confines	  of	  a	  different	  
worldview.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  minority	  groups	  have	  argued,	  they	  are	  required	  to	  translate	  their	  
reasons	  into	  the	  majority	  scheme	  in	  order	  to	  engage	  political	  institutions	  that	  function	  within	  
the	  majority	  paradigm.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  burden	  of	  translation	  is	  fair	  is	  a	  controversial	  
issue,24	  but	  before	  that	  question	  can	  be	  addressed	  something	  has	  to	  be	  said	  about	  the	  
possibility,	  or	  impossibility,	  of	  intercultural	  translation.	  	  There	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  See	  Tully,	  Strange	  Multiplicity;	  Burke	  Hendrix.	  "Moral	  Error,	  Power,	  and	  Insult."	  Political	  Theory,	  no.	  35	  (2007):	  
550-­‐73;	  Duncan	  Ivison,	  Paul	  Patton,	  and	  Will	  Sanders,	  Political	  Theory	  and	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,	  
(London:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  
24	  A	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  issue	  of	  translation	  and	  the	  fairness	  of	  expecting	  minority	  groups	  to	  translate	  or	  reframe	  
claims	  into	  the	  majority	  framework	  is	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  chapter	  1.2.	  
	  24	  
	  
translating	  reasons	  between	  cultures	  and	  it	  arises	  because	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  
the	  depth	  or	  breadth	  of	  cultural	  difference.	  	  Davidson,	  for	  example,	  takes	  issue	  with	  claims	  
made	  by	  Whorf	  about	  the	  difficulty	  of	  translation,	  even	  failures	  of	  inter-­‐translatability,	  between	  
Hopi	  and	  English.25	  	  That	  Whorf	  uses	  the	  English	  language	  to	  describe	  what	  supposedly	  cannot	  
be	  translated	  from	  Hopi,	  Davidson	  tells	  us,	  is	  evidence	  that	  there	  is	  something	  suspect	  about	  
the	  degree	  of	  difference	  Whorf	  claims	  prevents	  the	  translation	  of	  concepts	  from	  one	  language	  
to	  another.	  	  
It	  is	  difficult	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  alternative	  cultural	  frameworks,	  partly	  because	  there	  are	  
so	  many	  ways	  to	  speak	  about	  cultural	  paradigms	  or	  worldviews.	  	  Is	  culture	  as	  arcane	  as	  
linguistic	  idiom?	  	  How	  does	  a	  worldview	  present	  itself?	  	  Where	  are	  cultural	  boundaries?	  	  Who	  is	  
authorised	  to	  speak	  for	  a	  culture?	  	  Even	  the	  concept	  of	  culture	  itself	  is	  contentious;	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  this	  discussion,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  cultural	  boundaries	  are	  about	  as	  distinct	  as	  grey	  on	  
grey	  and	  the	  best	  we	  can	  do	  is	  work	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  culture	  as	  a	  package	  of	  beliefs,	  values	  
and	  concepts	  that	  are	  in	  some	  way	  linked	  to	  the	  social,	  political	  and	  linguistic	  practices	  of	  a	  
particular	  group—practices	  shaped	  by	  the	  shared	  content	  of	  experience.	  	  A	  cultural	  framework	  
(the	  worldview	  of	  a	  culture)	  then,	  is	  roughly	  equivalent	  to	  Davidson’s	  idea	  of	  a	  conceptual	  
scheme.	  	  	  
A	  conceptual	  scheme	  is	  a	  network	  of	  concepts	  through	  which	  a	  particular	  group	  
categorizes,	  organizes	  and	  explains	  experience—the	  way	  the	  group	  views	  and	  talks	  about	  the	  
world.	  	  Because	  language	  practices	  are	  closely	  linked	  with	  conceptual	  schemes	  we	  can	  examine	  
the	  contrast	  between	  our	  own	  worldview	  and	  that	  of	  another	  worldview	  by	  examining	  the	  
differences	  in	  language	  practices.	  	  If	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  different	  groups	  
view	  and	  talk	  about	  the	  world,	  it	  could	  be	  said	  that	  they	  operate	  in	  different	  conceptual	  
schemes.	  	  Yet	  there	  is	  a	  paradox	  lurking,	  Davidson	  tells	  us,	  in	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  conceptual	  
schemes.	  	  
Different	  points	  of	  view	  make	  sense,	  but	  only	  if	  there	  is	  a	  common	  co-­‐ordinate	  system	  
on	  which	  to	  plot	  them;	  yet	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  common	  system	  belies	  the	  claim	  of	  
dramatic	  incomparability.26	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Donald	  Davidson,	  "On	  the	  Very	  Idea	  of	  a	  Conceptual	  Scheme."	  In	  Inquiries	  into	  Truth	  and	  Interpretation,	  by	  
Donald	  Davidson,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  190.	  




We	  can	  only	  make	  sense	  of	  rival	  worldviews	  if	  different	  worldviews	  are	  brought	  under	  a	  shared	  
master	  scheme,	  but	  if	  such	  a	  scheme	  existed	  it	  would	  undermine	  the	  notion	  of	  significant	  
contrast27	  between	  worldviews.	  	  Hence,	  the	  paradox	  applies	  to	  a	  strong	  notion	  of	  conceptual	  
relativism;	  it	  is	  “extreme	  suppositions	  that	  founder	  on	  paradox	  or	  contradiction.”28	  	  	  
If	  two	  languages	  were	  so	  different	  that	  they	  were	  not	  translatable,	  it	  would	  be	  evidence	  
that	  there	  were	  two	  radically	  different	  conceptual	  schemes	  at	  play;	  however,	  this	  can	  never	  be	  
shown.	  	  I	  would	  have	  no	  evidence	  that	  there	  were	  two	  schemes	  because	  I	  would	  be	  in	  no	  
position	  to	  judge	  that	  there	  were	  two	  schemes.	  	  If	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  employ	  the	  concepts	  of	  one	  
language	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  other,	  translation	  is	  possible	  precisely	  because	  the	  conceptual	  
difference	  is	  not	  radical.	  	  If	  language	  a	  was	  so	  radically	  different	  from	  language	  b	  it	  is	  impossible	  
that	  the	  speakers	  of	  language	  a	  would	  recognize	  language	  b	  as	  a	  language	  practice.	  	  The	  
speakers	  of	  a	  language	  identify	  language	  practices	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  own;	  hence,	  a	  radically	  
different	  language	  would	  not	  look,	  to	  them,	  like	  a	  language.	  	  In	  order	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  a	  
language,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  translatable,	  languages	  must	  have	  something	  in	  common.	  	  	  
	   What	  holds	  for	  the	  translatability	  of	  languages	  holds	  for	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  reasoning,	  if	  
we	  encounter	  reasoning	  radically	  different	  from	  our	  own,	  we	  do	  not	  recognize	  it	  as	  reasoning.	  	  
If	  we	  are	  able	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  it	  as	  reasoning,	  it	  cannot	  embody	  radical	  difference.	  	  	  
If	  we	  cannot	  find	  a	  way	  to	  interpret	  the	  utterances	  and	  other	  behaviour	  of	  a	  creature	  as	  
revealing	  a	  set	  of	  beliefs	  largely	  consistent	  and	  true	  by	  our	  own	  standards,	  we	  have	  no	  
reason	  to	  count	  that	  creature	  as	  rational,	  as	  having	  beliefs,	  or	  as	  saying	  anything.29	  
	  
The	  differences	  in	  languages,	  in	  conceptual	  schemes,	  we	  encounter	  cannot	  be	  radical	  and	  
therefore	  are	  merely	  local	  and	  consequently	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  conceptual	  scheme	  does	  not	  really	  do	  
the	  explanatory	  work	  the	  relativist	  wants,	  it	  is	  describing	  something	  that	  does	  not	  exist	  apart	  
from	  itself—the	  scheme	  that	  I	  find	  myself	  in	  and	  cannot	  shed	  when	  viewing	  or	  talking	  about	  the	  
world.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  I	  take	  ‘dramatic	  incomparability’	  to	  be	  something	  different	  than	  merely	  a	  restatement	  of	  ‘radical	  difference’.	  	  
‘Significant’	  captures	  both	  the	  intensity	  and	  the	  extremity	  of	  the	  suppositions	  he	  is	  talking	  about	  and	  ‘contrast’	  
suggests	  both	  separateness	  and	  distinction.	  	  Significant	  contrast	  need	  not	  be	  radical.	  
28	  Davidson,	  “Very	  Idea,”	  184.	  
29	  Donald	  Davidson,	  “Radical	  Interpretation”,	  Dialectica	  27,	  no.	  3	  (1973):	  324.	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The	  very	  idea	  that	  there	  might	  be	  a	  culture	  so	  radically	  different	  from	  my	  own	  that	  its	  
members	  have	  a	  significantly	  different	  way	  of	  explaining,	  organizing	  and	  categorizing	  
experience	  of	  the	  world,	  is	  not	  something	  I	  can	  make	  sense	  of.	  	  We	  share	  the	  same	  world—and	  
largely	  the	  same	  apparatus	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  it.	  	  Hence,	  if	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  cultural	  
difference,	  it	  is	  because	  the	  contrast	  is	  not	  radical;	  understandable	  difference	  is,	  at	  most,	  
modest	  and	  local.	  	  This	  then,	  is	  the	  picture	  Davidson	  gives	  us;	  any	  scheme	  we	  know	  of	  must	  be	  
much	  like	  the	  one	  we	  are	  in.	  	  
	   If	  the	  conceptual	  content	  of	  claims	  is	  inevitably	  translatable,	  then	  cultural	  
misunderstanding	  is	  merely	  a	  mistake	  of	  words,	  not	  a	  clash	  of	  deep	  conceptual	  difference.30	  
The	  differences	  of	  words	  are	  what	  Davidson	  calls,	  the	  “modest	  examples	  we	  have	  no	  trouble	  
understanding.”31	  	  	  For	  example,	  when	  a	  French	  speaking	  Québécois	  goes	  to	  a	  pub	  in	  an	  
English-­‐speaking	  town,	  s/he	  will	  ‘take’	  a	  pint.	  	  In	  neighbouring	  Ontario,	  English-­‐speaking	  
Ontarians	  ‘have’	  a	  pint	  at	  the	  pub;	  to	  ‘take’	  a	  pint	  is	  to	  steal	  it.	  	  Davidson	  explains	  the	  reason	  
why	  the	  Québécois	  are	  not	  arrested	  every	  time	  they	  go	  into	  a	  pub	  in	  Ontario	  as	  charity.	  	  It	  is	  
because	  we	  are	  inescapably	  charitable	  in	  our	  interpretations	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  make	  use	  of	  
everything	  at	  our	  disposal	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  said.32	  	  When	  the	  Québécois	  says	  s/he	  will	  
take	  a	  beer,	  the	  background	  conditions	  support	  a	  certain	  interpretation	  that	  is,	  in	  this	  case,	  
different	  from	  the	  literal	  translation.	  	  The	  setting	  suggests	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  text	  is	  what	  
the	  bartender	  holds	  to	  be	  true—that	  people	  come	  to	  the	  pub	  to	  have	  pints	  rather	  than	  steal	  
pints;	  or,	  people	  intending	  to	  steal	  do	  not	  normally	  announce	  their	  intentions	  to	  the	  person	  
they	  are	  going	  to	  steal	  from.	  	  There	  are	  many	  expectations	  shaped	  by	  the	  background	  
conditions;	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  better,	  and	  correct,	  interpretation	  comes	  about	  because	  the	  
incongruous	  details	  are	  measured	  against	  the	  presumption	  that	  there	  is	  a	  shared	  background	  of	  
beliefs.	  
	   	  It	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  that	  very	  different	  cultures	  can	  share	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  background.	  	  
Members	  of	  the	  Cree	  Nation33	  can	  describe	  the	  differences	  between	  Cree	  and	  English	  to	  English	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Translation	  may	  be	  inevitable	  but	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  successful.	  	  The	  point	  is	  that	  failures	  of	  translation,	  total	  
or	  partial,	  are	  not	  the	  result	  of	  relativism.	  
31	  Ibid.,	  184.	  
32	  Ibid,	  197.	  
33	  The	  Cree	  First	  Nation	  is	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  groups	  of	  Native	  Americans	  with	  approximately	  200	  000	  members.	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speakers	  because	  both	  languages,	  and	  concomitant	  schemes,	  share	  fundamental	  similarities,	  
for	  example,	  both	  languages	  employ	  subjects,	  verbs	  and	  objects	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  world.	  	  
However,	  the	  Cree	  speakers	  describe	  learning	  English	  as	  being	  introduced	  to	  a	  different	  way	  of	  
seeing	  the	  world.34	  	  This	  suggests	  there	  is	  a	  close	  relationship	  between	  how	  they	  see	  the	  world	  
and	  how	  they	  talk	  about	  the	  world.	  	  This	  sort	  of	  inter-­‐relatedness	  is	  not	  compatible	  with	  a	  
scheme/content	  distinction	  because	  the	  way	  a	  language	  organizes	  the	  world,	  is	  in	  part	  infected	  
by	  what	  is	  being	  organized.	  	  By	  learning	  English	  the	  Cree	  speakers	  are	  not	  stepping	  out	  of	  their	  
native	  conceptual	  scheme	  into	  a	  new	  one.	  	  By	  learning	  English,	  Cree	  speakers	  are	  improving	  
what	  Davidson	  calls	  the	  clarity	  of	  translation	  “by	  enlarging	  the	  basis	  of	  shared	  (translatable)	  
language.”35	  	  	  
The	  speakers	  of	  a	  foreign	  language	  are	  not	  describing	  a	  different	  world.	  	  What	  we	  come	  
to	  understand	  through	  translation	  is	  the	  vocabulary	  they	  use	  to	  describe	  the	  world,	  the	  world	  
we	  have	  in	  common.	  	  Hence,	  we	  cannot	  say	  that	  we	  come	  to	  understand	  a	  foreign	  conceptual	  
scheme	  by	  shedding	  our	  own;	  nor	  are	  we	  in	  a	  position	  to	  say	  that	  their	  concepts	  are	  radically	  
foreign	  to	  ours.	  	  All	  we	  can	  say,	  is	  that	  we	  can	  translate	  Cree	  in	  English	  and	  English	  into	  Cree.	  	  
For	  all	  we	  know,	  there	  may	  be	  content	  lost	  in	  translation,	  but	  that	  is	  precisely	  the	  point,	  I	  can	  
only	  view	  the	  world	  from	  where	  I	  am.	  	  Where	  I	  am	  is	  not	  a	  fixed	  point,	  nor	  is	  my	  worldview,	  but	  
it	  is	  all	  I	  have	  at	  any	  given	  time.	  
When	  language	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  medium	  between	  scheme	  distinct	  from	  content,	  we	  
regain	  what	  Davidson	  calls	  “unmediated	  access	  to	  what	  makes	  our	  sentences	  true	  or	  false.”36	  	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  this	  is	  a	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom.	  	  There	  is	  no	  truth	  out-­‐there	  to	  
be	  discovered,	  nor	  can	  we	  create	  truth,	  as	  it	  was	  understood	  in	  an	  idiom	  that	  presupposed	  that	  
truth	  was	  out-­‐there.	  	  Concepts	  like	  truth	  are	  in	  the	  scheme,	  rather	  than	  independent	  of	  the	  
scheme.	  	  Obviously,	  I	  can	  understand	  more	  than	  one	  concept	  of	  truth;	  I	  can	  understand	  that	  in	  
a	  worldview	  steeped	  in	  religious	  tradition,	  the	  notion	  of	  truth	  is	  very	  different	  from	  a	  secular	  
worldview.	  	  However,	  I	  am	  prone	  to	  think	  that	  my	  view	  of	  truth,	  which	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Harvey	  Feit,	  "Hunting	  and	  the	  Quest	  for	  Power:	  The	  James	  Bay	  Cree	  and	  Whitemen	  in	  the	  20th	  Century,"	  Native	  
Peoples:	  The	  Canadian	  Experience,	  eds.	  R.	  Bruce	  Morrison	  and	  C.	  Roderick	  Wilson,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  1995).	  
35	  Davidson,	  “Very	  Idea,”	  197.	  
36	  Ibid.,	  198.	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worldview	  I	  cannot	  shed,	  is	  the	  right	  one.	  	  If	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’,	  we	  have	  no	  choice	  
but	  to	  take	  everything	  we	  come	  across	  into	  our	  own	  scheme	  and,	  here	  is	  the	  rub,	  call	  
everything	  we	  cannot	  take-­‐in	  a	  mistake.	  	  	  
For	  example,	  a	  devout	  person	  may	  feel	  they	  have	  very	  good	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  
will	  go	  to	  heaven	  when	  they	  die—because	  the	  bible	  is	  a	  manual	  for	  life	  and	  if	  one	  follows	  its	  
instructions,	  one	  goes	  to	  heaven.	  	  The	  structure	  of	  this	  argument	  may	  be	  acceptable	  to	  a	  
secular	  person;	  but	  even	  so,	  the	  argument	  itself	  looks	  unreasonable	  in	  a	  secular	  context	  
because	  it	  rests	  on	  premises	  that	  (from	  a	  secular	  standpoint)	  no	  reasonable	  person	  could	  
accept.	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  devout,	  their	  reasons	  are	  reasons	  no	  reasonable	  person	  
could	  deny.	  	  This	  is	  how	  a	  cultural	  confirmation	  bias37	  works,	  we	  believe	  our	  way	  is	  right,	  in	  
part,	  because	  a	  foreign	  culture	  can	  only	  be	  described	  in	  the	  only	  idiom	  we	  have	  available	  to	  us,	  
our	  own.	  	  	  
The	  dissolution	  of	  significant	  contrast	  between	  worldviews	  generates	  a	  certain	  amount	  
of	  tension.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  translation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  absorbing	  the	  content	  of	  difference	  such	  
that	  I	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  it	  in	  my	  own	  terms.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Davidson	  states	  that	  “there	  
can	  be	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  relation	  between	  being	  able	  to	  translate	  someone's	  language	  and	  
being	  able	  to	  describe	  his	  attitude	  is	  very	  close.”38	  	  This	  seems	  to	  suggest	  I	  must	  do	  what	  I	  
cannot	  do.	  	  Translation	  requires	  stepping	  into	  another’s	  shoes,	  but	  that	  is	  something	  I	  cannot	  
do	  if	  their	  shoes	  are	  radically	  different	  from	  mine.	  	  In	  coming	  to	  understand	  the	  Cree	  language,	  I	  
do,	  to	  a	  certain	  degree,	  have	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  Cree	  mind-­‐set.	  	  If	  that	  mind-­‐set	  is	  very	  
close	  to	  my	  own,	  then	  the	  local	  and	  modest	  differences	  can	  be	  absorbed	  without	  great	  
difficulty;	  however,	  if	  the	  differences	  are	  significant	  the	  task	  of	  absorbing	  the	  mind-­‐set	  is	  also	  
significant.	  	  What	  is	  to	  prevent	  me	  from	  appropriating	  only	  what	  harmonizes	  with	  my	  
worldview	  and	  rejecting	  the	  rest	  as	  if	  it	  were	  unintelligible?39	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  For	  further	  explanation	  of	  ‘confirmation	  bias’	  see	  chapter	  1.2.	  
38	  Ibid.,	  186.	  
39	  Davidson	  has	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question;	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  suggest	  that	  because	  we	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  
conceptual	  schemes	  that	  our	  scheme	  is	  the	  only	  scheme.	  	  If	  our	  scheme	  is	  not	  the	  only	  scheme	  then	  we	  should	  
expect	  to	  encounter	  different	  cultures,	  the	  point	  is,	  that	  if	  we	  can	  encounter	  them	  it	  is	  because	  they	  are	  not	  
radically	  different.	  	  Davidson’s	  non-­‐relativist	  picture	  stops	  there,	  it	  stops	  there	  because	  it	  in	  the	  strictest	  sense,	  it	  
can	  go	  no	  further,	  or	  can	  it?	  	  Hurley,	  in	  “Objectivity	  and	  Disagreement”	  Morality	  and	  Objectivity,	  ed.Ted	  Honderich,	  
(London:	  Routledge,	  1985)	  suggests	  that	  anti-­‐relativism	  is	  an	  unavoidable	  implication	  of	  the	  Davidsonian	  picture	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Such	  is	  the	  case	  when	  the	  beliefs	  of	  a	  minority	  worldview	  differ	  significantly	  from	  the	  
majority	  worldview.	  	  For	  example,	  Cree	  is	  a	  language	  of	  activity	  and	  consequently	  most	  
grammatical	  information	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  verb;	  ‘what’	  gives	  way	  to	  ‘how’,	  ‘where’	  gives	  way	  
to	  ‘how	  to	  get	  there’	  and	  ‘who’	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  agent	  but	  the	  action	  of	  the	  agent.	  	  Members	  
of	  the	  Cree	  Nation	  learning	  to	  speak	  English	  articulate	  the	  link	  between	  their	  language	  and	  how	  
they	  see	  the	  world	  in	  this	  way:	  	  Speaking	  Cree	  is	  voicing	  the	  fluid	  imagery	  they	  experience	  in	  
their	  minds’	  eye.	  	  When	  they	  speak	  English	  this	  internal	  video	  not	  only	  stops,	  but	  shuts	  off	  
entirely.	  	  English	  is	  not	  only	  inactive	  but	  also	  English	  thinking	  has	  no	  imagery	  and	  for	  the	  Cree,	  
dynamic	  imagery	  is	  essential	  to	  understand	  the	  complex	  relations	  of	  a	  world	  that	  functions	  
intelligently	  on	  multiple	  levels.40	  	  In	  the	  Cree	  world,	  all	  things	  are	  intentional;	  people,	  trees,	  the	  
wind,	  the	  sky	  and	  the	  animals	  all	  speak	  to	  the	  Cree	  in	  a	  language	  that	  they	  have	  come	  to	  know	  
and	  this	  conversation	  informs	  the	  moral	  fabric	  of	  their	  society.41	  	  	  
In	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  terms,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  
differences	  between	  the	  Cree	  and	  non-­‐Cree	  worldview	  are	  differences	  in	  beliefs	  or	  differences	  
in	  concepts	  because,	  Davidson	  argues,	  there	  is	  no	  independent	  framework,	  abstract	  or	  
empirical,	  to	  which	  we	  can	  appeal	  to	  adjudicate	  the	  difference.42	  	  However,	  this	  intentional	  
mind-­‐set	  of	  the	  Cree	  seems	  to	  shape	  far	  more	  than	  a	  mere	  belief	  system.	  	  It	  informs	  the	  
normative	  structure	  of	  their	  society	  in	  the	  form	  of	  entitlements	  and	  obligations	  in	  a	  social	  world	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
because	  the	  “problem	  of	  how	  to	  justify	  our	  forms	  of	  life	  to	  those	  who	  do	  not	  share	  them	  cannot	  arise”	  Hurley,	  91.	  	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  non-­‐relativist	  picture	  inevitably	  slides	  into	  what	  Davidson	  explicitly	  denies—the	  one	  scheme	  idea—
that	  the	  way	  of	  going	  on	  known	  to	  me	  is,	  to	  me,	  the	  only	  way	  of	  going	  on.	  	  In	  Contingency,	  Irony	  and	  Solidarity	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1989),	  48-­‐50,	  Rorty	  appropriates	  Davidson	  to	  dodge	  a	  charge	  of	  
relativism	  by	  denying	  that	  relativism	  is	  even	  possible.	  	  In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  or	  measure	  one	  language	  game	  against	  
another,	  we	  must	  step	  outside	  the	  game	  we	  are	  in;	  however,	  if	  we	  cannot	  escape	  our	  point	  of	  view,	  we	  cannot	  
observe	  the	  significant	  contrast	  necessary	  for	  a	  claim	  of	  relativism.	  	  Hence,	  there	  is	  no	  intelligible	  basis	  to	  support	  
the	  idea	  of	  rival	  language	  games.	  	  Although	  I	  can	  notice	  differences	  between	  my	  language	  game	  and	  that	  of	  others,	  
and	  my	  language	  game	  can	  change,	  it	  is	  to	  me	  the	  only	  language	  game.	  	  Not	  that	  my	  language	  game	  is	  the	  one	  
language	  game;	  it	  is	  that	  we	  are	  all	  confined	  to	  notions	  of	  truth	  and	  knowledge	  that	  are	  generated	  within	  our	  
language	  game.	  	  However,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  point	  I	  suggest	  anti-­‐relativism	  departs	  from	  non-­‐relativism,	  our	  truth	  and	  
knowledge	  is	  not	  only	  relatively	  valid	  within	  its	  own	  language	  game.	  	  For	  the	  anti-­‐relativist,	  that	  truth	  and	  
knowledge	  cannot	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  relative	  to	  a	  worldview	  also	  implies	  that	  even	  though	  my	  language	  game	  cannot	  
be	  known	  to	  be	  the	  one	  language	  game,	  it	  is	  the	  one	  language	  game	  I	  can	  know.	  	  	  
40	  George	  Taylor	  Fulford,	  “Children's	  Drawings	  in	  a	  Mashkeko	  Cree	  Community.”	  OAIster®,	  provided	  by	  the	  OCLC	  
Cooperative.	  1994.	  http://digitalcommons.mcmaster.ca/openthesiss/2284,	  (accessed	  January	  26,	  2004).	  
41	  Feit,	  “Hunting,”	  171-­‐207.	  
42	  Davidson,	  “Very	  Idea,”	  197.	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that	  extends	  beyond	  humans.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  concept	  of	  justice	  is	  better	  understood	  in	  relation	  
to	  the	  complex	  set	  of	  relations	  apparent	  in	  Cree	  practices.	  	  	  
For	  example,	  the	  Cree	  hunter	  sees	  himself	  as	  entitled	  to	  the	  animal	  he	  hunts.	  	  If	  he	  is	  
successful,	  the	  animal	  has	  intentionally	  sacrificed	  itself	  for	  the	  hunter’s	  well	  being,	  a	  sacrifice	  
that	  carries	  an	  obligation.	  	  The	  hunter	  is	  entitled	  to	  take	  the	  animal,	  but	  is	  also	  obligated	  to	  
reciprocate,	  to	  give	  back	  something	  to	  the	  intentional	  natural	  world	  of	  which	  he	  is	  a	  part.43	  	  
Consequently,	  I	  think	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  reduce	  the	  anthropomorphic	  representation	  of	  
forces,	  plants	  and	  animals	  in	  the	  world	  to	  a	  mere	  collection	  of	  beliefs.	  	  It	  seems	  to	  me,	  that	  the	  
concept	  of	  justice	  in	  the	  Cree	  worldview	  is	  significantly	  different	  from	  Western	  justice,	  not	  
because	  the	  Cree	  believe	  in	  a	  different	  definition	  of	  justice,	  but	  because	  the	  concept	  of	  justice	  
functions	  differently	  in	  their	  world—justice	  is	  not	  confined	  to	  a	  system	  of	  right	  nor	  is	  merely	  an	  
expression	  of	  what	  is	  good—the	  Cree	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  justice	  that	  permeates	  all	  of	  life	  and	  living	  
things.	  	  The	  response	  might	  be	  that	  I	  can	  only	  understand	  their	  concept	  of	  justice	  because	  it	  is	  
very	  close	  to	  my	  own—after	  all	  justice	  is	  justice.	  	  The	  question	  is:	  If	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  
have’,	  can	  we	  meaningfully	  disagree	  about	  the	  beliefs	  and	  concepts	  of	  the	  Cree	  worldview?	  	  As	  
Davidson	  points	  out,	  disagreement	  is	  dependent	  on	  agreement.	  
...to	  make	  meaningful	  disagreement	  possible...depends	  entirely	  on	  a	  foundation—some	  
foundation—in	  agreement.	  The	  agreement	  may	  take	  the	  form	  of	  widespread	  sharing	  of	  
sentences	  held	  true	  by	  speakers	  of	  ‘the	  same	  language’,	  or	  agreement	  in	  the	  large	  
mediated	  by	  a	  theory	  of	  truth	  contrived	  by	  an	  interpreter	  for	  speakers	  of	  another	  
language.44	  
	  
After	  all,	  truth	  is	  truth.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  me	  how	  we	  can	  meaningfully	  disagree	  
about	  conceptual	  difference,	  without	  conceptual	  relativism.	  	  In	  the	  anti-­‐relativist	  idiom,	  nothing	  
is	  relative	  and	  as	  a	  result	  we	  lack	  the	  resources	  to	  adequately	  recognize	  deep	  difference.	  	  There	  
is	  no	  room	  for	  a	  worldview	  with	  beliefs	  and	  values	  that	  run	  contrary	  to	  presuppositions	  taken	  
to	  hold	  in	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom.	  	  Presuppositions	  about	  the	  concept	  of	  
truth,	  for	  example,	  reflect	  much	  deeper	  difference	  than	  an	  anti-­‐relativist	  idiom	  can	  allow.	  The	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  Feit,	  “Hunting,”	  171-­‐207.	  
44	  Davidson,	  “Very	  Idea,”	  196.	  
	  31	  
	  
depth	  of	  difference	  in	  question	  here,	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  difference	  that	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  intercultural	  
dialogues.	  	  It	  may	  not	  be	  radical,	  but	  it	  may	  be	  significant.	  	  
The	  non-­‐relativist	  can	  accommodate	  the	  idea	  that	  alternative	  reasoning	  styles	  are	  
intelligible	  modes	  of	  reasoning,	  even	  if	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  hopelessly	  flawed	  modes	  of	  
reasoning;	  however,	  there	  are	  worldviews	  in	  which	  concepts	  are	  functionally	  different	  than	  the	  
non-­‐relativist	  idiom.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  most	  we	  can	  say	  about	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  sentence,	  
according	  to	  Davidson,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  relative	  to	  the	  language	  in	  which	  it	  was	  spoken.	  	  If	  Tarsky’s	  
convention	  T	  “embodies	  our	  best	  intuition	  as	  to	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  truth	  is	  used”,	  as	  Davidson	  
suggests	  it	  does,	  then	  “theory-­‐neutral	  reality”45	  cannot	  be	  translated	  into	  the	  analytic	  paradigm	  
and	  as	  such	  fails	  to	  be	  translatable.	  	  	  
However,	  religious	  fundamentalists	  (of	  a	  certain	  stripe)	  are	  operating	  in	  an	  idiom	  in	  
which	  reality	  is	  revealed	  to	  them	  as	  truth.	  	  The	  linguistic	  turn	  never	  happened	  for	  these	  people,	  
truth	  is	  not	  relative	  to	  a	  language	  game,	  truth	  is	  an	  independent	  ground	  that	  can	  be	  discovered	  
and	  it	  is	  the	  standard	  against	  which	  evaluations	  of	  true	  and	  false,	  right	  and	  wrong,	  good	  and	  
evil	  are	  made.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  fundamentalist	  believes	  that	  conceptual	  schemes	  can	  be	  
compared	  and	  measured	  against	  one	  another.	  	  Something	  Davidson	  explicitly	  denies.	  	  “Neither	  
a	  fixed	  stock	  of	  meanings,	  nor	  a	  theory-­‐neutral	  reality,	  can	  provide...a	  ground	  for	  comparison	  of	  
conceptual	  schemes.”46	  	  	  
In	  making	  such	  a	  strong	  argument	  against	  the	  notion	  of	  access	  to	  a	  fixed	  stock	  of	  
meanings,	  a	  scheme	  in	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  fixed	  stock	  of	  meanings	  holds	  is	  
incommensurable	  with	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom.	  	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  
fundamentalist	  reasoning	  about	  truth	  is	  not	  reasonable;	  it	  is	  so	  different	  it	  fails	  to	  meet	  the	  only	  
features	  of	  reasonableness	  that	  I	  can	  know,	  those	  that	  represent	  reasonable	  in	  my	  scheme.	  	  
This	  then,	  represents	  the	  sort	  of	  deep	  difference	  that	  cannot	  be	  recognized	  and	  as	  a	  result	  is	  
disallowed	  and	  swept	  away	  by	  Davidson’s	  paradox.47	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Ibid.,	  195.	  
46	  Ibid.,	  195	  
47	  The	  political	  implications	  of	  this	  worldview	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  claims	  of	  religious	  minorities	  are	  explored	  more	  
fully	  in	  chapter	  1.3.	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Davidson	  offers	  perhaps	  the	  best	  explanation	  of	  what	  I	  think	  is	  the	  dominant	  worldview	  
underpinning	  modern	  liberal	  democratic	  arrangements.	  	  Appeals	  to	  deities	  or	  natural	  orders	  
have	  no	  place,	  or	  should	  have	  no	  place,	  in	  modern	  political	  dialogue.	  	  That	  we	  cannot	  make	  
sense	  of	  conceptual	  schemes,	  plural,	  Davidson	  cautions,	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  can	  make	  
sense	  of	  a	  conceptual	  scheme,	  a	  singular	  grand	  master	  scheme,	  either.48	  	  The	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  
only	  one	  scheme	  there	  is	  equally	  esoteric;	  however,	  by	  dissolving	  the	  distinction	  between	  
scheme	  and	  world,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  a	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  point	  of	  view	  and	  there	  is	  
a	  tendency	  to	  characterise	  that	  view	  as	  the	  correct	  point	  of	  view.	  	  The	  finer	  points	  of	  the	  
theory,	  I	  think,	  have	  not	  trickled	  down	  to	  the	  comparatively	  blunt	  discursive	  context	  of	  minority	  
rights	  disputes.	  	  	  
	   	  In	  sum,	  the	  anti-­‐relativist	  idiom	  undermines	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  cultural	  relativism.	  	  My	  
concern	  is	  if	  we	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  conceptual	  relativism,	  we	  tend	  to	  dismiss	  the	  significance	  
of	  the	  contrast	  between	  alternative	  cultural	  frameworks.	  	  This	  notional	  position,	  I	  have	  argued,	  
complicates	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  because	  it	  stymies	  the	  claims	  of	  minorities	  whose	  
worldview	  is	  notably	  different	  from	  the	  majority	  worldview.	  	  The	  difference	  on	  which	  the	  claims	  
are	  based	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  as	  modest	  and	  local	  rather	  than	  significant	  and	  deep,	  yet	  
deep	  recognition	  is	  required	  to	  substantiate	  claims	  to	  special	  rights	  considerations.	  	  Hence,	  the	  
‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom	  seems	  inadequate	  to	  the	  task	  of	  generating	  political	  
space	  for	  oppressed,	  disenfranchised	  or	  otherwise	  marginalized	  minority	  groups.	  However,	  
Davidson’s	  paradox	  challenges,	  successfully	  I	  think,	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  knowledge,	  beliefs	  or	  
modus	  operandi	  of	  one	  group	  is	  radically	  different	  from	  another	  such	  that	  these	  things	  are	  
entirely	  inaccessible	  from	  outside	  the	  group.	  	  How	  then,	  do	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  cultural	  
relativism?	  	  The	  first	  step	  is	  to	  challenge	  the	  wholesale	  rejection	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  with	  a	  
picture	  of	  cultural	  difference	  that	  functions	  on	  multiple	  levels.	  
1.2	  Cultural	  Relativism	  	  
If	  Davidson	  is	  right	  about	  radical	  difference	  between	  schemes,	  and	  he	  may	  very	  well	  be,	  then	  
how	  do	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  cultural	  relativism?	  	  On	  what	  basis	  can	  minorities	  make	  claims	  based	  
on	  difference?	  	  Is	  it	  merely	  that	  we	  mistake	  modest	  and	  local	  difference	  for	  difference	  that	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Davidson,	  “Very	  Idea,”	  197-­‐98.	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significant	  and	  deep,	  or,	  is	  the	  paradox	  merely	  academic?	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  look	  at	  two	  
implications	  of	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  
diversity	  brought	  about	  by	  deep	  and	  significant	  difference.	  
First,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  presumptions	  of	  moral	  superiority.	  	  If	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  
that	  alternative	  conceptual	  schemes	  exist,	  and	  the	  only	  scheme	  available	  to	  us	  is	  the	  one	  we	  
are	  in;	  then	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  recognize	  difference	  but	  only	  if	  the	  differences	  are	  the	  result	  of	  
mistakes	  rather	  than	  the	  result	  of	  functioning	  in	  alternative	  conceptual	  frameworks.	  	  Second,	  in	  
the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom,	  interpretation	  is	  only	  possible	  between	  cultures	  that	  
share	  the	  same	  descriptive	  concepts,	  which	  apply	  to	  the	  same	  reality.	  	  If	  radically	  different	  
schemes	  existed,	  interpretation	  between	  them	  would	  be	  a	  non-­‐starter;	  consequently,	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  radically	  different	  schemes	  exist.	  	  If	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  
believe	  they	  exist,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  view	  the	  scheme	  we	  are	  in,	  as	  the	  only	  true	  scheme	  
and	  this	  sort	  of	  belief	  trivializes	  claims	  of	  significant	  difference.	  	  	  
However,	  when	  persons	  from	  distinct	  cultures	  come	  into	  contact,	  the	  events	  are	  not	  
static,	  nor	  are	  the	  cultures	  involved.49	  	  If	  we	  can,	  through	  on-­‐going	  processes	  of	  interpretation	  
acquire	  new	  concepts	  over	  time,	  then	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  cultures	  for	  which	  ‘what	  we	  have	  
is	  what	  we	  have’	  is	  just	  one	  idiom	  among	  many.	  	  What	  emerges	  is	  a	  picture	  of	  cultural	  
relativism	  that	  is	  not	  based	  only	  on	  modest	  and	  local	  difference	  nor	  significant	  and	  deep	  
difference,	  but	  rather,	  a	  picture	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  that	  functions	  on	  multiple	  levels.	  
If	  Only	  They	  Knew	  Better,	  They	  Would	  Surely	  Do	  Better	  
Any	  productive	  argument	  is	  based	  on	  the	  presupposition	  that	  bringing	  your	  interlocutor	  around	  
to	  your	  way	  of	  seeing	  things	  will	  change	  his	  or	  her	  mind	  about	  their	  original	  position.	  	  A	  good	  
argument,	  once	  properly	  understood,	  cannot	  (reasonably)	  be	  denied.	  	  In	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  
what	  we	  have’	  idiom,	  disagreement	  can	  only	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  local	  and	  modest	  and	  this	  raises	  a	  
question:	  	  Does	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom	  diminish	  claims	  of	  difference	  such	  
that	  disagreement	  cannot	  be	  taken	  seriously?	  Forster	  observes	  the	  following	  problem	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Cultural	  beliefs,	  values,	  ideals	  and	  practices	  may	  be,	  to	  a	  certain	  extend,	  stable;	  however,	  stability	  is	  not	  stasis.	  	  If	  
a	  snapshot	  could	  capture	  the	  cultural	  package	  at	  one	  time,	  it	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  reference	  against	  which	  the	  package	  
at	  other	  times	  would	  be	  measured.	  	  Stability	  is	  represented	  by	  threads	  that	  run	  across	  extended	  periods	  of	  time,	  
like	  a	  language.	  	  However	  stable	  a	  language	  may	  be,	  it	  is	  not	  static,	  words	  and	  grammar	  shift	  over	  time	  to	  
accommodate	  environmental	  change,	  shifting	  values	  and	  concepts.	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Davidson’s	  paradox.50	  	  It	  seems	  plausible	  that	  we	  could	  encounter	  a	  radically	  different	  
conceptual	  scheme	  that,	  over	  time,	  becomes	  intelligible	  to	  us.51	  	  A	  language	  we	  do	  not	  initially	  
recognize	  as	  a	  way	  of	  communicating	  meaning,	  becomes	  clearer	  after	  considerable	  effort	  is	  
made	  to	  find	  what	  Davidson	  calls	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  interpretable	  content—where	  we	  can	  
“assume	  general	  agreement	  on	  beliefs.”52	  	  If	  we	  can,	  over	  time,	  come	  to	  understand	  radically	  
different	  schemes	  by	  acquiring	  new	  concepts,	  then	  unintelligibility	  only	  holds	  if	  we	  are	  confined	  
to	  the	  concepts	  we	  have.53	  	  This	  sort	  of	  stasis,	  however,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  reflect	  the	  fluid	  
nature	  of	  languages	  or	  practices	  of	  interpretation.	  	  	  
	   Davidson	  can	  certainly	  account	  for	  increasing	  the	  resources	  of	  interpretation	  and	  
translation	  over	  time	  but	  Forester’s	  worry	  points	  to	  something	  quite	  different.	  	  I	  see	  the	  key	  
distinction	  between	  the	  two	  like	  this:	  	  Davidson	  freezes	  the	  interpretative	  frame	  to	  give	  us	  a	  
snap	  shot	  of	  what	  is	  going	  on	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time.	  	  This	  view	  of	  translation	  processes	  is	  
somewhat	  like	  a	  series	  of	  time	  slices.	  	  We	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  translate	  x	  amount	  of	  material	  
in	  time	  slice	  a	  and	  y	  amount	  of	  material	  in	  time	  slice	  z.	  	  What	  has	  happened	  between	  is	  an	  
increase	  in	  the	  resources	  available,	  each	  building	  on	  the	  last.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Forster	  view	  seems	  to	  
favour	  the	  interpretive	  frame	  on	  a	  continuum,	  where	  the	  blending	  of	  fluid	  moves	  cannot	  be	  
captured	  at	  any	  one	  point.	  	  The	  snapshot	  view	  relies	  on	  a	  very	  well	  ordered	  account	  of	  belief,	  
language	  and	  meaning;	  whereas	  in	  the	  continuum	  view,	  languages	  and	  the	  process	  of	  
translation	  defy	  the	  neatly	  ordered	  stacks	  of	  meaning	  required	  to	  slice	  up	  the	  contents	  for	  
analysis.	  	  The	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  views	  raise	  delicious	  questions	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  
meaning;	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  settle	  the	  finer	  points	  to	  see	  the	  question	  salient	  to	  
intercultural	  translation.	  	  Just	  how	  different	  are	  worldviews	  and	  what	  sort	  of	  impact	  does	  this	  
degree	  of	  difference	  have	  on	  political	  dialogue?	  	  
	   The	  beginnings	  of	  an	  answer	  might	  be	  found	  in	  the	  following	  example.	  	  When	  the	  Cree	  
hunter	  explains	  that	  the	  Wind,	  who	  is	  an	  intentional	  being,	  speaks	  to	  him,	  it	  is	  surely	  a	  language	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Forster’s	  take	  on	  Davidson	  is	  not	  without	  controversy.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  his	  criticisms	  hold	  is	  certainly	  worthy	  of	  
further	  scrutiny;	  however,	  settling	  that	  issue	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  this	  discussion	  to	  proceed.	  	  Davidson	  gives	  us	  an	  
excellent	  description	  of	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  culturally	  relative	  claims,	  I	  appeal	  to	  Forster’s	  critique	  because	  it	  
offers	  further	  insights	  into	  the	  complications	  that	  arise	  with	  claims	  that	  appeal	  to	  culturally	  relative	  reasoning.	  	  	  
51	  Forster,	  “Denying,”	  137-­‐38.	  
52	  Davidson,	  “Very	  Idea,”	  196.	  
53	  Forster,	  “Denying,”	  137-­‐38.	  
	  35	  
	  
so	  different	  from	  English	  that	  initially	  I	  do	  not	  recognize	  it	  as	  a	  language	  at	  all.	  	  I	  am	  likely	  to	  
make	  assumptions,	  that	  he	  is	  hearing	  voices	  in	  his	  head,	  that	  he	  is	  not	  receiving	  meaning	  
conveyed	  by	  the	  wind	  in	  the	  same	  way	  I	  receive	  meaning	  conveyed	  by	  another	  person	  speaking	  
English.	  	  However,	  over	  time,	  I	  come	  to	  understand	  more	  about	  the	  Cree	  culture	  and	  how	  the	  
predictability	  of	  the	  elements	  are	  viewed	  as	  habits	  that	  shape	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
character	  and	  mood	  of	  the	  Wind,	  that	  the	  Wind	  is	  understood	  as	  an	  intentional	  being	  and	  
consequently	  the	  Cree	  believe	  that,	  what	  the	  Wind	  does	  is	  what	  the	  Wind	  says.	  	  I	  negotiate	  the	  
content	  of	  this	  concept	  in	  familiar	  terms,	  in	  something	  that	  we	  say	  in	  English—actions	  speak	  
louder	  than	  words.	  	  It	  is	  then	  a	  small	  step,	  through	  the	  process	  of	  interpreting	  the	  content	  of	  
the	  idea	  in	  context,	  to	  acquire	  the	  Cree	  concept—that	  actions	  speak.54	  	  	  
If	  we	  can	  come	  to	  understand	  radically	  different	  schemes	  through	  acquiring	  new	  
concepts,	  then	  the	  unintelligibility	  of	  Davidson’s	  paradox	  seems	  only	  trivial.	  	  The	  paradox	  then,	  
is	  reduced	  to	  an	  explanatory	  device.	  	  It	  merely	  defines	  what	  radically	  different	  conceptual	  
schemes	  would	  look	  like.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  cannot	  come	  to	  understand	  radically	  
different	  schemes,	  Forster	  asks,	  “what	  justification	  could	  we	  possibly	  have	  for	  believing	  them	  to	  
exist?”55	  	  If	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  radically	  different	  schemes	  exist,	  then	  it	  is	  not	  at	  
all	  clear,	  on	  Davidson’s	  account,	  how	  we	  could	  ever	  find	  enough	  agreement	  sufficient	  to	  
communicate	  with	  anyone	  who	  believed	  that	  radically	  different	  schemes	  exist.	  	  Hence,	  the	  
‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom	  is,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  all	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  believe	  exists.	  	  	  
It	  is	  a	  big	  leap	  to	  suggest	  that	  all	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  believe	  exists	  is	  all	  that	  exists;	  but	  it	  is	  a	  
small	  step	  from	  all	  we	  can	  believe,	  to	  all	  we	  can	  show	  or	  demonstrate.	  	  To	  believe	  that	  which	  
cannot	  be	  shown	  or	  demonstrate	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  faith	  rather	  than	  fact.	  	  Consequently,	  
anyone	  who	  believes	  themselves	  to	  be	  from	  a	  significantly	  different	  culture	  is	  just	  mistaken	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  The	  concept	  here	  is	  an	  abstraction	  about	  who	  or	  what	  communicates	  and	  how	  they	  communicate.	  	  The	  non-­‐
Aboriginal	  infers	  the	  idea	  that	  humans	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  through	  a	  language	  of	  words	  and	  perhaps	  
gestures	  but	  it	  does	  not	  include	  the	  Aboriginal	  inference—that	  natural	  elements	  are	  communicating	  with	  humans	  
in	  a	  language	  of	  activity.	  	  When	  I	  am	  exposed	  to	  the	  Cree	  concept	  of	  communication,	  I	  identify	  
similarities/differences	  with	  my	  concept	  of	  communication	  and	  through	  those	  similarities/differences	  acquire	  a	  
new	  concept	  of	  communication.	  	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  communication	  is	  not	  new,	  it	  is	  merely	  
expanded.	  	  However,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  communication	  is	  the	  similarity,	  what	  I	  have	  acquired	  is	  a	  new	  
abstraction	  about	  the	  process	  of	  communication	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  my	  previous	  conception.	  	  It	  is	  a	  unique	  
abstraction	  that	  I	  would	  call	  Aboriginal	  communication	  in	  contrast	  to	  my	  original	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  concept.	  	  	  
55	  Ibid.,	  139.	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as	  a	  result	  intercultural	  dialogues	  take	  on	  a	  somewhat	  condescending	  tone	  where	  wrongdoing	  
comes	  about	  because	  the	  members	  of	  the	  ‘other’	  culture	  are	  misinformed,	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  
to	  see	  things	  as	  they	  really	  are.	  	  	  
There	  are	  numerous	  examples	  of	  the	  presumption	  of	  superiority	  that	  appeal	  to	  the	  
paradox	  to	  reject	  cultural	  relativism	  as	  legitimate	  support	  for	  rights	  claims.	  	  Such	  is	  the	  case	  in	  
the	  following	  example	  where	  the	  cultural	  practice	  of	  a	  minority	  group	  offends	  certain	  political	  
activists	  and	  majority	  sentiment.	  	  Every	  spring,	  off	  the	  most	  easterly	  coast	  of	  Canada	  in	  
Newfoundland-­‐Labrador	  and	  Prince	  Edward	  Island,	  thousands	  of	  harp	  seals	  are	  slaughtered	  in	  a	  
highly	  regulated	  annual	  seal-­‐hunt	  conducted	  by	  licensed	  hunters	  (known	  as	  sealers).	  	  For	  
Indigenous	  peoples,	  it	  is	  a	  tradition	  that	  goes	  back	  thousands	  of	  years.56	  	  For	  Aboriginals	  in	  the	  
area	  and	  inhabitants	  of	  European	  descent,	  sealing	  represents	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  rugged	  
region’s	  marine	  driven	  economy.	  	  The	  problem,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  the	  killing	  is	  not	  hidden	  inside	  
windowless	  concrete	  walls	  of	  a	  slaughterhouse.	  	  The	  harp	  seal	  fur	  is	  as	  white	  as	  the	  ice	  floes,	  
making	  the	  pools	  of	  deep	  red	  blood	  look	  all	  the	  more	  grizzly.	  	  Add	  the	  skull	  crushing	  ‘hakapik’,	  
used	  in	  the	  traditional	  method	  of	  slaughter,	  and	  the	  visual	  brutality	  of	  the	  whole	  process	  is	  an	  
activist’s	  jackpot.57	  	  Despite	  the	  endorsement	  of	  several	  Wildlife	  and	  Veterinarian	  organizations,	  
every	  year	  the	  ‘humaneness’58	  of	  the	  seal	  hunt	  dominates	  the	  media,	  and	  every	  year	  it	  ends	  in	  a	  
stalemate,	  the	  government	  goes	  on	  about	  the	  business	  of	  regulating	  seal	  hunting	  as	  it	  regulates	  
hunting	  and	  fishing	  across	  Canada.	  	  Occasionally	  a	  new	  country	  joins	  those	  who	  have	  already	  
banned	  the	  import	  of	  seal	  products,	  but	  the	  market	  continues,	  as	  does	  the	  seal	  hunt.	  
	   Aboriginals	  claim	  a	  special	  relationship	  with	  the	  nature	  that	  shapes	  the	  moral	  order	  of	  
their	  society.	  	  They	  believe	  the	  forces	  of	  nature	  provide	  the	  seals	  to	  them	  each	  year,	  and	  as	  a	  
result,	  the	  practice	  of	  hunting	  seals	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  their	  culture.	  	  The	  government	  agrees	  
and	  grants	  Aboriginal	  groups	  special	  hunting	  rights.	  	  However,	  animal	  rights	  activists	  launch	  
several	  arguments	  against	  the	  seal	  hunt,	  arguments	  that	  they	  say	  trumps	  the	  cultural	  reasoning	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  “History	  of	  Seal	  Hunting,”	  SealHunting.ca	  2012,	  http://www.sealhunting.ca/2010/03/09/the-­‐history-­‐of-­‐seal-­‐
hunting-­‐in-­‐canada/	  (accessed	  Jan	  2012).	  
57	  “Canadian	  Seal	  Slaughter”	  PETA.	  2012.	  http://www.peta.org/	  issues/animals-­‐used-­‐for-­‐clothing/canadian-­‐seal-­‐
slaughter.aspx	  (accessed	  January	  2012).	  
58	  “Hakapik:	  An	  Efficient	  and	  Humane	  Hunting	  Tool”	  The	  Seal	  Fishery.	  2012.	  
http://www.thesealfishery.com/articleView.php?id=65&page=0&sub=1&status=0	  (accessed	  January	  2012).	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of	  the	  Aboriginal	  sealers.	  	  Here’s	  one	  example:	  	  The	  animal	  rights	  lobby	  argues	  that	  nature	  of	  
‘culture’	  is	  fluid	  and	  cannot	  be	  fixed.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  culture	  cannot	  be	  preserved	  in	  stasis.	  	  
Preserving	  traditions	  that	  are,	  in	  their	  view,	  archaic	  does	  not	  support	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  
culture	  because	  culture	  is	  a	  process	  of	  adaptation	  to	  circumstances	  as	  they	  are,	  not	  as	  they	  
were.	  	  In	  this	  day	  and	  age,	  murdering	  animals	  for	  sustenance	  is	  no	  longer	  necessary.	  	  If	  only	  the	  
Aboriginal	  community	  knew	  better;	  they	  could	  be	  shown	  alternative	  sources	  of	  income;	  they	  
would	  see	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  kill	  animals	  and	  therefore,	  they	  would	  not	  continue	  the	  wrongful	  
slaughter	  of	  the	  harp	  seals.59	  	  All	  cultures	  will	  come	  to	  know	  this	  timeless	  ‘truth’	  eventually,	  
unless	  they	  are	  incapable	  of	  adapting	  to	  circumstances	  as	  they	  are—in	  effect,	  a	  ‘dead’	  culture.	  	  
Hence,	  by	  granting	  special	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  culture,	  by	  preserving	  an	  archaic	  practice,	  
the	  government	  is	  paradoxically	  threatening	  to	  destroy	  the	  very	  culture	  it	  is	  aiming	  to	  keep	  
alive.60	  
	  	   There	  may	  be	  an	  equivocation	  here;	  the	  stagnation	  of	  a	  culture	  is	  not	  necessarily	  
identical	  with	  the	  extinction	  of	  a	  culture.	  	  There’s	  also	  something	  to	  be	  said	  for	  preserving	  
traditions	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  historical	  background	  informing	  a	  living	  culture.	  	  But	  more	  significant	  
than	  the	  strength	  or	  weakness	  of	  the	  reasons	  or	  reasoning	  employed	  is	  the	  presumption	  of	  
moral	  correctness—the	  presumption	  that	  the	  moral	  correctness	  of	  the	  animal	  rights	  cause	  is	  
thought	  to	  be	  timeless.61	  	  It	  simply	  is	  the	  case	  that	  animal	  slaughter	  serves	  no	  function,	  meets	  
no	  need	  that	  cannot	  be	  met	  in	  another	  way;	  it	  simply	  is	  the	  case	  that	  animals	  have	  rights,	  the	  
right	  to	  life;	  therefore,	  to	  treat	  animals	  as	  a	  resource	  and	  slaughter	  animals	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  
that	  resource	  is	  morally	  equivalent	  to	  murdering	  your	  neighbour	  and	  selling	  her	  house	  for	  
profit.	  	  If	  I	  am	  an	  animal	  rights	  activist,	  I	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  beliefs,	  values	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Robichaud,	  Ian.	  Harpseals.org.	  2012.	  www.harpseals.org	  (accessed	  Jan	  2012).	  
60	  The	  underlying	  claim	  of	  the	  animal	  rights	  lobby	  is	  simply	  the	  idea	  that	  cultures	  contain	  reasons	  for	  practices;	  
however,	  to	  simply	  appeal	  to	  the	  practice	  is	  not	  an	  argument.	  In	  order	  to	  justify	  the	  practice,	  Indigenous	  peoples	  
must	  give	  good	  reasons	  for	  hunting	  seals.	  It	  is	  a	  point	  well	  by	  made	  by	  Jeremy	  Waldron	  in	  “What	  is	  Cosmopolitan?”	  
Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  (Blackwell	  Publishing)	  8,	  no.	  2	  (June	  2000):	  227-­‐243.	  	  However,	  there	  seems	  very	  
little	  agreement	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  (and	  their	  concomitant	  worldviews)	  about	  the	  measure	  of	  what	  can	  be	  
considered	  a	  ‘good’	  reason.	  
61	  The	  arguments	  surveyed	  from	  sources	  such	  as	  PETA	  and	  Harpseals.org	  recognize	  the	  Indigenous	  tradition	  but	  do	  
not	  accept	  the	  tradition	  or	  any	  of	  the	  reasoning	  drawn	  from	  it	  as	  acceptable	  reasons	  to	  continue	  hunting	  seals.	  	  
There	  may	  have	  been	  particular	  times	  and	  particular	  places	  where	  other	  factors	  rendered	  animal	  cruelty	  
defensible,	  but	  it	  never	  was	  and	  never	  will	  be	  right,	  never	  ethical.	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practices	  of	  any	  other	  idiom	  are	  correct.	  	  There	  can	  be	  the	  recognition	  of	  difference	  but	  only	  
with	  presumption	  that	  the	  difference	  is	  a	  mistake.	  	  	  
To	  claim	  that	  cultural	  context	  supports	  a	  competing	  moral	  order	  is	  puzzling.	  	  The	  animal	  
rights	  activist	  cannot	  shed	  the	  scheme	  of	  which	  she	  or	  he	  is	  a	  part.	  	  Claims	  to	  the	  right	  to	  
culture	  are	  interpreted	  as	  paradoxically	  claiming	  to	  preserve	  culture	  in	  a	  way	  that	  runs	  contrary	  
to	  the	  nature	  of	  culture	  and	  therefore	  threatens	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  that	  culture.	  	  The	  
traditions	  of	  Indigenous	  cultures	  change	  with	  circumstances,	  and	  circumstances	  have	  changed.	  	  
Preserving	  the	  tradition	  is	  not	  preserving	  the	  culture	  it	  is	  ossifying	  the	  culture.	  	  Once	  the	  
Aboriginal	  sealers	  come	  to	  understand	  first,	  the	  presuppositions	  that	  support	  the	  values	  of	  the	  
animal	  rights	  lobby	  (and	  perhaps	  the	  majority	  culture)	  and	  second,	  the	  nature	  of	  culture	  as	  
understood	  by	  the	  activists,	  they	  will	  obviously	  agree	  because	  there	  is	  simply	  no	  other	  (right)	  
way	  to	  see	  things.	  
Aboriginal	  sealers	  may	  respond	  that	  it	  is	  not	  merely	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  tradition	  that	  justifies	  
their	  hunting	  rights.	  	  Hunting	  is	  woven	  into	  their	  moral	  outlook	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  animals	  
are	  provided	  to	  the	  hunter	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  cosmological	  order.	  	  Within	  their	  culture,	  they	  
have	  good	  reasons	  for	  continuing	  the	  practice	  even	  though	  their	  circumstances	  may	  have	  
changed.	  	  Accepting	  those	  reasons;	  however,	  requires	  accepting	  the	  content	  of	  their	  worldview	  
as	  relevant	  and	  equally	  ethical	  to	  that	  of	  the	  animal	  rights	  activist.	  	  Organizations	  like	  PETA	  
“People	  for	  the	  Ethical	  Treatment	  of	  Animals”62	  clearly	  claim	  the	  ethical	  high	  ground,	  to	  
disagree	  is	  to	  be	  wrong,	  to	  be	  unethical.	  	  One	  worldview,	  to	  the	  exception	  of	  any	  or	  all	  others	  
and	  as	  a	  result,	  that	  worldview	  is,	  to	  the	  activist,	  the	  only	  one	  that	  will	  ever	  be	  right.	  	  The	  ‘what	  
we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom	  may	  not	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  idea	  
of	  a	  one	  and	  only	  master	  scheme,	  but	  it	  provides	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  any	  other	  moral	  
order	  exists	  or	  ever	  existed—to	  believe	  otherwise	  is	  simply	  an	  error.	  
A	  Failure	  of	  Translation	  
When	  operating	  from	  within	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom,	  we	  cannot	  make	  sense	  
of	  the	  idea	  of	  translation	  between	  radically	  different	  schemes.	  	  If	  we	  cannot	  acquire	  new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




concepts	  in	  order	  to	  find	  agreement,	  then	  we	  are	  stuck	  in	  the	  only	  scheme	  we	  can	  ever	  know,	  
the	  one	  we	  are	  in.	  	  Forster	  notices	  that	  Davidson’s	  paradox	  rests	  on	  a	  positivist	  theory	  of	  
meaning	  and	  understanding	  in	  which	  meaning,	  understanding	  and	  interpretation	  have	  a	  
particular	  relationship.	  	  Recall	  from	  1.1	  that	  meaning	  is	  understood	  contextually—in	  the	  
context	  of	  a	  language	  with	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  semantic	  rules.	  	  An	  account	  of	  meaning	  is	  a	  
theoretical	  explanation	  of	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  that	  can	  apply	  to	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  new	  
sentences	  in	  that	  language.	  	  Interpretation	  is	  based	  on	  evidence,	  which	  includes	  evidence	  
indicating	  the	  beliefs,	  desires	  and	  intentions	  of	  the	  speaker.	  	  Interpretation	  is	  made	  possible	  
through	  charity,	  the	  presumption	  that	  the	  other	  speaker	  is	  using	  their	  language	  correctly,	  and	  
that	  what	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  true	  is	  causally	  related	  to	  their	  beliefs.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  understanding	  
a	  language	  requires	  an	  understanding	  of	  this	  theory	  of	  meaning,	  to	  the	  exception	  of	  all	  other	  
theories	  of	  meaning.	  
Given	  this	  positivist	  approach	  to	  meaning,	  Forster	  argues,	  the	  descriptive	  resources	  of	  
an	  interpreter	  are	  limited	  to	  concepts	  that	  the	  interpreter	  already	  had,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  
encountered	  in	  reality.63	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  interpreter	  could	  only	  attribute	  the	  conceptual	  
content	  to	  the	  other	  speaker	  if	  the	  interpreter	  believed	  that	  the	  other	  had	  also	  encountered	  
them,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  in	  reality.	  	  Hence,	  the	  interpreter	  and	  the	  other	  speaker	  must	  share	  the	  
following	  features;	  first,	  they	  must	  possess	  in	  common	  the	  same	  descriptive	  concepts,	  which	  
apply	  to	  the	  same	  reality,	  and	  as	  such	  are	  used	  by	  both	  interpreter	  and	  the	  other	  speaker	  as	  
concepts	  causally	  conditioned	  by	  reality.64	  
The	  problem,	  Forster	  argues,	  with	  a	  positivist	  theory	  of	  meaning	  is	  that	  it	  severely	  limits	  
interpretive	  resources.	  	  The	  degree	  of	  agreement	  necessary	  to	  make	  interpretation	  possible	  is	  
established	  prior	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  interpretation,	  and	  that	  eliminates	  the	  possibility	  of	  gaining	  
anything	  from	  the	  process	  of	  evaluating	  the	  results	  of	  interpretation	  in	  historical	  or	  cultural	  
context.65	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  By	  collapsing	  the	  distinction	  between	  scheme	  and	  world,	  language	  is	  a	  construction	  that	  is	  linked	  to	  what	  it	  is	  
about.	  	  Talking	  about	  a	  concept	  is,	  in	  part,	  encountering	  the	  concept	  in	  reality.	  	  
64	  Forster,	  “Denying,”	  155.	  
65	  Note	  that	  Forester	  is	  assessing	  an	  implication	  of	  Davidson’s	  theory	  because	  strictly	  speaking,	  Davidson	  does	  not	  




The	  interpreter	  must	  in	  large	  measure	  find	  anyone	  whom	  he	  interprets	  to	  possess	  
descriptive	  concepts	  which	  he	  himself	  already	  uses,	  which	  moreover	  have	  application	  to	  
reality,	  and	  which	  in	  addition	  are	  used	  by	  the	  person	  in	  question	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  
caused	  in	  him	  by	  real	  instances.66	  
	  
The	  positivist	  approach	  does	  not	  promote	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  precisely	  because	  it	  eliminates	  the	  
potential	  for	  error	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  the	  impetus	  to	  engage	  in	  trials	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
discovering	  errors.	  	  This	  tendency,	  to	  confirm	  by	  seeking	  out	  what	  we	  already	  affirm	  rather	  than	  
to	  seek	  out	  that	  which	  would	  challenge	  what	  we	  affirm,	  has	  become	  known	  as	  a	  cognitive	  bias.	  	  	  
The	  term	  ‘confirmation	  bias’	  was	  coined	  in	  the	  60’s	  by	  psychologist	  Peter	  Wason	  after	  a	  
series	  of	  experiments	  designed	  to	  test	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  cognitive	  bias—a	  bias	  that	  explains	  why	  
people	  consistently	  commit	  logical	  errors	  in	  reasoning.67	  	  The	  original	  experiment	  was	  quite	  
simple.	  	  Participants	  were	  shown	  pairs	  of	  numbers,	  given	  a	  hypothesis	  and	  then	  asked	  to	  test	  
the	  hypothesis.	  	  In	  most	  cases,	  participants	  chose	  to	  test	  pairs	  of	  numbers	  that	  they	  could	  
reasonably	  expect	  to	  confirm	  the	  hypotheses,	  rather	  than	  those	  that	  they	  could	  expect	  to	  
challenge	  the	  hypotheses.	  	  Since	  then,	  the	  term	  has	  often	  been	  confused	  with	  ideas	  that	  
challenge	  the	  objectivity	  of	  the	  experimentation	  process	  such	  as	  experimental	  bias	  or	  observer	  
bias.	  	  However,	  by	  using	  only	  pairs	  of	  numbers,	  Wason’s	  experiment	  was	  devised	  in	  such	  a	  way	  
that	  both	  the	  experimenters	  and	  the	  participants’	  pre-­‐experiment	  commitments	  were	  not	  a	  
factor	  in	  their	  choices.	  	  The	  original	  experiment	  simply	  showed	  a	  cognitive	  tendency	  to	  choose	  a	  
course	  of	  action	  that	  will	  confirm	  a	  hypothesis,	  rather	  than	  to	  choose	  options	  that	  might	  
challenge	  the	  given	  hypothesis.	  	  	  
	   	  A	  cultural	  confirmation	  bias	  functions	  to	  affirm	  familiar	  concepts	  and	  constructs	  while	  
undermining	  foreign	  concepts	  or	  constructs	  that	  might	  challenge	  what	  is	  familiar.	  	  Given	  that	  
the	  positivist	  approach	  to	  meaning	  relies	  on	  such	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  agreement,	  it	  functions	  as	  a	  
confirmation	  bias	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  cultural	  status	  quo,	  and	  undermines	  concepts	  and	  constructs	  
from	  other	  cultures	  that	  are	  not	  found	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  intercultural	  agreement.	  	  Forster	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
interpretation	  possible.	  	  It	  is	  fair;	  however,	  to	  describe	  Davidson’s	  theory	  of	  meaning	  as	  positivist,	  as	  there	  is	  no	  
distinction	  between	  scheme	  and	  world,	  hence	  language	  does	  not	  mediate	  between	  the	  two.	  
66	  Ibid.,	  155.	  
67	  Peter	  C.	  Wason,"On	  the	  failure	  to	  eliminate	  hypotheses	  in	  a	  conceptual	  task,"	  The	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  
Experimental	  Psychology	  12,	  no.	  3	  (1960):	  129-­‐140.	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notes	  that	  when	  a	  positivist	  “finds	  himself	  quite	  unable	  to	  assimilate	  a	  text’s	  concepts	  and	  
beliefs	  to	  his	  own,	  his	  characteristic	  response	  is	  to	  deny	  that	  it	  is	  meaningful	  at	  all.”68	  	  Hence	  a	  
positivist	  approach	  to	  meaning	  poses	  a	  significant	  problem	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  diversity.	  	  
Within	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom,	  there	  can	  be	  talk	  of	  difference	  but	  only	  up	  to	  
a	  certain	  point.	  	  Beyond	  that	  point,	  that	  which	  is	  significantly	  different	  lacks	  the	  requisite	  
purchase,	  significance	  or	  meaning	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  in	  a	  dialogue.	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  minority	  
groups	  are	  aware	  of	  this	  problem	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  understand	  the	  differences	  well	  
enough	  to	  attempt	  to	  translation.	  
Proponents	  of	  a	  particular	  view	  will	  often	  appropriate	  the	  terms	  and	  values	  of	  their	  
opponent	  to	  strengthen	  their	  position.	  	  However,	  if	  the	  attempt	  to	  argue	  from	  within	  the	  
opponent’s	  worldview	  fails,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  take	  the	  claims	  seriously.	  	  These	  failures,	  I	  
think,	  are	  instructive	  as	  to	  how	  large	  the	  chasm	  between	  worldviews	  can	  be,	  and	  how	  
significant	  these	  gaps	  are	  in	  political	  dialogues.	  	  Arguments	  from	  the	  debate	  over	  same-­‐sex	  
marriage,	  for	  example,	  illustrate	  the	  convoluted	  strategies	  employed	  in	  translated	  arguments.	  	  
The	  Proposition	  8	  case	  is	  a	  clash	  between	  two	  distinct	  minority	  groups	  that	  is	  mediated	  through	  
majority	  legal	  and	  political	  processes.	  	  Both	  minority	  lobbies	  framed	  their	  claims	  in	  modern	  
liberal	  democratic	  terms—in	  the	  language	  of	  individual	  rights;	  however,	  the	  resulting	  
translations	  are	  not	  equally	  successful.	  
In	  June	  of	  2008,	  the	  state	  of	  California	  became	  one	  of	  the	  first	  in	  the	  US	  to	  give	  legal	  
recognition	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  Just	  6	  months	  later,	  on	  the	  night	  President	  Barack	  Obama	  
was	  elected,	  the	  people	  of	  California	  also	  voted	  to	  affirm	  Proposition	  8	  which	  took	  away	  that	  
right	  with	  one	  line:	  	  Only	  marriage	  between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman	  is	  valid	  or	  recognized	  in	  
California.	  	  The	  successful	  campaign	  to	  affirm	  Prop	  8	  was	  spearheaded	  by	  the	  Coalition	  for	  the	  
Preservation	  of	  Marriage,	  an	  organization	  that	  presented	  itself	  as	  a	  coalition	  multiple	  faiths	  
who	  opposed	  same-­‐sex	  marriage;	  however,	  during	  the	  campaign	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  
Mormon	  Church	  (aka	  The	  Church	  of	  Jesus	  Christ	  of	  Latter-­‐day	  Saints,	  or,	  the	  LDS	  Church)	  was	  
the	  driving	  force	  behind	  the	  movement.69	  	  One	  might	  think	  that	  Mormons	  would	  have	  a	  special	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Forster,	  “Denying,”	  156.	  
69	  Jesse	  McKinley,	  and	  Kirk	  Johnson,	  “New	  York	  Times.”	  Mormons	  Tipped	  Scale	  in	  Ban	  on	  Gay	  Marriage,	  14	  
November	  2008.	  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/15/us/politics/15marriage.html?_r=3&pagewanted=	  
	  42	  
	  
understanding	  of	  the	  need	  for	  special	  rights	  for	  minority	  groups,	  especially	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
alternative	  marriage	  practices.	  	  The	  Mormons	  were,	  and	  some	  fundamentalists	  still	  are,	  
polygamists.	  	  Their	  objection,	  however,	  with	  same-­‐sex	  lifestyles	  is	  that	  they	  run	  contrary	  to	  
crucial	  elements	  of	  the	  church’s	  cosmology	  and	  consequently	  are	  perceived	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  
eternal	  wellbeing	  of	  their	  members.	  	  	  
	   Without	  going	  into	  too	  much	  detail,	  the	  Mormon	  Church	  cannot	  endorse	  any	  lifestyle	  
that	  involves	  alternatives	  to	  the	  traditional	  family.	  	  They	  believe	  a	  series	  of	  ordinances,	  such	  as	  
baptism,	  traditional	  marriage	  and	  celestial	  marriage,	  are	  required	  to	  achieve	  exaltation	  (entry	  
into	  heaven).	  	  The	  highest	  degree	  of	  heaven	  is	  reserved	  for	  those	  who	  fulfill	  certain	  ordinances	  
such	  as	  marriage	  and	  family	  life.	  	  Hence,	  marriage	  and	  family	  are	  not	  only	  important	  for	  this	  life,	  
but	  crucial	  for	  the	  afterlife	  as	  well.	  	  A	  member	  who	  does	  not	  follow	  the	  path	  threatens	  not	  only	  
their	  own	  exaltation,	  but	  also	  threatens	  their	  family’s	  cosmological	  progress.	  	  It	  gets	  very	  
complicated	  very	  quickly,	  there	  is	  talk	  of	  unmarried	  persons	  getting	  into	  a	  low	  level	  of	  heaven	  
as	  slaves,	  fundamentalists	  still	  believe	  polygamy	  is	  necessary	  for	  entry	  to	  the	  highest	  level	  while	  
moderates	  suggests	  that	  belief	  in	  polygamy,	  while	  practicing	  monogamy,	  is	  sufficient.	  	  In	  
addition,	  exaltation	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  God’s	  plan	  for,	  not	  just	  for	  Mormons,	  but	  for	  everyone	  on	  
earth	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  Mormons	  believe	  that	  they	  cannot	  allow	  non-­‐Mormons	  to	  engage	  in	  
practices,	  like	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  that	  run	  contrary	  to	  the	  achieving	  exaltation.70	  
The	  LDS	  church	  actively	  campaigned	  against	  same-­‐sex	  marriage;	  however,	  the	  campaign	  
was	  not	  waged	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  beliefs,	  it	  was	  framed	  in	  the	  language	  of	  rights.	  	  Same-­‐sex	  
marriage,	  they	  campaigned,	  will	  inevitably	  threaten	  religious	  freedoms,	  freedom	  of	  association	  
and	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  	  While	  persecuting	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  community	  by	  campaigning	  
to	  take	  away	  their	  right	  to	  equal	  marriage,	  the	  Mormon’s	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  the	  Mormon	  
community,	  rather	  than	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  community,	  facing	  persecution.	  	  They	  listed	  several	  
undesirable	  consequences	  if	  Prop	  8	  was	  not	  affirmed:	  	  Mormon	  Churches	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  
conduct	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  ceremonies.	  	  Religious	  adoption	  agencies	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  place	  
children	  in	  same-­‐sex	  homes.	  	  Parents	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  teach	  their	  children	  that	  same-­‐sex	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  (accessed	  January	  12,	  2012).	  
70	  The	  church’s	  teachings,	  doctrine	  and	  cosmology	  are	  publicly	  available	  on	  their	  official	  website:	  The	  Church	  of	  
Jesus	  Christ	  Of	  Latter-­‐Day	  Saints.	  2012.	  http://lds.org/?lang=eng	  (accessed	  January	  12,	  2012).	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marriage	  is	  equal	  to	  traditional	  marriage.	  	  People	  who	  spoke	  out	  against	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  
would	  face	  undesirable	  social	  consequences	  such	  as	  being	  labelled	  intolerant.	  	  Consequently,	  
same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  they	  argued,	  is	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  church.71	  	  	  
These	  arguments	  reflect	  a	  complicated,	  even	  internally	  contested,	  worldview	  in	  which	  a	  
set	  of	  beliefs	  inform	  the	  obligations	  that	  underlie	  their	  objection	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  Rather	  
than	  use	  that	  set	  of	  beliefs	  to	  make	  their	  claim,	  they	  opted	  to	  reframe	  their	  claims	  in	  the	  terms	  
of	  the	  majority,	  the	  language	  of	  rights.	  	  It	  is	  clear,	  however,	  that	  something	  is	  lost	  in	  the	  
translation.72	  	  First	  of	  all,	  most	  of	  the	  consequences	  they	  prophesied	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  occur,	  i.e.	  
religious	  practitioners	  cannot	  be	  compelled	  to	  perform	  marriages	  they	  do	  not	  endorse,	  and	  the	  
US	  government	  does	  not	  literally	  legislate	  what	  parents	  teach	  their	  children.	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  
mistaken	  claims	  is	  a	  more	  interesting,	  and	  I	  think	  significant,	  failure	  of	  translation—a	  
misinterpretation	  of	  the	  function	  of	  rights.	  	  	  
Without	  some	  understanding	  of	  the	  Mormon	  belief	  system,	  the	  claims	  seem	  ridiculous.	  	  
Appealing	  to	  fundamental	  freedoms	  (religion)	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  take	  away	  fundamental	  freedoms	  
(equal	  marriage)	  is	  paradoxically	  undermining	  the	  very	  concept,	  i.e.	  ‘freedom’	  that	  supports	  
rights	  based	  reasoning.	  	  Being	  labelled	  ‘intolerant’	  may	  be	  undesirable,	  but	  if	  the	  shoe	  fits...it	  
fits.	  	  Mormons	  are	  not	  known	  for	  tolerance,	  this	  is	  the	  same	  church	  that	  did	  not	  allow	  African	  
Americans	  to	  participate	  in	  temple	  activities	  until	  the	  late	  70’s.	  	  Why	  then,	  should	  they	  think	  
that	  religious	  freedom	  gives	  them	  the	  right	  to	  restrict	  the	  freedoms	  of	  others,	  and	  to	  be	  free	  of	  
the	  label	  ‘intolerant’?	  	  	  
The	  answer,	  I	  think,	  is	  found	  in	  their	  unfailing	  devotion	  to	  their	  own	  worldview,	  and	  the	  
unwavering	  belief	  that	  the	  non-­‐Mormon	  world	  is	  simply	  blind	  to	  the	  truth	  that	  they	  have	  come	  
to	  know.	  	  They	  believe	  they	  are	  the	  benefactors	  of	  humanity.	  	  They	  speak	  in	  non-­‐Mormon	  
terms	  to	  get	  their	  message	  heard,	  not	  only	  to	  fulfill	  their	  own	  evangelistic	  obligations	  but	  also,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Preserving	  the	  Divine	  Institution	  of	  Marriage.	  2008.	  http://www.preservingmarriage.org/	  (accessed	  January	  12,	  
2012).	  
72	  See	  Mary	  Ann	  Glendon.	  Rights	  Talk:	  The	  Impoverishment	  of	  Political	  Discourse,	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  &	  Schuster,	  
1991).	  Glendon	  observes	  an	  “increasing	  tendency	  to	  speak	  of	  what	  is	  most	  important	  to	  us	  in	  terms	  of	  rights,	  and	  
to	  frame	  nearly	  every	  social	  controversy	  as	  a	  clash	  of	  rights”	  4.	  	  While	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  rights	  has	  
devolved	  to	  a	  point	  where	  the	  language	  of	  rights	  is	  an	  inadequate	  means	  of	  expressing	  the	  content	  of	  claims.	  “Our	  
stark,	  simple	  rights	  dialect	  puts	  a	  damper	  on	  the	  processes	  of	  public	  justification,	  communication,	  and	  deliberation	  
upon	  which	  the	  continuing	  vitality	  of	  a	  democratic	  regime	  depends.”	  Rights	  Talk,	  171.	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for	  the	  good	  of	  those	  who	  will	  hear	  it.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  translation	  is	  a	  deliberate	  attempt	  to	  
mask	  their	  premises	  in	  order	  to	  make	  their	  message	  more	  appealing	  to	  non-­‐Mormons	  is	  beside	  
the	  point.	  	  What	  is	  salient	  to	  this	  discussion	  is	  how	  bad	  the	  translation	  is	  when	  working	  from	  
within	  a	  worldview	  that	  differs	  from	  the	  liberal	  rights	  tradition	  in	  significant	  ways.	  	  
In	  a	  conceptual	  scheme	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  only	  one	  worth	  believing	  in,	  where	  obedience	  
trumps	  freedom,	  the	  system	  of	  rights	  is	  not	  an	  ethos	  of	  entitlements	  and	  obligations;	  instead,	  
rights	  are	  tools	  to	  be	  bent	  by	  the	  will	  and	  purposes	  of	  their	  God	  (as	  interpreted	  by	  the	  Quorum	  
of	  the	  Twelve	  Apostles).73	  	  Hence,	  when	  their	  moral	  order	  is	  translated	  into	  the	  language	  of	  
rights	  things	  come	  out	  backwards.	  Liberal	  rights	  meant	  to	  protect	  equality	  are	  used	  to	  defend	  
intolerance	  and	  restrict	  equality	  in	  marriage	  practices.	  	  From	  a	  worldview	  informed	  by	  the	  
liberal	  rights	  tradition,	  the	  Mormon	  claims	  do	  not	  hold	  up.	  	  In	  August	  2010,	  Chief	  U.S.	  District	  
Judge	  Vaughn	  Walker	  overruled	  the	  results	  of	  the	  vote,	  "Because	  California	  has	  no	  interest	  in	  
discriminating	  against	  gay	  men	  and	  lesbians,	  and	  because	  Proposition	  8	  prevents	  California	  
from	  fulfilling	  its	  constitutional	  obligation	  to	  provide	  marriages	  on	  an	  equal	  basis,	  the	  court	  
concludes	  that	  Proposition	  8	  is	  unconstitutional."74	  	  	  
One	  might	  argue	  that	  the	  differences	  reflected	  in	  this	  debate	  are	  modest	  and	  local,	  
merely	  differences	  of	  belief.	  	  The	  Davidsonian	  response	  is	  easy	  to	  anticipate.	  	  The	  mistake,	  the	  
mistake	  made	  by	  both	  sides,	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  one’s	  own	  scheme	  is	  the	  only	  scheme,	  that	  one’s	  
own	  language	  is	  the	  only	  functional	  expression	  of	  political	  reality.	  	  Forster’s	  reading	  of	  Davidson	  
is	  a	  controversial	  one;	  however,	  I	  think	  the	  point	  is	  a	  fair	  one,	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  other	  
schemes	  out	  there	  when	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  different	  schemes	  out	  there	  can	  never	  be	  
shown	  seems	  to	  render	  the	  notion	  of	  radical	  difference	  quite	  trivial.	  	  To	  make	  sense	  of	  cultural	  
difference	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  minority	  rights	  claims	  are	  considered	  first,	  intelligible	  and	  second,	  
legitimate,	  room	  must	  be	  made	  for	  cultures	  in	  which	  alternate	  schemes	  are	  a	  negotiable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  The	  LDS	  church	  claims	  their	  entitlement,	  to	  freedom	  of	  religion,	  without	  regard	  for	  their	  obligation	  to	  respect	  
the	  rights	  of	  other	  citizens.	  	  Glendon	  observes	  that	  contemporary	  rights	  discourse	  “seems	  to	  condone	  acceptance	  
of	  the	  benefits	  of	  living	  in	  a	  democratic	  social	  welfare	  state,	  without	  accepting	  the	  corresponding	  personal	  and	  
civic	  obligations.”	  Rights	  Talk,	  14.	  
74	  Quote	  available	  from	  “Excerpts	  From	  the	  Judge's	  Ruling	  on	  Proposition	  8.”	  New	  York	  Times.	  5	  August	  2010.	  
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE6D8163EF936A3575BC0A9669D8B63&ref=californiasprop
osition8samesexmarriage	  (accessed	  January	  12,	  2012).	  	  For	  more	  information	  see	  Jesse	  McKinley	  and	  John	  
Schwartz.	  “Court	  Rejects	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  Ban	  in	  California.”	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	  4	  August	  2010.	  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/05/us/05prop.html	  (accessed	  January	  12,	  2012).	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reality—room	  for	  cultural	  reasoning	  informed	  by	  alternatives	  to	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  
have’	  idiom.	  	  	  
The	  picture	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  that	  emerges	  when	  looking	  at	  cases	  is	  not	  one	  of	  
merely	  radical	  difference	  nor	  of	  modest	  difference;	  instead,	  it	  is	  a	  picture	  of	  difference	  that	  
functions	  on	  multiple	  levels.	  	  In	  some	  cases	  cultures	  share	  many	  similar	  descriptive	  concepts,	  
which	  apply	  to	  the	  same	  reality,	  and	  as	  such	  are	  shared	  concepts	  causally	  conditioned	  by	  
reality.	  	  When	  two	  cultures	  share	  a	  common	  theory	  of	  meaning,	  interpretation	  and	  
understanding	  the	  differences	  encountered	  are	  modest	  and	  local.	  	  However,	  the	  cultural	  
differences	  encountered	  in	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  this	  level	  of	  difference.	  	  The	  
conversely	  convoluted	  arguments	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  rights	  dialogue	  over	  Prop	  8	  show	  just	  how	  
deep	  difference	  can	  run	  and	  how	  those	  differences	  can	  impact	  political	  dialogue.	  	  	  
Similarly,	  the	  way	  the	  Cree	  attribute	  intentions	  to	  natural	  phenomena	  is	  significantly	  
different	  from	  the	  majority	  worldview.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  those	  differences	  are	  radical	  is	  not	  
important,	  what	  is	  important	  is	  to	  recognize	  that	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  difference—
significant	  enough	  to	  make	  dialogue	  between	  worldviews	  difficult.	  	  However,	  if	  we	  can,	  over	  
time,	  come	  to	  understand	  radically	  different	  schemes	  by	  acquiring	  new	  concepts,	  then	  
unintelligibility	  only	  holds	  if	  we	  are	  confined	  to	  the	  concepts	  we	  have.	  	  This	  sort	  of	  stasis,	  
however,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  reflect	  the	  nature	  of	  languages	  or	  practices	  of	  interpretation.	  	  As	  a	  
result,	  the	  on-­‐going	  processes	  of	  evaluating	  the	  results	  of	  interpretation	  and	  extending	  
resources	  as	  needed	  to	  facilitate	  intercultural	  understanding	  supports	  a	  much	  greater	  degree	  of	  
potentially	  intelligible	  cultural	  difference	  and	  as	  such	  leaves	  room	  for	  the	  level	  of	  cultural	  
relativism	  necessary	  to	  support	  claims	  from	  alternative	  frameworks.	  
When	  we	  look	  at	  presumptions	  of	  moral	  superiority	  and	  failures	  of	  translation	  within	  
the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  the	  step	  from	  ‘having	  no	  reason	  
to	  believe	  distinct	  schemes	  exist’,	  to	  ‘believing	  no	  other	  schemes	  exists’	  impacts	  political	  
dialogue.	  	  Whether	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  those	  operating	  within	  different	  frameworks	  are	  wrong,	  
or	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  scheme	  available,	  the	  charge	  of	  paradox	  ends	  the	  
dialogue	  before	  the	  two	  parties	  have	  effectively	  engaged	  one	  another.	  	  The	  worry,	  then,	  is	  that	  
political	  institutions	  shaped	  by	  a	  particular	  idiom	  functionally	  exclude	  some	  groups	  on	  the	  basis	  
	  46	  
	  
of	  their	  worldview	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  undermine	  deep	  diversity.	  	  I	  now	  go	  on	  to	  examine	  two	  
cases,	  in	  which	  claims	  of	  institutional	  bias	  are	  levied	  against	  liberal	  democratic	  institutions.	  
1.3	  What	  We	  Have	  is	  Not	  What	  They	  Have	  
Religious	  groups	  argue	  that	  secular	  institutions	  fail	  to	  recognize	  religious	  reasons	  and	  therefore	  
cannot	  negotiate	  claims	  made	  from	  religious	  worldviews	  on	  equal	  terms.	  	  Similarly,	  minority	  
cultures	  argue	  that	  the	  institutions	  that	  service	  majority	  culture	  functionally	  exclude	  alternative	  
values	  systems,	  communication	  styles	  and	  reasoning	  styles.	  	  Although	  the	  distinction	  between	  
religious	  minorities	  and	  cultural	  minorities	  is	  exceedingly	  complex,	  in	  these	  particular	  types	  of	  
claims	  they	  share	  a	  common	  ground.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  explore	  two	  cases	  where	  minority	  
groups	  claim	  legal	  institutions	  illegitimately	  exclude	  what	  they	  consider	  crucial	  to	  their	  claims.	  	  	  
Although	  the	  minority	  groups	  in	  these	  examples	  are	  very	  different,	  both	  groups	  face	  the	  
dialogue	  ending	  implication	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  and	  both	  argue	  that	  their	  claims	  
were	  not	  given	  a	  fair	  hearing	  because	  institutional	  biases	  discredit	  key	  features	  of	  their	  
worldview.	  	  Both	  cases	  illustrate	  what	  is	  important	  to	  the	  larger	  argument;	  that	  the	  minority	  
rights	  paradox	  ends	  the	  dialogue	  and	  that	  the	  dialogue	  ends	  because	  the	  minority	  claim	  is	  
thought	  to	  employ	  faulty	  reasoning.	  	  However,	  these	  cases	  show	  that	  the	  standard	  of	  
evaluation	  is	  far	  from	  a	  formal,	  objective	  or	  neutral	  analysis	  because	  it	  exerts	  a	  decidedly	  liberal	  
bias.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  that	  bias	  can	  be	  justified	  is	  taken	  up	  in	  chapter	  2,	  but	  before	  that,	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  explore	  claims	  of	  bias,	  and	  how,	  it	  is	  argue,	  those	  biases	  function	  to	  exclude	  the	  
claims	  put	  forward	  by	  some	  minority	  groups.	  
Uniform	  Diversity	  
One	  of	  the	  more	  troubling	  implications	  of	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom	  is	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  claims	  shaped	  by	  worldviews	  that	  do	  not	  harmonize	  with	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  
what	  we	  have’	  idiom.	  	  In	  1.1	  I	  suggested	  that	  religious	  worldviews	  are	  one	  such	  example,	  where	  
the	  tenets	  of	  faith	  shape	  belief	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  notion	  of	  the	  truth,	  an	  objective	  standard	  
against	  which	  the	  rightness	  or	  wrongness	  of	  conceptual	  schemes	  can	  be	  measured.	  	  The	  
process	  of	  religious	  conversion	  necessitates	  an	  awakening	  to	  the	  truth	  which	  then	  significantly	  
alters	  how	  the	  convert	  views	  and	  talks	  about	  the	  world.	  	  Hence,	  religious	  fundamentalists	  do	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not	  see	  the	  world	  like	  Davidson	  or	  Tarsky;	  they	  do	  not	  see	  truth	  as	  relative	  to	  the	  language	  in	  
which	  it	  was	  spoken.	  	  Truth	  is	  objective,	  timeless	  and	  accessible	  (to	  varying	  degrees).	  	  Religious	  
persons	  who	  subscribe	  to	  this	  alternative	  conceptual	  framework	  find	  themselves	  disadvantaged	  
when	  dealing	  with	  liberal	  institutions.	  
In	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins,	  a	  case	  often	  cited	  in	  the	  literature,	  religious	  fundamentalist	  
parents	  objected	  to	  a	  program	  called	  “critical	  reading”	  because	  it	  exposed	  their	  children	  to	  
alternative	  ideas—ideas	  that	  ran	  contrary	  to	  their	  belief	  system.	  	  The	  school	  board,	  and	  
eventually	  the	  courts,	  responded	  that	  exposing	  a	  child	  to	  alternative	  ideas	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  
teaching	  or	  indoctrinating	  a	  child.75	  	  However,	  the	  exposure/indoctrination	  distinction	  is	  very	  
hard	  to	  navigate	  in	  a	  psychology	  based	  on	  original	  sin,	  where	  the	  very	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  
rationally	  adjudicate	  between	  conflicting	  belief-­‐systems	  is	  questionable.	  	  The	  truth	  of	  the	  
fundamentalist	  belief	  system	  is	  not	  necessarily	  revealed	  through	  reason.	  	  Their	  belief	  system	  
may	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  best	  rational	  approach	  to	  life	  and	  meaning,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
rationality	  of	  the	  system	  that	  makes	  it	  the	  right	  belief	  system.	  	  It	  is	  the	  right	  belief	  system,	  
simply	  because	  it	  is—the	  fact	  of	  its	  rightness	  is	  discovered	  through	  faith.	  	  One	  might,	  in	  this	  
worldview,	  choose	  between	  belief	  systems,	  but	  one	  cannot	  question	  the	  rightness	  of	  the	  
worldview	  itself.	  	  Hence	  the	  parents	  argued	  that	  the	  courts’	  decision	  was	  framed	  in	  the	  very	  
terms	  to	  which	  they	  objected	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  terms	  that	  presuppose	  a	  rational	  capacity	  for	  
analytical	  detachment	  not	  recognized	  in	  the	  fundamentalist	  frame.76	  	  	  
There	  is	  a	  wealth	  of	  literature	  on	  critical	  thinking	  and	  most	  of	  the	  skills	  taught	  in	  the	  
program	  are	  not	  a	  problem	  for	  fundamentalists.	  	  Many	  features	  of	  critical	  thinking	  are	  not	  
unlike	  the	  tools	  of	  a	  common	  religious	  practice—the	  careful	  study	  of	  sacred	  texts.	  	  The	  critical	  
thinker	  seeks	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  texts	  contextually	  within	  its	  own	  historical,	  social	  and	  
political	  context.	  	  Students	  are	  taught	  to	  evaluate	  the	  credibility	  of	  appeals,	  from	  emotional	  to	  
evidentiary	  appeals.	  	  Logical	  strengths	  or	  weakness	  are	  revealed	  through	  the	  process	  of	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76	  In	  Liberal	  Pluralism:	  The	  Implications	  of	  Value	  Pluralism	  for	  Political	  Theory	  and	  Practice,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press.,	  2002),	  Ch.	  8,	  William	  A.	  Galston	  observes	  a	  tendency	  in	  contemporary	  liberal	  thought,	  to	  favour	  
certain	  ways	  of	  thinking	  over	  others.	  	  The	  Socratic	  idea,	  the	  unexamined	  life	  is	  not	  worth	  living,	  underpins	  biases	  
against	  faith	  based	  ways	  of	  life	  that	  appear	  to	  set	  limits	  on	  what	  is	  worthy	  of	  examination.	  	  However,	  citizens	  of	  a	  
free	  society,	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  free,	  must	  be	  free	  to	  choose	  the	  unexamined	  life.	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summarizing	  and	  outlining.	  	  It	  is	  process	  by	  which	  scholars	  (of	  any	  age,	  race,	  creed,	  etc.)	  learn	  
to	  distinguish	  between	  fact	  and	  opinion	  by	  uncovering	  presuppositions	  and	  by	  asking	  questions	  
to	  expand	  their	  own	  understanding	  of	  the	  text.	  	  All	  these	  skills	  are	  as	  applicable	  to	  religious	  
study	  as	  any	  other	  type	  of	  study;	  however,	  there	  is	  one	  tool	  in	  the	  critical	  thinker’s	  toolbox	  that	  
is	  most	  often	  cited	  as	  contrary	  to	  faith-­‐based	  living:	  	  When	  the	  text	  challenges	  the	  young	  
scholar’s	  beliefs	  and	  values,	  he	  or	  she	  must	  re-­‐examine	  her	  or	  his	  beliefs	  and	  values.	  	  	  
Students	  are	  taught	  to	  systematically	  look	  for	  patterns	  in	  the	  ideas	  or	  concepts	  that	  
challenge	  their	  personal	  attitudes,	  i.e.	  to	  reflect	  upon	  their	  own	  beliefs	  and	  values.	  	  Then	  the	  
student	  engages	  the	  challenge	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  text	  by	  examining	  the	  internal	  coherence	  of	  
their	  personal	  package	  of	  presuppositions	  and	  the	  social	  implications	  of	  those	  beliefs	  and	  
values.	  	  The	  fundamentalist	  parents	  claim	  certain	  beliefs	  are	  the	  bedrock	  of	  faith	  and	  as	  such,	  
simply	  cannot	  be	  examined	  as	  if	  they	  might	  be	  subject	  to	  revision.	  	  To	  think	  that	  we	  can	  
critically	  examine	  such	  fundamental	  truths,	  such	  as	  creation	  v.	  evolution,	  is	  the	  hubris	  of	  the	  
non-­‐believer.	  	  Hence,	  fundamentalist	  parents	  do	  not	  want	  their	  children	  led	  to	  believe	  what	  is	  
false	  in	  their	  worldview—that	  certain	  facts	  of	  faith	  are	  subject	  to	  scrutiny.	  
Critical	  thinking	  asks	  the	  fundamentalist	  children	  to	  shape	  their	  identity	  according	  to	  
what	  the	  courts	  called	  “compelling	  state	  interests”	  which	  range	  from	  teaching	  children	  how	  to	  
approach	  controversial	  ideas	  to	  avoiding	  disruptions	  in	  the	  classroom.77	  	  Allowing	  students	  to	  
work	  from	  alternative	  reading	  materials	  would	  result	  in	  far	  more	  requests	  for	  special	  programs	  
than	  the	  public	  school	  system	  could	  feasibly	  offer.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  students	  learn	  valuable	  
lessons	  such	  as	  tolerance	  and	  how	  to	  approach	  competing	  beliefs	  and	  values	  in	  productive	  and	  
thoughtful	  ways.	  	  This	  collection	  of	  interests,	  the	  court	  responded,	  does	  not	  promote	  unyielding	  
adherence	  to	  a	  set	  of	  fixed	  beliefs	  on	  faith;	  instead,	  recognizing	  the	  fallibility	  of	  what	  is	  known	  
or	  considered	  true	  encourages	  a	  healthy	  curiosity.	  	  Of	  course	  for	  fundamentalists,	  there	  is	  
nothing	  healthy	  about	  being	  taught	  to	  believe	  what	  is	  simply	  not	  true.	  	  It	  is	  as	  though	  the	  tree	  
of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  good	  and	  evil	  grows	  in	  the	  classroom	  and	  the	  state	  wantonly	  hands	  apples	  
to	  the	  innocent	  children.	  	  These	  fundamentalists	  are	  unable	  to	  imagine	  functioning	  in	  the	  world	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without	  their	  beliefs	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  they	  take	  issue	  with	  the	  content	  of	  the	  beliefs	  endorsed	  by	  
the	  education	  system.	  
It	  is	  on	  this	  point	  that	  their	  claims	  fall	  into	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  because,	  like	  the	  
MacFarlane	  case,	  their	  claim	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  tenets	  of	  a	  particular	  religion.	  	  Their	  claim	  is	  
based	  on	  the	  right	  to	  religious	  freedom;	  however,	  freedom	  of	  religion	  is	  jeopardized	  when	  the	  
tenet	  of	  any	  one	  religion	  is	  institutionalized	  by	  the	  state.	  	  If	  the	  fundamentalist	  interpretation	  of	  
the	  implications	  of	  original	  sin	  on	  rational	  capacity	  stands	  as	  a	  good	  reason	  in	  support	  of	  public	  
policy,	  then	  that	  interpretation	  of	  human	  rationality	  would	  render	  any	  religion	  with	  a	  different	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  human	  condition	  illegitimate	  and	  thereby	  violate	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  
religion.	  	  	  
Liberalism	  is	  one	  of	  a	  very	  few	  political	  systems	  (if	  not	  the	  only	  one)	  concerned	  with	  this	  
sort	  of	  institutional	  exclusion	  precisely	  because	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  are	  meant	  to	  
be	  free	  to	  pursue	  multiple	  visions	  of	  the	  good	  life	  (so	  long	  as	  those	  visions	  do	  not	  harm	  others	  
or	  destabilize	  society).	  	  The	  fundamentalists	  in	  the	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins	  case	  appeal	  to	  the	  
promise	  of	  pluralism	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  their	  claims	  are	  seen	  to	  countermand	  what	  is	  essential	  
to	  religious	  pluralism,	  the	  equal	  political	  recognition	  of	  multiple	  religions	  in	  society.	  	  In	  the	  
secular	  worldview,	  adhering	  to	  the	  prescriptions	  and	  tenets	  of	  a	  religion	  is	  a	  choice	  that	  is	  often	  
characterized,	  as	  it	  was	  in	  the	  McFarlane	  case,	  as	  thinking	  for	  oneself	  versus	  subordinating	  
one’s	  reason	  to	  something	  outside	  one’s	  self—an	  external	  authority.	  	  From	  the	  liberal	  
perspective,	  making	  claims	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  any	  the	  tenets	  of	  one	  religion	  is	  unreasonable	  
because	  the	  state	  cannot	  give	  political	  recognition	  to	  one	  religion	  over	  another.	  	  	  
The	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins	  case	  illustrates	  the	  problem	  of	  pluralism	  in	  uneasy	  terms.	  	  
Religious	  fundamentalists,	  of	  certain	  sects,	  are	  not	  known	  for	  tolerating	  alternative	  views	  on	  
truth,	  lifestyles,	  or	  even	  the	  tenets	  of	  other	  religions.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  does	  seem	  that	  the	  state	  
has	  a	  compelling	  interest	  to	  educate	  their	  children	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  
embrace	  and	  function	  within	  the	  diversity	  of	  a	  liberal	  society.	  	  Theorists	  like	  Brian	  Barry	  for	  
example	  consider	  the	  fundamentalists’	  attempt	  to	  subvert	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  liberal	  education	  
system	  as	  a	  type	  of	  mutilation.	  	  If,	  he	  argues,	  they	  were	  deforming	  their	  children’s	  bodies	  the	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way	  they	  are	  deforming	  their	  minds,	  the	  state	  would	  be	  compelled	  to	  intervene.78	  	  However,	  
the	  question	  is	  raised:	  	  How	  diverse	  is	  a	  society	  that	  legislates	  not	  only	  how	  its	  citizens	  see	  the	  
world,	  but	  also	  what	  they	  believe	  about	  the	  world	  and	  how	  they	  think	  about	  the	  world?79	  	  	  
In	  cases	  like	  MacFarlane	  and	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins,	  the	  charge	  of	  paradox	  effectively	  ends	  
the	  dialogue;	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  full	  weight	  of	  their	  reasoning	  has	  come	  to	  bear	  on	  
the	  issue.	  	  From	  the	  fundamentalists’	  perspective,	  diversity	  is	  illegitimately	  constrained	  by	  
institutions	  that	  interfere	  with	  their	  beliefs	  and	  values	  when	  those	  beliefs	  and	  values	  are	  not	  
the	  sort	  of	  threat	  suggested	  by	  the	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins	  case.	  	  Their	  children	  are	  taught	  different	  
reasons	  to	  accommodate	  others.	  	  They	  are	  taught	  to	  suspend	  judgement	  and	  lovingly	  accept	  
others	  regardless	  social	  status,	  position	  or	  standing;	  their	  sense	  of	  civic	  responsibility	  is	  
supported	  by	  different	  premises,	  but	  it	  is	  there	  nonetheless;	  and	  their	  reasons,	  or	  so	  they	  
argue,	  are	  better	  than	  those	  offered	  by	  a	  liberal	  education	  and	  as	  a	  result	  those	  beliefs	  and	  
values	  produce	  better	  people,	  and	  in	  turn	  better	  citizens.	  	  If	  the	  education	  system	  were	  
accommodating	  the	  diversity	  of	  the	  citizenry,	  it	  would	  be	  able	  to	  accommodate	  the	  idea	  that	  
there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  way	  to	  justify	  tolerance	  and	  facilitate	  diversity.	  
And	  Justice	  for	  Some	  
The	  second	  case	  emerges	  in	  liberal	  states	  that	  have	  a	  history	  of	  colonialism.	  	  In	  Canada,	  for	  
example,	  only	  3.71%	  of	  the	  total	  population	  is	  Aboriginal,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  Aboriginals	  make	  up	  
24%	  of	  those	  admitted	  to	  custodial	  sentence.80	  	  The	  Canadian	  Criminal	  Justice	  Association	  
(CCJA)	  published	  a	  Bulletin	  in	  2000	  dedicated	  to	  “Aboriginal	  Peoples	  and	  the	  Criminal	  Justice	  
System”	  which	  identified	  key	  differences	  in	  values	  and	  procedure	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  
problem	  of	  overrepresentation.81	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Brian	  Barry,	  Culture,	  246.	  
79	  Barry’s	  suggestion,	  that	  the	  state	  is	  justified	  in	  imposing	  a	  liberal	  education	  on	  its	  citizens,	  has	  worrisome	  
implications.	  	  Chief	  among	  them	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  dissent	  about	  liberalism	  can	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  ‘educated’	  out	  of	  
citizens.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Chandran	  Kukathas	  argues	  that	  the	  liberal	  state,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  a	  pluralist	  association,	  “must	  
resist	  the	  temptation	  to	  turn	  its	  fiercest	  critics	  into	  compliant	  believers	  in	  the	  liberal	  creed.”	  “Education	  and	  
Citizenship	  in	  Diverse	  Societies.”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Education	  Research,	  no.	  35	  (2001),	  323. 
80	  Statistics	  Canada.	  "Table	  251-­‐0001."	  CANSIM.	  2006.	  http://cansim2.statcan.ca/cgi-­‐win/CNSMCGI.PGM	  (accessed	  
October	  30,	  2009).	  
81	  Robert	  Paiement	  et	  al,	  "Aboriginal	  Peoples	  and	  the	  Criminal	  Justice	  System."	  Canadian	  Criminal	  Justice	  




The	  emphasis	  on	  guilt	  or	  innocence	  in	  the	  Western	  adversarial	  system	  is	  notably	  absent	  
from	  Aboriginal	  legal	  culture.	  	  Aboriginal	  justice	  strategies	  embody	  a	  problem/solution	  model	  
that	  aims	  to	  fix	  or	  resolve	  issues	  rather	  than	  establish	  guilt.	  	  A	  person	  responsible	  for	  a	  crime	  is	  
obligated	  to	  be	  honest	  about	  the	  crime;	  hence,	  the	  notion	  of	  pleading	  not	  guilty	  if	  responsible	  is	  
considered	  dishonest	  (‘responsible’	  does	  not	  always	  entail	  guilt	  in	  Aboriginal	  terms).	  	  Non-­‐
confrontational	  values	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  Aboriginals	  to	  stand	  witness	  and	  testify,	  for	  or	  
against,	  the	  accused.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  Western	  system	  designates	  who	  may	  credibly	  speak	  
about	  what,	  whereas,	  in	  Aboriginal	  justice	  strategies,	  all	  are	  free	  to	  comment.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  
Aboriginal	  demeanours	  such	  as	  avoiding	  eye	  contact	  and	  an	  unchanging	  facial	  expression	  are	  
misread	  as	  signs	  of	  deceit	  or	  guilt.	  	  And	  finally,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  striking	  difference	  is	  the	  
function	  of	  criminal	  justice.	  	  The	  Canadian	  legal	  system	  is	  a	  means	  of	  punishing	  and	  
rehabilitating	  offenders	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  conformity	  to	  a	  system	  of	  law	  that	  protects	  
society.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Aboriginal	  circles	  aim	  to	  restore	  peace	  and	  harmony	  in	  the	  community	  by	  
different	  means—punishment	  is	  not	  the	  objective.	  	  Instead,	  Circles	  and	  peacemaking	  aim	  to	  
heal	  and	  restore	  peace	  for	  the	  victim,	  perpetrator	  and	  others	  who	  have	  been	  wronged	  through	  
a	  process	  of	  building	  relationships	  through	  extended	  dialogue.82	  
Navajo	  peacemaking	  embodies	  Aboriginal	  justice	  strategies	  and	  since	  its	  revival	  in	  1982,	  
its	  success	  of	  has	  attracted	  worldwide	  attention.	  	  Some	  argue	  that	  peacemaking	  calls	  upon	  
human	  universals	  and	  as	  such	  could	  be	  incorporated	  into	  any	  justice	  system;	  however,	  others	  
argue	  that	  peacemaking	  cannot	  be	  severed	  from	  its	  cultural	  context—the	  values	  and	  beliefs	  of	  
the	  Navajo	  people.	  	  Navajo	  Chief	  Justice	  Robert	  Yazzie	  is	  sceptical	  that	  attempts	  to	  package	  the	  
methods	  of	  peacemaking	  for	  use	  in	  alternative	  cultural	  contexts	  can	  capture	  this	  distinct	  way	  of	  
reasoning	  about	  justice	  because	  it	  requires	  what	  he	  calls	  “Navajo	  thinking”.83	  	  Unlike	  European	  
law,	  which	  is	  rational	  and	  therefore	  retains	  a	  uniformity	  of	  process	  and	  procedure	  regardless	  of	  
cultural	  context,	  peacemaking	  is	  a	  feeling	  of	  justice	  that	  draws	  upon	  the	  resources	  of	  not	  
merely	  the	  mind,	  but	  the	  heart	  as	  well.	  	  The	  divide	  Yazzie	  identifies	  is	  based	  on	  a	  distinction	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  Ibid.	  
83	  Chief	  Justice	  Robert	  Yazzie,	  “Navajo	  Peacemaking	  and	  Intercultural	  Dispute	  Resolution.”	  In	  Intercultural	  Dispute	  
Resolution	  in	  Aboriginal	  Contexts,	  eds.	  David	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  and	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  (Vancouver:	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  British	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Press,	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between	  the	  abstracted	  rational	  process	  of	  applying	  universal	  principles	  to	  particular	  situations,	  
and	  a	  process	  of	  embedded	  rationality—of	  reasoning	  from	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  particular	  cases	  
steeped	  in	  cultural	  beliefs,	  practices	  and	  values.	  	  There	  are	  three	  interrelated	  distinctions	  going	  
on	  here,	  reasoning	  from	  principles	  versus	  case	  by	  case	  reasoning;	  the	  universality	  or	  non-­‐
universality	  of	  the	  values	  form	  the	  content	  of	  practical	  reasoning;	  and	  the	  individual	  rational	  
(head)	  thinking	  versus	  the	  social	  feeling	  discernment	  (heart)	  thinking.84	  	  
It	  is	  not	  merely	  the	  role	  of	  justice	  that	  differs	  between	  Aboriginal	  cultural	  contexts	  and	  
the	  majority	  legal	  system,	  the	  concept	  of	  justice	  differs	  considerably.	  	  As	  Bell	  points	  out,	  a	  
typically	  Western	  notion	  of	  justice	  rests	  on	  the	  neutrality	  of	  the	  blindfolded	  lady,	  an	  impartial,	  
independent	  and	  fair	  process.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  notion	  of	  small	  community	  oriented	  justice	  
raises	  fears	  of	  bias,	  and	  because	  extended	  families	  are	  so	  prevalent	  in	  Aboriginal	  communities,	  
nepotism	  is	  considered	  a	  significant	  threat	  to	  fairness.	  	  The	  threat	  of	  bias	  within	  the	  community	  
supports	  arguments	  against	  giving	  Aboriginal	  justice	  tribunals’	  special	  powers	  in	  their	  
community.	  	  The	  rights	  of	  individuals	  within	  that	  community,	  it	  is	  argued,	  are	  under	  threat	  by	  a	  
system	  of	  justice	  empowered	  by	  a	  state	  that	  is	  constitutionally	  obligated	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  
individuals.	  	  	  
The	  charge	  of	  paradox	  in	  this	  case	  is	  based	  on	  fears	  of	  intra-­‐cultural	  hegemony.	  	  
Aboriginal	  groups	  are	  claiming	  the	  right	  to	  govern	  their	  peoples	  according	  to	  a	  distinct	  concept	  
of	  justice—one	  that	  better	  serves	  and	  protects	  individuals	  within	  the	  group.	  	  However,	  the	  
attribution	  of	  group	  rights	  is	  seen	  to	  contravene	  the	  state’s	  ability	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  
individuals	  within	  the	  group.	  	  Aboriginal	  groups	  respond	  that	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  majority	  
legal	  system	  is	  superior	  to	  their	  own.	  	  In	  fact,	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  majority	  legal	  system	  is	  
not	  equipped	  to	  protect	  the	  individuals	  of	  their	  community.	  	  Members	  of	  their	  community	  face	  
special	  challenges,	  not	  faced	  by	  the	  individuals	  of	  the	  majority	  culture,	  because	  of	  the	  way	  
justice	  functions	  in	  their	  worldview.	  	  To	  force	  them	  to	  conform	  to	  a	  system	  of	  justice	  that	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  There	  are	  some	  similarities	  between	  the	  culturally	  embedded	  system	  of	  Aboriginal	  justice	  and	  common	  law.	  	  
Common	  law	  reasoning	  typically	  asks	  about	  what	  makes	  sense,	  or	  what	  judgments	  must	  be	  made,	  within	  the	  
particular	  tradition	  of	  thought	  and	  judgment,	  and	  is	  in	  that	  sense	  culturally	  embedded.	  	  What	  is	  distinctive	  about	  
the	  Aboriginal	  case	  is	  that	  their	  system	  of	  law	  is	  inextricably	  linked	  with	  their	  culture.	  	  Unlike	  common	  law,	  which	  
(in	  form)	  is	  applicable	  in	  various	  cultures,	  the	  Aboriginal	  system	  of	  justice,	  it	  is	  thought,	  cannot	  be	  exported	  
without	  exporting	  key	  features	  and	  many	  facets	  of	  the	  culture.	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do	  not	  understand	  or	  endorse	  is	  violating	  their	  right	  to	  culture	  and	  depriving	  members	  of	  their	  
community	  of	  justice.	  	  
The	  Common	  Ground	  
Both	  these	  minority	  groups	  have	  a	  problem	  with	  legal	  processes.85	  	  But,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
Aboriginal	  peoples,	  liberal	  nations	  seem	  increasingly	  willing	  first,	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  there	  are	  
significant	  conceptual	  differences	  and	  second,	  that	  these	  differences	  in	  reasoning	  styles	  are	  an	  
obstacle	  to	  carrying	  out	  justice.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  much	  greater	  resistance	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  
religious	  groups	  are	  operating	  within	  a	  different	  conceptual	  framework.	  	  	  Religious	  individuals,	  
it	  is	  thought,	  are	  fully	  capable	  and	  able	  to	  operate	  within	  the	  liberal	  justice	  system	  when	  they	  
share	  the	  same	  cultural	  background	  as	  the	  dominant	  majority.	  	  There	  are	  certainly	  many	  
differences	  between	  religion	  and	  culture;	  however,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  liberal	  institutions,	  their	  
claims	  share	  a	  common	  feature.	  	  The	  both	  claim	  that	  liberal	  institutions	  unfairly	  exert	  a	  liberal	  
bias	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  there	  is	  a	  failure	  to	  recognize	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  claims	  shaped	  by	  their	  
worldview.	  	  The	  claims	  of	  both	  groups	  are	  considered	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  
Anne	  Philips	  argues,	  convincingly	  I	  think,	  that	  the	  bias	  is	  in	  part	  shaped	  by	  a	  
presumption	  that	  liberal	  institutions	  function	  on	  the	  objective,	  universal	  ground	  of	  reason	  
which	  applies	  to	  everyone	  regardless	  of	  race,	  creed	  etc.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  majority	  culture	  
presumes	  that	  minorities	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  the	  universal	  ground	  of	  reason	  and	  as	  a	  result	  
are	  confined	  to	  acting	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  culture	  or	  religion.86	  	  This	  sets	  up	  the	  hierarchal	  
opposition	  between	  the	  superior	  liberal	  worldview	  and	  the	  limited,	  shortsighted,	  inferior	  small-­‐
world	  views	  of	  non-­‐liberals.	  	  In	  response,	  minority	  groups	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  think	  that	  
liberal	  institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  legal	  system,	  overcome	  the	  biases	  of	  majority	  culture.	  	  This,	  
then,	  is	  the	  crucial	  point	  of	  contact	  between	  religious	  and	  cultural	  minorities.	  	  Both	  are	  
considered,	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  consider	  themselves,	  to	  be	  non-­‐liberal.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  One	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  think	  that	  the	  problems	  encountered	  by	  Aboriginals	  in	  Canada	  and	  the	  US	  are	  
problems	  with	  the	  legal	  system;	  that	  the	  problems	  stem	  from	  procedural	  differences	  rather	  than	  conceptual	  
differences;	  however,	  procedures	  of	  law	  and	  procedures	  of	  justice	  seldom	  match	  up.	  	  In	  his	  research	  about	  Maori	  
claims	  for	  justice	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  Andrew	  Sharp	  observes	  that	  there	  very	  little	  agreement	  about	  concept	  of	  justice,	  
and	  not	  surprisingly,	  even	  less	  agreement	  about	  what	  justice	  demands	  when	  it	  come	  to	  minority	  claims.	  Sharp,	  
Justice	  and	  the	  Maori,	  2nd	  Edition,	  (Auckland:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1990)	  28.	  	  
86	  Anne	  Phillips,	  Multiculturalism,	  universalism	  and	  the	  claims	  of	  democracy.	  Geneva:	  UNRISD,	  2001.	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In	  both	  cases,	  their	  worldview	  (their	  package	  of	  traditions,	  practices,	  assumptions,	  
beliefs	  and	  values)	  is	  considered	  key	  to	  determinations	  of	  justice,	  and	  this	  worldview	  is	  
marginalized	  by	  the	  liberal	  legal	  system.	  	  If	  these	  two	  minority	  groups	  are	  making	  essentially	  
the	  same	  claim,	  then	  their	  claims	  carry	  equal	  political	  force.	  	  If	  they	  are	  not	  treated	  equally,	  
then	  reasons	  must	  be	  given.	  	  However,	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  idiom,	  it	  seems,	  
cannot	  provide	  us	  with	  these	  reasons	  if	  what	  they	  have	  is	  a	  significantly	  different	  idiom.	  	  These	  
claims	  are	  complicated	  by	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  cultural	  relativism.	  	  The	  belief	  that	  ‘all	  we	  
have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  rebuts	  the	  notion	  of	  relativism	  and	  consequently	  serves	  to	  undermine	  
the	  legitimacy	  of	  claims	  made	  relative	  to	  a	  minority	  worldview,	  and	  perhaps,	  reinforces	  
minority	  scepticism	  regarding	  the	  pre-­‐eminence	  of	  majority	  culture.	  	  	  
It	  may	  be	  that	  the	  worldviews	  of	  fundamentalists,	  Aboriginal	  peoples,	  and	  what	  is	  
characterized	  as	  majority	  cultural	  have	  more	  in	  common	  than	  not.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  the	  
differences	  that	  function	  to	  advantage,	  or	  disadvantage,	  some	  citizens	  and	  not	  others;	  as	  a	  
result,	  it	  is	  the	  differences	  that	  require	  recognition	  in	  political	  dialogue.	  	  If	  not,	  there	  is	  a	  
uniformity	  of	  diversity	  in	  liberal	  societies	  in	  that	  only	  the	  claims	  of	  groups’	  and	  individuals	  that	  
fall	  within	  a	  particular	  idiom	  are	  fully	  recognized	  by	  liberal	  democratic	  institutions.	  Minorities	  
whose	  worldview	  does	  not	  harmonize	  with	  that	  idiom	  are	  seen,	  and	  see	  themselves,	  to	  be	  in	  
opposition	  to	  that	  idiom.	  	  This	  oversimplification	  of	  ‘other’	  reinforces	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
minority	  rights	  claims	  as	  paradoxical	  because	  we	  can	  only	  negotiate	  the	  claims	  from	  the	  
conceptual	  scheme	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in,	  an	  idiom	  that	  has	  a	  particular	  view	  about	  the	  right	  way	  
to	  reason	  about	  rights.	  	  	  
Genuine	  pluralism,	  it	  seems,	  requires	  that	  political	  institutions	  are	  functionally	  able	  to	  
include	  reasons	  from	  the	  many	  worldviews	  of	  a	  diverse	  citizenry,	  rather	  than	  functionally	  
exclude	  the	  claims	  of	  some	  citizens	  because	  their	  claims,	  shaped	  by	  a	  minority	  worldview,	  are	  
thought	  to	  be	  internally	  inconsistent.	  	  Recognition,	  then,	  requires	  that	  political	  arrangements,	  
institutions	  and	  processes	  promote	  mutual	  understanding	  rather	  than	  dismissing	  the	  claims	  of	  
minorities	  as	  paradoxical	  before	  they	  are	  properly	  understood.	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1.4	  Conclusions	  	  	  
I	  have	  described	  the	  anti-­‐relativist	  picture	  as	  an	  idiom.	  	  I	  use	  that	  term	  because	  it	  reflects	  the	  
arcane	  nature	  of	  what	  is	  taken	  for	  granted	  as	  sound,	  obvious,	  even	  thought	  to	  be	  irrefutable.	  	  
The	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  fits	  neatly	  in	  the	  antirealist	  idiom	  because	  Davidson’s	  paradox	  
shows	  just	  how	  difficult	  it	  is	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  and	  by	  implication	  claims	  made	  
relative	  to	  a	  significantly	  different	  culture.	  	  The	  anti-­‐relativist	  implications	  of	  this	  picture	  
presuppose	  that	  we	  are	  confined	  to	  the	  concepts	  we	  have,	  that	  interpretation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  
fitting	  foreign	  data	  into	  our	  theory	  of	  meaning	  and	  understanding.	  	  However,	  the	  fluid	  nature	  of	  
culture,	  languages	  and	  practices	  of	  interpretation	  suggest	  that	  we	  can,	  over	  time,	  acquire	  
concepts	  once	  thought	  to	  be	  radically	  different.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  question	  
the	  paradoxical	  nature	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  and	  to	  avoid	  interpreting	  the	  claims	  shaped	  by	  
alternative	  worldviews	  as	  paradoxical.	  
Even	  so,	  the	  hesitancy	  liberal	  democratic	  institutions	  exhibit	  toward	  culturally	  relative	  
reasons	  and	  reasoning	  seem	  to	  stem	  from	  a	  hesitancy	  to	  recognize	  claims	  made	  from	  
significantly	  different	  cultural	  frameworks—particularly	  when	  the	  claims	  are	  made	  by	  groups	  
who	  see	  themselves	  and	  are	  seen	  as	  non-­‐liberal.	  	  It	  is	  a	  curious	  state	  of	  affairs,	  to	  have	  non-­‐
liberal	  groups	  functioning	  within	  a	  liberal	  society,	  even	  claiming	  liberal	  rights	  to	  engage	  in	  non-­‐
liberal	  practices.	  	  From	  a	  liberal	  democratic	  perspective,	  the	  claims	  are	  paradoxically	  appealing	  
to	  rights	  to	  undermine	  the	  very	  rights	  on	  which	  the	  claims	  are	  based.	  	  The	  paradox	  rests	  on	  the	  
opposition	  of	  worldviews—the	  designation	  non-­‐liberal	  that	  reinforces	  a	  polemic	  based	  on	  
presuppositions	  of	  opposition.	  	  However,	  this	  binary	  framework	  does	  not	  seem	  adequate	  to	  
capture	  the	  full	  range	  and	  force	  of	  minority	  claims.	  
Minority	  groups	  argue	  that	  liberal	  institutions	  exert	  a	  cultural	  bias	  on	  them	  and	  they	  
have	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  liberal	  culture	  is	  superior	  to	  their	  own.	  	  These	  groups	  have	  often	  
been	  cast	  as	  anti-­‐liberal	  or	  illiberal,87	  and	  that	  may	  be	  an	  apt	  description	  for	  some	  groups;	  
however,	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  discussion	  is	  groups	  that	  are	  non-­‐liberal—that	  is	  groups	  who	  not	  
liberal	  but	  not	  necessarily	  against	  everything	  that	  might	  be	  characterised	  as	  liberal.	  	  Hence,	  the	  
first	  step	  in	  coming	  to	  grips	  with	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  is	  to	  look	  past	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  See	  Amy	  Gutmann’s	  introduction	  to	  Multiculturalism	  and	  the	  'Politics	  of	  Recognition',	  ed.	  Amy	  Gutmann,	  (New	  
Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  5.	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oversimplification	  of	  opposition	  and	  unpack	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  claims	  to	  non-­‐liberalness.	  	  In	  
chapter	  two	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  liberal	  and	  non-­‐liberal	  in	  order	  to	  flesh	  out	  an	  
account	  of	  diversity	  that	  extends	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  mere	  opposition.	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Chapter	  2:	  	  Liberal	  and	  Non-­‐Liberal	  
‘Non-­‐liberal’	  is	  an	  interesting	  designation,	  at	  least	  as	  interesting	  as	  ‘liberal.’	  	  The	  terms	  are	  used	  
to	  describe	  something	  in	  particular—a	  political	  ideology	  to	  which	  one	  can	  subscribe	  or	  not,	  in	  
which	  one	  can	  believe	  or	  not,	  with	  which	  one	  can	  be	  identified	  or	  not.	  	  So	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  
say	  we	  are	  liberal,	  or	  not?	  	  Broadly	  speaking,	  liberalism	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  liberty	  and	  
as	  such	  demands	  that	  any	  sort	  of	  political	  coercion	  must	  be	  justified	  or	  legitimated.	  	  Can	  we	  
then	  presume	  that	  non-­‐liberal	  communities	  are	  therefore	  constituted	  by	  un-­‐justified	  or	  
illegitimate	  political	  coercion?	  	  I	  will	  suggest	  not.	  	  Difference,	  in	  this	  case,	  does	  not	  always	  entail	  
opposition;	  however,	  in	  some	  cases	  there	  is	  considerable	  opposition	  to	  granting	  political	  
concessions	  to	  self-­‐proclaimed	  non-­‐liberal	  groups	  situated	  within	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  	  
In	  what	  follows,	  I	  explore	  the	  term	  ‘non-­‐liberal’	  as	  it	  is	  currently	  used	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
dialogues	  about	  minority	  rights.	  	  Not	  exclusively	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  theory,	  but	  instead,	  as	  
an	  umbrella	  term	  that	  identifies	  not	  merely	  political	  ideologies	  but	  also	  distinct	  worldviews	  
complete	  with	  packages	  of	  presuppositions	  about	  what	  is	  right	  and	  good—packages	  that	  shape	  
beliefs,	  values	  and	  practices.	  	  When	  minorities	  makes	  claims	  of	  non-­‐liberalness,	  I	  will	  suggest,	  
they	  are	  not	  merely	  opposing	  liberalism	  understood	  as	  a	  political	  system	  that	  places	  limits	  on	  
state	  interference	  by	  protecting	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals;	  they	  are	  positioning	  their	  worldview	  as	  
distinct	  from	  a	  package	  of	  traditional	  values	  endemic	  of	  liberal	  institutions.	  	  	  
	   The	  scope	  of	  things	  ‘liberal’	  is	  difficult	  to	  discern.	  	  The	  sheer	  volume	  and	  diversity	  of	  
liberal	  theory	  makes	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  liberalism	  and	  what	  is	  non-­‐liberal.	  	  Hence,	  
there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  work	  from	  a	  level	  of	  abstraction	  in	  order	  to	  pick	  out	  the	  features	  of	  liberalism	  
and	  liberal	  institutions	  that	  complicate	  minority	  claims	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  reinforce	  the	  
minority	  rights	  paradox.88	  	  I	  focus,	  then,	  not	  on	  liberalism	  understood	  only	  from	  the	  perspective	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  This	  level	  of	  abstraction	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  examine	  what	  non-­‐liberals	  say	  about	  liberalism	  without	  falling	  into	  
the	  trap	  of	  defining	  liberalism	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  opposing	  viewpoints.	  	  When	  I	  speak	  of	  common	  features,	  I	  am	  not	  
referring	  to	  a	  clearly	  articulated	  set	  of	  principles	  or	  ideals	  that	  inform	  liberalism	  across	  the	  board.	  	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  
a	  package	  of	  presuppositions	  about	  the	  social	  and	  political	  world	  that	  influence	  political	  arrangements.	  	  Jeremy	  
Waldron	  discusses	  the	  impossible	  task	  of	  defining	  the	  core	  ideals	  of	  liberalism	  in	  chapter	  2	  of	  Liberal	  Rights:	  
Collected	  Papers	  1991-­‐1991,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1993).	  	  Understanding	  the	  liberal	  tradition	  is	  
complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  early	  theorist	  like	  Locke	  and	  Burke	  did	  not	  set	  out	  to	  produce	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  
theory;	  they	  produced	  a	  theory	  of	  society.	  	  Those	  early	  theories	  spawned	  schools	  of	  thought	  that	  have	  gone	  in	  
different	  directions	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  have	  produced	  seemingly	  intractable	  disagreements	  about	  what	  it	  means	  to	  
say	  a	  theory	  is	  a	  liberal	  theory.	  	  No	  one	  has	  singular	  authority	  over	  the	  usage	  and	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  liberal,	  no	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of	  the	  ideologue,	  but	  on	  the	  role	  of	  liberal	  ideals	  and	  principles	  in	  political	  dialogue.	  	  As	  this	  
chapter	  progresses,	  it	  will	  emerge	  that	  certain	  features	  of	  liberalism	  limit	  the	  conceptual	  
apparatus	  available	  to	  deal	  with	  claims	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  liberal	  institutions	  falter	  when	  
pushed	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  certain	  theoretical	  underpinnings.	  	  Hence,	  a	  claim	  of	  non-­‐
liberalness	  cannot	  be	  taken	  seriously	  within	  the	  liberal	  framework.	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  non-­‐
liberal	  moniker	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  minority	  rights	  and	  it	  is	  this	  role	  that	  speaks	  
directly	  to	  the	  competing	  arguments	  in	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.89	  	  
To	  begin,	  2.1	  sketches	  a	  type	  of	  liberalism,	  broadly	  construed,	  as	  a	  starting	  point.	  	  Non-­‐
liberal	  minority	  groups	  wish	  to	  distinguish	  themselves	  from	  the	  liberal	  majority	  on	  many	  fronts.	  	  
I	  focus	  on	  three,	  individualism,	  justice	  and	  property.	  	  	  In	  the	  liberal	  tradition,	  the	  concept	  of	  
justice	  is	  oriented	  to	  the	  individual;	  in	  contrast,	  for	  some	  non-­‐liberal	  groups,	  justice	  of	  the	  many	  
is	  a	  social	  and	  relational	  concept,	  which	  differs	  in	  important	  ways.	  	  Entitlements	  and	  duties	  
extend	  beyond	  human	  relationships	  to	  a	  natural	  world	  imbued	  with	  intentional	  beings	  
constitutive	  of	  a	  functioning	  moral	  system.90	  	  As	  a	  result,	  property	  rights	  do	  not	  govern	  only	  
human	  relations,	  but	  the	  right	  to	  land	  entails	  duties	  to	  the	  land	  and	  all	  living	  entities	  associated	  
with	  it.	  	  Despite	  these	  differences,	  the	  claims	  of	  self-­‐proclaimed	  non-­‐liberal	  groups	  may	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
doubt	  some	  self-­‐proclaimed	  liberals	  object	  to	  the	  way	  the	  term	  is	  employed	  and	  deployed	  by	  other	  liberals,	  or	  
non-­‐liberals.	  	  	  
Despite	  the	  lack	  of	  common	  ideals	  or	  ideologies,	  however,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  liberal	  theories	  do	  share	  a	  
common	  approach	  to	  justifying	  social	  and	  political	  arrangements.	  	  Waldron	  points	  out,	  rightly	  so	  I	  think,	  that	  
liberals	  "are	  committed	  to	  a	  conception	  of	  freedom	  and	  respect	  for	  the	  capacities	  and	  the	  agency	  of	  individual	  
men	  and	  women,	  and	  these	  commitments	  generate	  a	  requirement	  that	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  social	  world	  should	  
either	  be	  made	  a	  acceptable	  or	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  acceptable	  to	  every	  last	  individual."	  Liberal	  Rights,	  36-­‐37.	  	  
Bernard	  Williams	  takes	  a	  similar	  approach	  in	  In	  the	  Beginning	  was	  the	  Deed:	  Realism	  and	  Moralism	  in	  Political	  
Argument,	  Ed.	  Geoffrey	  Hawthorn.	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2005)	  3-­‐7.	  Rather	  than	  identifying	  what	  
might	  be	  considered	  the	  essential	  ideas	  or	  core	  principles	  of	  a	  theory,	  he	  looks	  at	  how	  different	  political	  theories	  
have	  sought	  to	  answer	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  first	  question	  of	  politics	  which	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  securing	  order,	  
trust	  and	  the	  conditions	  of	  cooperation.	  	  In	  liberal	  terms,	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  question	  cannot	  merely	  be	  the	  
justification	  of	  the	  dominators;	  it	  has	  to	  legitimate	  the	  use	  of	  power	  according	  to	  its	  purpose	  to	  each	  individual	  
citizen.	  	  This	  legitimation	  does	  not	  have	  to	  take	  liberal	  form;	  however,	  a	  this	  form	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  liberal	  
approach.	  	  In	  cases	  where	  the	  paradox	  poses	  a	  problem	  for	  minorities,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  the	  sticking	  point	  seems	  
to	  be	  a	  package	  of	  features	  that	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  features	  of	  a	  liberal	  approach	  to	  political	  arrangements.	  
89	  There	  are	  some	  points	  of	  contact	  between	  the	  liberal/non-­‐liberal	  distinction	  and	  the	  differences	  articulated	  
through	  the	  individualism/communitarianism	  debate;	  however,	  the	  idiosyncrasies	  of	  the	  liberal/non-­‐liberal	  
conversation	  are,	  I	  think,	  of	  their	  own	  kind	  and	  therefore	  warrant	  special	  consideration.	  	  	  
90	  The	  notion	  of	  rights	  applying	  to	  non-­‐human	  entities	  is	  not	  entirely	  foreign	  to	  the	  liberal	  picture.	  	  Theorists	  like	  
Peter	  Singer	  and	  Tom	  Regan	  certainly	  extend	  liberalism	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  human	  only	  associations	  in	  Animal	  
Rights	  and	  Human	  Obligations:	  An	  Anthology.	  (2nd	  Revised	  Edition,	  1989.	  New	  Jersey:	  Prentice	  Hall,	  1976).	  
However,	  the	  differences	  I	  will	  address	  are	  something	  specific	  to	  obstacles	  faced	  by	  non-­‐liberal	  minority	  groups.	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successful	  if	  the	  claims	  are	  translatable	  into	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  dominant	  majority.	  	  The	  concern	  is	  
that	  marginalized	  minority	  groups	  are	  unfairly	  burdened	  by	  the	  need	  for	  translation,	  and	  in	  
cases	  where	  the	  content	  of	  claims	  is	  not	  easily	  translated;	  the	  minority	  claim	  is	  dismissed	  
without	  a	  fair	  hearing.	  	  Such	  is	  the	  case,	  I	  suggested	  in	  chapter	  1,	  when	  minority	  rights	  claims	  
are	  simplified	  and	  reduced	  to	  fit	  the	  paradox	  model.	  	  	  
The	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  rests	  on	  the	  presupposition	  that	  a	  paradoxical	  argument	  is	  a	  
badly	  reasoned	  argument.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  take	  an	  argument	  riddled	  with	  internal	  
contradictions	  seriously,	  and	  logically	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  do	  so.	  	  But	  is	  it	  appropriate,	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  a	  political	  dialogue,	  to	  pit	  paradoxical	  in	  opposition	  to	  reasonable?	  	  In	  2.2,	  I	  turn	  to	  
some	  of	  the	  key	  presuppositions	  of	  liberal	  theory,	  chief	  among	  them	  an	  account	  of	  reason	  that	  
functions	  exclusively.	  	  Liberal	  thinking,	  it	  is	  thought,	  is	  the	  correct	  way	  to	  think,	  to	  the	  exclusion	  
of	  alternative	  reasoning	  styles.	  	  The	  presumption	  of	  pre-­‐eminent	  reasoning;	  however,	  has	  shaky	  
foundations.	  	  If	  liberalism	  cannot	  justify	  its	  ahistorical	  status	  as	  the	  product	  of	  reason;	  then,	  
liberalism	  is	  one	  theory	  among	  many	  and	  as	  such	  can	  be	  viewed	  in	  terms	  that	  reveal	  the	  
paradoxical	  nature	  of	  essentially	  liberal	  ideas.	  	  Hence,	  the	  dichotomy	  between	  paradoxical	  and	  
reasonable	  breaks	  down	  as	  an	  adequate	  means	  to	  evaluate	  the	  strength	  or	  weakness	  of	  an	  
argument	  shaped	  by	  a	  particular	  worldview.	  	  	  
2.1	  	  What	  is	  Liberalism?	  	  What	  is	  not?	  
What	  is	  liberalism?	  	  In	  brief,	  liberalism	  is	  a	  contested	  concept.	  	  Liberty	  is,	  of	  course,	  the	  central	  
concern	  of	  liberal	  theory	  but	  even	  the	  concept	  and	  content	  of	  liberty	  itself	  is	  not	  spared	  
controversy.	  	  We	  can	  say,	  however,	  that	  if	  citizens	  are	  to	  be	  free	  and	  yet	  get	  along	  together,	  the	  
system	  of	  governance	  must	  impinge	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  its	  citizens	  in	  various	  ways	  and	  to	  
varying	  degrees.	  	  Whether	  freedom	  is	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  opportunities	  or	  the	  capacity	  to	  
exercise	  freedom,91	  liberalism	  demands	  that	  coercion	  or	  impediments	  to	  individual	  freedom	  
must	  be	  justified.	  	  Berlin	  notably	  presented	  negative	  liberty	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  coercion.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Judith	  Shklar,	  describes	  the	  liberal	  project	  in	  this	  way:	  “Liberalism	  has	  only	  one	  overriding	  aim:	  to	  secure	  the	  
political	  conditions	  that	  are	  necessary	  for	  the	  exercise	  of	  personal	  freedom.”	  	  Shklar,	  "The	  Liberalism	  of	  Fear."	  
Liberalism	  and	  the	  Moral	  LIfe,	  ed.Nancy	  L.	  Rosenblum.	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  21.	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Coercion	  implies	  the	  deliberate	  interference	  of	  other	  human	  beings	  within	  the	  area	  in	  which	  I	  
could	  otherwise	  act.	  You	  lack	  political	  liberty	  or	  freedom	  only	  if	  you	  are	  prevented	  from	  
attaining	  a	  goal	  by	  other	  human	  beings.92	  	  
	  
A	  free	  person	  is	  one	  who	  is	  free	  to	  choose	  and	  pursue	  his	  or	  her	  vision	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  The	  
freedom	  of	  the	  citizen	  must	  be	  protected	  from	  unjust	  constraint	  by	  the	  state,	  and	  by	  other	  
citizens.	  	  What	  form	  this	  protection	  takes	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  debate,93	  most	  of	  which	  is	  
(mercifully)	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  
The	  principle	  concern	  of	  this	  discussion	  is	  the	  term	  ‘liberal’	  as	  it	  is	  understood	  and	  used	  
by	  minority	  groups	  situated	  within	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  In	  this	  context,	  liberalism	  is	  understood	  
as	  a	  package	  of	  beliefs,	  values	  and	  practices	  that	  shape	  a	  particular	  worldview.	  	  The	  conditions	  
of	  pluralism	  necessitate	  accommodation	  of	  multiple	  visions	  of	  the	  good	  life	  and	  the	  various	  
forms	  of	  life	  that	  emerge	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  divergent	  ideals.	  	  In	  the	  conditions	  of	  pluralism,	  
liberalism,	  unlike	  other	  political	  systems	  can	  legitimately	  solicit	  agreement	  from	  its	  citizens.	  	  
Liberalism	  is,	  thought	  to	  be,	  the	  best	  response	  to	  pluralism	  because	  any	  sort	  of	  coercion	  by	  the	  
state	  must	  be	  justified	  to	  each	  individual.	  	  
Within	  this	  worldview,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  characterize	  liberal	  principles	  (specific	  
substantive	  understandings	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality	  chief	  among	  them)	  as	  not	  only	  the	  best	  
principles,	  but	  as	  the	  only	  reasonable	  principles	  on	  which	  to	  base	  political	  activity.	  	  Hence,	  
claims	  shaped	  by	  non-­‐liberal	  worldviews	  are,	  by	  implication,	  unreasonable,	  or,	  more	  
specifically,	  claims	  and	  the	  premises	  on	  which	  they	  are	  based	  are	  considered	  unreasonable	  if	  
they	  do	  not	  harmonize	  reassuringly	  with	  core	  liberal	  principles.94	  	  	  	  	  
When	  liberalism	  is	  viewed	  from	  beyond	  its	  own	  package	  of	  traditions	  and	  values,	  it	  
becomes	  clear	  that	  non-­‐liberals	  are	  objecting	  to	  liberalism	  as	  a	  way	  of	  life,	  a	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  
the	  world	  and	  the	  role	  that	  worldview	  plays	  in	  political	  dialogues	  between	  majority	  and	  
minority	  cultures.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  survey	  three	  points	  of	  divergence	  articulated	  by	  Indigenous	  
peoples	  in	  post-­‐colonial	  liberal	  democracies—individualism,	  justice	  and	  property.	  	  Specifically,	  I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  Isaiah	  Berlin,	  ‘Two	  Concepts	  of	  Liberty’	  in	  Four	  Essays	  on	  Liberty,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press:	  1969),	  122.	  
93	  Taylor,	  and	  others,	  has	  argued	  that	  negative	  liberty	  does	  not	  capture	  the	  full	  range	  of	  possible	  impediments	  to	  
freedom.	  	  The	  exercise	  concept	  of	  liberty	  suggests	  that	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  a	  person	  acts	  must	  be	  such	  that	  
that	  person	  is	  able	  to	  exercise	  his	  or	  her	  freedom	  as	  a	  self-­‐directing	  autonomous	  agent.	  	  Charles	  Taylor,	  ‘What's	  
Wrong	  with	  Negative	  Liberty,’	  in	  The	  Idea	  of	  Freedom,	  ed.	  A.	  Ryan,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press:	  1979),	  175-­‐93.	  	  
94	  The	  idea	  of	  ‘reasonableness’	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  liberalism	  is	  explored	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  chapter	  4.2.	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draw	  upon	  Canadian	  research	  in	  law,	  conflict	  resolution,	  political	  theory,	  education	  and	  the	  
works	  of	  Aboriginal	  theorists.	  	  These	  objections	  are	  not	  entirely	  discrete	  but	  rather	  are	  
representative	  of	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  point	  of	  view	  that	  informs	  a	  distinct	  approach	  to	  political	  
arrangements.	  	  As	  a	  starting	  point,	  I	  briefly	  sketch	  the	  relevant	  features	  of	  individualism	  in	  the	  
liberal	  tradition	  up	  to	  and	  including	  the	  internally	  contested	  concept	  of	  the	  individual.	  	  With	  this	  
rudimentary	  framework,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  how	  non-­‐liberal	  groups	  identify	  differences	  
between	  their	  own	  conceptual	  apparatus	  and	  that	  of	  the	  liberal	  rights	  tradition	  with	  regard	  to	  
the	  individual,	  justice	  and	  property.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  diversity	  within	  self-­‐proclaimed	  non-­‐liberal	  groups.	  	  I	  
draw	  examples	  from	  cultural	  and	  religious	  minorities	  and	  also	  national	  and	  sub-­‐national	  groups	  
who	  share	  the	  designation	  non-­‐liberal,	  what	  else	  they	  share	  or	  do	  not	  share	  is	  incidental	  to	  this	  
discussion.	  	  It	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  offer	  exhaustive	  definitions	  (or	  defend	  such	  definitions)	  of	  
the	  terms	  liberal	  or	  non-­‐liberal,	  or	  to	  set	  out	  a	  complete	  philosophical	  conception	  of	  liberalism;	  
but	  rather,	  I	  intend	  to	  look	  at	  the	  points	  of	  conflict	  in	  which	  these	  terms	  have	  come	  into	  usage.	  	  
As	  I	  stated	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  chapter,	  liberalism	  is	  a	  contested	  idea	  and	  so	  too	  are	  the	  
features	  I	  am	  about	  to	  discuss.	  	  Unpacking	  the	  features	  of	  liberalism	  requires	  the	  recognition	  
that	  internal	  contest	  is	  constitutive	  of	  liberal	  theory.	  	  I	  will	  not	  engage	  the	  internally	  contested	  
concepts	  of	  liberal	  theory	  in	  order	  to	  proffer	  one	  over	  the	  other;	  instead,	  I	  look	  to	  the	  internally	  
contested	  contents	  of	  the	  liberal	  tradition	  as	  the	  best	  explanation	  available	  for	  and	  about	  these	  
features	  that	  figure	  prominently	  in	  minority	  rights	  dialogues.	  	  	  
Individualism	  
Liberalism	  is	  oriented	  around	  the	  individual.	  	  It	  is	  a	  requirement	  of	  liberalism	  that	  each,	  and	  all,	  
individual	  citizens	  view	  political	  coercion	  as	  legitimate.95	  	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  liberal	  society	  is	  one	  
comprised	  of	  individuals,	  and	  the	  aggregate	  of	  those	  individual	  citizens	  is	  constitutive	  of	  liberal	  
society.	  	  Broadly	  speaking,	  for	  a	  theory	  to	  take	  a	  liberal	  approach	  to	  political	  arrangements,	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  The	  liberal	  promise	  is	  political	  legitimacy	  acceptable	  to	  each	  individual,	  even	  those	  who	  deeply	  disagree,	  as	  
Thomas	  Nagel	  puts	  it	  religious	  toleration	  applies,	  “not	  only	  to	  religious	  sceptics	  but	  to	  the	  devout.”	  Equality	  and	  
Partiality,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  156.	  	  A	  legitimate	  political	  system	  is	  one	  upon	  which	  there	  is	  
unanimous	  agreement;	  however,	  the	  agreement	  sought	  is	  confined	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  political	  arrangements	  that	  




must	  be	  concerned,	  among	  other	  things,	  with	  liberty	  and	  the	  theoretical	  moves	  turn	  on	  the	  
liberty	  of	  individuals	  that	  comprise	  political	  associations.	  	  The	  liberal	  society	  is	  comprised	  by	  no	  
more	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  parts	  (individuals),	  and	  its	  parts	  determine	  society.	  This	  sort	  of	  
individualism	  lends	  itself	  to	  a	  formalized	  analysis	  of	  the	  state	  based	  on	  the	  simplest	  common	  
denominator	  shared	  by	  all	  citizens.	  	  A	  common,	  shared	  motivation	  makes	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  
citizenry	  quite	  predictable	  and	  therefore	  suitable	  for	  analysis.	  	  	  
In	  game	  theory,	  for	  example,	  citizens	  are	  primarily	  motivated	  by	  self-­‐interest	  and	  as	  a	  
result,	  cooperation	  occurs	  when	  individuals	  work	  together	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  self-­‐interest.	  	  Self-­‐
interested	  individuals	  simply	  assess	  the	  situation	  and	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  their	  own	  
interests	  are	  furthered	  by	  social	  cooperation	  and	  fair	  distribution.	  	  Cooperation	  facilitates	  
individual	  pursuits	  by	  diminishing	  the	  adverse	  conditions	  brought	  about	  by	  disorder.	  	  An	  
ordered	  society	  is	  therefore	  a	  good	  society.	  	  Morality	  can	  then	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  shared	  
framework	  that	  enables	  each	  individual	  to	  best	  pursue	  and	  potentially	  realize	  his	  or	  her	  
interests.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  individuals	  are	  free	  and	  can	  rely	  on	  things	  like	  property	  rights	  to	  secure	  
order.	  	  Agreement	  or	  consensus	  about	  the	  moral	  framework	  that	  is	  conducive	  to	  maintaining	  
the	  social	  order	  is	  found	  because	  it	  appeals	  to	  the	  self-­‐interest	  of	  each	  individual.	  	  It	  is	  a	  moral	  
framework	  in	  which	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  individual	  freedom	  and	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals	  to	  
pursue	  their	  interests.96	  	  
In	  contrast,	  other	  strains	  of	  liberal	  theory	  are	  not	  so	  much	  concerned	  with	  individual	  
interests	  as	  with	  individual	  perfection.	  	  Freedom	  of	  the	  individual	  is	  not	  merely	  the	  right	  way	  to	  
organize	  society	  but	  individual	  freedom	  is	  the	  good	  of	  society—individual	  freedom	  is	  what	  a	  
just	  society	  aims	  to	  provide.	  	  Freedom	  to	  develop	  or	  to	  pursue	  individual	  perfection	  is	  a	  moral	  
obligation	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  liberal	  rights	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  state.	  	  It	  is	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  state	  to	  secure	  individual	  liberty	  such	  that	  the	  individual	  may	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  
moral	  ideal,	  to	  freely	  develop	  and	  pursue	  his	  or	  her	  own	  perfection.97	  	  The	  perfectionist	  picture	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Hobbesian	  liberalism,	  for	  example,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  individual	  freedom	  and	  security	  are	  necessary	  to	  
enable	  individuals	  to	  pursue	  their	  interests.	  	  Therefore,	  a	  contract	  that	  guarantees	  freedom	  and	  security	  will	  be	  
acceptable	  to	  everyone	  governed	  by	  the	  contract	  because	  it	  serves	  the	  self-­‐interest	  of	  each	  individual.	  See	  Thomas	  
Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  Michael	  Oakeshott,	  ed.	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  1948).	  
97	  John	  Stuart	  Mill,	  for	  example,	  argues	  the	  individual	  is	  the	  locus	  of	  moral	  development,	  “Individuality	  is	  the	  same	  
thing	  with	  development,	  and…it	  is	  only	  the	  cultivation	  of	  individuality	  which	  produces,	  or	  can	  produce,	  well-­‐
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offers	  a	  full-­‐blown	  conception	  of	  the	  good;	  however,	  if	  society	  is	  organized	  around	  any	  one	  
particular	  conception	  of	  the	  good,	  the	  individual	  citizen	  may,	  in	  certain	  circumstances,	  not	  be	  
free	  to	  develop	  or	  pursue	  his	  or	  her	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good.98	  	  
Hence,	  in	  a	  pluralist	  situation,	  society	  ought	  to	  be	  organized	  around	  principles	  that	  
support	  what	  is	  right	  rather	  than	  good.	  	  What	  is	  right	  is	  an	  organizational	  arrangement	  that	  
does	  not	  impose	  a	  substantive	  view	  of	  any	  particular	  good	  on	  citizens;	  principles	  that	  govern	  
such	  arrangements	  are	  those	  that	  can	  be	  justified	  to	  each	  individual.	  	  Social	  morality,	  on	  this	  
view,	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  any	  sort	  of	  constraint	  or	  impingement	  on	  individual	  freedom	  must	  
be	  justified	  with	  good	  reasons.	  	  The	  reasons	  or	  justifications	  given	  must	  be	  commonly	  
understood	  and	  publicly	  shared;	  otherwise,	  they	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  a	  social	  morality	  
and	  therefore	  are	  relegated	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  private	  morality—which	  should	  not	  be	  imposed	  on	  
others.99	  	  Pluralism,	  in	  this	  sense,	  is	  still	  very	  much	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  individual.	  	  Individual	  
freedom	  to	  choose	  and	  pursue	  one’s	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  is	  protected	  by	  privatizing	  
substantive	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  in	  organizational	  arrangements	  of	  individuals.	  
	   The	  picture	  of	  the	  individual	  that	  emerges	  is	  a	  controversial	  one.	  	  Taylor,	  for	  example,	  
argued	  that	  the	  liberal	  individual	  is	  abstracted	  from	  social	  context	  such	  that	  the	  individual	  is	  left	  
with	  no	  basis	  upon	  which	  to	  make	  choices.100	  	  It	  is	  the	  social	  world	  that	  provides	  us	  with	  
reasons	  and	  the	  capacity	  to	  evaluate	  which	  reasons	  are	  better	  than	  others;	  hence	  the	  radical	  
individual,	  if	  such	  a	  thing	  were	  possible,	  would	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  for	  choice.	  	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  
though,	  that	  liberal	  theorists	  are	  projecting	  an	  individual	  as	  devoid	  of	  social	  context	  as	  the	  
critics	  suggest.	  	  Even	  so,	  collectivists	  or	  communitarians	  paint	  a	  very	  different	  picture	  of	  choice	  
and	  of	  choosers.	  	  	  
	   Individuals	  are	  social,	  inextricably	  linked	  with	  the	  social	  world,	  its	  engrained	  routines,	  
unquestioned	  conventions	  and	  background	  conditions	  that	  shape	  choices.	  	  The	  traditional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
developed	  human	  beings…what	  more	  can	  be	  said	  of	  any	  condition	  of	  human	  affairs,	  than	  that	  it	  brings	  human	  
beings	  themselves	  nearer	  to	  the	  best	  thing	  they	  can	  be?	  Or	  what	  worse	  can	  be	  said	  of	  any	  obstruction	  to	  good,	  
than	  that	  it	  prevents	  this?”	  Mill,	  On	  Liberty,	  (New	  York:	  Cosimo,	  2005),	  77.	  	  
98	  The	  liberal	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  is	  one	  that	  is	  meant	  to	  leave	  citizens	  free	  to	  pursue	  it	  or	  not.	  
99	  Ideas	  of	  this	  type	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  great	  reams	  of	  political	  thought	  such	  as	  Kantian	  contractualism	  and	  Rawls’	  
Political	  Liberalism.	  
100	  See	  Taylor,	  “Atomism,”	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Human	  Sciences:	  Philosophical	  Papers	  2,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1985).	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picture	  of	  the	  liberal	  autonomous	  self	  suggests	  that	  the	  individual	  imposes	  his	  or	  her	  will	  on	  the	  
world,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  one-­‐way	  street.	  	  Communitarians,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  a	  two	  way	  
street.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  our	  choices	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  hinges101	  on	  which	  our	  social	  world	  turns,	  
in	  this	  way,	  social	  conditions	  impose	  a	  structure,	  or	  way	  of	  going	  about	  things	  that	  is	  not	  
questioned	  until	  a	  chink	  appears	  in	  the	  armour.	  	  When	  our	  way	  of	  going	  about	  things	  breaks	  
down,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  reflect	  upon	  its	  contents,	  at	  which	  point	  we	  begin	  to	  evaluate	  and	  make	  a	  
particular	  type	  of	  choice.	  	  It	  is	  at	  that	  point,	  when	  an	  accepted	  practice	  (slavery	  for	  example)	  is	  
called	  into	  question,	  that	  we	  shape	  an	  understanding	  of	  ourselves	  as	  abstracted,	  autonomous	  
choosers.	  	  It	  is	  this	  picture	  of	  the	  autonomous	  individual	  that	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  liberal	  view	  of	  
selves.	  
 However,	  if	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  our	  choices	  are	  actually	  the	  product	  of	  engrained	  
routines,	  habits	  and	  the	  backdrop	  of	  social	  practices,	  then	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  abstracted	  
individual	  capable	  of	  reflecting	  on	  the	  social	  milieu	  and	  making	  the	  type	  of	  choices	  that	  occur	  
under	  those	  circumstances	  seems	  to	  account	  for	  only	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  	  A	  type	  
of	  decision	  that	  occurs	  when	  we	  see	  ourselves	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  external	  world	  and	  
consequently	  free	  to	  reflect	  on	  experiences,	  and	  our	  values	  to	  shape	  and	  revise	  our	  conception	  
the	  good	  life,	  and	  take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  means	  by	  which	  we	  are	  pursuing	  that	  vision.	  	  The	  
chooser,	  in	  this	  case,	  develops	  a	  moral	  outlook	  through	  individual	  choice.	  	  However,	  Taylor	  
argues	  that	  the	  abstracted	  individual	  lacks	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  develop	  a	  moral	  outlook—the	  
abstracted	  individual	  cannot	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  moral	  responsibility	  unless	  they	  are	  situated	  in	  
moral	  space.	  	  Moral	  obligations	  and	  commitments	  are	  not	  merely	  invented	  by	  individuals,	  they	  
are	  shaped	  by	  ‘strongly	  evaluated	  goods’,	  goods	  that	  are	  not	  merely	  the	  product	  of	  individual	  
interests	  or	  preferences,	  but	  instead	  are	  located	  in	  the	  very	  space	  the	  liberal	  chooser	  is	  
abstracted	  from,	  in	  the	  social	  context.102	  	  	  
	   The	  so-­‐called	  communitarian	  critique	  calls	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  liberal	  
individual	  into	  question;	  however,	  there	  is	  strong	  resistance	  to	  the	  idea.	  	  Buchanan	  and	  Tullock	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	  On	  Certainty,	  eds.	  G.E.M.	  Anscombe	  and	  G.H.	  von	  Wright,	  trans.	  G.E.M	  Anscombe	  and	  
Denis	  Paul	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishing,	  1969).	  	  The	  Wittgensteinian	  hinge	  is,	  put	  simply,	  the	  axis	  on	  which	  a	  worldview	  turns.	  	  Hinges	  are	  the	  presuppositions	  so	  entrenched	  in	  our	  beliefs	  values	  and	  practices	  that	  they	  go	  unquestioned	  until	  some	  sort	  of	  upheaval	  brings	  them	  to	  light.	  	  Knowledge,	  propositions,	  sense	  material,	  beliefs,	  practices,	  etc.	  may	  change;	  I	  am	  only	  certain	  of	  the	  
hinges	  on	  which	  all	  those	  things	  in	  a	  form	  of	  life	  turn.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  hinges	  are	  absolutely	  static;	  
they	  only	  appear	  fixed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  other	  things	  on	  their	  axis	  of	  rotation.	  	  
102	  Taylor,	  “What's	  Wrong,”	  175-­‐93.	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point	  out	  “the	  human	  individual	  is	  the	  primary	  philosophical	  entity”103	  in	  the	  liberal	  
philosophical	  tradition.104	  	  It	  is	  the	  interests,	  preferences	  and	  ultimately	  the	  choices	  of	  
individuals	  that	  determine	  both	  private	  and	  public	  activity.	  	  When	  the	  individual	  is	  the	  
fundamental	  moral	  unit,	  every	  individual	  is	  accounted	  for	  and	  consequently	  no	  one	  is	  outside	  
the	  scope	  of	  minimal	  moral	  concern.	  	  The	  fear	  is	  that	  special	  rights	  for	  self	  proclaimed	  non-­‐
liberal	  minorities	  threaten	  what	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  aims	  to	  protect—each	  individual.	  	  When	  a	  
minority	  is	  afforded	  rights	  as	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  collective	  rather	  than	  a	  collection	  of	  individuals	  who	  
happen	  to	  share	  group	  membership,	  power	  structures	  within	  that	  group	  may	  infringe	  on	  the	  
rights	  of	  individual	  members	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  runs	  contrary	  to	  the	  individual	  rights	  
guaranteed	  by	  a	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  Claims	  to	  group	  rights	  appear	  to,	  liberals	  of	  a	  certain	  type,	  
fall	  into	  the	  paradox	  model.	  	  They	  are	  claiming	  a	  right	  while	  paradoxically	  opposing	  the	  
legitimacy	  of	  rights	  for	  the	  individual	  citizens	  of	  their	  group.	  	  The	  potential	  threat	  to	  individual	  
members	  of	  the	  group	  is	  regarded	  as	  further	  evidence	  that	  the	  liberal	  project	  is	  legitimately	  
oriented	  around	  the	  individual	  citizen.	  	  However,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  individual	  does	  not,	  
according	  to	  Kymlicka,	  determine	  liberalism	  as	  an	  individual	  only	  enterprise.	  	  Instead,	  by	  
advocating	  the	  pursuit	  of	  equality,	  liberal	  societies	  continue	  to	  recognize	  the	  rights	  of	  
individuals	  belonging	  to	  minority	  groups.105	  	  	  
Kymlicka	  draws	  upon	  liberalism’s	  long-­‐standing	  emphasis	  on	  toleration	  by	  expanding	  
the	  scope	  of	  cultural	  diversity	  in	  modern	  pluralist	  societies	  by	  repositioning	  cultural	  
membership	  in	  relation	  to	  freedom	  and	  equality	  as	  a	  fundamentally	  liberal	  principle.	  	  His	  theory	  
recognizes	  the	  importance	  of	  cultural	  membership	  in	  terms	  of	  individual	  autonomy.	  	  Our	  
choices	  only	  become	  meaningful	  against	  a	  backdrop	  of	  common	  values,	  practices	  and	  history	  
that	  comes	  from	  membership	  in	  a	  culture	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  community	  is	  a	  pre-­‐condition	  for	  
exercising	  agency.106	  	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  say	  that	  we	  are	  free	  to	  pursue	  our	  chosen	  ends	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  James	  Buchanan	  and	  Gordon	  Tullock,	  The	  Calculus	  of	  Consent:	  Logical	  Foundations	  of	  Constitutional	  Democracy,	  
(Ann	  Arbor:	  The	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  1966),	  11-­‐12.	  
104	  Liberalism’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  individual	  is	  seen	  as	  particularly	  problematic	  for	  groups	  seeking	  recognition	  of	  
cultural	  rights.	  	  See	  Vernon	  Van	  Dyke,	  Human	  Rights,	  Ethnicity	  and	  Discrimination,	  (London:	  Greenwook,	  1985);	  
Anthony	  Smith,	  The	  Ethnic	  Revival,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1980);	  and	  John	  Gray,	  “Mill	  and	  Other	  
Liberalisms,”	  In	  Liberalisms:	  Essays	  in	  Political	  Philosophy,	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1989),	  217-­‐238.	  
105	  Will	  Kymlicka,	  Liberalism,	  Community	  and	  Culture,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1989),	  187.	  
106	  Ibid.,	  209.	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rational	  agents,	  but	  then	  to	  remove	  the	  means	  by	  which	  we	  determine	  what	  end	  is	  worth	  
pursuing	  does	  not	  make	  sense.	  	  Agency	  makes	  us	  responsible	  for	  our	  ends	  and	  those	  ends	  
should	  be	  chosen	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  others.	  	  Therefore,	  minorities	  
should	  receive	  the	  respect	  owed	  individuals	  as	  members	  of	  a	  culture	  that	  shapes	  the	  means	  by	  
which	  they	  determine	  ends	  worth	  pursuing,	  i.e.	  exercise	  agency.	  	  	  
Similarly,	  collective	  rights	  claims	  can	  be	  couched	  in	  individualist	  terms.	  Individual	  
members	  of	  a	  culture,	  in	  some	  cases,	  face	  inequalities	  because	  of	  their	  membership	  in	  that	  
particular	  culture.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  recognizing	  special	  rights	  for	  the	  members	  of	  a	  culture	  that	  
redress	  the	  inequalities	  faced	  by	  the	  community	  is	  to	  recognize	  the	  equality	  of	  the	  individual	  
members	  of	  that	  culture.107	  	  In	  this	  way,	  cultural	  membership	  is	  a	  primary	  good,	  positioned	  
alongside	  liberal	  principles	  like	  freedom	  and	  equality.108	  	  However,	  Kymlicka	  stops	  short	  of	  
suggesting	  that	  liberal	  institutions,	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  liberal,	  must	  recognize	  alternative	  
conceptual	  frameworks	  associated	  with	  cultural	  membership.	  	  
Aboriginal	  people	  have	  their	  own	  understanding	  of	  self-­‐government	  and	  that	  is	  
important.	  	  But	  it	  is	  also	  important,	  politically,	  to	  know	  how	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  Canadians—
Supreme	  Court	  Justices,	  for	  example—will	  understand	  Aboriginal	  rights	  and	  relate	  them	  
to	  their	  own	  experiences	  and	  traditions.109	  	  
	  
The	  burden	  here,	  is	  put	  on	  Aboriginal	  peoples,	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  liberal	  worldview	  in	  
order	  to	  make	  themselves	  understood	  by	  those	  with	  political	  authority	  over	  them,	  those	  
steeped	  in	  the	  liberal	  rights	  tradition.	  	  Aboriginal	  philosopher	  Dale	  Turner	  credits	  Kymlicka	  with	  
identifying	  the	  central	  issue	  for	  the	  promise	  of	  pluralism,	  the	  issue	  of	  framing	  arguments	  in	  
such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  can	  be	  understood	  and	  effective	  in	  the	  context	  in	  which	  they	  are	  
presented.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  minority	  groups	  should	  have	  to	  bear	  the	  burden	  of	  
translation.	  
	   The	  expectation,	  that	  minority	  groups	  must	  frame	  their	  claims	  in	  liberal	  terms,	  
presumes	  the	  pre-­‐eminence	  of	  the	  liberal	  picture110—that	  a	  liberal	  approach,	  an	  individualist	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  Ibid.,	  240	  
108	  Ibid.,	  184.	  
109	  Ibid.,	  154.	  
110	  See	  2.2	  for	  more	  on	  liberalism’s	  presumptions	  of	  pre-­‐eminence	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  those	  presumptions	  can	  
find	  justification	  in	  a	  pluralist	  society.	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approach,	  is	  the	  best	  way	  to	  navigate	  intercultural	  issues	  in	  political	  arrangements.	  	  However,	  it	  
is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  this	  presumption	  is	  warranted,	  in	  fact,	  many	  minority	  groups	  openly	  
question	  the	  value	  and	  role	  of	  individualist	  presumptions	  in	  a	  pluralist	  association.	  	  As	  Kukathas	  
notes,	  “To	  try	  to	  reshape	  [a	  culture]	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  ideals	  of	  individual	  choice	  is	  to	  
strike	  at	  [a	  culture’s]	  very	  core.”111	  	  An	  Aboriginal	  minority	  may	  make	  liberal	  claims,	  that	  is,	  
claims	  that	  fit	  the	  framework	  that	  makes	  sense	  in	  a	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  However,	  translating	  
Aboriginal	  reasons	  and	  concepts	  into	  the	  liberal	  tradition	  is	  no	  easy	  task—significant	  values,	  
meanings	  and	  understandings	  are	  often	  lost	  in	  the	  process.	  	  Although,	  it	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  
that	  a	  continued	  dialogue	  expands	  the	  interpretive	  resources	  available	  to	  both	  the	  Aboriginal	  
minority	  and	  the	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  majority;	  intercultural	  relations	  are	  constrained	  when	  the	  
beliefs,	  values	  and	  practices	  of	  one	  culture	  dominate	  the	  relationship.	  	  Hence,	  Turner	  calls	  for	  a	  
political	  dialogue	  that	  recognizes	  not	  only	  the	  liberal	  reasons	  that	  might	  justify	  rights,	  but	  also	  
the	  Aboriginal	  reasons.112	  	  	  
Justice	  for	  the	  One,	  or,	  for	  the	  Many?	  
Even	  when	  cultural	  membership	  is	  recognized	  as	  a	  primary	  good,	  the	  underlying	  principles	  of	  
liberalism	  can	  serve	  as	  stumbling	  blocks	  to	  intercultural	  understanding.	  	  Justice,	  for	  example,	  is	  
understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  individual,	  as	  Turner	  puts	  it	  “liberalism	  privileges	  the	  individual	  as	  
the	  fundamental	  moral	  unit	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  justice.”113	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  the	  individual	  not	  only	  
limits	  the	  type	  of	  allowable	  reasons	  but	  also	  the	  type	  of	  allowable	  issues.114	  	  Turner	  observes	  
that	  most	  Aboriginals	  do	  not	  see	  their	  rights	  as	  something	  conferred	  by	  the	  Canadian	  
Government.	  	  Aboriginals	  see	  their	  rights	  as	  sui	  generis,	  not	  akin	  to	  rights	  protected	  by	  a	  
European	  style	  legal	  system,	  the	  authority	  of	  which	  they	  do	  not	  recognize.	  	  The	  Canadian	  legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Chandran	  Kukathas,	  “Are	  There	  Any	  Cultural	  Rights?”	  Political	  Theory	  20,	  no.	  1	  (1992),	  122.	  
112	  Dale	  Turner,	  Peace	  Pipe,	  119.	  
113	  Ibid.,	  13.	  
114	  The	  distinction	  between	  Aboriginal	  justice	  and	  European	  style	  justice	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  two	  ways,	  the	  first	  is	  
about	  who,	  if	  anyone,	  is	  recognised	  as	  having	  the	  authority	  to	  confer	  or	  to	  recognise	  or	  to	  protect	  rights;	  the	  other	  
is	  about	  whether	  only	  individuals	  are	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  right	  bearers,	  or	  also	  groups.	  	  Kukathas	  explains	  how	  
liberalism’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  individual	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  cultures	  are	  not	  so	  much	  fundamental	  as	  they	  are	  
adaptive—cultures	  are	  constantly	  changing	  in	  responding	  to	  environmental	  conditions.	  	  “Groups	  or	  cultural	  
communities	  do	  not	  exist	  prior	  to	  or	  independently	  of	  legal	  and	  political	  institutions	  but	  are	  themselves	  given	  
shape	  by	  those	  institutions”	  Cultural	  Rights,	  100.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  a	  culture,	  then,	  is	  not	  fundamental	  in	  the	  
relevant	  sense;	  culture	  is	  a	  background	  against	  which	  liberalism	  recognizes	  the	  interests	  of	  its	  individual	  members	  
who	  are	  the	  fundamental	  unit	  of	  concern.	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system	  subjects	  Aboriginal	  peoples	  along	  with	  all	  other	  citizens	  to	  a	  commonly	  shared	  system	  
of	  law,	  and	  understandably,	  the	  legal	  system	  cannot	  undermine	  its	  own	  authority.	  	  
Consequently,	  it	  cannot	  help	  but	  exercise	  a	  bias	  against	  Aboriginal	  claims	  that	  question	  the	  
legitimacy	  of	  its	  absolute	  authority.115	  	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Aboriginals	  situated	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  a	  liberal	  democracy,	  the	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals	  takes	  sovereignty	  off	  the	  table.	  	  Aboriginals	  see	  the	  
political	  relationship	  between	  themselves	  and	  the	  Canadian	  state	  as	  nation-­‐to-­‐nation,	  whereas,	  
the	  Canadian	  state	  sees	  the	  relationship	  as	  citizens-­‐to-­‐nation.	  	  Former	  National	  Chief	  George	  
Erasmus:	  
All	  across	  North	  America	  today	  First	  Nations	  share	  a	  common	  perception	  of	  what	  was	  
then	  agreed:	  	  We	  would	  allow	  Europeans	  to	  stay	  among	  us	  and	  use	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  
our	  land,	  while	  in	  our	  own	  lands	  we	  would	  continue	  to	  exercise	  our	  own	  laws	  and	  
maintain	  our	  own	  institutions	  and	  systems	  of	  government.116	  
	  
The	  Canadian	  state	  asserts	  unilateral	  authority	  over	  Aboriginal	  lands;	  Aboriginal	  nationalists	  do	  
not	  recognize	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Canadian	  state.	  	  Hence,	  if	  they	  have	  rights	  they	  are	  not	  rights	  
secured	  by	  the	  Canadian	  state,	  they	  are	  rights	  against	  international	  interference	  by	  the	  
Canadian	  state.	  	  Justice	  is	  not	  served	  by	  attributing	  rights	  to	  Aboriginal	  peoples	  as	  discrete	  
citizens,	  it	  is	  not	  served	  by	  attributing	  special	  rights	  to	  Aboriginal	  peoples	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  
membership	  in	  the	  minority	  group	  ‘Aboriginal’.	  	  Intercultural	  justice,	  justice	  of	  the	  many,	  
requires	  that	  the	  Canadian	  state	  enter	  into	  a	  dialogue	  with	  the	  First	  Nations	  of	  Canada,	  not	  as	  
the	  governing	  authority	  over	  Aboriginal	  communities,	  but	  as	  an	  equal	  nation.	  	  As	  long	  as	  justice	  
is	  conceived	  in	  liberal	  terms,	  in	  which	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  individual	  citizen	  are	  considered	  the	  
measure	  of	  justice,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  justice	  for	  the	  First	  Nations	  as	  sovereign,	  self-­‐governing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  See	  David	  Kahane,	  "What	  Is	  Culture?	  Generalizing	  about	  Aboriginal	  and	  Newcomer	  Perspectives,"	  Intercultural	  
Dispute	  Resolution	  in	  Aboriginal	  Contexts,	  eds.	  David	  Kahane	  and	  Catherine	  Bell,	  (Vancouver:	  University	  of	  British	  
Columbia	  Press,	  2004),	  31.	  	  Kahane	  explains	  that	  neutral	  adjudication	  occurs	  in	  a	  legal	  system	  when	  both	  parties	  in	  
a	  dispute	  are	  jointly	  subject	  to	  an	  authoritative	  system	  of	  law;	  a	  presupposition	  that	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  all	  cases	  
involving	  Aboriginal	  peoples.	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  definitions	  of	  parties	  in	  the	  dispute,	  and,	  who	  or	  what	  has	  the	  
proper	  authority	  to	  adjudicate	  the	  dispute	  are	  the	  issues	  at	  stake. 
116	  Dale	  Turner	  quoting	  Erasmus	  in	  "Perceiving	  the	  World	  Differently"	  in	  Catherine	  Bell	  and	  David	  Kahane,	  (eds.)	  
Intercultural	  Dispute	  Resolution	  in	  Aboriginal	  Contexts	  (Vancouver:	  Univeristy	  of	  British	  Columbia	  Press,	  2004),	  61.	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communities.117	  In	  addition	  to	  undermining	  the	  self-­‐governing	  authority	  of	  Aboriginal	  nations,	  
liberal	  individualism	  generates	  a	  picture	  of	  intra-­‐cultural	  justice	  that	  is	  foreign	  to	  an	  Aboriginal	  
understanding	  of	  justice.	  
The	  justice	  of	  individualism—justice	  for	  the	  one—is	  something	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  
idea	  of	  justice	  for	  the	  many—a	  socially	  constituted	  concept.118	  	  As	  described	  in	  chapter	  one,	  
respect	  plays	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  the	  Aboriginal	  understanding	  of	  justice	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  
inescapably	  social	  and	  relational.	  	  The	  measure	  of	  criminal	  justice,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  complicated	  
process	  involving	  not	  just	  victims	  and	  perpetrators	  but	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  This	  is	  quite	  
different	  from	  what	  Bell	  calls	  a	  typically	  liberal	  notion	  of	  justice	  that	  rests	  on	  the	  neutrality	  of	  
the	  blindfolded	  lady,	  an	  impartial,	  independent	  and	  fair	  process.	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  
liberal	  legal	  culture,	  the	  notion	  of	  small	  community	  oriented	  justice	  raises	  fears	  of	  bias	  because	  
extended	  families	  are	  so	  prevalent	  in	  Aboriginal	  communities’	  nepotism	  is	  considered	  a	  
significant	  threat	  to	  fairness.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Aboriginal	  concept	  of	  fairness	  only	  makes	  sense	  
relationally,	  by	  removing	  the	  real	  workings	  of	  social	  status,	  liberal	  justice	  is	  missing	  what	  is	  
essential	  to	  fairness—deep	  recognition.	  
The	  recognition	  afforded	  to	  social	  roles	  and	  status	  in	  Aboriginal	  contexts	  is	  also	  
considered	  antithetical	  to	  liberal	  values.	  	  The	  special	  status	  of	  elders	  is	  considered	  a	  threat	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  There	  are	  two	  issues	  here,	  one	  concerns	  the	  political	  status	  of	  Aboriginal	  communities—whether	  they	  should	  
be	  recognised	  as	  separate	  nations,	  or	  as	  groups	  within	  and	  thus	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Canadian	  nation-­‐state;	  
the	  other	  is	  whether	  and	  how	  Canadian	  law	  should	  respect	  and	  make	  room	  for	  Aboriginal	  conceptions	  of	  justice.	  
118	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  justice	  of	  individualism	  is	  not	  a	  social	  concept	  or	  that	  respect	  does	  not	  play	  a	  role	  
for	  the	  individualist.	  	  Institutionally	  focused	  liberalism,	  for	  example,	  can	  be	  considered	  social	  and	  relational.	  	  The	  
difference	  turns	  on	  what	  sorts	  of	  things	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determinations	  of	  justice.	  	  For	  example,	  underlying	  the	  
Iroquoian	  idea	  of	  justice	  is	  the	  presumption	  that	  everyone	  desires	  peace	  and	  peaceful	  relations	  over	  war	  or	  
discord.	  	  The	  Iroquoian	  understanding	  of	  peace	  turns	  on	  concepts	  of	  reciprocity	  and	  renewal	  that	  are	  deeply	  
embedded	  in	  the	  social	  constitution	  of	  their	  culture—these	  are	  not	  principles	  that	  merely	  guide	  political	  activity,	  
they	  are	  concepts	  that	  are	  lived	  out	  on	  multiple	  levels	  of	  association.	  In	  the	  oral	  tradition,	  kinship	  metaphors	  are	  
crucial	  to	  understanding	  the	  justness	  of	  agreements	  (or	  disagreements)	  between	  groups	  but	  the	  structure	  of	  
authority	  and	  power	  in	  familial	  relations	  is	  quite	  different	  than	  the	  traditional	  European	  understanding.	  	  In	  the	  
European	  tradition	  blood	  relations	  determine	  designations	  of	  father,	  mother,	  or	  cousin.	  	  There	  are	  exceptions	  of	  
course,	  adopted	  children	  are	  not	  related	  by	  blood	  to	  their	  parents,	  but	  it	  is	  an	  ersatz	  model	  of	  the	  traditional	  
family	  that	  defines	  who	  is	  in	  the	  family,	  and	  who	  is	  not.	  	  For	  the	  Iroquois	  the	  term	  ‘brother’	  is	  used	  to	  recognize	  
equality	  in	  social	  relations,	  not	  one’s	  position	  on	  the	  family	  tree.	  	  The	  extension	  of	  familial	  terms	  to	  those	  not	  
related	  by	  blood	  is	  a	  significant	  social	  bond	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  a	  concept	  of	  justice	  that	  is	  seeking	  peaceful	  
balance	  on	  the	  grandest	  scale.	  	  Unlike	  gangs,	  for	  example,	  who	  use	  the	  term	  brother	  to	  determine	  who	  is	  in	  their	  
group	  and	  who	  is	  not—who	  is	  the	  enemy,	  the	  Iroquois	  presumption	  about	  human	  nature	  is	  that	  everyone	  desires	  
peace	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  to	  become	  ‘brothers’	  is	  to	  facilitate	  peaceable	  relations	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  balance	  of	  life,	  
the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  justice.	  	  From	  Turner,	  Peace	  Pipe,	  51-­‐52.	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equality.	  	  Elders	  are	  respected	  as	  mediators,	  mentors	  and	  teachers,	  instructing	  the	  group	  on	  the	  
traditions,	  cosmology	  and	  history	  relevant	  to	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.119	  	  However,	  the	  special	  status	  
of	  elders	  is	  generally	  not	  considered	  hierarchical	  in	  Aboriginal	  Circles;	  in	  contrast,	  those	  elected	  
(or	  appointed)	  as	  elders	  are	  persons	  in	  the	  community	  who	  have	  special	  abilities	  the	  suite	  the	  
role—chief	  among	  them,	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  peace	  and	  the	  concomitant	  ethic	  of	  fairness	  that	  
precludes	  the	  abuse	  of	  power.	  	  In	  addition,	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  mutual	  respect	  than	  
in	  liberal	  legal	  culture.	  	  The	  elder	  does	  not	  sit	  in	  judgment	  of	  arguments;	  it	  is	  the	  elder’s	  role	  to	  
“create	  a	  safe	  problem	  solving	  environment”	  where	  fears,	  concerns,	  interests	  and	  aspiration	  
can	  be	  heard.120	  	  To	  ensure	  that	  “all	  significant	  interests	  [are]	  represented	  and	  respected”	  and	  
that	  all	  parties	  have	  an	  “equal,	  effective	  voice”	  in	  the	  dialogue.121	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  respect,	  the	  
mutual	  respect	  of	  the	  Circle,	  would	  be	  violated	  if	  elders	  occupied	  a	  position	  over	  and	  above	  the	  
other	  participants.	  Hence,	  elders	  are	  better	  thought	  of	  as	  guides,	  who	  are	  equally	  subordinate	  
and	  responsible	  to	  the	  collective	  contributions	  that	  shape	  the	  Circle.	  	  
Aboriginal	  justice	  cannot	  be	  abstracted	  from	  the	  network	  of	  social	  relationships	  in	  the	  
community.	  	  Fairness,	  then,	  is	  not	  an	  abstraction;	  it	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  process	  of	  seeking	  
justice.	  	  The	  Alberta	  Metis	  Settlement	  council,	  for	  example,	  employs	  a	  process	  of	  “consultation	  
and	  consensus”122	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  However,	  the	  Metis	  tradition	  of	  consensus	  
should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  unanimity.	  	  It	  is	  accepted	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  plurality	  of	  opinions	  
on	  the	  issue	  under	  discussion;	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  council	  functions	  as	  a	  mechanism	  through	  which	  
dialogue	  will	  continue,	  despite	  a	  divergence	  of	  opinion,	  until	  a	  consensual	  decision	  is	  
reached.123	  	  Stuart	  describes	  the	  value	  of	  consensus	  in	  Circles	  in	  this	  way,	  “reaching	  a	  consensus	  
is	  not	  the	  primary	  objective;	  striving	  together	  to	  reach	  a	  consensus	  is.”124	  	  The	  importance	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  Interestingly	  enough,	  the	  inequality	  of	  participants	  seems	  somewhat	  balanced	  off	  by	  the	  inclusive	  equality	  of	  
‘head-­‐thinking’	  and	  ‘heart-­‐thinking’.	  
120	  Barry	  Stuart,	  Aboriginal	  Justice	  Strategy,	  Building	  Community	  Justice	  Partnerships:	  	  Community	  Peacemaking	  
Circles,	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  (Minister	  of	  Public	  Works	  and	  Government	  Services	  Canada:	  1997),	  6.	  	  
121	  Ibid.,	  7.	  
122	  Catherine	  Bell,	  "Indigenous	  Dispute	  Resolution	  Systems	  within	  Non-­‐Indeigenous	  Frameworks:	  Intercutlural	  
Dispute	  Resolution	  Initiatives	  in	  Canada,"	  Intercultural	  Dispute	  Resolution	  in	  Aboriginal	  Contexts,	  eds.	  Catherine	  
Bell	  and	  David	  Kahane,	  (Vancouver:	  University	  of	  British	  Columbia	  Press,	  2004),	  249.	  
123	  Noskey	  quoted	  by	  Bell,	  Indigenous,	  248.	  
124	  Stuart,	  Peacemaking	  Circles,	  6.	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consensus	  is	  not	  agreement,	  not	  the	  unification	  of	  opinion;	  it	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  consensus	  that	  
brings	  individuals	  with	  divergent	  opinions	  together	  to	  talk	  it	  out.	  
Decisions	  are	  not	  the	  result	  of	  an	  individual	  being	  found	  innocent	  or	  guilty	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  the	  facts	  presented	  on	  their	  behalf.	  	  Instead,	  respect	  for,	  and	  commitment	  to,	  the	  
community	  inspires	  the	  sincere	  participation	  of	  those	  engaging	  peacemaking.	  	  Participants	  are	  
not	  likely	  to	  make	  insincere	  contributions	  or	  act	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  own	  self-­‐interests.	  	  
Stuart	  explains,	  “no	  one	  retains	  ownership	  of	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  Circle.	  Each	  contribution	  is	  
respected	  and	  built	  upon	  by	  others.	  It	  is	  this	  sense	  of	  contribution,	  of	  common	  ownership	  and	  
shared	  responsibility	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Circle	  process.”125	  	  The	  self-­‐design	  of	  Circles	  
requires	  that	  the	  community	  and	  the	  particularities	  of	  each	  individual	  case	  shape	  the	  process.	  	  
The	  needs	  of	  each	  case	  determine	  how	  the	  Circle	  proceeds,	  and	  this	  attention	  to	  the	  
idiosyncrasies	  of	  individual	  cases	  is	  deemed	  necessary	  to	  build	  confidence	  in,	  and	  commitment	  
to,	  the	  process.	  	  The	  commitment	  of	  each	  individual	  is	  directed	  outward,	  toward	  the	  process	  
and	  the	  group,	  rather	  than	  inward,	  toward	  their	  own	  interests.126	  	  	  
In	  sum,	  the	  concept	  of	  Aboriginal	  justice	  described	  has	  the	  following	  features	  that	  are	  
inconsistent	  with	  the	  individualism	  of	  the	  liberal	  worldview.	  First,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  the	  
activity	  of	  justice,	  rather	  than	  end	  results.	  	  Second,	  the	  system	  of	  Aboriginal	  justice	  is	  an	  activity	  
of	  exchange	  between	  members	  of	  a	  community	  that	  functions	  inclusively.	  	  Third,	  fairness	  is	  not	  
brought	  about	  by	  abstraction;	  it	  is	  brought	  about	  by	  sincere	  commitment	  to	  each	  other	  and	  the	  
good	  of	  the	  group.	  	  Finally,	  justice	  is	  a	  socially	  constituted	  concept;	  as	  a	  result,	  justice	  for	  one	  is	  
insufficient,	  there	  can	  only	  be	  justice	  of	  the	  many.	  	  	  
Property	  and	  Claims	  of	  ‘Firstness’	  	  
Land	  disputes	  between	  modern	  democracies	  and	  Indigenous	  peoples	  displaced	  through	  
colonialism	  are,	  in	  many	  cases,	  the	  flash	  point	  of	  intercultural	  conflict.	  	  Property	  rights	  and	  
liberal	  land	  ownership	  generally	  are	  something	  foreign	  to	  the	  Aboriginal	  concept	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  Ibid.	  
126	  	  A	  liberal	  might	  respond	  that	  this	  is	  an	  idealised	  view	  of	  how	  these	  processes	  work;	  and	  that	  in	  the	  real	  world	  
we	  are	  not	  looking	  for	  processes	  that	  would	  work	  best	  at	  an	  ideal	  level,	  we	  are	  looking	  for	  processes	  that	  best	  
safeguard	  against	  the	  abuses	  of	  power.	  	  For	  an	  example	  of	  this	  type	  of	  argument	  see	  Shklar	  “Liberalism	  of	  Fear”,	  
149-­‐166.	  	  The	  problem	  for	  the	  liberal	  is	  how	  to	  justify	  the	  concern	  with	  abuses	  of	  power	  to	  Aboriginals	  groups,	  and	  
that	  requires	  some	  connection	  to	  the	  concepts	  and	  categories	  of	  Aboriginal	  thought.	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stewardship,	  which	  governs	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  land	  they	  occupy.	  	  These	  differences	  make	  
the	  claims	  shaped	  by	  an	  Aboriginal	  worldview	  appear	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	  typically	  
liberal	  way	  of	  thinking.	  	  When	  viewed	  from	  the	  conceptual	  apparatus	  of	  the	  liberal	  rights	  
tradition,	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  Aboriginal	  claims	  and	  the	  premises	  upon	  which	  
they	  are	  based.	  
	   Just	  as	  liberty	  is	  a	  contested	  concept	  within	  the	  liberal	  tradition,	  so	  too	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  
private	  property.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  might	  be	  appropriate	  to	  say	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  understand	  
the	  eighteenth	  century	  concept	  of	  liberty	  without	  property	  and	  an	  economic	  system	  based	  on	  
ownership—ownership	  of	  one’s	  labour	  and	  capital	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  essential	  to	  one’s	  
freedom.	  	  For	  some	  liberals,	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  is	  sometimes	  construed	  as	  a	  form	  of	  property	  
right.	  	  The	  freedom	  of	  citizens	  can	  be	  measured	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  are	  free	  to	  make	  use	  of	  their	  
property.	  	  Citizens	  are	  made	  free	  through	  making	  contracts	  and	  endeavouring	  to	  sell	  their	  
labour	  as	  they	  see	  fit.	  	  	  For	  other	  liberals,	  property	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  a	  form	  of	  liberty	  rights.	  	  
Property	  serves	  to	  empower	  individuals	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  protects	  them	  against	  state	  
interference;	  it	  is	  what	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  citizens	  to	  be	  free.	  	  In	  either	  case,	  in	  old-­‐school	  
liberalism,	  the	  relationship	  between	  liberty	  and	  property	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  very	  close.127	  	  
	   The	  free	  market	  economy	  based	  on	  property	  rights	  did	  not	  actually	  deliver	  what	  it	  was	  
meant	  to	  do,	  it	  did	  facilitate	  the	  freedom	  of	  social	  mobility	  for	  the	  poor,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  make	  the	  
poor	  richer.	  	  In	  fact,	  property	  rights	  can	  serve	  to	  reinforce	  inequalities	  because	  they	  secure	  the	  
power	  base	  of	  the	  economically	  privileged	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  secure	  equal	  liberty	  for	  those	  
who	  find	  themselves	  economically	  disadvantaged.	  	  It	  may	  seem	  ironic,	  that	  Aboriginal	  groups	  
espoused	  an	  almost	  classically	  liberal	  view	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  their	  freedom,	  in	  the	  
positive	  sense,	  and	  their	  land,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  many	  have	  fallen	  victim	  to	  the	  inherent	  
inequalities	  of	  property	  rights	  per	  se.128	  
	   There	  has	  been	  a	  shift	  in	  recent	  history,	  a	  shift	  toward	  reconciliation	  and	  restoration	  
between	  the	  descendants	  of	  colonialism	  and	  the	  descendants	  of	  Indigenous	  peoples	  who	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  From	  Gerald	  F.	  Gaus	  “Public	  and	  Private	  Interests	  in	  Liberal	  Political	  Economy:	  Old	  and	  New.”	  In	  Public	  and	  
Private	  in	  Social	  Life,	  eds.	  ,Gerald	  F.	  Gaus	  and	  S.I.	  Benn,	  (New	  York:	  St	  Martin's	  Press,	  1983)	  183-­‐221.	  
128	  The	  idea	  of	  common	  ownership	  or	  stewardship	  is	  not	  foreign	  to	  liberalism,	  nor	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  individual	  
ownership	  foreign	  to	  a	  great	  many	  Indigenous	  cultures.	  	  The	  disagreement	  turns	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  ownership.	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displaced,	  taken	  advantage	  of,	  oppressed	  or	  in	  some	  other	  way	  violated	  by	  colonial	  explorers,	  
settlers	  or	  governing	  authorities	  of	  the	  new	  world	  colonies.	  	  There	  is	  the	  recognition,	  official	  
recognition	  in	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  cases,	  that	  the	  original	  or	  first	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  land	  were	  
wronged.	  	  However,	  this	  notion	  of	  wrongness	  is	  not	  very	  clear,	  nor	  does	  it	  help	  determine	  the	  
legitimacy	  of	  claims.	  	  Jeremy	  Waldron,	  for	  example,	  questions	  the	  notion	  of	  firstness	  from	  a	  
non-­‐Aboriginal	  philosophical	  framework.	  	  The	  argument	  from	  first	  occupancy	  gives	  moral	  
priority	  to	  peoples	  who	  were	  the	  first	  occupants	  of	  a	  land,	  no	  matter	  how	  long	  ago	  they	  might	  
have	  populated	  the	  region.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  problem	  with	  claims	  that	  reach	  back	  to	  pre-­‐historic	  
times	  is	  that	  they	  are	  hard	  to	  prove.	  	  Arguments	  like	  this	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  empirical	  demand	  for	  
evidence,	  which	  renders	  the	  factual	  terms	  impossible	  to	  prove.	  	  Second,	  firstness	  does	  not,	  in	  
and	  of	  itself,	  offer	  a	  reason	  why	  moral	  force	  carries	  forward.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  claiming	  to	  be	  the	  
descendants	  of	  the	  original	  inhabitants	  of	  a	  region	  does	  not	  necessarily	  entail	  moral	  priority.	  
Moral	  force	  does	  hold	  in	  claims	  of	  prior	  occupancy	  that	  are	  only	  concerned	  with	  
civilizations	  that	  were	  destroyed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  colonization.	  	  The	  wanton	  destruction	  of	  a	  
functioning	  moral	  order	  is	  an	  injustice	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  carries	  the	  kind	  of	  moral	  force	  that	  
justifies	  land	  claims.	  	  However,	  the	  problem	  with	  prior	  occupancy	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  conservative	  
claim.	  	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  injustice	  is	  the	  destruction	  of	  a	  functioning	  society	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  
would	  be	  unjust	  for	  Aboriginals	  to	  make	  a	  claim	  against	  the	  existing	  majority	  culture	  because	  
their	  claim	  would	  require	  the	  upheaval	  of	  a	  functioning	  society.	  	  In	  application	  the	  argument	  
contradicts	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  Aboriginal	  claim,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  justify	  destroying	  one	  existing	  
society	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  another.	  	  According	  to	  Waldron,	  the	  factually	  provable	  argument	  from	  
prior	  occupancy	  is	  often	  illegitimately	  merged	  with	  first	  occupancy	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  justify	  
moral	  claims.129	  	  Without	  the	  moral	  force	  of	  prior	  occupancy,	  first	  occupancy	  becomes	  an	  
empty	  claim	  that	  cannot	  do	  any	  real	  work	  in	  political	  disputes	  over	  land	  rights.	  
	   There	  is	  no	  problem	  with	  the	  logic	  of	  Waldron’s	  argument	  and	  he	  raises	  important	  
questions.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  argument	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  absolve	  colonial	  descendants	  of	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  historical	  harm	  perpetrated	  against	  the	  ancestors	  of	  Aboriginal	  
communities.	  	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  take	  this	  argument	  at	  face	  value	  if	  the	  only	  concern	  is	  the	  structure	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Jeremy	  Waldron,	  "Indigeneity?	  First	  Peoples	  and	  Last	  Occupancy?"	  New	  Zealand	  Journal	  of	  Public	  and	  
International	  Law,	  no.	  1	  (2003),	  552.	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of	  claims	  and	  support,	  but	  for	  some,	  this	  argument	  is	  a	  way	  of	  sidestepping	  the	  main	  issue—
simply	  another	  stonewalling	  manoeuvre	  that	  displaces	  responsibility	  and	  delays	  any	  sort	  of	  
compensatory	  action.	  	  The	  history	  of	  injustice	  places	  a	  special	  burden	  on	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  
listeners	  because	  non-­‐Aboriginals	  have	  illegitimately	  dominated	  the	  conversation	  in	  the	  past,	  
and,	  non-­‐Aboriginals	  are	  in	  a	  position	  of	  power—the	  decisions	  of	  non-­‐Aboriginals	  deeply	  affect	  
the	  lives	  of	  Aboriginals.	  
Interpreting	  and	  evaluating	  an	  Aboriginal	  claim	  within	  a	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  framework	  can	  
generate,	  what	  Burke	  Hendrix	  calls,	  mistaken	  associations	  such	  that	  the	  argument	  addresses	  a	  
position	  that	  no	  one	  actually	  holds.130	  Mistaken	  focus,	  such	  as	  focus	  on	  the	  logical	  flaws,	  does	  
not	  address	  what	  the	  argument	  is	  about.	  	  Logical	  flaws	  are	  unavoidable	  in	  human	  reasoning;	  
consequently,	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  hold	  Aboriginal	  arguments	  to	  a	  standard	  to	  which	  others	  are	  not	  
held.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  support	  an	  anything	  goes	  situation,	  the	  objection	  is	  to	  a	  narrow	  
focus	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  intended	  thrust	  of	  the	  argument.131	  For	  example	  ‘firstness’	  is	  not	  
just	  about	  temporal	  priority,	  it	  points	  toward	  a	  complex	  relationship	  to	  the	  land.	  	  The	  set	  of	  
relations	  between	  Aboriginal	  peoples	  and	  the	  land	  is	  constrained	  not	  only	  by	  the	  duty	  to	  other	  
people,	  but	  by	  a	  duty	  to	  all	  intentional	  beings	  including	  birds,	  animals,	  trees,	  the	  elements	  and	  
the	  land	  itself.	  	  Aboriginal	  peoples	  are	  beholden	  to	  the	  land,	  not	  as	  owners	  but	  as	  stewards.	  	  	  
In	  theory,	  the	  reasoning	  that	  goes	  into	  an	  argument	  can	  be	  laid	  out	  and	  evaluated.	  	  
However,	  in	  practice,	  between	  cultures,	  the	  complex	  set	  of	  presuppositions	  and	  values	  that	  
support	  an	  action	  are	  often	  difficult	  to	  understand,	  even	  if	  there	  are	  adequate	  resources	  to	  
accurately	  translate	  the	  conceptual	  contents	  of	  the	  idea	  (which	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case).	  	  Moral	  
concepts	  are	  linked	  with	  the	  history,	  beliefs,	  values	  and	  practices	  of	  a	  culture	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  
is	  difficult	  to	  understand	  the	  concepts	  without	  coming	  to	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  
background.	  	  Unless	  the	  full	  range	  of	  ideas	  built	  into	  the	  argument	  is	  taken	  into	  account,	  key	  
elements	  of	  the	  claim	  are	  missed.	  	  So	  what	  else	  is	  going	  on	  when	  Aboriginals	  make	  claims	  of	  
firstness?	  
Arguments	  from	  firstness	  are	  launched	  from	  a	  different	  conceptual	  framework,	  one	  that	  
does	  not	  easily	  harmonize	  with	  the	  liberal	  rights	  tradition.	  	  In	  the	  Aboriginal	  worldview,	  the	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  Hendrix,	  "	  Error,"	  560.	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  Ibid.,	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right	  to	  property	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  entitlement	  of	  the	  land,	  animals,	  birds,	  trees	  which	  
imposes	  a	  duty	  on	  persons	  that	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  a	  notion	  of	  ‘responsible	  ownership.’	  	  For	  
example,	  in	  1972,	  the	  Cree	  and	  the	  Inuit	  of	  northern	  Quebec	  filed	  for	  an	  injunction	  against	  a	  
massive	  hydroelectric	  project,	  which	  ended	  up	  being	  the	  longest	  temporary	  injunction	  hearing	  
in	  Canadian	  history.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  enormous	  project	  would	  have	  been	  ecologically	  
devastating	  with	  significant	  changes	  to	  the	  water	  table	  including	  the	  flooding	  of	  wetlands,	  a	  key	  
location	  for	  local	  trap	  lines	  that	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Aboriginal	  economy.	  	  The	  Cree	  and	  Inuit	  
claimed	  they	  had	  a	  prima	  facie	  claim	  to	  territorial	  rights.	  	  They	  claimed	  their	  culture	  was	  
inextricable	  from	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  land	  and	  therefore,	  their	  use	  of	  the	  territory	  for	  
fishing,	  hunting	  and	  trapping	  was	  an	  expression	  of	  their	  culture.	  	  	  
This	  expression	  was	  explained	  to	  the	  court	  as	  a	  distinctly	  Cree	  worldview.	  	  The	  root	  term	  
Nitao,	  which	  is	  found	  in	  many	  Cree	  hunting	  terms,	  can	  be	  roughly	  translated	  as	  ‘hunting,	  fishing	  
and	  trapping	  in	  the	  bush.’132	  	  The	  term	  denotes	  several	  meanings	  including	  the	  actions	  of	  
seeing,	  fetching,	  needing,	  wanting,	  and	  the	  ongoing	  process	  of	  growth.	  	  Hunting	  is	  a	  part	  of	  an	  
on-­‐going	  cycle	  that	  is	  so	  complex,	  no	  one	  can	  know	  it	  completely,	  but	  just	  as	  we	  can	  come	  to	  
know	  the	  habits	  of	  people,	  the	  Cree	  believe	  they	  come	  to	  know	  the	  habits	  of	  nature.	  	  The	  Cree	  
hunter	  sees	  the	  world	  and	  all	  creatures	  in	  it	  as	  intentional	  beings,	  animals,	  plants	  and	  even	  the	  
wind	  are	  understood	  a	  volitional.	  	  Hence,	  animals	  are	  not	  taken	  from	  nature;	  a	  successful	  hunt	  
is	  not	  merely	  the	  result	  of	  the	  hunter’s	  intentions	  but	  the	  animal’s	  intentions	  as	  well.	  	  
In	  this	  relationship	  animals	  are	  given	  to	  the	  hunter,	  and	  the	  hunter	  has	  a	  moral	  
obligation	  to	  reciprocate.	  	  Hence	  the	  practice	  is	  considered	  more	  than	  just	  a	  means	  of	  
subsistence;	  it	  is	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Cree	  understanding	  of	  an	  active	  and	  social	  community	  
that	  extends	  beyond	  the	  human	  community	  to	  include	  animals,	  the	  elements,	  etc.	  	  The	  
hydroelectric	  project,	  they	  argued,	  would	  so	  damage	  the	  environment	  that	  it	  would	  prevent	  
them	  from	  participating	  in	  their	  way	  of	  life,	  and	  therefore	  prevent	  them	  from	  exercising	  their	  
rights.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  Recall	  from	  1.1	  the	  close	  connection	  between	  the	  Cree	  language	  and	  the	  Cree	  Worldview.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  
grammatical	  information	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  verb;	  ‘what’	  gives	  way	  to	  ‘how’,	  ‘where’	  gives	  way	  to	  ‘how	  to	  get	  
there’	  and	  ‘who’	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  agent	  but	  the	  action	  of	  the	  agent.	  	  The	  dynamic	  imagery	  is	  essential	  to	  
understand	  the	  complex	  relations	  of	  a	  world	  that	  functions	  intelligently	  on	  multiple	  levels.	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In	  response,	  the	  governmental	  lawyers	  argued	  that	  the	  Cree	  culture	  was	  already	  in	  the	  
process	  of	  being	  transformed	  by,	  and	  into,	  Canadian	  culture.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  Cree	  were	  no	  longer	  
were	  dependent	  on	  the	  traditions	  of	  hunting	  and	  trapping;	  instead,	  they	  were	  living	  on	  
government	  subsidies	  and	  derived	  income	  from	  employment.	  	  The	  government	  denied	  the	  
prima	  facie	  claim	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  Cree	  way	  of	  life	  was	  not	  significantly	  different	  from	  a	  
Canadian	  way	  of	  life	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  Cree	  were	  appealing	  to	  a	  culture	  that,	  if	  it	  was	  not	  
extinct	  already,	  would	  soon	  be	  abandoned	  for	  what	  the	  governmental	  lawyers	  considered	  the	  
far	  superior	  wage-­‐earning	  way	  of	  life.	  	  The	  government	  continued	  by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  
project	  would	  bring	  much	  needed	  economic	  growth	  to	  the	  region	  and	  therefore	  was	  necessary	  
to	  ensure	  the	  prosperity	  of	  the	  community.	  	  To	  oppose	  the	  project	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  preservation	  
of	  community	  was	  paradoxically	  opposing	  what	  was	  necessary	  to	  protect	  the	  long-­‐term	  future	  
of	  the	  community.	  	  They	  argued	  that	  the	  Cree	  had	  no	  claim	  of	  Aboriginal	  land	  title	  and	  based	  on	  
other	  treaties	  and	  settlements	  with	  other	  Aboriginal	  reserves	  in	  Canada,	  they	  could	  only	  claim	  
the	  right	  to	  monetary	  compensation	  for	  temporary	  economic	  hardship	  caused	  by	  the	  initial	  
stages	  of	  the	  project.	  	  The	  case	  was	  ultimately	  decided	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  prima	  facie	  claim	  
and,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  government’s	  argument	  failed.	  	  
In	  November,	  1973,	  Mr.	  Justice	  Malouf	  ruled	  that	  the	  Cree	  and	  Inuit	  people	  did	  appear	  to	  have	  
an	  Indian	  title	  to	  the	  land;	  that	  they	  had	  been	  occupying	  and	  using	  the	  land	  to	  a	  full	  extent;	  that	  
hunting	  was	  still	  of	  great	  importance,	  constituted	  a	  way	  of	  life,	  and	  provided	  a	  portion	  of	  their	  
diet	  and	  incomes;	  that	  they	  had	  a	  unique	  concept	  of	  the	  land;	  that	  they	  wished	  to	  continue	  their	  
way	  of	  life;	  that	  any	  interference	  with	  their	  use	  compromised	  their	  very	  existence	  as	  a	  people;	  
and	  that	  the	  project	  was	  already	  causing	  much	  interference.	  He	  ruled	  that	  the	  province	  was	  
trespassing.	  The	  ruling	  was	  a	  stronger	  affirmation	  of	  Cree	  rights	  than	  many	  people	  had	  thought	  
would	  be	  possible	  at	  that	  time	  and	  forced	  the	  government	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  Cree.133	  
The	  Cree	  were	  successful	  largely	  because	  they	  were	  able	  to	  translate	  their	  claim	  of	  firstness	  as	  
the	  complex	  set	  of	  relations	  inextricable	  from	  their	  way	  of	  life.	  	  Hence,	  firstness	  was	  articulated	  
in	  terms	  that	  made	  sense	  in	  the	  Canadian	  legal	  system.	  
	   Despite	  the	  success	  of	  the	  case,	  significant	  misunderstandings	  between	  the	  Cree	  and	  
the	  Canadian	  state	  remain	  (to	  this	  day).	  	  Many	  of	  the	  James	  Bay	  Cree	  continued	  to	  regulate	  the	  
use	  of	  their	  collective	  land	  in	  the	  traditional	  ways—ways	  that	  do	  not	  subscribe	  to	  the	  officially	  
recognized	  parcels	  of	  property	  owned	  by	  individuals.	  	  Vast	  tracts	  of	  the	  region	  are	  operated	  as	  a	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  Feit,	  "Hunting,”	  171-­‐207.	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commons,	  with	  shared	  access	  and	  responsibilities	  disseminated	  throughout	  the	  community.	  	  
The	  Canadian	  government	  does	  not	  recognize	  the	  commons	  as	  it	  is,	  it	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  in	  
the	  terms	  of	  property	  rights.	  	  Hence,	  the	  only	  alternative	  available	  is	  to	  interpret	  the	  ownership	  
of	  the	  land	  in	  its	  own	  terms,	  individual	  A	  (or	  corporate	  entity	  A)	  owns	  parcel	  a,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  As	  
owners,	  these	  individuals	  can	  choose	  to	  share	  the	  land	  with	  each	  other	  if	  they	  wish	  and	  as	  long	  
as	  nothing	  arises	  to	  challenge	  the	  misunderstanding,	  like	  many	  others,	  it	  is	  left	  alone.	  	  	  
	   	  So	  far,	  these	  examples	  of	  political	  dialogues	  between	  Indigenous	  peoples	  situated	  
within	  post-­‐colonial	  liberal	  democracies	  give	  a	  picture	  of	  cultural	  difference	  in	  liberal	  and	  non-­‐
liberal	  terms.	  	  Aboriginal	  groups	  see	  themselves	  as	  having	  a	  way	  of	  life	  and	  looking	  at	  the	  world	  
that	  is	  very	  different	  than	  key	  features	  of	  the	  liberal	  package.	  	  In	  the	  liberal	  tradition,	  the	  
concept	  of	  justice	  is	  oriented	  to	  the	  individual;	  as	  a	  result,	  groups	  who	  see	  justice	  as	  a	  social	  
and	  relational	  concept	  see	  themselves	  as	  distinct	  from	  that	  tradition.	  	  Liberal	  justice	  seeks	  
fairness	  and	  equality	  through	  impartiality,	  through	  institutional	  arrangements	  designed	  to	  
eliminate	  the	  influence	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  patronage,	  nepotism	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  illegitimate	  
favouritism.	  	  In	  contrast,	  in	  Aboriginal	  terms,	  impartiality	  of	  the	  sort	  necessary	  to	  facilitate	  
liberal	  fairness	  does	  not	  make	  sense—fairness	  only	  makes	  sense	  relationally.	  	  Without	  the	  
recognition	  of	  social	  roles	  and	  status	  within	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole,	  liberal	  justice	  is	  missing	  
what	  is	  essential	  to	  fairness—a	  sense	  of	  what	  would	  be	  unfair.	  	  Similarly,	  equality	  without	  
recognition	  is	  not	  equality	  at	  all;	  removing	  recognition	  is	  removing	  what	  is	  vital	  to	  
understanding	  equality.	  	  	  
Instrumental	  considerations	  can	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  liberal	  political	  arrangements,	  
whereas,	  the	  politics	  of	  non-­‐liberal	  groups	  tend	  to	  be	  less	  instrumental,	  with	  a	  greater	  
emphasis	  on	  social	  responsibility.	  	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  liberalism,	  in	  theory	  and	  practice,	  does	  
not	  take	  into	  account	  responsibility	  toward	  others,	  it	  is	  indeed	  a	  central	  concern.	  	  	  What	  makes	  
Aboriginal	  responsibility	  different,	  non-­‐liberal,	  is	  the	  scope	  of	  that	  to	  which	  they	  are	  
responsible—a	  world	  of	  inter-­‐relational	  exchange	  with	  not	  only	  humans	  but	  also	  all	  intentional	  
entities	  in	  the	  natural	  world.	  	  In	  the	  liberal	  tradition	  the	  relationship	  between	  freedom	  and	  
property	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  very	  close,	  similarly	  Aboriginal	  claims	  for	  land	  rights	  and	  the	  right	  to	  
self-­‐government	  are	  woven	  together.	  	  However,	  the	  extension	  of	  entitlements	  and	  duties	  to	  the	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natural	  world	  means	  that	  property	  rights	  do	  not	  govern	  only	  human	  relations	  regarding	  an	  
object,	  but	  the	  right	  to	  property	  entails	  duties	  to	  the	  land	  as	  a	  relational	  subject.	  	  The	  notion	  of	  
individual	  ownership	  and	  authority	  over	  land	  taken	  for	  granted	  in	  liberal	  institutional	  
arrangements	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  role	  of	  steward	  and	  the	  communal	  authority	  of	  land	  as	  
a	  commons.	  	  	  
Finally,	  the	  notion	  of	  rights	  secured	  by	  liberal	  institutions	  presumes	  that	  non-­‐liberal	  
minorities	  recognize	  the	  authority	  of	  those	  institutions	  and	  consequently	  limits	  the	  claims	  of	  
minorities	  to	  fit	  the	  scope	  of	  that	  authority.	  	  Aboriginal	  nations	  challenge	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  
limits	  liberal	  institutions	  place	  political	  discourse	  by	  appealing	  to	  rights	  of	  a	  very	  different	  kind.	  	  
Not	  natural	  rights,	  not	  those	  conferred	  by	  institutional	  arrangements;	  but	  rather,	  prima	  facie134	  
rights,	  apparent	  upon	  first	  impression,	  substantiate	  their	  claim	  for	  political	  autonomy.	  	  	  	  
The	  Aboriginal	  examples	  illustrate	  some	  of	  the	  key	  features	  of	  non-­‐liberalness,	  and	  
perhaps	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  as	  follows:	  	  A	  non-­‐liberal	  is	  someone	  who	  is	  looking	  at	  liberalness	  
from	  the	  outside	  and	  from	  this	  position	  questions	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  liberal	  supremacy.	  	  In	  the	  
antirealist	  idiom,	  the	  very	  idea	  that	  anyone	  could	  be	  outside	  looking	  in	  is	  difficult	  to	  navigate;	  
however,	  that	  difficulty	  does	  not	  justify	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  way	  to	  look	  at	  the	  world.	  	  
If	  all	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have,	  then	  we	  must	  be	  fallibilists,	  prepared	  to	  reorient	  our	  worldview	  
as	  the	  changing	  scene	  demands.	  	  However,	  liberalism	  seems	  unable	  to	  cope	  with	  its	  own	  
fallibility	  and	  it	  is	  to	  this	  problem	  I	  now	  turn.	  	  Does	  liberalism	  function	  as	  a	  politics	  of	  ultimate	  
supremacy?	  
2.2	  Reasonable	  or	  Paradoxical?	  	  
In	  chapter	  one,	  the	  paradox	  functioned	  to	  delimit	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  appeals	  to	  elements	  of	  
minority	  worldviews	  (cultural	  or	  religious)	  to	  support	  rights	  claims.	  	  When	  claims	  fit	  the	  paradox	  
model,	  they	  are	  dismissed	  because	  they	  are	  internally	  inconsistent	  and	  therefore	  not	  
considered	  reasonable.	  	  In	  contrast,	  liberalism,	  at	  least	  in	  theory,	  has	  been	  depicted	  as	  the	  
outcome	  of	  reasonable.	  	  There	  is	  a	  Whiggish	  tendency	  to	  characterize	  liberal	  conceptions	  of	  
principles	  like	  freedom	  and	  equality	  as	  the	  definitive	  expression	  of	  reasonable.	  	  It	  may	  be	  too	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  Based	  on	  context,	  the	  best	  interpretation	  of	  prima	  facie	  in	  this	  case	  suggests	  that	  the	  Cree	  successfully	  gave	  
sufficient	  evidence	  to	  substantiate	  the	  land	  claim,	  but	  that	  the	  land	  rights	  in	  question	  were	  not	  absolute	  rights	  and	  
could	  be	  outweighed	  by	  other	  considerations.	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easy	  to	  say	  that	  this	  view	  generates	  a	  dichotomy	  between	  reasonable	  and	  paradoxical	  which	  
maps	  neatly	  onto	  the	  opposition	  of	  liberal	  and	  non-­‐liberal;	  however,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  look	  at	  
some	  features	  of	  the	  liberal	  picture	  that	  suggest	  exactly	  that.	  	  Liberal	  values,	  it	  is	  thought	  by	  
some,	  are	  the	  achievement	  and	  ultimate	  expression	  of	  human	  reason.	  	  The	  universal	  truth	  of	  
liberal	  principles	  is	  apparent	  to	  anyone,	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  social	  conditions	  or	  cultural	  
context,	  who	  is	  thinking	  straight.	  	  
	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  two	  elements	  that	  support	  the	  justification	  of	  liberalism	  as	  the	  
reasonable	  alternative.	  	  One	  is	  the	  idea,	  from	  Berlin,	  that	  liberalism	  is	  simply	  the	  best	  response	  
to	  pluralism.	  The	  other	  is	  what	  I	  will	  call	  the	  Whig	  justification,	  which	  suggests	  that	  liberalism	  is	  
the	  culmination	  of	  progress	  toward	  the	  ideal	  political	  system.	  	  At	  first	  blush,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  
second	  justification	  would	  be	  the	  most	  objectionable	  to	  non-­‐liberal	  groups,	  but	  even	  the	  ‘best	  
response’	  approach	  carries	  with	  it	  an	  air	  of	  correctness	  and	  mutual	  exclusion	  that	  is	  
problematic	  in	  pluralist	  associations	  that	  must	  function	  inclusively.	  
To	  be	  sure,	  many	  liberals	  have	  attempted	  to	  dial	  back	  the	  dogma	  of	  liberalism	  by	  
limiting	  it	  to	  the	  political,	  rather	  than	  metaphysical	  or	  epistemic	  ballparks;	  however,	  even	  in	  the	  
thin	  versions	  there	  remains	  a	  very	  strong	  connection	  to	  the	  moral	  correctness	  of	  liberal	  
principles.	  	  In	  order	  to	  unpack	  the	  problem	  the	  presumption	  of	  liberal	  moral	  correctness	  poses	  
for	  non-­‐liberal	  minorities,	  I	  begin	  with	  the	  exclusionary	  account	  of	  reasonable	  that	  emerges	  
from	  the	  ahistoricist	  liberal	  picture.	  	  If,	  as	  I	  will	  suggest	  we	  should,	  we	  accept	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  
principles	  of	  liberalism	  are	  not	  yet	  perfected,	  not	  the	  realization	  of	  a	  timeless	  teleological	  end,	  
then	  the	  puzzles	  and	  paradoxes	  within	  the	  liberal	  picture	  become	  evident.	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  look	  at	  two	  paradoxes	  that	  speak	  directly	  to	  tensions	  within	  the	  liberal	  
conception	  of	  pluralism.	  The	  antifoundationalist	  paradox	  runs	  something	  like	  this:	  If	  all	  we	  have	  
is	  what	  we	  have,	  then	  all	  theoretical	  enquiry	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  idiom	  it	  is	  in.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  it	  is	  
not	  at	  all	  clear	  how	  social	  and	  political	  beliefs,	  values	  and	  practices	  are	  available	  to	  the	  
theorist...unless	  the	  critic	  is	  himself,	  or	  herself,	  able	  to	  make	  the	  kind	  of	  existential	  leap	  
necessary	  to	  observe	  one’s	  own	  worldview.	  	  Similarly,	  I	  will	  suggest	  the	  social	  constructivist	  
paradox	  arises	  from	  the	  theoretical	  standpoint.	  	  The	  members	  of	  a	  group	  are	  bound	  to	  their	  
worldview	  such	  that	  the	  way	  they	  view	  and	  talk	  about	  the	  world	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  social	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construction,	  but	  rather	  it	  is	  the	  apparatus	  within	  which	  meanings	  and	  values	  are	  constructed.	  	  
The	  social	  constructivist,	  paradoxically,	  needs	  to	  see	  through	  the	  bounds	  of	  their	  own	  
worldview	  and	  the	  worldviews	  of	  others	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  constructions	  they	  are	  
talking	  about,	  a	  point	  of	  view	  not	  possible	  in	  social	  constructivist	  terms.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  both	  
the	  antifoundationalist	  and	  the	  constructivist	  paradoxically	  presume	  that	  the	  reasons	  and	  
reasoning	  of	  others	  is	  constrained	  by	  their	  worldview	  in	  a	  way	  that	  liberal	  reasoning	  is	  not.135	  	  If	  
the	  paradoxes	  emerge	  in	  the	  very	  fabric	  of	  liberal	  reasoning,	  then	  it	  seems	  the	  charge	  of	  
paradox	  levied	  against	  minority	  rights	  claims	  reflects	  an	  inconsistency,	  an	  illegitimate	  
inconsistency,	  in	  the	  way	  justifications	  are	  evaluated.	  	  	  
Ahistoricism	  	  
There	  is	  in	  liberal	  discourse,	  it	  seems,	  a	  tendency	  to	  characterize	  the	  good	  of	  core	  principles	  of	  
the	  liberal	  rights	  tradition	  (liberal	  conceptions	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality)	  as	  timeless.	  	  Kukathas	  
observes	  how	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  ‘body	  politic’,	  prevalent	  in	  the	  history	  of	  liberal	  political	  
theory,	  reinforces	  the	  intransience	  of	  liberal	  ideas.	  	  	  
[The	  body	  politic]	  encourages	  the	  thought	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  social	  life	  is	  dependent	  
upon	  the	  functioning	  of	  a	  single	  (timeless)	  political	  order	  regularizing	  human	  conduct…	  	  
Like	  the	  human	  body,	  the	  body	  politic	  is	  not	  a	  site	  of	  conflict,	  or	  of	  unstable	  or	  divergent	  
tendencies.	  	  It	  may	  contain	  different	  elements;	  but	  all	  must	  be	  standardized	  or	  
detoxified,	  and	  ‘incorporated’	  in	  the	  bodily	  whole.”136	  	  	  
	  
Similarly,	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  ‘well-­‐ordered	  society’	  summons	  up	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  closed	  society,	  
guided	  by	  ideals	  of	  social	  unity	  and	  stability	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  there	  is	  inadequate	  recognition	  
for	  the	  complexity,	  diversity,	  variability	  and	  fluidity	  of	  an	  authentically	  pluralist	  association.137	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  these	  metaphors	  of	  unification	  and	  stability,	  Kukathas	  proffers	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  
archipelago	  as	  a	  better	  metaphor	  for	  a	  pluralist	  association.	  “Political	  society—and	  in	  particular,	  
the	  good	  political	  society—is	  best	  understood	  not	  as	  a	  single	  body	  or	  and	  ideal	  realm	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  Anne	  Phillips,	  Multiculturalism	  without	  Culture.	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  	  Phillips	  explains	  
the	  phenomena	  of	  majority	  superiority:	  	  Those	  who	  identify	  with	  the	  liberal	  majority	  presume,	  mistakenly,	  that	  
they	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reasons,	  whereas,	  members	  of	  a	  minority	  culture	  can	  only	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  culture.	  	  
This	  generates	  a	  picture	  of	  minorities	  as	  unable	  to	  reflect	  the	  contents	  of	  their	  claims,	  when	  in	  many	  cases;	  it	  is	  
only	  that	  they	  do	  not	  account	  for	  the	  content	  of	  their	  claims	  in	  terms	  familiar	  of	  the	  liberal	  majority.	  	  	  
136	  Chandran	  Kukathas,	  The	  LIberal	  Archipelago,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  20.	  
137	  Ibid.,	  21.	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just…	  	  The	  liberal	  archipelago	  is	  a	  society	  of	  societies	  which	  is	  neither	  the	  creation	  nor	  the	  
object	  of	  control	  of	  any	  single	  authority.”138	  	  However,	  other	  liberal	  theorists	  remain	  committed	  
to	  the	  universality	  of	  liberalism—that	  a	  liberal	  society	  is	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  just.	  	  Brian	  Barry	  for	  
example	  continues,	  “to	  believe	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  putting	  forward	  a	  universally	  valid	  case	  in	  
favour	  of	  liberal	  egalitarian	  principles.”139	  	  Barry	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  the	  presumption	  that	  everyone	  
should	  agree	  with	  the	  content	  of	  liberal	  values	  expressed	  through	  the	  discourse	  of	  rights	  
regardless	  of	  social	  or	  historical	  background	  conditions.	  	  
Whig	  history,	  for	  example,	  describes	  a	  historical	  approach	  that	  views	  the	  past	  as	  
inevitable	  progress	  toward	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  values	  and	  beliefs	  of	  the	  present.	  	  More	  
specifically,	  Butterfield	  saw	  the	  Whig	  historian	  as	  one	  who	  presumed	  that	  progress	  toward	  
personal	  freedom	  culminated	  in	  the	  political	  arrangements	  of	  the	  constitutional	  monarchy	  and	  
modern	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  He	  was	  concerned	  with	  the	  British	  tendency	  to	  appropriate	  
history	  to	  justify	  the	  constitutional	  monarchy	  of	  Britain	  as	  the	  culmination	  of	  progress	  by	  
presuming	  that	  current	  political	  values,	  liberal	  values,	  were	  (anachronistically)	  viable	  in	  all	  
times.	  	  This	  presumption	  led	  to	  selectively	  portraying	  historical	  figures	  as	  heroes	  if	  they	  upheld	  
the	  ‘right’	  values,	  or	  villains	  if	  they	  were	  proponents	  of	  the	  ‘wrong’	  sort	  of	  values.	  	  Similarly,	  
only	  those	  events	  that	  support	  the	  causal	  chain	  were	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  Whig	  historian,	  those	  
that	  challenged	  the	  view	  of	  the	  present	  as	  the	  teleological	  end	  of	  the	  pursuit	  of	  individual	  
liberty	  were	  conveniently	  overlooked.140	  	  	  
These	  presuppositions,	  I	  think,	  arise	  because	  the	  guiding	  principles	  of	  liberalism	  must	  be	  
considered	  ‘timeless’	  and	  ‘universal’	  in	  order	  to	  legitimate	  the	  imposition	  of	  liberal	  values	  in	  
non-­‐liberal	  contexts.141	  	  This	  requirement,	  coupled	  with	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  we	  have’	  
view	  of	  difference	  venerates	  the	  presumption	  Davidson	  explicitly	  denied,	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  Ibid.,	  22.	  
139	  Brian	  Barry,	  Justice	  as	  Impartiality	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1995),	  3.	  
140	  Herbert	  Butterfield,	  The	  Whig	  Interpretation	  of	  History,	  (New	  York:	  W	  W	  Nortan	  and	  Company,	  1965).	  
141	  Barry	  states	  that	  “The	  point	  of	  liberalism	  is	  that	  it	  is	  universalistic.	  	  It	  therefore	  necessarily	  conflicts	  with	  the	  
claim	  that	  nations	  are	  the	  bearers	  of	  values	  that	  cannot,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle,	  be	  overridden	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  
liberal	  ends.”	  Barry,	  Culture,	  138.	  	  However,	  Geertz	  observes	  tension	  between	  pluralism	  and	  universalism:	  “The	  
very	  universalism	  to	  which	  [liberalism]	  is	  committed	  and	  which	  it	  promotes,	  its	  cosmopolitan	  intent,	  has	  brought	  it	  
into	  open	  conflict	  both	  with	  other	  universalisms	  with	  similar	  intent,	  most	  notably	  with	  that	  set	  forth	  by	  a	  revenant	  
Islam,	  and	  with	  a	  large	  number	  of	  alternative	  visions	  of	  the	  good,	  the	  right	  and	  the	  indubitable,	  Japenese,	  Indian,	  
African,	  Singaporean,	  to	  which	  it	  looks	  like	  just	  one	  more	  attempt	  to	  impose	  Western	  values	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
world—the	  continuation	  of	  colonialism	  by	  other	  means.”	  Geertz,	  Available	  Light,	  258.	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values	  of	  our	  time	  and	  our	  place	  are	  not	  merely	  all	  we	  have	  but	  are	  all	  there	  is,	  in	  a	  never	  
ending	  present.	  	  Liberal	  principles	  are	  not	  just	  an	  incarnation	  of	  our	  present	  conception	  of	  the	  
good;	  they	  are	  the	  expression	  of	  good	  and	  as	  such	  hold	  across	  boundaries	  of	  culture,	  time	  and	  
place.	  	  The	  ahistoricism	  implicit	  in	  a	  political	  ideology	  steeped	  in	  timeless	  and	  universal	  
principles	  stands	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  alternative	  worldviews	  in	  political	  
practices,	  because	  liberalism,	  ahistoricist	  liberalism,	  cannot	  take	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  conceptual	  
scheme	  seriously.	  	  
	   The	  roots	  of	  modern	  liberal	  ahistoricism	  can	  perhaps	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  moral	  
universalism	  of	  Kant.142	  	  Kant	  did	  not	  imagine	  a	  universal	  global	  polity;	  however,	  he	  did	  suggest	  
that	  all	  states	  ought	  to	  respect	  the	  dignity	  of	  free	  and	  equal	  persons	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  moral	  
obligation.	  	  Rather	  than	  a	  global	  polity,	  Kant	  envisioned	  a	  cosmopolitan	  arrangement	  of	  states	  
governed	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  cosmopolitan	  right,	  which	  determines	  the	  juridical	  constraints	  on	  
interaction	  between	  divergent	  states.143	  
The	  circumstances	  of	  cosmopolitan	  right,	  Kant	  tells	  us,	  are	  both	  outward	  and	  inward.	  	  
The	  ‘outward	  circumstances	  of	  cosmopolitan	  right’	  provide	  some	  interesting	  reasons	  why	  we	  
must	  find	  a	  way	  to	  get	  along.	  	  The	  earth,	  the	  world	  that	  humans	  share	  is	  a	  sphere,	  such	  that	  if	  I	  
travel	  far	  enough	  away	  from	  you,	  I	  will	  approach	  you	  again,	  therefore,	  I	  am	  reminded	  that	  we	  
share	  in	  common	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  earth.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  natural	  migration	  of	  animals,	  birds	  
and	  other	  natural	  things	  suggests	  that	  we	  were	  meant	  to	  travel	  and	  encounter	  each	  other.	  	  This	  
disposition	  toward	  movement	  shapes	  the	  presupposition	  of	  the	  ‘internal	  circumstances	  of	  
cosmopolitan	  right’.	  	  Humans	  are	  meant	  to	  travel	  and	  settle	  in	  new	  places,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  are	  
bound	  to	  encounter	  new	  peoples.	  	  
Cosmopolitan	  right	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  constraints	  on	  what	  we	  ought	  to	  do	  as	  we	  
encounter	  peoples	  strange	  to	  us.	  	  For	  example,	  each	  person	  has	  the	  right	  to	  approach	  each	  
other	  in	  commerce;	  however,	  no	  one	  has	  the	  right	  to	  settle	  lands	  that	  are	  already	  settled	  by	  
displacing	  the	  inhabitants.	  	  When	  a	  settlement	  illegitimately	  displaces	  and	  existing	  moral	  order,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  Kant	  casts	  moral	  universalism	  in	  historical	  terms;	  however,	  it	  will	  become	  clear	  in	  this	  chapter	  how,	  in	  specific	  
cases,	  universalism	  slides	  from	  application	  ‘in	  all	  places’	  to	  include	  ‘in	  all	  times’.	  
143	  See	  the	  "Idea	  for	  a	  Universal	  History	  with	  a	  Cosmopolitan	  Aim,"	  Anthropology	  from	  a	  Pragmatic	  Point	  of	  View,	  
and	  "Lectures	  on	  Pedagogy"	  from	  The	  Cambridge	  Edition	  of	  the	  Works	  of	  Immanuel	  Kant	  in	  English,	  2007	  
Anthropology,	  History,	  and	  Education,	  trans.	  Robert	  Louden	  and	  Guenther	  Zoeller.	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Kant	  asserted,	  “the	  stain	  of	  injustice	  cannot	  be	  erased	  from	  such	  a	  settlement.”144	  	  The	  
descendants	  of	  a	  new	  settlement	  that	  contrary	  to	  cosmopolitan	  right,	  displaced	  peoples	  
generations	  ago	  must	  come	  to	  a	  fair	  and	  equitable	  distribution	  of	  lands	  and	  resources	  with	  the	  
descendants	  of	  those	  who	  were	  wronged.	  	  However,	  we	  humans	  suffer	  from	  ‘unsocial	  
sociability’.	  	  We	  have	  a	  cosmopolitan	  curiosity	  about	  other	  peoples,	  their	  practices,	  beliefs,	  
values,	  traditions	  but	  we	  do	  not	  take	  alternative	  moral	  schemes	  seriously,	  we	  unsociably	  want	  
to	  make	  everyone	  else	  line	  up	  with	  our	  ideas	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  we	  socially	  constrain	  the	  
urge	  to	  force	  others	  into	  our	  way	  of	  thinking.145	  In	  Kant’s	  thinking,	  the	  tightrope	  between	  
coercion	  and	  tolerance	  can	  only	  be	  rightly	  navigated	  with	  the	  grounding	  of	  a	  universal	  moral	  
order.	  	  Contemporary	  liberal	  theorists,	  Pogge	  and	  Nussbaum	  for	  example,	  appeal	  to	  the	  Kantian	  
idea	  of	  universal	  morality	  in	  political	  arrangements.146	  Liberal	  moral	  principles,	  they	  argue,	  
apply	  across	  civil,	  cultural	  and	  state	  boundaries.	  
Berlin	  too,	  seems	  to	  presume	  the	  universality	  of	  liberalism.	  	  If	  he	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  
liberalism	  was	  the	  political	  system,	  he	  left	  little	  evidence	  of	  his	  doubt.	  	  It	  is	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  
value	  itself	  that	  reasonable	  and	  rational	  people	  are	  going	  to	  develop	  very	  different	  ways	  of	  
going	  about	  their	  lives.	  	  For	  Berlin,	  the	  fact	  of	  pluralism	  supports	  the	  normative	  contents	  and	  
concepts	  of	  equality	  and	  freedom	  (freedom	  from	  coercion).	  	  Given	  that	  people,	  who	  are	  equally	  
reasonable,	  choose	  different	  goals	  and	  have	  different	  ways	  about	  achieving	  them,	  it	  is	  absurd	  
to	  think	  that	  one	  person	  can	  make	  the	  right	  choice	  for	  all.	  	  Hence,	  equal	  liberty	  (negative	  liberty	  
of	  course)	  is	  the	  only	  reasonable	  alternative.	  	  This	  argument	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  
criticism147	  but	  the	  fact	  of	  reasonable	  pluralism	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  central	  issue	  in	  liberal	  theory.	  	  	  
	   Rawls	  points	  out	  that	  liberalism	  has	  to	  have	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  questions	  that	  arise	  from	  
the	  fact	  of	  reasonable	  pluralism;	  answers	  that	  are	  not	  required	  in	  political	  systems	  that	  do	  not	  
recognize	  pluralist	  associations.	  	  He	  continues	  to	  develop	  his	  account	  of	  liberalism	  as	  a	  political	  
theory,	  rather	  than	  a	  comprehensive	  doctrine.	  	  A	  liberal	  society	  must	  accommodate	  multiple	  
comprehensive	  doctrines;	  hence,	  metaphysical	  questions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  selves	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  Ibid.	  
145	  Ibid.	  
146	  See	  Thomas	  Pogge,	  chapter	  4	  of	  World	  Poverty	  and	  Human	  Rights	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2002);	  and	  Martha	  
Nussbaum,	  “Women	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  Peoples.”	  Politics,	  Philosophy	  and	  Economics,	  (2002):	  283-­‐306.	  
147	  See	  4.2	  for	  a	  summary	  of	  Rawls’	  criticism.	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universal	  morality	  are	  bracketed	  out	  of	  the	  equation.	  	  Political	  liberalism	  is	  neutral148	  with	  
regard	  to	  competing	  moral	  orders,	  theories	  of	  value	  and	  even	  epistemic	  considerations	  while	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  it	  does	  maintain	  a	  set	  of	  core	  liberal	  principles	  on	  which	  there	  can	  be	  consensus	  
among	  citizens	  seeking	  fair	  terms	  of	  cooperation.	  	  These	  principles	  are	  constitutional	  and	  are	  
primarily	  concerned	  with	  individual	  liberty	  and	  equality—principles	  that	  apply	  universally.149	  	  	  
	   Although	  political	  liberalism	  is	  meant	  to	  give	  us	  a	  theory	  of	  justice	  that	  is	  purely	  political,	  
critics,	  Taylor	  for	  example,	  have	  argued	  that	  liberalism	  is	  inextricably	  linked	  with	  controversial	  
metaphysical	  and	  epistemological	  presuppositions.	  	  Because	  justice,	  like	  any	  other	  concept,	  is	  
embedded	  in	  the	  language,	  beliefs,	  practices	  and	  values	  of	  a	  society,	  it	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  may	  
find	  perfectly	  reasonable	  expression	  in	  non-­‐liberal	  terms.150	  	  The	  political	  is	  so	  dependent	  upon	  
the	  way	  citizens	  view	  and	  talk	  about	  the	  world,	  it	  seems	  that	  a	  political	  theory	  abstracted	  from	  
the	  very	  real	  way	  of	  going	  on	  in	  a	  society	  is	  a	  non-­‐starter.151	  Although	  Rawls	  has	  attempted	  to	  
distinguish	  political	  liberalism	  from	  the	  implications	  of	  universality,	  the	  consensus	  needed	  to	  
stabilize	  the	  liberal	  polity	  seems	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  universality	  of	  the	  core	  liberal	  principles.	  	  If	  
liberalism	  is	  the	  ideal	  political	  system,	  then	  all	  individuals,	  if	  they	  are	  reasonable	  and	  operating	  
in	  good	  faith,	  will	  come	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion	  about	  the	  core	  principles	  of	  a	  just	  society.	  	  Non-­‐
liberal	  societies	  are	  simply	  those	  that	  have	  not	  yet	  realized	  the	  truth	  of	  it.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148	  The	  idea	  of	  liberal	  neutrality	  has	  a	  rich	  heritage.	  	  In	  chapter	  1	  of	  On	  Liberty,	  Mill	  gestures	  toward	  neutrality	  by	  
suggesting	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  political	  power	  should	  not	  occur	  for	  reasons	  that	  are	  not	  neutral.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  
enacting	  legislation	  that	  would	  benefit	  some	  citizens	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  sex	  or	  race	  would	  be	  unjust;	  however,	  if	  
the	  same	  legislation	  were	  enacted	  for	  different	  reasons,	  reasons	  neutral	  with	  regard	  to	  sex	  or	  race,	  the	  legislation	  
would	  be	  neutral.	  	  This	  implies	  that	  it	  is	  the	  reasons	  supporting	  the	  legislation	  speak	  to	  its	  neutrality	  rather	  than	  
the	  effects	  of	  the	  legislation.	  	  Some	  liberals	  demand	  more	  of	  neutrality.	  	  Ronald	  Dworkin	  argues	  that	  legislators	  
“must	  be	  neutral	  on	  what	  might	  be	  called	  the	  question	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  or	  of	  what	  gives	  value	  to	  life.	  	  Since	  the	  
citizens	  of	  society	  differ	  in	  their	  conceptions,	  the	  government	  does	  not	  treat	  them	  as	  equals	  if	  it	  prefers	  one	  
conception	  to	  another,	  either	  because	  the	  officials	  believe	  that	  one	  is	  intrinsically	  superior,	  or	  because	  one	  is	  held	  
by	  the	  more	  numerous	  or	  powerful	  group.”	  Dworkin,	  A	  Matter	  of	  Principle.	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  1985),	  191.	  
149	  Rawls,	  from	  the	  introduction	  to	  Political	  Liberalism.	  
150	  Interestingly	  enough,	  Rawls	  also	  takes	  the	  idea	  of	  non-­‐liberal	  justice	  seriously.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  liberal	  
conception	  of	  all	  persons	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  form	  a	  just	  society.	  	  As	  long	  as	  persons	  are	  
responsible	  to	  each	  other	  and	  are	  committed	  to	  cooperation,	  the	  inherent	  equality	  of	  persons	  in	  its	  liberal	  form	  is	  
not	  necessary	  to	  stabilize	  society.	  	  However,	  the	  cooperative	  element	  of	  such	  a	  society,	  which	  is	  implicit	  in	  the	  idea	  
of	  human	  rights,	  does	  apply	  across	  cultural	  and	  civilizational	  boundaries.	  Law	  of	  Peoples	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  
University	  Press,	  1999),	  66.	  
151	  See	  Charles	  Taylor,	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Human	  Sciences:	  Philosophical	  Papers	  2.	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1985).	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The	  recent	  debate	  over	  human	  rights	  in	  east	  Asia	  reveals	  just	  how	  deeply	  entrenched	  
Western	  commitments	  to	  liberal	  principles	  are,	  particularly	  individual	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  	  
Although	  Taylor	  argues	  for	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  respect	  for	  non-­‐liberal	  political	  arrangements,	  
his	  deep	  commitments	  to	  liberal	  rights	  are	  apparent.	  	  For	  example,	  he	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  
possible	  to	  generate	  an	  ‘unforced	  consensus’	  on	  human	  rights	  despite	  deep	  divergence	  by	  
separating	  out	  the	  content	  of	  rights	  from	  their	  liberal	  justifications	  and	  the	  legal	  forms	  they	  
take.	  	  	  
Taylor	  envisions	  a	  situation	  where	  “different	  groups,	  countries,	  religious	  communities	  
and	  civilizations,	  although	  holding	  incompatible	  fundamental	  views	  on	  theology,	  metaphysics,	  
human	  nature,	  and	  so	  on,	  would	  come	  to	  an	  agreement	  on	  certain	  norms	  that	  ought	  to	  govern	  
human	  behaviour.”152	  	  How	  might	  this	  be	  possible?	  	  An	  unforced	  consensus	  is	  possible	  if	  we	  
distinguish	  between	  three	  levels	  of	  disagreement—norms	  of	  conduct,	  legal	  forms	  and	  
philosophical	  justifications.	  	  What	  is	  crucial,	  for	  Taylor,	  is	  to	  secure	  agreement	  on	  the	  normative	  
level	  despite	  essential	  disagreement	  on	  the	  legal	  forms	  these	  norms	  take,	  or	  disagreement	  
regarding	  the	  philosophical	  justification	  for	  the	  agreed	  norms.	  	  Rather	  than	  look	  for	  universal	  
values	  to	  justify	  rights,	  the	  consensus	  should	  look	  for	  required	  “norms	  of	  conduct.”153	  	  	  
In	  the	  West,	  the	  right	  to	  equality	  aims	  to	  correct	  the	  unequal	  treatment	  of	  individuals	  in	  
a	  society.	  	  Minorities	  are	  protected	  against	  discrimination	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race	  or	  gender;	  in	  this	  
way,	  rights	  counteract	  a	  background	  of	  assumptions	  about	  the	  ‘natural’	  order	  of	  things	  that	  
supported	  certain	  hierarchies	  from	  the	  past	  that	  are	  based	  on	  difference.	  	  Hence,	  the	  
difference,	  between	  genders	  for	  example,	  is	  no	  longer	  seen	  as	  ‘natural’	  in	  the	  West;	  instead,	  
gender	  inequality	  is	  a	  social	  construction	  and	  as	  a	  result	  appeals	  to	  a	  natural	  order	  in	  which	  
women	  are	  subjugated	  fail	  to	  justify	  unequal	  treatment	  by	  governmental	  institutions.	  	  In	  
contrast,	  in	  some	  non-­‐Western	  cultures,	  gender	  differences	  are	  still	  deeply	  entrenched	  and	  
thought	  of	  as	  reasonable	  justifications	  for	  claims	  based	  on	  the	  natural	  order.154	  	  This	  sort	  of	  
observation	  is	  invaluable	  when	  looking	  to	  export	  rights	  without	  imposing	  the	  package	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152	  Charles	  Taylor,	  "Conditions	  of	  an	  Unforced	  Concensus	  on	  Human	  Rights."	  In	  The	  East	  Asian	  Challenge	  for	  
Human	  Rights,	  edited	  by	  Joanne	  Bauer	  and	  Daniel	  A.	  Bell.	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  124.	  
153	  Ibid.,	  125.	  
154	  Ibid.,	  138.	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assumptions	  and	  values	  upon	  which	  the	  liberal	  rights	  tradition	  rests.	  	  However,	  the	  problem	  is	  
the	  presumption	  that	  the	  values	  and	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  non-­‐liberal	  East	  can	  be	  fairly	  
translated	  into	  liberal	  terms;	  particularly	  terms	  that	  position	  Eastern	  concepts	  as	  relics	  of	  a	  
more	  primitive	  way	  of	  thinking	  that	  the	  liberal	  rights	  tradition	  has	  transcended.	  	  	  	  	  
Consider	  the	  following:	  	  Taylor,	  on	  natural	  orders,	  “a	  very	  common	  form	  of	  thinking	  in	  
almost	  all	  human	  societies.”155	  	  Taylor,	  on	  the	  turn	  away	  from	  natural	  order	  toward	  non-­‐
discriminatory	  practices,	  “the	  process	  of	  working	  it	  out	  has	  been	  long...in	  Western	  
civilization.”156	  	  Taylor,	  on	  some	  Eastern	  states	  where	  natural	  order	  underpins	  “certain	  social	  
differences	  [that]	  are	  still	  considered	  very	  meaningful...[that	  are]	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  certain	  
practices	  that	  in	  Western	  societies	  are	  now	  regarded	  as	  discriminatory	  [emphasis	  mine].”157	  	  
We	  too,	  were	  once	  so	  backward,	  or	  so	  the	  claim	  implies;	  your	  (foreign)	  culture,	  values	  and	  
practices	  can	  be	  translated	  into	  our	  (familiar)	  language	  and	  are	  easily	  understood	  by	  us	  as	  a	  
part	  of	  our	  past,	  but	  our	  concepts	  and	  principles	  are	  in	  your	  future	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  your	  
conceptual	  framework	  is	  inadequate	  to	  the	  task.	  	  	  
Taylor	  is	  all	  too	  aware	  of	  the	  negative	  effect	  this	  sort	  of	  Western	  condemnation	  can	  
have	  on	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  exchange;	  however,	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  illustration	  of	  the	  
presumption	  of	  Western	  superiority.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  minimizing	  
suffering,	  we	  in	  the	  West	  are	  “so	  little	  aware	  of	  the	  positive	  change”158	  we	  have	  gone	  through	  
that	  we	  “anachronistically...think	  that	  people	  must	  have	  always	  felt	  this	  way.”159	  	  I	  think	  Taylor	  
touches	  on	  an	  important	  point.	  	  He	  does	  not	  have	  to	  presume	  that	  people	  have	  always	  
believed,	  valued	  or	  wanted	  the	  same	  things,	  but	  he	  does	  have	  to	  presume	  that	  given	  what	  we	  
have	  had	  and	  have	  now,	  liberal	  principles	  are	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  political	  thought.	  	  	  
While	  this	  type	  of	  argument	  succeeds	  in	  conceptually	  detaching	  rights	  from	  the	  whole	  
package	  of	  philosophical	  or	  religious	  justifications,	  it	  fails	  to	  overcome	  the	  privileging	  of	  liberal	  
reasoning	  in	  intercultural	  dialogues	  about	  rights.	  	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  reframe	  rights	  in	  terms	  of	  
Eastern	  justifications	  but	  the	  Eastern	  justifications	  are	  simply	  judged	  against	  the	  presumption	  of	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  Ibid.,	  139.	  
156	  Ibid.,	  139.	  
157	  Ibid.,	  139	  
158	  Ibid.,	  142.	  	  
159	  Ibid.,	  142.	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existing	  consensus	  on	  the	  normative	  content	  of	  rights.	  	  The	  only	  way	  this	  sort	  of	  confirmation	  
bias	  works	  is	  if	  the	  normative	  content	  is	  universal.	  	  Hence,	  the	  presumption	  is	  that	  Western	  
reasoning	  has	  achieved	  something	  that	  Eastern	  reasoning	  has	  not	  yet	  achieved—the	  formal	  
justification	  of	  what	  are	  universal	  rights.	  
Within	  the	  liberal	  philosophical	  tradition,	  liberalism	  is	  considered	  an	  ahistorical	  ideal.	  	  If	  
we	  have	  is	  all	  there	  is,	  we	  just	  cannot	  take	  history	  seriously.	  	  History	  is	  now,	  and	  as	  the	  scene	  
passes,	  history	  ends	  over	  and	  over	  again.160	  	  Butterfield’s	  dream,	  that	  historians	  would	  shed	  
their	  Whigs	  and	  seek	  to	  come	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  history	  on	  its	  own	  terms	  becomes	  
impossible.	  	  Once	  history	  is	  off	  the	  continuum	  of	  change,	  we	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  present	  
in	  terms	  of	  the	  past.	  	  What	  emerges	  is	  a	  picture	  of	  liberal	  reasoning	  as	  the	  paradigm	  of	  
reasonable,	  standing	  in	  contrast	  to	  non-­‐liberal	  reasoning	  which,	  by	  implication,	  is	  unreasonable.	  	  
When	  minority	  groups	  translate	  the	  content	  of	  claims	  that	  do	  not	  jive	  with	  key	  features	  of	  
liberalism,	  the	  paradox	  model	  easily	  applies	  to	  their	  claims.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  these	  claims	  are	  
legitimately	  so	  characterised	  is	  not	  important	  at	  this	  point.	  	  What	  is	  important	  to	  note	  is	  the	  
connection	  between	  non-­‐liberal	  thinking,	  unreasonableness	  and	  paradox	  which	  puts	  minority	  
groups	  who	  consider	  themselves	  non-­‐liberal	  in	  an	  untenable	  situation.	  	  	  
To	  get	  around	  the	  associative	  implications	  of	  non-­‐liberal,	  it	  seems	  necessary	  to	  
challenge	  the	  ahistoricist	  nature	  of	  liberal	  reasoning—to	  acknowledge	  that	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  
liberalism	  is	  the	  Whiggish	  end	  of	  progress	  toward	  individual	  liberty.	  	  Rather	  than	  an	  end,	  
liberalism	  is	  a	  response,	  maybe	  the	  best	  response,	  to	  this	  time	  and	  this	  place.	  	  Bernard	  Williams	  
argues	  that	  contemporary	  conditions	  are	  such	  that	  a	  liberal	  solution	  to	  the	  first	  and	  
fundamental	  question	  of	  politics	  (about	  securing	  order,	  trust	  and	  the	  conditions	  of	  cooperation)	  
is	  the	  best	  contextually	  conditioned	  response.161	  	  Outside	  contemporary	  circumstances,	  
liberalism	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  acceptance	  or	  rejection	  of	  its	  internal	  morality.	  	  The	  moral	  
foundation	  of	  the	  liberal	  state	  is	  not,	  as	  is	  often	  thought,	  the	  conception	  of	  a	  person	  as	  
autonomous	  instead,	  the	  autonomous	  agent	  is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  conditions	  that	  only	  allow	  a	  
liberal	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  question	  of	  politics.	  The	  liberal	  state	  and	  the	  liberal	  conception	  of	  a	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  Francis	  Fukuyama,	  “The	  End	  of	  History?”	  (The	  National	  Interest,	  1989),	  presents	  one	  of	  the	  best	  examples	  of	  
this	  type	  of	  anacronistic	  presumption.	  
161	  Williams,	  Deed,	  9-­‐11.	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person	  fit	  together	  but	  to	  suggest	  that	  they	  justify	  each	  other	  is	  to	  falsely	  attribute	  cause	  when	  
there	  is	  only	  correlation.	  Without	  this	  causal	  link,	  the	  internal	  morality	  of	  liberalism	  loses	  its	  
moorings.162	  
Williams	  does	  not	  accept	  a	  form	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  derived	  from	  the	  formal	  
properties	  of	  a	  moral	  law	  or	  the	  moral	  person.163	  	  Instead,	  legitimation	  is	  shaped	  by	  a	  
sociological	  point	  where	  the	  nature	  of	  modernity	  is	  such	  that	  liberalism	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  
appropriate	  way	  to	  organize	  society	  in	  light	  of	  pluralism,	  individualism	  and	  other	  features	  of	  
modernity.164	  	  	  Hence,	  liberal	  legitimacy	  cannot	  say	  that	  other	  political	  forms	  are	  or	  were	  
illegitimate.	  	  However,	  liberal	  thought	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  recognize	  its	  own	  history,	  and	  as	  a	  
result,	  it	  cannot	  explain	  why	  its	  ahistorical	  truth	  has	  only	  emerged	  to	  certain	  people	  in	  recent	  
history.165	  	  	  
As	  Collingwood	  pointed	  out	  “Certain	  historians,	  sometimes	  whole	  generations	  of	  
historians,	  find	  in	  certain	  periods	  of	  history	  nothing	  intelligible,	  and	  call	  them	  dark	  ages;	  but	  
such	  phrases	  tell	  us	  nothing	  about	  those	  ages	  themselves,	  though	  they	  tell	  us	  a	  great	  deal	  
about	  the	  persons	  who	  use	  them,	  namely	  that	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  re-­‐think	  the	  thoughts	  which	  
were	  fundamental	  to	  their	  life.”166	  	  To	  say	  whether	  or	  not	  something	  makes	  sense	  is	  more	  an	  
evaluation	  of	  our	  understanding	  rather	  than	  an	  assessment	  of	  what	  sense	  can	  be	  made	  of	  
something.	  	  Tyranny	  makes	  sense,	  it	  is	  a	  fact	  familiar	  to	  us,	  but	  to	  say	  that	  tyranny	  makes	  sense	  
is	  not	  a	  normative	  claim.	  	  However,	  it	  becomes	  normative	  when	  what	  makes	  sense	  is	  a	  
structure	  of	  authority	  that	  we	  find	  acceptable.	  	  We	  do	  not	  say	  that	  others	  were	  or	  are	  wrong,	  
but	  there	  is	  a	  cognitive	  bias	  at	  play,	  a	  theory	  of	  error	  which	  makes	  one	  political	  morality	  
different	  in	  that	  it	  is	  correct.	  	  Similarly,	  what	  we	  call	  legitimate	  is	  what	  makes	  sense	  given	  our	  
understanding	  of	  legitimate	  authority.167	  	  That	  liberalism	  makes	  sense	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  
product	  of	  reason,	  but	  rather,	  it	  is	  the	  product	  of	  a	  sociological	  point	  in	  history	  in	  which	  
pluralism	  and	  diversity	  ask	  the	  questions	  liberalism	  is	  able,	  and	  indeed	  compelled,	  to	  answer.	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  Ibid.,	  8.	  
163	  Ibid.,	  10.	  
164	  Ibid.,	  11.	  
165	  Ibid.,	  9.	  
166	  R.	  G.	  Collingwood,	  The	  Idea	  of	  History.	  Revised	  Edition.	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1994)	  218.	  
167	  Williams,	  Deed,	  12.	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If	  liberalism	  cannot	  justify	  its	  ahistorical	  status	  as	  the	  product	  of	  reason;	  then,	  liberalism	  is	  one	  
theory	  among	  many	  and	  as	  such	  can	  be	  viewed	  in	  terms	  that	  reveal	  the	  paradoxical	  nature	  of	  
essentially	  liberal	  ideas.	  
Two	  Paradoxes	  	  
It	  may	  be	  overreaching	  to	  declare	  constructivism	  and	  antifoundationalism	  as	  essentially	  liberal	  
ideas;	  however,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  navigate	  the	  fact	  of	  reasonable	  pluralism	  without,	  at	  the	  
minimum,	  a	  socially	  conditioned	  view	  of	  truth	  and	  the	  good.	  	  When	  I	  speak	  of	  
antifoundationalism,	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  a	  progression	  of	  thought	  from	  Wittgenstein	  through	  
Davidson	  that	  finds	  contemporary	  expression	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Foucault	  and	  Rorty.	  	  It	  is	  
characterized	  by	  the	  rejection	  of	  foundational	  thinking,	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  
fundamental	  principles	  can	  govern	  inquiry	  or	  knowledge.	  	  Expressions	  of	  social	  constructivism	  
are	  found	  in	  Kant	  on	  the	  way	  to	  Rawls’	  political	  liberalism.	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  these	  two	  schools	  
of	  thought	  have	  much	  in	  common,	  and,	  important	  differences.168	  	  Relevant	  to	  the	  task	  at	  hand	  
is	  that	  they	  share	  a	  theoretical	  standpoint	  that	  is	  not,	  in	  the	  strictest	  terms,	  possible	  within	  the	  
confines	  of	  their	  own	  theoretical	  framework.	  	  The	  theorist,	  then,	  seems	  to	  be	  working	  at	  some	  
sort	  of	  meta-­‐level169	  that	  I	  will	  suggest	  is	  concomitant	  with	  the	  ahistoricist	  presuppositions	  
discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  	  	  
I	  begin	  with	  social	  constructivism,	  which	  is	  hailed	  as	  a	  liberating	  force	  in	  political	  
arrangements.	  	  Social	  constructivism	  provides	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  embrace	  tolerance	  but	  at	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  For	  an	  account	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  Rawls	  and	  Kant,	  see	  Onora	  Oneill,	  “Constructivism	  in	  Rawls	  and	  
Kant,”	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Rawls,	  ed.	  Samuel	  Freeman,	  347-­‐366.	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  2003),	  362-­‐363.	  
169	  It	  is	  not	  unusual	  for	  theorists	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  meta-­‐level	  perspective.	  Christopher	  Hookway,	  in	  "Fallibilism	  and	  
Objectivity:	  Science	  and	  Ethics."	  In	  World,	  Mind	  and	  Ethics,	  eds.,	  J.E.J.	  Altham	  and	  Ross	  Harrison,	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995)	  46-­‐67,	  characterizes	  the	  tendency	  to	  ascend	  to	  this	  ‘meta’	  level	  as	  an	  objectivity	  
analogue:	  	  “Just	  as	  it	  is	  a	  mark	  of	  the	  objectivity	  of	  science	  that	  it	  aims	  at	  a	  body	  of	  knowledge	  which	  any	  open-­‐
minded	  inquirer	  could	  accept,	  so	  it	  is	  a	  mark	  of	  the	  objectivity	  of	  values	  that	  we	  seek	  a	  body	  of	  knowledge	  which	  
only	  the	  hopelessly	  prejudiced	  or	  deceived	  could	  deny.”	  Hookway,	  “Fallibilism,”	  60;	  Nagel’s	  “view	  from	  nowhere”	  
posits	  an	  objective	  world,	  independent	  of	  our	  point	  of	  view,	  or	  any	  other	  particular	  point	  of	  view.	  	  We,	  at	  once,	  
perceive	  ourselves	  at	  once	  as	  of	  this	  world	  and	  as	  part	  of	  the	  objective	  world.	  	  Thomas	  Nagel,	  The	  View	  from	  
Nowhere.	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1989);	  Rawls’	  “Archimedean	  point”,	  the	  original	  position,	  is	  meant	  to	  
act	  as	  a	  fulcrum	  to	  achieve	  the	  necessary	  critical	  leverage	  in	  determining	  the	  principles	  of	  social	  justice.	  	  Behind	  the	  
veil	  of	  ignorance,	  the	  chooser	  is	  sufficiently	  removed	  from	  their	  own	  particulars	  to	  prevent	  individual	  biases,	  and	  
yet	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  relevant	  general	  knowledge	  necessary	  to	  assess	  the	  situation.	  	  John	  Rawls,	  A	  Theory	  of	  
Justice.	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1971)	  230-­‐32.	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same	  time,	  the	  social	  constructivist	  worldview	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  
there	  are	  radically	  different	  worldviews	  out	  there.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  increased	  emphasis	  on	  
the	  idea	  that	  tolerance	  is	  not	  really	  putting	  up	  with	  people	  who	  are	  significantly	  different;	  it	  is	  
just	  a	  matter	  of	  putting	  up	  with	  people	  who	  are	  marginally	  different.	  	  	  
If	  a	  worldview	  is	  a	  social	  construction,	  the	  beliefs,	  values	  and	  practices	  of	  a	  culture	  are	  
not	  ordained	  by	  an	  independent	  ground	  such	  as	  nature	  or	  God.	  	  Without	  an	  independent	  
ground	  to	  which	  we	  can	  appeal,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  legitimately	  adjudicate	  which	  is	  the	  superior,	  
or	  correct	  worldview.	  	  There	  are	  of	  course,	  all	  sorts	  of	  ways	  to	  compare	  one	  worldview	  against	  
another	  and	  ways	  to	  determine	  which	  political	  system	  might	  more	  efficiently	  yield	  the	  desired	  
results	  for	  example.	  	  However,	  there	  may	  be	  disagreement	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  efficiency	  is	  
the	  appropriate	  way	  to	  measure	  success	  and	  questions	  of	  that	  type	  cannot	  be	  settled	  by	  
appealing	  to	  an	  independent	  ground.	  	  Disagreements	  may	  be	  settled	  in	  other	  ways,	  but	  the	  
point	  is,	  it	  would	  be	  illegitimate	  to	  impose	  a	  religious	  standard	  onto	  a	  secular	  minority	  group	  
because	  God	  says	  so.	  	  The	  majority	  cannot	  legitimately	  judge	  a	  minority	  worldview	  to	  be	  
inferior	  just	  because	  it	  is	  held	  by	  fewer	  people,	  or	  because	  it	  is	  unpopular.	  	  Oppressed	  or	  
disenfranchised	  groups	  cannot	  be	  denied	  the	  opportunity	  to	  express	  their	  worldview,	  even	  
when	  that	  worldview	  does	  not	  harmonize	  with	  the	  majority.	  	  So	  far,	  so	  good;	  however,	  there	  is	  
something	  paradoxical	  about	  the	  point	  of	  view	  a	  theorist	  must	  take	  up	  in	  order	  to	  make	  
constructivist	  claims.	  	  	  
The	  members	  of	  a	  group,	  it	  is	  suggested,	  are	  bound	  to	  their	  worldview	  such	  that	  the	  
way	  they	  view	  and	  talk	  about	  the	  world	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  construction,	  but	  as	  it	  is	  the	  only	  point	  
of	  view	  available	  to	  them,	  it	  is	  the	  apparatus	  within	  which	  meanings	  and	  values	  are	  
constructed.	  	  The	  constructivist,	  paradoxically,	  needs	  to	  see	  through	  the	  bounds	  of	  their	  own	  
worldview	  and	  the	  worldviews	  of	  others	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  necessary	  critical	  distance	  from	  
the	  constructors	  they	  are	  talking	  about.	  	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  the	  constructivist	  sees	  more,	  
than	  the	  constructivists	  (that	  we	  all	  really	  are)	  he	  or	  she	  is	  talking	  about.170	  	  If	  liberal	  values	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  Geertz	  characterizes	  the	  theorist’s	  standpoint	  in	  this	  way:	  “Views	  from	  nowhere	  can	  be	  imaginatively	  
constructed,	  of	  course.	  	  If	  they	  are	  done	  well	  they	  can	  be,	  and	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences	  have	  been,	  immensely	  useful.	  	  
But	  thus	  constructed,	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  a	  particular	  variety	  of	  view	  from	  somewhere—the	  philosopher’s	  study,	  the	  
theorist’s	  computer.”	  Geertz,	  Available	  Light,	  137.	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social	  constructions,	  then	  they	  are	  the	  product	  of	  reason	  here	  and	  now,	  not	  the	  only	  product	  of	  
reason	  available	  everywhere	  and	  forever.	  	  And	  yet,	  the	  close	  relationship	  between	  liberal	  
values	  and	  reason	  generates	  a	  picture	  of	  liberalism	  thought	  to	  be	  applicable	  across	  cultural,	  
civilizational	  and	  national	  boundaries.	  	  	  
Political	  agreement,	  in	  the	  liberal	  picture,	  comes	  from	  reason;	  but	  not	  just	  any	  type	  of	  
reason,	  reason	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  our	  nature	  as	  free	  and	  equal171	  rational	  agents.	  	  
Consequently,	  it	  is	  not	  merely	  that	  reason	  gives	  us	  our	  concept	  of	  justice;	  it	  is	  that	  justice,	  the	  
correct	  notion	  of	  justice,	  is	  expressed	  through	  the	  reasoning	  of	  a	  free	  and	  equal	  rational	  agent.	  	  
Reason	  is	  our	  moral	  compass;	  hence,	  to	  impinge	  unjustly	  on	  the	  freedom	  and	  equality	  of	  the	  
individual	  is	  to	  unjustly	  mess	  with	  the	  moral	  compass.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  practice	  of	  moral	  
discourse	  is	  equated	  with	  reason	  itself.	  	  However,	  reason,	  in	  these	  terms,	  is	  the	  expression	  of	  
liberal	  principles	  and	  values,	  the	  free	  and	  equal	  autonomous	  agent.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  concept	  of	  
reasonable	  becomes	  inherently	  liberal.	  	  	  
	   In	  liberal	  terms,	  coercion	  cannot	  be	  justified	  when	  it	  impinges	  on	  individual	  freedom	  or	  
promotes	  inequalities.	  	  Or,	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  freedom	  and	  equality	  are	  necessary	  to	  protect	  
individual	  citizens	  from	  coercion	  that	  cannot	  be	  justified.	  	  What	  sets	  non-­‐liberal	  groups	  apart	  
from	  liberal	  thinking	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  freedom	  and	  equality	  (understood	  in	  liberal	  terms)	  may	  
not	  be	  the	  only	  way	  to	  protect	  individual	  citizens	  from	  injustice.	  	  Given	  the	  close	  relationship	  
between	  moral	  discourse,	  liberal	  principles	  and	  reason,	  Williams	  argues,	  a	  liberal	  would	  have	  to	  
argue	  that	  the	  only	  sort	  of	  legitimate	  coercion	  was	  liberal,	  because	  only	  liberal	  reasoning	  is	  the	  
kind	  of	  reasoning	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  considered	  legitimate.	  	  Hence	  liberalism	  is	  paradoxically	  at	  
once	  constructivist	  and	  dogmatic.172	  	  This	  may	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  deep	  contradiction	  in	  the	  
constructivist	  picture.	  	  The	  view	  from	  nowhere	  is	  necessary	  to	  engage	  in	  constructivist	  theory,	  
but	  paradoxically	  is	  an	  independent	  ground	  explicitly	  denied	  by	  the	  theory.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  See	  chapter	  3.1	  and	  3.2	  for	  in	  depth	  discussions	  of	  equality	  and	  freedom.	  
172	  Williams,	  Deed,	  23.	  	  Chandran	  Kukathas	  similarly	  notices	  deep	  tensions	  in	  the	  liberal	  picture	  brought	  about	  by	  
the	  implementation	  of	  liberatarian	  ideals	  will	  regard	  to	  illiberal	  elements	  of	  society.	  	  Either	  citizens	  are	  free	  to	  be	  
illiberal,	  or,	  a	  liberal	  society	  must	  exercise	  its	  authority	  to	  restrict	  the	  freedom	  of	  citizens	  who	  dissent	  in	  which	  case	  
“A	  libertarian	  orthodoxy	  is	  still	  an	  orthodoxy.”	  	  From	  “Can	  a	  LIberal	  Society	  Tolerate	  Illiberal	  Elements?”	  Policy	  17,	  
no.	  2	  (2001),	  44.	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   Liberalism	  is	  a	  response	  to	  pluralism,	  but	  pluralism,	  as	  a	  fact	  about	  the	  world,	  and	  facts	  
about	  the	  world	  alone	  are	  not	  enough	  to	  justify	  liberalism.	  	  Pluralism,	  as	  Williams	  puts	  it,	  does	  
not	  authenticate	  a	  way	  of	  life.	  	  What	  facts	  about	  the	  world	  do	  is	  inform	  what	  sorts	  of	  things	  
make	  sense	  to	  us.	  	  According	  to	  Williams,	  “The	  relationship	  between	  a	  practice	  and	  a	  set	  of	  
beliefs	  cannot	  be	  anything	  like	  that	  of	  premises	  and	  conclusions,	  or	  indeed	  any	  other	  relation	  of	  
two	  sets	  of	  propositions.”173	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  political	  thought	  makes	  sense	  is	  dependent	  upon	  
political	  circumstances	  and	  political	  action.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  conditions	  generated	  by	  actions	  
that	  violated,	  what	  we	  now	  call	  human	  rights,	  were	  the	  circumstances	  that	  begged	  for	  a	  
political	  response,	  and	  thereby	  shaped	  liberal	  thought,	  the	  liberal	  rights	  tradition.174	  	  Williams	  
notices	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  theory	  and	  action	  is	  not	  fixed.	  	  In	  some	  circumstances	  
theory	  advances	  action,	  in	  others	  action	  precedes	  the	  theoretical	  interpretation.	  	  However,	  
theory	  cannot	  advance	  far	  enough	  ahead	  of	  action	  to	  determine	  what	  makes	  sense,	  nor	  can	  it	  
determine	  what	  will	  make	  sense	  in	  the	  future.	  	  Theory,	  like	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy,	  may	  
generate	  the	  circumstances	  it	  predicts;	  but	  this	  is	  not	  evidence	  of	  its	  timelessness175	  (some	  
liberal	  theorists	  suggests	  otherwise).	  
	   Williams	  asks	  the	  question:	  	  Theocratic	  governments	  and	  patriarchal	  practices	  did,	  at	  
one	  time,	  make	  sense	  to	  people	  under	  those	  regimes	  in	  that	  time;	  however,	  does	  this	  suggest	  
that,	  if	  they	  made	  sense	  for	  them	  then,	  that	  they	  could	  make	  sense	  for	  a	  community	  now?	  	  
Arguments	  that	  justify	  these	  types	  of	  coercion	  do	  not	  change	  substantially;	  what	  does	  change	  
are	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  they	  make	  sense	  or	  not.176	  	  	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  the	  
same	  is	  not	  true	  of	  liberalism.	  	  “No	  political	  theory,	  liberal	  or	  other,	  can	  determine	  by	  itself	  its	  
own	  application.”177	  The	  reasons	  a	  practice	  makes	  sense	  or	  not,	  are	  many	  and	  varied.	  	  
Consequently	  political	  action,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  theory,	  are	  only	  one	  of	  the	  many	  forces	  at	  
play.	  	  Hence,	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  ahistorical	  political	  theory	  becomes	  unreasonable.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  Ibid.,	  24.	  
174	  See	  chapter	  2	  of	  Will	  Kymlicka’s	  Multicultural	  Odysseys:	  Navigating	  the	  New	  International	  Politics	  of	  Diversity,	  
(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007)	  for	  a	  critical	  look	  at	  the	  post	  WWII	  conditions	  that	  favored	  an	  emphasis	  on	  
universal	  human	  rights	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  minority	  rights	  considerations.	  
175	  Williams,	  Deed,	  26.	  
176	  Ibid.,	  27.	  
177	  Ibid.,	  28.	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   We	  can	  only	  interpret	  theories	  of	  the	  past	  from	  our	  position	  in	  the	  present,	  and	  that	  
situation	  will	  always	  taint	  our	  interpretation.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  broken	  sculpture	  of	  Laocoön	  
and	  His	  Sons	  (2nd	  or	  1st	  century	  BCE)	  was	  discovered	  in	  Rome	  in	  1506.	  	  An	  early	  restoration	  
placed	  Laocoön’s	  arms	  thrust	  outward	  suggesting	  a	  heroic	  struggle	  against	  the	  snakes	  sent	  by	  
Athena	  whereas,	  a	  recent	  restoration	  utilizing	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  techniques,	  places	  the	  arms	  turned	  
inward	  depicting	  an	  inner	  struggle	  and	  suffering.	  	  Art	  historians	  suggest	  that	  the	  choice	  made	  in	  
the	  reconstruction	  was	  more	  about	  the	  social	  consciousness	  of	  the	  age	  than	  about	  the	  
artefacts—that	  the	  inner	  struggles	  of	  20th	  century	  determined	  the	  statues	  reconstruction.178	  	  
Here	  is	  the	  interesting	  point:	  We	  cannot	  take	  up	  the	  ahistorical	  point	  of	  view	  necessary	  to	  
compare	  the	  reconstructions	  with	  its	  original	  form,	  the	  pieces	  of	  the	  puzzle	  can	  never	  tell	  us	  
which	  construction	  is	  correct.	  	  However,	  we	  can	  come	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  
historical	  context	  and	  social	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  original	  was	  produced.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  
come	  to	  estimate	  degrees	  of	  authenticity.	  	  Even	  so,	  its	  original	  form	  is	  just	  that,	  its	  original	  
form—because	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  it	  started	  that	  way,	  does	  not	  make	  that	  construction	  the	  
correct	  construction	  for	  all	  time.	  	  If	  we	  let	  go	  of	  a	  rigid	  conception	  of	  correct	  as	  original,	  it	  may	  
be	  that	  Laocoön	  is	  correct	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  present	  context.	  	  Similarly,	  political	  theory	  is	  
essentially	  conditioned	  by	  the	  intellectual,	  empirical	  and	  historical	  circumstances.	  
Like	  the	  constructivist	  theorist,	  the	  antifoundationalist	  theorist	  seems	  to	  be	  operating	  
on	  some	  sort	  of	  meta-­‐level,	  which	  is	  paradoxically	  not	  available	  in	  the	  antifoundationalist	  
framework.	  	  Rorty,	  for	  example,	  famously	  argued	  that	  metaphysical	  theories	  are	  no	  more	  than	  
fossils;	  remnants	  of	  thought	  from	  a	  time	  when	  foundations	  like	  eternal	  essences	  and	  
universalism	  were	  part	  of	  the	  historically	  conditioned	  vocabulary.	  	  Now,	  however,	  the	  liberal	  
ironist	  recognizes	  the	  contingent	  nature	  of	  scientific	  and	  philosophical	  methods	  of	  inquiry.	  	  The	  
ironist	  works	  within	  a	  vocabulary,	  a.k.a.	  a	  conceptual	  framework;	  however,	  that	  vocabulary	  is	  
not	  grounded	  on	  a	  foundation.	  	  The	  ironist	  believes	  that	  his	  or	  her	  current	  vocabulary	  is	  
brought	  about	  by	  the	  social	  and	  historical	  conditions	  in	  which	  it	  is	  embedded;	  hence,	  what	  we	  
have	  is	  what	  we	  have.179	  	  However,	  the	  antifoundationalist	  theorist	  paradoxically,	  it	  seems,	  is	  
able	  to	  speak	  in	  a	  vocabulary	  that	  talks	  about	  multiple	  vocabularies	  (plural)	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  is	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  Stockstad,	  Art:	  A	  Brief	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  Edition,	  (New	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not	  possible	  if	  one’s	  vocabulary	  (singular)	  is	  the	  only	  vocabulary	  made	  available	  by	  the	  social	  
and	  historical	  conditions	  of	  any	  given	  time.	  
	   The	  liberal	  ironist,	  even	  in	  Rorty’s	  own	  terms,	  is	  a	  decidedly	  elitist	  character.	  	  Most	  
people,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  pluralism,	  focus	  on	  the	  particular	  rather	  than	  the	  universal—leaving	  the	  
arcane	  content	  of	  metaphysical	  truth	  undisturbed	  because	  it	  lacks	  the	  requisite	  utility	  to	  be	  
relevant	  in	  the	  pragmatic	  liberal	  utopia.	  	  Similarly,	  most	  people	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  historicist	  
nature	  of	  common	  sense,	  and	  see	  their	  way	  of	  life	  relative	  to	  others	  in	  history	  as	  occupying	  a	  
niche	  on	  a	  continuum.	  	  However,	  most	  people	  do	  not	  have	  the	  depth	  of	  doubt	  necessary	  to	  
achieve	  ironist	  status.	  	  The	  ironist	  cannot	  help	  but	  be	  ironic	  about	  his	  or	  her	  current	  vocabulary	  
because	  he	  or	  she	  cannot	  see	  it	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  purely	  contingent,	  and	  the	  sheer	  
contingency	  of	  vocabularies	  means	  no	  one	  vocabulary	  is	  closer	  to	  reality	  than	  any	  other.	  	  
Hence,	  the	  ironist	  way	  of	  life	  is	  just	  that,	  a	  way	  of	  life.	  	  Clearly	  Rorty’s	  elite	  gang	  of	  ironists	  do	  
not	  merely	  have	  doubts,	  they	  have	  radical	  doubts	  about	  philosophical	  inquiry.180	  	  How	  then,	  
can	  they	  engage	  in	  the	  language	  of	  philosophical	  inquiry	  to	  express	  those	  doubts	  and	  express	  
the	  justificatory	  story	  behind	  those	  doubts?	  	  The	  simple	  answer	  is	  that	  they	  are	  ironic	  about	  it,	  
but	  that	  does	  not	  get	  the	  ironist	  out	  of	  the	  paradox.	  	  	  
To	  the	  antifoundationalist,	  any	  theory	  that	  appeals	  to	  foundations	  is	  no	  longer	  
intelligible	  in	  an	  ironist	  framework.	  	  As	  Williams	  points	  out,	  if	  “our	  way	  of	  going	  on	  is	  simply	  our	  
way	  of	  going	  on”,	  the	  justificatory	  picture	  is	  very	  different,	  it	  is	  unrecognizable.181	  The	  primacy	  
of	  shared	  social	  practice	  in	  our	  understandings	  implies	  that	  change	  only	  occurs	  arbitrarily,	  in	  
this	  framework,	  progress	  does	  not	  make	  sense.	  	  We	  simply	  do	  not	  feel	  the	  pull	  of	  principle	  or	  
the	  tug	  of	  moral	  obligation	  in	  a	  foundationalist	  way.	  	  Instead,	  we	  are	  pushed	  along	  the	  road	  to	  
nowhere,	  or,	  at	  the	  minimum,	  the	  road	  to	  I-­‐cannot-­‐know-­‐where.	  	  The	  acceptance	  of	  the	  
conceptual	  framework	  cannot	  be	  questioned;	  hence,	  it	  implies	  a	  conservative	  impulse	  to	  
sustain	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  Not	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  decision,	  but	  because	  there	  is	  no	  escaping	  the	  
framework,	  no	  position	  from	  which	  criticism	  can	  be	  levied.	  	  Conceptual	  change	  and	  social	  
change	  are	  closely	  linked,	  but	  not	  accessible	  to	  philosophy;	  hence	  Williams	  articulates	  the	  
antifoundationalist	  paradox	  this	  way:	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If	  all	  social	  phenomena	  equally	  are	  just	  whatever	  they	  are,	  merely	  part	  of	  this	  
interwoven	  net	  of	  practices,	  then	  all	  of	  them	  equally	  will	  be	  opaque	  to	  philosophical	  
criticism.	  	  But	  the	  Wittgensteinian	  philosopher	  is	  himself	  criticizing	  something,	  if	  only	  
the	  practices	  of	  ethical	  theorists	  and	  other	  philosophers	  who	  misunderstand	  the	  proper	  
nature	  of	  our	  thought.182	  	  	  
It	  is	  the	  great	  merit	  of	  antifoundationalist	  and	  constructivist	  theories,	  that	  they	  can	  account	  for	  
the	  socially	  conditioned	  nature	  of	  human	  enterprise,	  be	  it	  scientific,	  political	  or	  philosophical.	  	  
The	  recognition	  of	  ongoing	  change	  tends	  to	  support	  a	  tolerant	  approach	  to	  difference	  rather	  
than	  a	  confrontational	  approach.	  	  However,	  if	  we	  reject	  foundationalism	  in	  the	  Rortian	  way,	  we	  
lose	  access	  to	  what	  has	  shaped	  our	  society;	  the	  traditions	  and	  history	  underneath	  our	  
conception	  of	  our	  own	  institutions	  and	  practices	  as	  distinctly	  unique	  to	  our	  society.183	  	  Social	  
critique	  is	  possible	  without	  foundationalism.	  	  If	  foundationalism	  becomes	  historically	  and	  
socially	  relevant	  to	  ethical	  thought,	  it	  becomes	  realistic.	  	  It	  offers	  a	  ground	  from	  which	  
alternatives	  are	  seen	  and	  can	  be	  critically	  deployed.184	  
Political	  theory,	  when	  largely	  concerned	  with	  justice	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  individuals	  within	  a	  
particular	  citizenry,	  and	  has	  not	  yet	  tackled	  the	  questions	  emerging	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  as	  to	  
what	  type	  of	  group	  can	  claim	  a	  political	  identity.	  	  There	  is	  the	  growing	  recognition	  that	  
culturally	  homogeneous	  groups	  should	  be	  able	  to	  form	  a	  state,	  despite	  their	  lack	  of	  internal	  
plurality.	  	  However,	  as	  articulated	  in	  chapter	  one,	  intra-­‐cultural	  hegemony	  would	  deny	  to	  
minority	  groups	  or	  individuals	  within	  the	  state	  the	  very	  right	  they	  might	  claim	  to	  form	  their	  own	  
state.	  	  Williams	  argues	  that	  the	  internal	  contradictions	  of	  liberal	  pluralist	  theory	  cannot	  provide	  
a	  clear	  answer	  to	  this	  problem.	  Hence,	  without	  a	  return	  to	  the	  Enlightenment	  roots	  in	  which	  
the	  absolute	  value	  of	  the	  individual	  trumps	  cultural	  homogeneity,	  liberalism	  is	  hopelessly	  
internally	  conflicted.185	  	  A	  return	  to	  the	  universalism	  and	  ahistoricism	  of	  Enlightenment	  values;	  
however,	  is	  a	  step	  backward,	  one	  that	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  justified	  cultural	  imperialism	  that	  
the	  modern	  pluralist	  liberal	  state	  cannot	  abide.	  
As	  I	  said	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  chapter,	  liberalism	  is,	  rightly	  so,	  a	  deeply	  contested	  
concept.	  	  My	  purpose	  here	  was	  to	  explore	  the	  notion	  that	  paradoxical	  arguments	  are	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unreasonable—that	  the	  internal	  contradictions	  of	  minority	  rights	  claims	  make	  those	  claims	  
unreasonable.	  	  If	  paradox	  stands	  in	  contrast	  to	  reasonableness,	  then	  the	  paradoxes	  found	  in	  the	  
liberal	  tradition	  suggest	  that	  the	  liberal	  state	  is	  itself	  unreasonable.	  	  	  
The	  liberal	  dogma	  of	  correctness	  cannot	  itself	  be	  tested	  from	  within	  liberalism.	  	  The	  
ahistoricist	  picture	  negates	  the	  traditions	  necessary	  to	  legitimate	  key	  features	  of	  liberalism.	  	  
Expression	  of	  both	  constructivism	  and	  antifoundationalism	  are	  constituent	  of	  pluralist	  societies;	  
however,	  both	  are	  rendered	  opaque	  to	  philosophical	  speculation	  by	  the	  ‘what	  we	  have	  is	  what	  
we	  have’	  idiom.	  	  Hence,	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  how	  social	  and	  political	  beliefs,	  values	  and	  practices	  
are	  available	  to	  the	  theorist.	  The	  ideological	  underpinnings	  of	  liberalism	  support	  and	  sustain	  a	  
package	  of	  beliefs,	  values,	  practices	  and	  a	  distinct	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  world	  that	  cannot	  
account	  for	  its	  own	  error,	  or	  the	  error	  of	  others.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  charge	  of	  paradoxical	  seems	  
wholly	  inadequate	  as	  a	  basis	  to	  deny	  the	  claims	  of	  non-­‐liberal	  minority	  groups.	  	  
2.3	  Conclusions	  
Here	  is	  a	  much	  quoted	  remark:	  “Aboriginal	  rights,	  at	  least	  in	  their	  robust	  form,	  will	  only	  be	  
secure	  when	  they	  are	  viewed,	  not	  as	  competing	  with	  liberalism,	  but	  as	  an	  essential	  component	  
of	  liberal	  political	  practice.”186	  	  Kymlicka	  is	  speaking	  of	  a	  type	  of	  liberalism	  that	  offers	  deep	  
recognition	  to	  the	  value	  of	  culture	  and	  diversity	  within	  a	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  I	  began	  this	  
chapter	  by	  looking	  at	  liberalism	  through	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  lens,	  that	  is,	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  claims	  of	  
difference	  made	  by	  non-­‐liberal	  minority	  groups.	  	  I	  submit	  that	  it	  is	  not	  Kymlicka’s	  liberalism,	  nor	  
the	  liberalism	  of	  any	  one	  theorist,	  nor	  the	  intellectual	  liberal	  tradition	  from	  which	  non-­‐liberal	  
groups	  wish	  to	  distinguish	  themselves,	  that	  is	  at	  issue	  here.	  	  Instead,	  it	  is	  some	  of	  the	  key	  
elements	  of	  the	  liberal	  approach	  to	  politics,	  the	  liberal	  worldview	  that	  are	  at	  issue.	  	  	  
Clearly,	  individualism	  is	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  liberalism	  that	  non-­‐liberals	  do	  not	  consider	  
necessary	  for	  a	  functional	  account	  of	  justice.	  	  The	  liberal	  concept	  of	  justice	  is	  oriented	  to	  the	  
individual,	  whereas	  non-­‐liberal	  groups	  view	  justice	  as	  a	  concept	  of	  the	  many—a	  social	  and	  
relational	  construct.	  	  In	  the	  self-­‐proclaimed	  non-­‐liberal	  worldviews	  discussed,	  the	  natural	  world	  
is	  not	  an	  object,	  but	  part	  of	  a	  functioning	  moral	  order	  comprised	  of	  multiple	  intentional	  forms	  
of	  life.	  	  Consequently,	  entitlements	  and	  duties	  extend	  beyond	  human	  relationships	  to	  the	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natural	  world	  as	  well.	  	  Land	  rights,	  as	  prima	  facie	  rights,	  do	  not	  govern	  only	  human	  relations;	  
the	  right	  to	  land	  entails	  duties	  to	  the	  land	  itself.	  	  These	  differences	  shape	  a	  type	  of	  reasoning	  
foreign	  to	  the	  liberal	  view	  that	  is	  often	  misrecognized	  and	  cast	  as	  paradoxical	  rather	  than	  
reasonable.	  	  	  	  
The	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  is	  reinforced	  when	  liberal	  thinking	  is	  presumed	  to	  be	  the	  
correct	  way	  to	  think,	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  alternative	  reasoning	  styles.	  	  Liberal	  principles,	  it	  has	  
been	  argued,	  are	  not	  just	  the	  incarnation	  of	  our	  present	  expression	  of	  the	  good,	  they	  are	  the	  
expression	  of	  good	  and	  as	  such	  hold	  across	  boundaries	  of	  culture,	  time	  and	  place.	  	  The	  
ahistoricism	  implicit	  in	  a	  political	  ideology	  steeped	  in	  timeless	  and	  universal	  principles	  stands	  as	  
an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  alternative	  worldviews	  in	  political	  practices,	  because	  
liberalism	  cannot	  take	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  conceptual	  scheme	  seriously.	  	  The	  presumption	  of	  pre-­‐
eminent	  reasoning;	  however,	  has	  shaky	  foundations.	  	  If	  liberalism	  cannot	  justify	  its	  ahistorical	  
status	  as	  the	  product	  of	  reason	  then	  liberalism	  is	  one	  theory	  among	  many	  and	  as	  such	  can	  be	  
viewed	  in	  terms	  that	  reveal	  the	  paradoxical	  nature	  of	  essentially	  liberal	  ideas.	  	  Hence,	  the	  
dichotomy	  between	  paradoxical	  and	  reasonable	  breaks	  down	  as	  an	  inadequate	  means	  to	  
evaluate	  the	  strength	  or	  weakness	  of	  an	  argument	  shaped	  by	  a	  particular	  worldview.	  	  	  
The	  presumption	  that	  liberal	  reasoning	  is	  somehow	  more	  correct	  than	  non-­‐liberal	  forms	  
of	  thought	  hampers	  the	  efforts	  of	  non-­‐liberal	  minorities	  seeking	  political	  recognition	  and	  
equality	  in	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  What	  is	  needed	  is	  a	  political	  decision-­‐making	  apparatus	  that	  
can	  function	  inclusively	  with	  regard	  to	  minority	  rights	  claims	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  offer	  not	  only	  
substantive	  recognition	  of	  worldviews,	  but	  also	  a	  mechanism	  by	  which	  the	  contested	  nature	  of	  
liberal	  political	  practice	  finds	  expression	  in	  political	  activity.	  	  In	  part	  2,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  a	  
deliberative	  approach	  to	  political	  decision-­‐making	  is	  a	  process	  through	  which	  groups	  with	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Part	  2:	  A	  Fresh	  Approach	  
I	  call	  the	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  model	  I	  am	  about	  to	  put	  forward	  fresh,	  not	  because	  it	  is	  a	  
new	  idea.	  	  It	  is	  a	  fresh	  approach	  because	  I	  look	  to	  the	  rich	  resources	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  
in	  order	  to	  generate	  a	  model	  of	  political	  dialogue	  that	  facilitates	  the	  recognition	  of	  genuine	  
pluralism	  in	  modern	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  Again,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  all	  modern	  liberal	  
democracies	  are	  the	  same,	  or	  that	  they	  are	  not	  pluralist	  associations.	  	  As	  previously	  noted,	  it	  is	  
liberalism’s	  commitment	  to	  pluralism	  that	  brings	  these	  issues	  to	  the	  fore—a	  commitment	  aptly	  
described	  by	  Kukathas:	  “What	  characterizes	  a	  liberal	  political	  order	  is	  not	  shared	  political	  
commitments	  but	  institutions	  which	  enable	  people	  whose	  moral,	  religious,	  cultural,	  and	  
political	  commitments	  differ.”187	  	  My	  aim,	  then,	  is	  simply	  to	  put	  forward	  a	  suggestion	  about	  
how	  the	  justness	  of	  those	  pluralist	  associations	  might	  be	  improved,	  to	  recommend	  a	  way	  out	  of	  
a	  paradox	  that	  threatens	  to	  illegitimately	  stifle	  the	  claims	  of	  minorities,	  particularly	  non-­‐liberal	  
minorities.	  
It	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  defend	  deliberative	  democracy	  as	  either	  the	  best	  description	  or	  
prescription	  of	  or	  for	  all	  the	  complications	  thrown	  up	  by	  pluralism	  in	  modern	  liberal	  
democracies.	  	  It	  is	  my	  intention	  to	  critically	  examine	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
get	  around	  the	  dialogue	  ending	  implications	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  
deliberative	  processes	  (that	  is	  political	  processes	  that	  take	  on	  an	  inclusive	  deliberative	  
character)	  succeed	  on	  three	  fronts	  identified	  as	  problematic	  for	  minority	  groups:	  	  Dialogical	  
inclusion,	  public	  reason	  and	  political	  identity.	  	  Deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  is	  inclusive	  with	  
regard	  to	  reasons	  and	  reasoning	  styles	  and	  is	  able	  to	  offer	  substantive	  and	  procedural	  
recognition	  of	  identity	  in	  political	  dialogues	  about	  rights.	  
The	  scope	  of	  theories	  characterised	  as	  ‘deliberative’	  is	  broad	  and	  there	  are	  many	  
questions	  about	  what	  a	  deliberation	  does,	  could	  or	  should	  look	  like.	  	  What	  motivates	  
deliberation?	  	  Who	  should	  be	  included?	  	  What	  should	  be	  deliberated?	  	  What	  are	  the	  necessary	  
conditions	  of	  deliberation?	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  deliberative	  theories	  are	  importantly	  differentiated	  
by	  the	  priority	  and	  relationship	  between	  the	  various	  features	  of	  deliberation.	  	  By	  looking	  at	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these	  differences	  in	  light	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  inclusion,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  construct	  a	  framework	  of	  
deliberative	  processes	  that	  can	  accommodate	  deep	  diversity.	  	  	  
In	  the	  next	  three	  chapters,	  I	  identify	  three	  types	  of	  exclusion	  that	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
prioritizing	  one	  feature	  of	  deliberation	  over	  another.	  	  First,	  when	  reasonableness	  sets	  limits	  on	  
the	  character	  of	  deliberative	  participants,	  individuals	  may	  be	  unjustly	  excluded.	  	  Second,	  the	  
influence	  of	  deliberations	  in	  the	  social	  and	  civil	  spheres	  of	  society	  may	  be	  unjustly	  excluded	  
when	  a	  particular	  conceptual	  framework	  restricts	  the	  allowable	  content	  of	  political	  
deliberation.	  	  Third,	  individuals	  may	  be	  illegitimately	  excluded	  when	  legitimacy	  is	  dependent	  on	  
a	  comprehensive	  notion	  of	  transformation.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  I	  argue	  that	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation	  
requires	  equality	  of	  access	  and	  influence;	  that	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  be	  determined	  
publicly;	  that	  deliberative	  legitimacy	  is	  independent	  of	  transformation;	  and,	  that	  legitimacy	  is	  
tied	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  	  A	  deliberation,	  ordered	  in	  this	  way,	  makes	  
room	  for	  alternative	  worldviews,	  reasoning	  styles	  and	  content	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making	  and	  
in	  doing	  so	  gets	  around	  obstacles	  thrown	  up	  by	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	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Chapter	  3:	  	  Dialogical	  Inclusion	  
An	  idealized	  definition	  of	  political	  deliberation	  might	  run	  something	  like	  this:	  	  A	  deliberation	  is	  a	  
dialogue	  between	  the	  free	  and	  equal	  members	  of	  an	  association	  which	  takes	  place	  when	  those	  
members	  share	  in	  common	  the	  need	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  or	  choose	  a	  course	  of	  collective	  action.	  	  
Deliberative	  reasoning	  is	  dialogical	  reasoning,	  that	  is,	  reasoning	  constructed	  in	  a	  dialogue	  
between	  individual	  members	  or	  groups	  of	  an	  association	  regarding	  a	  decision.	  	  Since	  all	  
participants	  are	  bound	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  deliberation,	  any	  individual	  or	  group	  with	  
something	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  decision	  should	  have	  a	  voice	  in	  the	  dialogue.	  	  It	  is	  a	  wonderful	  ideal,	  a	  
very	  old	  ideal—members	  of	  a	  political	  association	  coming	  together	  in	  a	  spirit	  of	  good	  faith,	  
cooperation,	  equality	  and	  equanimity	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  decisions	  that	  are	  fair	  and	  just	  for	  all.	  	  	  
	   The	  direct	  democracy	  of	  ancient	  Athens	  emphasised	  the	  necessity	  of	  public	  discussion	  
and	  public	  decision-­‐making	  and	  although	  the	  size	  of	  the	  discussions,	  often	  involving	  several	  
thousand	  citizens,	  necessitated	  appointed	  interlocutors	  the	  discussion	  was	  open	  to	  all.188	  	  In	  
fact,	  inclusion	  was	  so	  important	  to	  the	  Athenians	  that	  public	  discussion	  was	  not	  an	  option—it	  
was	  an	  obligation.189	  	  Hence,	  participation	  was	  a	  way	  of	  life	  and	  this	  sort	  of	  political	  
engagement	  is	  what	  deliberationists190	  like	  Barber	  argue	  is	  missing	  in	  the	  liberal	  democracies	  of	  
today.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  deliberation	  is	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘politics	  in	  the	  participatory	  mode’	  where	  
public	  policy	  is	  deliberated	  not	  by	  professional	  politicians,	  but	  by	  an	  active,	  dynamically	  engage	  
citizenry	  concerned	  with	  bringing	  about	  what	  is	  best	  for	  all	  citizens.191	  	  
As	  appealing	  as	  the	  deliberative	  ideal	  is,	  it	  raises	  many	  questions.	  	  How	  can	  a	  
deliberation	  logistically	  occur	  between	  members	  of	  a	  mass	  society?	  	  What	  motivates	  good	  
faith?	  	  How	  can	  a	  deliberation	  accommodate	  divergent	  reasoning	  styles	  and	  competing	  values?	  	  
Who	  sets	  the	  agenda	  for	  a	  deliberation?	  	  Can	  deliberation	  bridge	  the	  conceptual	  divides	  
between	  groups	  with	  deeply	  divergent	  worldviews?	  	  My	  primary	  focus	  is	  the	  last	  three	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Athenian	  society	  is	  a	  model	  of	  political	  deliberation	  in	  the	  contemporary	  sense.	  	  They	  did	  
not	  recognize	  women,	  slaves	  or	  foreigners	  as	  political	  actors;	  however,	  the	  public	  sphere	  required	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
political	  actors,	  they	  were	  under	  obligations	  of	  public	  discussion	  and	  decision	  making	  that	  harmonize	  with	  
deliberative	  ideals.	  
189	  Jon	  Elster,	  Deliberative	  Democracy,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  2.	  
190	  Deliberationists=Deliberative	  democrats.	  
191	  Benjamin	  Barber,	  Strong	  Democracy,	  (London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1984),	  132.	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questions,	  but	  in	  addressing	  the	  scope	  and	  efficacy	  of	  deliberation	  in	  intercultural	  contexts,	  
many	  other	  questions	  are	  addressed	  as	  well.	  	  	  
The	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter	  (3.1)	  offers	  a	  brief	  survey	  of	  deliberative	  theory	  and	  
identifies	  key	  features	  of	  deliberation	  as	  a	  political	  dialogue.	  	  These	  features	  highlight	  the	  
overarching	  significance	  of	  inclusion	  in	  deliberative	  politics,	  and	  the	  significance	  of	  inclusion	  is	  
what	  makes	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  a	  process	  that	  can	  overcome	  problems	  thrown	  up	  by	  
the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  	  However,	  accounts	  of	  deliberation	  differ	  in	  important	  ways.	  	  Some	  
support	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  inclusion	  than	  others	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  inclusion	  raises	  concerns.	  	  
In	  3.2	  I	  look	  at	  the	  question	  of	  consensus	  and	  its	  role	  in	  legitimating	  deliberative	  outcomes.	  	  
Deliberation	  requires	  that	  citizens	  actively	  engage	  one	  another	  in	  a	  dialogue	  aimed	  at	  making	  a	  
decision	  by	  coming	  to	  consensus.	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  consensus	  raises	  the	  concern	  that	  
committing	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  deliberation	  threatens	  basic	  freedoms	  and	  the	  autonomy	  of	  
individuals.	  	  However,	  I	  suggest	  that	  consensus	  need	  not	  legitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes;	  
instead,	  legitimacy	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  freedom	  and	  autonomy	  of	  the	  deliberative	  participants.	  	  The	  
protection	  of	  basic	  freedoms	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  task	  of	  negotiating	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  
3.1	  What	  is	  Political	  Deliberation?	  
Theorists	  of	  deliberative	  politics	  are	  not	  shy	  at	  all,	  it	  would	  seem,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  ‘defining’	  
deliberation	  and	  yet	  those	  definitions	  are	  notoriously	  vague	  about	  various	  elements	  of	  
deliberative	  process.	  	  It	  seems,	  then,	  that	  these	  definitions	  are	  not	  put	  forward	  definitively;	  the	  
exacting	  nature	  and	  crisp	  clean	  lines	  of	  formal	  discourse,	  deliberationists	  argue,	  are	  inadequate	  
for	  the	  inexact	  and	  often	  unfocused	  everyday	  realm	  of	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  In	  what	  
follows,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  problem	  of	  inclusion	  in	  light	  of	  cross	  section	  of	  deliberative	  theories	  in	  
order	  to	  flesh	  out	  the	  main	  features	  of	  deliberative	  politics.	  	  	  
To	  begin,	  Barber’s	  account	  of	  Strong	  Democracy	  has	  served	  as	  starting	  point	  or	  at	  the	  
minimum	  a	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  several	  variations	  on	  the	  deliberative	  theme	  in	  political	  
theory.	  	  Barber’s	  politics	  in	  the	  participatory	  mode	  is	  formulated	  in	  response	  to	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  
fundamental	  flaws	  in	  the	  justificatory	  story	  of	  liberal	  political	  theory.	  	  First,	  liberalism's	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  individual	  makes	  democracy	  merely	  a	  mechanism	  through	  which	  individual	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rights	  are	  secured.	  	  From	  this	  solitary	  position	  individuals	  lose	  a	  sense	  of	  social	  obligation.192	  	  
Second,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  cast	  humans	  and	  human	  activity	  as	  analogous	  to	  atoms	  and	  
atomic	  activity,	  which	  are	  governed	  by	  physical	  laws.	  	  This	  well	  ordered	  approach	  to	  politics	  
facilitates	  the	  dissolution,	  resolution	  or	  solution	  of	  political	  issues	  via	  the	  reassuring	  notion	  of	  
certainty.	  	  However,	  according	  to	  Barber,	  the	  political	  realm	  is	  complicated	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  
physical	  realm	  is	  not,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  reduced	  political	  issues	  to	  scientific,	  
natural	  or	  rational	  frameworks.193	  	  	  
From	  the	  naturalistically	  grounded	  theory	  of	  right	  in	  Hobbes	  to	  Kant’s	  categorical	  
imperative,	  abstract	  principles	  and	  the	  formal	  reasoning	  of	  metaphysical	  speculation	  offer	  
certainty	  where	  Barber	  argues	  it	  cannot	  be	  found—in	  the	  day	  to	  day	  reality	  of	  political	  
activity.194	  	  Benhabib	  expresses	  a	  similar	  concern	  in	  a	  different	  way;	  her	  concern	  is	  that	  political	  
reality	  cannot	  be	  hammered	  into	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  rationality	  independent	  of	  social	  and	  
cultural	  content.	  	  Both	  the	  Rawlsian	  account	  of	  ‘Kantian	  constructivism'	  and	  what	  Habermas	  
dubs	  'reconstruction'	  share	  the	  presupposition	  that	  the	  idealized	  content	  of	  practical	  reason	  is	  
realized	  in	  liberal	  democratic	  institutions.195	  	  These	  democratic	  institutions	  have	  "a	  culture-­‐
transcending	  validity	  claim"	  because	  they	  embody	  a	  form	  of	  practical	  reason	  that	  "has	  become	  
the	  collective	  and	  anonymous	  property	  of	  cultures,	  institutions,	  and	  traditions	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
experiments	  and	  experiences,	  both	  ancient	  and	  modern,	  with	  democratic	  rule	  over	  the	  course	  
of	  human	  history."196	  	  These	  expressions	  of	  practical	  reason	  form	  a	  way	  of	  life	  with	  an	  intrinsic	  
rationality	  embedded	  in	  the	  rules,	  practices	  and	  procedures	  of	  a	  society.	  	  What	  sets	  
deliberation	  apart,	  Benhabib	  argues,	  is	  its	  function,	  which	  publicly	  questions	  those	  
presuppositions	  about	  practical	  reason,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  questions	  that	  way	  of	  life.197	  	  	  
The	  norms	  constituted	  by	  political	  institutional	  arrangements	  are	  valid	  and	  morally	  
binding,	  Benhabib	  argues,	  when	  they	  are	  arrived	  at	  through	  a	  deliberative	  procedure	  with	  three	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192	  Barber,	  Strong,	  110.	  
193	  Ibid.,	  130.	  
194	  Ibid.,	  130.	  
195	  Seyla	  Benhabib,	  "Toward	  a	  Deliberative	  Model	  of	  Democratic	  Legitimacy,"	  Democracy	  and	  Difference:	  
Contesting	  the	  Boundaries	  of	  the	  Political,	  ed.	  Seyla	  Benhabib,	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  68.	  
196	  Ibid.,	  69.	  
197	  Recall	  from	  2.2	  the	  difficulties	  that	  arise	  when	  trying	  to	  justify	  the	  pre-­‐eminence	  of	  liberalism	  in	  non-­‐liberal	  
terms.	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  liberalism	  and	  deliberative	  processes	  is	  examined	  closely	  in	  chapter	  4.	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features.	  	  First,	  all	  parties	  have	  the	  same	  access	  and	  voice	  as	  equal	  participants	  with	  equal	  
opportunities.	  	  Second,	  a	  deliberative	  agenda	  can	  be	  set	  or	  questioned	  by	  all	  participants.	  	  
Third,	  the	  rules	  and	  normative	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  deliberation	  takes	  place	  are	  equally	  
open	  to	  scrutiny.198	  	  These	  features	  secure	  the	  deliberation	  as	  more	  than	  merely	  a	  procedure,	  
but	  less	  than	  a	  determining	  factor	  in	  public	  policy	  decisions.	  	  Unlike	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  
abstracted	  rationality	  shaped	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  independent	  ground,	  a	  public	  deliberation	  is	  in	  
part	  shaped	  by	  the	  deliberators	  who	  do	  not	  bring	  a	  uniform	  set	  of	  rational	  norms	  to	  the	  
deliberation.	  
Barber	  defines	  strong	  democracy	  as:	  	  
Politics	  in	  the	  participatory	  mode	  where	  conflict	  is	  resolved	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  
independent	  ground	  through	  a	  participatory	  process	  of	  ongoing,	  proximate	  self-­‐
legislation	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  political	  community	  capable	  of	  transforming	  dependent,	  
private	  individuals	  into	  free	  citizens	  and	  partial	  and	  private	  interests	  into	  public	  
goods.199	  	  	  
	  
Within	  this	  definition	  are	  key	  features	  of	  deliberative	  politics	  that	  will	  sketch	  the	  discursive	  
landscape.	  	  Starting	  with	  Barber,	  I	  survey	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  and	  sophisticated	  
accounts	  that	  have	  dominated	  the	  deliberative	  literature.200	  	  Although	  these	  accounts	  differ	  in	  
many	  ways,	  they	  share	  a	  number	  of	  formal	  features	  in	  common	  such	  as	  publicity,	  equality,	  
reasonableness,	  dynamic	  revision,	  transformation,	  decision,	  consensus	  and	  legitimacy.	  	  These	  
features	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  differ	  in	  various	  deliberative	  theories	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  
greater	  detail	  in	  later	  chapters,	  but	  before	  that,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  look	  at	  the	  problem	  of	  inclusion	  
by	  surveying	  what	  deliberative	  theories	  have	  in	  common—what	  is	  it	  to	  say	  a	  theory	  is	  a	  
deliberative	  theory?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	  Benhabib,	  “Toward,”	  70.	  
199	  Barber,	  Strong,	  132.	  
200	  Theorists,	  books	  and	  articles	  surveyed	  include	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson,	  Democracy	  &	  Why	  Deliberative	  
Democracy?	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2004);	  Barber,	  Strong;	  Iris	  Marion	  Young,	  Inclusion	  and	  
Democracy,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000);	  Joshua	  Cohen,	  "Deliberation	  and	  Democratic	  Legitimacy"	  In	  
The	  Good	  Polity:	  Normative	  Analysis	  of	  the	  State,	  eds.	  Alan	  Hamlin	  and	  Philip	  Pettit,	  (New	  York:	  Basil	  Blackwell,	  
1989)	  &	  “Procedure	  and	  Substance	  in	  Deliberative	  Democracy,"	  Democracy	  and	  Difference:	  Contesting	  the	  
Boundaries	  of	  the	  Political,	  ed.	  Seyla	  Benhabib,	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Benhabib,	  “Toward”;	  
and	  Carlos	  Nino,	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Deliberative	  Democracy,	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1996).	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Publicity,	  Equality	  and	  Reasonableness	  	  	  
First	  off,	  deliberation	  makes	  all	  participants	  accountable	  to	  each	  other	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  
process;	  hence	  there	  is	  a	  publicity	  requirement.	  	  Reasons	  must	  be	  made	  public	  to	  carry	  force	  in	  
the	  dialogue.	  	  Young	  asserts	  that	  the	  deliberative	  model	  of	  democracy	  is	  based	  on	  public	  
discussion.	  	  The	  open	  exchange	  of	  ideas	  is	  a	  form	  of	  collective	  practical	  reason	  that	  leads	  to	  
policy	  agreement.201	  	  Deliberative	  reasoning	  is	  public,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  have	  
good	  reasons	  in	  one’s	  own	  mind,	  or	  one’s	  own	  framework.	  	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  stress	  the	  
conditions	  of	  reasonable	  public	  exchange;	  the	  reasons	  given	  must	  meet	  a	  standard	  of	  public	  
approval.	  	  In	  order	  to	  receive	  public	  approval,	  the	  reasons	  must	  make	  sense	  for	  the	  dialogical	  
participants.202	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  process	  of	  deliberation	  includes	  the	  critical	  review	  of	  hidden	  
biases	  in	  the	  claims	  of	  participants	  and	  the	  dialogical	  structure	  itself.	  	  Hierarchical	  language	  or	  
communications	  styles	  that	  preference	  the	  skills	  of	  one	  participant	  over	  others	  may	  be	  re-­‐
evaluated	  and	  adjusted	  to	  accommodate	  all	  participants	  equally.	  	  	  
Nino	  characterizes	  public	  deliberation	  as	  a	  forum	  for	  an	  intersubjective	  discussion;	  the	  
impartial	  exchange	  of	  ideas	  through	  which	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  participants	  may	  be	  examined.	  	  
The	  burden	  of	  justifying	  a	  position	  to	  others	  in	  the	  dialogue	  helps	  to	  extend	  knowledge	  beyond	  
the	  scope	  of	  that	  which	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  solitary	  reflection.	  	  Through	  collective	  
dialogue,	  errors	  in	  reasoning	  may	  be	  revealed	  and	  the	  knowledge	  of	  all	  participants	  may	  be	  
broadened	  through	  the	  public,	  impartial	  exchange	  of	  ideas.203	  	  The	  public	  exchange	  plays	  a	  role	  
in	  how	  the	  participants	  view	  the	  dialogue	  and	  each	  other.	  	  According	  to	  Cohen,	  “the	  members	  
[of	  the	  group	  deliberating]	  recognize	  one	  another	  as	  having	  equal	  deliberative	  capacities,	  i.e.	  
the	  capacities	  required	  for	  entering	  into	  a	  public	  exchange	  of	  reasons”204	  and	  are	  able	  to	  act	  on	  
the	  results	  of	  public	  reasoning.205	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  Young,	  Inclusion,	  23-­‐24.	  
202	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson,	  Why?,	  4.	  
203	  Nino,	  Constitution,	  113.	  
204	  Cohen,	  	  “Legitimacy,"	  21-­‐22.	  
205	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  citizens	  have	  ‘equal’	  deliberative	  capacities,	  or,	  that	  all	  citizens	  have	  the	  capacities	  that	  
are	  needed	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  public	  exchange	  of	  reasons.	  It	  is	  to	  say	  that	  all	  take	  part	  in	  a	  deliberation	  on	  equal	  




The	  recognition	  of	  equal	  capacity	  runs	  into	  the	  second	  feature	  of	  a	  deliberative	  
approach—equality.206	  	  In	  a	  deliberation,	  according	  to	  Young,	  all	  parties	  are	  included	  on	  equal	  
terms	  and	  all	  parties	  possess	  a	  disposition	  to	  listen	  to	  others	  and	  respond	  to	  reasons	  in	  order	  to	  
reach	  agreement.207	  	  To	  impose	  a	  decision,	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  decision	  must	  be	  understood	  
and	  accepted	  by	  those	  subject	  to	  the	  decision	  (even	  if	  the	  decision	  runs	  contrary	  to	  a	  particular	  
participant’s	  interests).	  	  Participants	  contribute	  as	  equals	  to	  the	  dialogue	  and	  are	  bound	  equally	  
to	  the	  outcome.	  	  A	  deliberation	  accommodates	  all	  interested	  parties	  equally	  regardless	  of	  social	  
or	  economic	  status	  and	  position;	  accommodates	  divergent	  reasons	  for	  claims;	  and	  
accommodates	  divergent	  reasoning	  styles	  and	  structures	  while	  making	  claims,	  their	  
underpinnings	  and	  presuppositions	  equally	  available	  for	  critical	  review	  through	  the	  dialogical	  
process.	  	  	  
Equality	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  to	  advance	  what	  is	  best	  for	  all	  participants	  in	  a	  climate	  
of	  pluralism.	  	  Cohen’s	  account	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  is	  an	  ideal	  procedure	  not	  justified	  by	  
public	  values	  such	  as	  equality	  and	  fairness,	  but	  rather,	  reasonable	  deliberation	  itself	  is	  a	  public	  
good.208	  	  The	  shared	  goal	  of	  participants	  in	  a	  deliberation	  is	  “rationally	  motivated	  consensus.”	  	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  reasons	  supporting	  a	  claim	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  persuasive	  to	  all	  committed	  to	  
deliberation	  as	  a	  legitimate	  justification	  for	  a	  decision.209	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  goal—to	  reach	  a	  
consensus	  upon	  which	  decisive	  action	  can	  be	  taken	  about	  the	  most	  just	  policies,	  practices	  and	  
institutions—emerges	  from	  the	  deliberative	  procedure	  to	  which	  all	  equally	  capable	  participants	  
have	  had	  equal	  access	  and	  opportunity	  to	  influence	  the	  outcome	  through	  reasoned	  
deliberation.	  
The	  third	  feature,	  reasonableness210,	  is	  considered	  by	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  to	  be	  the	  
most	  important	  feature	  of	  deliberation.	  	  
Most	  fundamentally,	  deliberative	  democracy	  affirms	  the	  need	  to	  justify	  decisions	  made	  
by	  citizens	  and	  their	  representatives...	  	  The	  reasons	  are	  neither	  merely	  procedural	  
(“because	  the	  majority	  favours	  the	  war”)	  nor	  purely	  substantive	  (“because	  the	  war	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206	  What	  is	  meant	  by	  deliberative	  equality	  is	  examined	  closely	  in	  chapter	  4.1.	  
207	  Young,	  Inclusion,	  23-­‐24.	  
208	  Cohen,	  “Legitimacy,”	  21-­‐22.	  
209	  Ibid.,	  22-­‐23.	  
210	  Reasonableness	  is	  examined	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  chapter	  4.2.	  
	  106	  
	  
promotes	  the	  national	  interest	  or	  world	  peace”).	  	  They	  are	  reasons	  that	  should	  accepted	  
by	  free	  and	  equal	  persons	  seeking	  fair	  terms	  of	  cooperation.211	  	  	  
	  
All	  participants	  equally	  share	  the	  burden	  and	  responsibility	  of	  providing	  good	  reasons,	  and	  
responding	  to	  good	  reasons,	  for	  claims.212	  	  Formal	  equality	  ensures	  that	  all	  participants	  have	  
equal	  opportunity	  to	  advance	  their	  own	  interests	  and	  recognize	  that	  other	  participants	  share	  
the	  same	  aim.	  	  The	  recognition	  of	  ‘other’	  as	  equal	  constrains	  private	  interests	  that	  would	  harm	  
other	  participants	  or	  jeopardize	  advancing	  the	  public	  good,	  what	  is	  best	  for	  all	  concerned.	  
Dynamic	  Revision,	  Transformation	  and	  Decision	  
The	  forth	  feature	  of	  deliberation	  is	  that	  it	  is	  dynamic;	  “an	  ongoing	  and	  independent	  association,	  
whose	  members	  expect	  [the	  debate]	  to	  continue	  into	  the	  indefinite	  future.”213	  	  Deliberation	  is	  
not	  static;	  it	  does	  not	  produce	  final	  decisions	  that	  hold	  for	  all	  time	  in	  all	  places.	  	  Deliberation	  is,	  
as	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  put	  it,	  a	  dynamic	  process	  of	  give	  and	  take	  in	  an	  extended	  dialogue	  
that	  responds	  to	  critical	  review	  of	  previous	  decisions	  as	  new	  information	  as	  it	  comes	  to	  light.214	  	  
A	  debate,	  over	  a	  moral	  disagreement	  for	  example,	  is	  expected	  to	  continue	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  
participants	  do	  not	  always	  expect	  agreement.215	  	  
Participants	  agree	  to	  respect	  alternative	  moral	  frameworks	  and	  to	  actively	  seek	  
common	  ground,	  wherever	  that	  common	  ground	  may	  be,	  in	  order	  to	  move	  the	  dialogue	  
forward.216	  Cohen	  explains	  that	  a	  diversity	  of	  preferences,	  interests,	  values	  and	  ideals	  are	  
constitutive	  of	  the	  pluralist	  nature	  of	  an	  association	  that	  allows	  for	  multiple	  conceptions	  of	  the	  
good	  life.217	  	  Deliberation	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  a	  range	  of	  moral	  values	  to	  find	  expression	  on	  the	  
bases	  of	  a	  range	  of	  theoretical	  frameworks	  that	  are	  recognized	  as	  equally	  justifiable.	  	  It	  is	  just	  
this	  sort	  of	  impartial	  exchange	  that	  brings	  the	  internal	  contradictions	  and	  paradoxes	  of	  theory	  
and	  practice	  to	  light.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  deliberation	  serves	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  self-­‐reflective	  activity	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  Gutmann	  &	  Thompson,	  Why?,	  3.	  
212	  Ibid.,	  3.	  
213	  Cohen,	  “Legitimacy,”	  21-­‐22.	  
214	  Gutmann	  &	  Thompson,	  Why?,	  6-­‐7.	  
215	  Participants	  do	  need	  to	  find	  a	  way	  of	  deciding	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  complete	  agreement.	  	  In	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  
intractable	  disagreement	  and	  there	  is	  no	  more	  time	  for	  deliberations	  a	  decision	  can	  be	  reached	  by	  a	  vote.	  	  For	  an	  
expanded	  account	  of	  voting	  in	  deliberation	  see	  chapter	  3.2.	  
216	  Ibid.,	  6-­‐7.	  
217	  Cohen,	  “Legitimacy,”	  21-­‐22.	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necessary	  to	  sustain	  political	  stability	  without	  a	  natural	  order	  or	  universally	  applicable	  
principles.	  
The	  fifth	  element,	  transformation,218	  rests	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  recognition	  of	  ‘other’	  and	  
recognition	  of	  one’s	  self	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  greater	  social	  whole	  motivates	  change.	  	  While	  there	  is	  
agreement	  that	  transformation	  is	  an	  element	  of	  deliberation,	  different	  accounts	  locate	  the	  
transformative	  function	  in	  distinct	  elements	  of	  the	  procedure.	  	  For	  example,	  Nino	  argues	  that	  
deliberation's	  vital	  capacity	  is	  "to	  transform	  people's	  interests	  and	  preferences"	  from	  a	  plurality	  
of	  partial	  interests	  to	  the	  singularity	  of	  an	  impartial	  solution.219	  	  While	  Barber	  suggests	  that	  
conflict,	  through	  deliberation,	  is	  transformed	  into	  a	  cooperative	  enterprise.220	  	  Despite	  the	  
differences,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  the	  deliberative	  accounts	  surveyed	  all	  appeal	  to	  the	  
transformative	  aspect	  of	  genuine	  deliberative	  activity.	  	  
The	  sixth	  feature	  of	  deliberation	  is	  the	  goal.	  	  Deliberative	  dialogues	  aim	  to	  make	  binding,	  
at	  least	  provisionally	  binding,	  decisions	  upon	  which	  action	  is	  taken.	  	  Although	  deliberative	  
reasoning	  shares	  features	  with	  enquiry	  in	  that	  its	  process	  expands	  epistemic	  resources	  beyond	  
existing	  resources;	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  process	  is	  not	  the	  pursuit	  of	  knowledge	  or	  truth,	  its	  aim	  is	  
decisive,	  to	  affect	  a	  decision.221	  	  	  
Although	  there	  may	  be	  epistemic	  advantages	  of	  deliberation	  over	  other	  means	  of	  
decision-­‐making,	  the	  deliberative	  process	  is	  aimed	  at	  consensus	  regarding	  a	  decision	  that	  
affects	  all	  interested	  parties.	  	  This	  shifts	  the	  focus	  away	  from	  finding	  agreement	  on	  normative	  
or	  fundamental	  principles,	  or	  concepts,	  toward	  those	  elements	  of	  the	  dialogue	  necessary	  to	  
make	  a	  decision.	  	  When	  we	  ask,	  ‘who	  can	  speak	  for	  the	  values	  of	  a	  culture?’	  the	  question	  
becomes	  far	  more	  negotiable	  when	  specified	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  specific	  context,	  ‘who	  can	  speak	  
for	  the	  values	  of	  this	  culture	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  issue	  under	  discussion?’	  	  When	  we	  ask,	  ‘on	  
what	  basis	  are	  those	  claims	  advanced?’	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  epistemic	  frameworks	  is	  only	  
limited	  to	  those	  that	  are	  acceptable	  to	  all	  participants.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  deliberation	  offers	  a	  means	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218	  The	  transformative	  feature	  of	  deliberative	  processes	  is	  examined	  at	  length	  in	  chapter	  5.1.	  
219	  Nino,	  Constitution,	  1.	  
220	  Barber,	  Strong,	  151.	  
221	  Gutmann	  &	  Thompson,	  Why?,	  5.	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by	  which	  we	  can	  come	  to	  know	  what	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  dialogue	  to	  move	  forward	  relative	  to	  a	  
specific,	  rather	  than	  general,	  purpose.	  
Consensus	  and	  Legitimacy	  
The	  seventh	  feature,	  consensus,	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  consensus.222	  	  Not	  
a	  comprehensive	  consensus	  that	  makes	  individuals	  indistinguishable	  from	  one	  another,	  but	  
rather,	  consensus	  on	  the	  deliberative	  outcome.	  	  While	  deep	  disagreement	  will	  remain,	  
participants	  provisionally	  concede	  to	  the	  outcome,	  agree	  that	  the	  decision	  is	  the	  best	  course	  of	  
action	  under	  the	  circumstances	  delineated	  through	  the	  deliberation.	  
And	  finally,	  like	  transformation,	  different	  theorists	  tie	  the	  final	  feature	  of	  deliberation,	  
legitimacy,223	  to	  different	  features	  of	  deliberation.	  	  In	  the	  broadest	  terms,	  where	  agreement	  
can	  be	  found,	  a	  deliberative	  decision	  is	  legitimate	  when	  the	  members	  of	  an	  association	  
successfully	  deliberate	  to	  reach	  consensus	  and	  therefore	  are,	  in	  effect,	  a	  self-­‐legislating	  body.	  	  	  	  
Cohen	  argues	  that	  deliberative	  democracy	  is	  "an	  association	  whose	  affairs	  are	  governed	  by	  the	  
public	  deliberation	  of	  its	  members."224	  	  Legitimacy	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  
association	  to	  self-­‐legislate.	  	  The	  strength	  of	  deliberation	  is	  that	  legitimacy	  is	  bound	  to	  the	  
structure	  of	  deliberation;	  consequently,	  deliberation	  deals	  not	  just	  with	  competing	  reasons	  for	  
claims,	  but	  also	  with	  the	  dialogical	  structure	  of	  reasoning	  about	  those	  claims.	  	  Hence,	  
deliberation	  requires	  not	  only	  understanding	  from	  one’s	  own	  standpoint,	  but	  from	  the	  
standpoint	  of	  all	  participants	  which	  serves	  to	  expand	  the	  epistemic	  resources	  brought	  to	  bear	  in	  
the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  	  In	  a	  legitimate	  deliberation,	  each	  participant	  is	  bound	  to	  come	  to	  
understand	  not	  only	  the	  reasons	  for	  claims	  but	  also	  the	  reasoning	  about	  those	  claims.	  	  
There	  are,	  to	  be	  sure,	  important	  differences	  between	  different	  deliberative	  theories	  and	  
in	  the	  coming	  chapters	  I	  will	  explore	  those	  differences	  in	  greater	  detail.	  	  For	  now,	  it	  is	  important	  
to	  note	  that	  the	  features	  surveyed	  here	  highlight	  the	  significance	  of	  inclusion	  in	  deliberation.	  	  It	  
is	  clear	  that	  deliberative	  inclusion	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  seat	  at	  the	  table,	  not	  merely	  a	  formal	  
invitation	  to	  participate.	  	  The	  procedural	  requirements	  of	  publicity,	  equality,	  reasonableness,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222	  Deliberative	  consensus	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  
223	  Legitimacy	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  various	  features	  of	  the	  deliberation	  are	  explored	  in	  chapter	  5.1.	  
224	  Cohen,	  “Legitimacy,”	  17.	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dynamic	  revision	  and	  transformation	  along	  with	  the	  substantive	  requirements	  of	  decision,	  
consensus	  and	  legitimacy	  are	  constitutive	  of	  an	  inclusive	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  
Why	  Include?	  	  
One	  challenge,	  often	  overlooked,	  is	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  group	  or	  individual	  has	  or	  has	  
not	  been	  included	  in	  a	  deliberation.	  	  It	  is	  all	  well	  and	  good	  for	  a	  group	  to	  say,	  we	  do	  not	  feel	  as	  
though	  we	  were	  included,	  but	  self-­‐adjudication	  is	  not	  adequate	  to	  justify	  the	  feeling	  of	  
exclusion	  as	  evidence	  of	  exclusion.	  	  Young	  identifies	  key	  indicators	  of	  exclusion	  that	  are	  found	  
by	  reviewing	  the	  dialogue	  of	  a	  deliberation.	  	  First,	  if	  a	  group	  who	  has	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  issue	  under	  
deliberation	  is	  constantly	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  third	  person,	  it	  is	  evidence	  that	  they	  are	  being	  
treated	  as	  an	  object	  of	  the	  discussion	  rather	  than	  a	  participant	  in	  the	  deliberation.	  	  Second,	  if	  
other	  deliberators	  do	  not	  appeal	  to,	  or	  direct	  their	  arguments	  toward,	  that	  group,	  it	  is	  evidence	  
that	  the	  other	  deliberators	  are	  not	  deliberating	  with	  that	  group.	  	  Third,	  if	  the	  other	  participants	  
of	  the	  deliberation	  do	  not	  believe	  themselves	  accountable	  to	  that	  group,	  then	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  
that	  the	  group	  has	  been	  excluded	  from	  the	  deliberation.225	  
	   For	  example,	  in	  the	  late	  90’s	  young	  single	  mothers	  on	  welfare	  in	  the	  US	  were	  perceived	  
as	  a	  problem	  that	  was	  often	  debated	  publicly;	  however,	  young	  single	  mothers	  on	  welfare	  
seldom,	  if	  ever,	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  discussion	  about	  their	  problem.	  	  If	  
they	  were	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  speak,	  they	  were	  trotted	  out	  as	  an	  object	  lesson,	  a	  
cautionary	  tale	  about	  how	  difficult	  life	  on	  welfare	  really	  is	  and	  how	  no	  one	  would	  choose	  to	  live	  
life	  that	  way.226	  	  Then	  the	  experts	  would	  take	  over	  to	  deliberate	  potential	  solutions—experts	  
who	  were	  not	  speaking	  with	  single	  mothers,	  they	  were	  speaking	  about	  them,	  often	  in	  quite	  
disparaging	  terms.227	  	  	  
	   Evidence	  of	  objectification	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  international	  dialogues	  about	  rights.	  	  In	  
Said’s	  account	  of	  Orientalism	  in	  Western	  intelligentsia,	  he	  argues	  that	  when	  academics	  from	  
the	  West	  began	  studying	  the	  east	  they,	  perhaps	  inadvertently,	  set	  the	  limits	  of	  reasoning	  about	  
all	  things	  Asian.	  	  This	  produced	  a	  skewed	  picture	  of	  the	  East;	  one	  that	  conformed	  to	  terms	  
familiar	  in	  the	  Western	  scholastic	  tradition;	  terms	  that	  did	  not	  have	  the	  range	  of	  resources	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  Young,	  Inclusion,	  157.	  
226	  Ibid.,	  158.	  
227	  This	  idea	  is	  explored	  further	  in	  chapter	  5.1.	  
	  110	  
	  
needed	  to	  capture	  the	  scope	  and	  degree	  of	  difference	  between	  the	  Western	  Occident	  and	  the	  
Eastern	  Orient.	  	  Inoue	  argues	  that	  Orientalism	  is	  in	  part	  responsible	  for	  generating	  a	  picture	  of	  
the	  rights	  denying	  Orient	  in	  political	  opposition	  to	  the	  rights	  affirming	  Euro-­‐Western	  Occident.	  	  	  
The	  Western	  tradition	  carries	  with	  it	  a	  history	  of	  cultural	  domination	  that	  did	  not	  
recognize	  difference,	  except	  in	  opposition—oppositions	  that	  reinforced	  the	  narrative	  of	  
superiority	  like	  master/slave,	  civilized/barbaric,	  stately/undignified	  
multifaceted/uncomplicated,	  progressive/backward,	  etc.	  	  In	  the	  West-­‐centric	  rights	  paradigm,	  
the	  achievement	  of	  rights	  is	  the	  result	  of	  superior	  reasoning;	  reasoning	  that	  determines	  the	  
passage	  from	  principle	  to	  functional	  norm	  with	  logical	  precision.	  	  The	  West	  is	  the	  hero	  of	  
human	  rights	  in	  modernity	  while	  the	  East	  is	  incapable	  of	  adopting	  practices	  so	  progressive	  and	  
foreign	  to	  their	  ways.228	  	  It	  is	  only	  in	  relatively	  recent	  history	  that	  women,	  Indigenous	  groups	  in	  
post-­‐colonial	  nations	  have	  escaped	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ‘other’,	  the	  ‘lesser’,	  and	  consequently	  it	  is	  
relatively	  recently	  that	  these	  others	  have	  gained	  equal	  status	  and	  the	  right	  to	  be	  included	  in	  
public	  policy	  decisions	  that	  affect	  their	  way	  of	  life.	  
There	  is	  a	  close	  relationship	  between	  inclusion	  and	  justice	  in	  a	  democracy	  that	  Young	  
argues	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  publicity	  requirement.	  	  
Inclusion	  ought	  not	  to	  mean	  simply	  the	  formal	  and	  abstract	  equality	  of	  all	  members	  of	  
the	  polity	  as	  citizens.	  	  It	  means	  explicitly	  acknowledging	  social	  differentiations	  and	  
divisions	  and	  encouraging	  differently	  situated	  groups	  to	  give	  voice	  to	  their	  needs,	  
interests,	  and	  perspectives	  on	  the	  society	  in	  ways	  that	  meet	  conditions	  of	  
reasonableness	  and	  publicity.229	  	  
The	  significance	  of	  inclusion	  in	  deliberative	  processes	  makes	  deliberation	  a	  good	  candidate	  for	  
intercultural	  dialogues	  about	  minority	  rights;	  however,	  the	  level	  of	  inclusion	  raises	  some	  
important	  questions.	  	  To	  exclude	  citizens	  from	  the	  political	  decisions	  to	  which	  they	  are	  subject,	  
and	  consequently	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  live	  their	  lives	  is	  unjust.	  	  However,	  there	  do	  
seem	  to	  be	  occasions	  where	  exclusion	  is	  justified.	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  Inoue,	  “Orientalism,”	  42.	  
229	  Young,	  Inclusion,	  119.	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Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  argued	  that	  excluding	  reasons	  (religious	  reasons)	  put	  forward	  
by	  the	  fundamentalist	  parents	  in	  the	  Mozert	  case230	  was	  well	  justified.	  	  Religious	  reasons	  are	  
based	  on	  the	  right	  to	  religious	  freedom;	  however,	  freedom	  of	  religion	  is	  jeopardized	  when	  the	  
tenet	  of	  any	  one	  religion	  is	  institutionalized	  by	  the	  state.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  religious	  reasons	  should	  
not	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  states	  decision.	  	  The	  worry,	  however,	  identified	  by	  Fish	  is	  that	  deliberation	  
then	  functions	  as	  a	  “device	  of	  exclusion.”231	  	  I	  agree	  with	  Fish	  on	  that	  point,	  Gutmann	  and	  
Thompson’s	  defence	  of	  excluding	  certain	  types	  of	  reasoning	  limits	  the	  allowable	  content	  of	  
deliberations	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  deliberative	  process	  becomes	  exclusive	  and	  I	  suggest	  that	  
in	  deliberating	  minority	  rights	  claims,	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  inclusion	  is	  required.	  	  Why?	  	  One	  
answer	  is	  that	  it	  is	  what	  justice	  requires,	  that	  minority	  groups	  are	  simply	  asking	  the	  liberal	  
democratic	  state	  to	  deliver	  on	  the	  promise	  of	  pluralism.	  	  But	  there	  is	  another	  answer	  based	  on	  
instrumental	  considerations.	  	  In	  situations	  where	  there	  are	  tensions	  between	  a	  minority,	  with	  
an	  alternative	  worldview,	  and	  the	  state,	  it	  is	  better	  to	  have	  dialogue	  than	  stand	  off;	  it	  is	  better	  
to	  have	  dialogue	  than	  terrorism;	  it	  is	  simply	  a	  way	  to	  relieve	  tension	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  
blowing	  things	  up.	  	  That,	  I	  think,	  is	  a	  good	  enough	  reason	  to	  cast	  the	  net	  of	  inclusion	  as	  far	  as	  
possible.	  	  Not	  everyone	  agrees	  with	  me.	  
	   One	  common	  complaint	  is	  that	  deliberation	  can	  be	  counter-­‐productive,	  “in	  the	  sense	  
that	  it	  actually	  intensifies	  disagreement	  about	  public	  policy	  and	  increases	  the	  risk	  that	  things	  
could	  go	  drastically	  wrong.”232	  	  This	  is	  easy	  to	  understand.	  	  Two	  parties	  can	  start	  out	  on	  
pleasant	  terms	  discussing	  agreements	  or	  disagreements	  about	  relatively	  unimportant	  matters,	  
but	  when	  the	  conversation	  touches	  on	  disagreement	  about	  morals	  or	  deeply	  felt	  principles	  
things	  can	  go	  downhill	  quite	  fast.	  	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  simple	  example,	  one	  might	  be	  inclined	  to	  
think	  that	  this	  is	  something	  like	  Rawls’	  overlapping	  consensus.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  disagree	  
on	  deeper	  levels	  but	  still	  find	  agreement	  on	  other	  levels	  seems	  essential	  to	  any	  sort	  of	  pluralist	  
association,	  but	  that	  idea	  is	  something	  quite	  different	  from	  selectively	  picking	  out	  what	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230	  The	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins	  case	  is	  presented	  in	  full	  in	  chapter	  1.3.	  	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson’s	  defence	  of	  exclusion	  
and	  Fish’s	  objection	  are	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  chapter	  5.1.	  
231	  Stanley	  Fish,	  “Mutual	  Respect	  as	  a	  Device	  of	  Exclusion.”	  In	  Deliberative	  Politics:	  Essays	  on	  Democracy	  and	  
Disagreement,	  ed.	  Stephen	  Macedo.	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  88-­‐102.	  
232	  Daniel	  A.	  Bell,	  “Democratic	  Deliberation:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Implementation”,	  In	  Deliberative	  Politics:	  Essays	  on	  
Democracy	  and	  Disagreement,	  ed.	  Stephen	  Macedo.	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  73.	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deeply	  felt	  or	  not—what	  is	  morally	  significant	  or	  not.	  	  Putting	  brackets	  around	  the	  touchy	  stuff	  
may	  seem	  like	  a	  good	  idea;233	  however,	  there	  is	  not	  always	  agreement	  as	  to	  what	  is	  touchy	  and	  
what	  is	  not.	  	  A	  woman	  might	  feel	  quite	  comfortable	  discussing	  degrees	  of	  rape	  with	  a	  group	  of	  
women,	  but	  rather	  uncomfortable	  when	  a	  man	  presumes	  to	  suggest	  that	  marital	  rape	  is	  less	  
severe	  than	  other	  types	  of	  sexual	  assault.	  	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  minority	  rights,	  putting	  brackets	  around	  the	  touchy	  stuff	  has	  been	  and	  still	  
is,	  in	  some	  cases,	  a	  manoeuvre	  to	  avoid	  dealing	  with	  unpleasant	  baggage	  inextricably	  linked	  
with	  the	  political	  reality;	  that	  some	  minority	  groups	  carry	  the	  burden	  of	  historical	  injustice;	  that	  
some	  racial	  groups	  suffer	  the	  injustice	  of	  profiling;	  or	  that	  some	  disability	  groups	  suffer	  the	  
injustice	  of	  inaccessibility.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  excluding	  groups	  from	  discussions	  about	  public	  policy	  
that	  will	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  their	  lives,	  or	  in	  other	  cases	  excluding	  their	  reasons	  from	  
those	  discussions,	  has	  not	  made	  the	  peace.234	  	  
	   A	  second	  concern	  often	  cited	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  that	  democratic	  processes	  would	  grind	  
to	  a	  halt	  under	  the	  weight	  of	  meeting	  deliberative	  requirements.	  	  Including	  everyone	  with	  a	  
stake	  in	  the	  issue	  is	  bound	  to	  increase	  the	  amount	  of	  stonewalling,	  stalling	  for	  time,	  attempts	  to	  
wear	  other	  parties	  out,	  and	  other	  delay	  tactics	  that	  could	  drag	  out	  decision-­‐making	  to	  such	  a	  
degree	  that	  nothing	  would	  ever	  be	  decided.	  	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  deliberation	  is	  not	  always	  the	  
most	  efficient	  means	  of	  decision-­‐making,	  I	  suggest,	  if	  the	  aim	  is	  coming	  to	  a	  just	  decision	  about	  
minority	  rights	  claims,	  it	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  effective.	  	  This	  criticism	  also	  neglects	  one	  of	  the	  
key	  features	  of	  any	  dialogical	  model—it	  is	  not	  a	  free-­‐for-­‐all.	  	  Parties	  begin	  by	  setting	  the	  terms,	  
including	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  dialogue	  and	  what	  will	  happen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  impasse	  at	  the	  
outset.	  Because	  the	  dialogue	  is	  governed	  by	  its	  aim,	  to	  come	  to	  a	  decision,	  and	  presumably	  
coming	  to	  a	  decision	  benefits	  all	  those	  with	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  issue,	  delay	  tactics	  would	  be	  
regulated	  by	  both	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  deliberation	  and	  the	  collective	  aim	  of	  the	  participants.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233	  Bruce	  Ackerman,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  dialogical	  legitimacy	  is	  hopelessly	  utopian	  in	  “Why	  Dialogue?”	  Journal	  
of	  Philosophy,	  (January	  1989),	  16-­‐17.	  	  
234	  Natalie	  Oman,	  “Paths	  to	  Intercultural	  Understanding:	  Feasting,	  Shared	  Horizons,	  and	  Unforced	  Concensus.”	  In	  
Intercultural	  Dispute	  Resolution	  in	  Aboriginal	  Contexts,	  eds.	  Catherine	  Bell	  and	  David	  Kahane,	  (Vancouver:	  UBC	  
Press,	  2004),	  72.	  	  Oman	  explains	  how	  the	  standoffs	  between	  Aboriginal	  peoples	  and	  the	  Canadian	  Government	  at	  
Oka,	  Ipperwash,	  and	  Burnt	  Church	  just	  to	  name	  a	  few,	  show	  how	  important	  it	  is,	  to	  minority	  groups,	  to	  have	  their	  
claims	  and	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  those	  claims	  heard	  by	  a	  government	  whose	  decisions	  have	  such	  a	  significant	  
impact	  on	  their	  lives.	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If	  there	  are	  participants,	  who	  demonstrably	  do	  not	  want	  the	  deliberation	  to	  end,	  then	  they	  are	  
deliberating	  in	  bad	  faith	  but	  this	  still	  does	  not	  justify	  exclusion,	  it	  simply	  renders	  their	  
arguments	  weaker	  than	  the	  arguments	  of	  those	  participating	  in	  good	  faith.	  	  	  
	   Inclusion	  is	  an	  important	  first	  step	  toward	  escaping	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  	  In	  the	  
broadest	  sense,	  in	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation,	  the	  charge	  of	  paradox	  itself	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  
scrutiny	  by	  all	  deliberating	  parties.	  	  The	  charge	  of	  paradox	  presumes	  agreement	  about	  how	  the	  
argument	  put	  forward	  by	  a	  particular	  group	  should	  be	  evaluated;	  presumes	  that	  logical	  
precision	  trumps	  other	  contextual	  considerations.	  	  Deliberation	  is	  not	  a	  decision-­‐making	  
procedure	  governed	  by	  any	  one	  particular	  deliberator;	  as	  a	  result,	  inclusion	  and	  publicity	  offer	  a	  
means	  by	  which	  a	  minority	  group	  facing	  the	  charge	  of	  paradox	  can	  challenge	  the	  underlying	  
presuppositions	  of	  other	  deliberative	  participants.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  those	  challenges	  are	  
successful	  is	  another	  issue,	  one	  that	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  	  At	  this	  point	  is	  
enough	  to	  say	  that	  inclusion	  is	  a	  small,	  yet	  vital,	  first	  step	  around	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  
3.2	  Inclusion,	  Consensus	  and	  Freedom	  
I	  have	  argued	  that	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  is	  oriented	  around	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  inclusion,	  
and	  that	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  political	  dialogue	  that	  can	  negotiate	  the	  
concepts	  and	  content	  of	  minority	  rights	  claims	  that	  are,	  in	  some	  cases,	  erroneously	  cast	  as	  
paradoxical.	  	  However,	  this	  degree	  of	  inclusion	  can	  prove	  highly	  problematic,	  particularly	  if	  the	  
end	  point	  of	  a	  deliberation	  is	  consensus.	  	  In	  some	  ways,	  the	  notion	  of	  decision-­‐making	  by	  
consensus	  seems	  contrary	  to	  equal	  recognition	  and	  value	  pluralism.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  look	  at	  
arguments	  suggesting	  the	  consensus	  requirement	  of	  deliberation	  threatens	  not	  only	  individual	  
autonomy	  but	  the	  basic	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  of	  the	  individual	  as	  well.	  	  In	  response,	  I	  look	  at	  that	  
the	  relationship	  between	  consensus,	  freedom	  and	  autonomy	  in	  political	  deliberation	  to	  show	  
how	  deliberative	  processes	  need	  not	  be	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  equality	  and	  basic	  freedoms	  of	  
participants.	  
	   To	  begin,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  problem	  of	  inclusion	  in	  light	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  exclusion.	  	  
Although	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  inclusion	  may	  pose	  difficulties	  in	  coming	  to	  a	  consensus,	  it	  is,	  I	  will	  
argue,	  better	  than	  the	  injustice	  of	  exclusion.	  	  In	  addition,	  deliberative	  consensus	  is	  distinct	  from	  
other	  forms	  of	  political	  consensus.	  	  It	  does	  not	  legitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes,	  nor	  is	  the	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content	  of	  deliberations	  limited	  to	  those	  basic	  principles	  upon	  which	  agreement	  is	  possible.	  	  
The	  proximate	  and	  provisional	  nature	  of	  deliberative	  consensus	  requires	  that	  participants	  are	  
free	  and	  as	  such	  could	  not	  threaten	  the	  basic	  freedoms	  of	  constituents	  on	  pain	  of	  contradiction.	  
Deliberative	  Consensus	  
There	  is	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  tension	  that	  comes	  about	  when	  we	  imagine	  a	  politically	  engaged	  
citizenry.	  	  The	  more	  experienced	  citizens	  become	  at	  deliberating,	  the	  better	  they	  are	  able	  to	  
articulate	  their	  position	  in	  opposition	  to	  others.	  	  Hence,	  deliberation	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  
deepen	  disagreement	  rather	  than	  promote	  its	  purported	  aim—consensus.	  	  Political	  consensus,	  
in	  the	  traditional	  sense,	  requires	  that	  there	  be	  sufficient	  agreement	  on	  the	  basic	  principles	  that	  
undergird	  political	  arrangements	  such	  that	  the	  coercive	  effects	  of	  societal	  institutions	  are	  
legitimate.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  there	  can	  be	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  disagreement	  on	  multiple	  levels	  of	  
association	  as	  long	  as	  there	  is	  consensus	  on	  the	  structures	  that	  govern	  political	  
arrangements.235	  	  Similarly,	  deliberative	  consensus	  does	  not	  signal	  full	  or	  comprehensive	  
agreement	  on	  the	  part	  of	  participants.	  	  Consensus	  only	  need	  go	  a	  deep	  as	  necessary	  for	  
agreement	  regarding	  the	  decision	  about	  the	  issue	  under	  deliberation.	  	  	  
Deliberation,	  as	  Cohen	  puts	  it,	  functions	  to	  "arrive	  at	  rationally	  motivated	  consensus."236	  	  
However,	  deliberation	  is	  not	  a	  process	  of	  perfection;	  in	  contrast,	  it	  is	  an	  ongoing	  association.	  	  
Although	  consensus	  is	  sufficient	  to	  settle	  a	  deliberation,	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  complete	  
deliberation.	  	  When	  consensus	  is	  not	  possible,	  the	  issue	  may	  be	  decided	  by	  a	  vote.	  	  This	  raises	  
an	  obvious	  question;	  if	  the	  issue	  can	  be	  settled	  by	  a	  vote,	  why	  bother	  deliberating	  in	  the	  first	  
place?	  	  However,	  this	  question	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  nothing	  has	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  deliberation.	  	  It	  is	  not,	  as	  Cohen	  points	  out,	  that	  the	  issue	  is	  then	  decided	  by	  aggregation,	  or	  
that	  the	  deliberation	  turns	  into	  an	  aggregative	  procedure.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  commitment	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235	  The	  nature	  of	  deliberative	  consensus	  is	  similar	  to	  overlapping	  consensus.	  	  For	  Rawls,	  overlapping	  consensus	  is	  a	  
way	  to	  buttress	  public	  reason	  by	  outsourcing	  the	  justification	  for	  principles	  of	  justice	  to	  the	  private	  and	  more	  
comprehensive	  moral	  reasons	  of	  individual	  citizens.	  	  The	  reasons	  of	  reasonable	  comprehensive	  visions	  of	  the	  will	  
converge	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  justice;	  however	  that	  is	  where	  the	  consensus	  ends.	  	  What	  differs	  is	  the	  role	  of	  
consensus.	  	  For	  Rawls,	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  consensus	  are	  plural	  and	  therefore	  are	  not	  public	  reasons	  per	  se,	  as	  a	  
result,	  the	  stability	  of	  an	  overlapping	  consensus	  is	  not	  found	  in	  the	  justificatory	  stories	  that	  explain	  its	  legitimacy,	  it	  
is	  rather	  that	  overlapping	  consensus	  shows	  the	  stability	  of	  public	  reason.	  	  Deliberatively	  speaking	  consensus	  does	  
not	  signal	  the	  stability	  of	  public	  reason,	  it	  is	  rather	  that	  the	  process	  of	  working	  toward	  consensus	  signals	  the	  
collaborative	  aim	  of	  the	  participants.	  
236	  Cohen,	  “Legitimacy,”	  22.	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required	  of	  participants	  in	  a	  deliberation	  results	  in	  a	  different	  type	  of	  voting	  by	  a	  different	  
voter.237	  	  	  
Deliberative	  participants	  share	  a	  common	  problem	  and	  as	  a	  result	  are	  committed	  to	  
finding	  a	  solution	  that	  can	  be	  held	  in	  common.	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  advancing	  general	  rather	  than	  
particular	  interests	  turns	  participants	  away	  from	  the	  fragmented	  and	  narrow	  focus	  of	  
bargaining	  toward	  a	  process	  conducive	  to	  forming	  social	  solidarities.238	  	  Hence,	  the	  process	  of	  
deliberating	  the	  issue	  affects	  the	  interests	  of	  voters.	  	  The	  deliberation	  might	  not	  alter	  individual	  
preferences	  enough	  to	  reach	  consensus	  on	  the	  decision,	  but	  by	  deliberating	  the	  issue	  
preferences	  have	  been	  altered	  enough	  to	  come	  to	  consensus	  on	  voting	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  make	  
a	  provisional	  decision.	  	  	  
	   	  Social	  solidarities	  are	  the	  ground	  upon	  which	  consensus	  can	  be	  built	  and	  sustained	  even	  
when	  there	  are	  multiple	  value	  systems	  and	  divergent	  principles	  at	  play.	  	  Not	  because	  individual	  
interests	  remain	  unaffected	  by	  the	  deliberation,	  but	  because	  the	  understandings	  of	  the	  
problem	  at	  hand	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  community	  is	  altered.	  	  Benhabib	  argues	  that	  even	  beliefs	  
may	  be	  modified	  through	  deliberative	  procedures.	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  value	  pluralism	  and	  multiple	  
versions	  of	  the	  good	  life	  in	  contemporary	  democracies,	  conflicts	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  by	  
adopting	  one	  value	  system.	  	  Instead,	  fundamental	  liberties	  are	  preserved	  when	  there	  is	  
agreement	  about	  the	  processes	  and	  practices	  that	  produce	  rational	  outcomes	  amid	  ongoing	  
value	  conflicts.	  	  Deliberation	  mediates	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  conditions	  of	  
cooperation	  are	  legitimate.	  	  Procedural	  solutions	  to	  conflict	  offer	  a	  forum	  to	  articulate	  interests	  
and	  their	  conflicts	  in	  order	  to	  deliberate	  a	  mutually	  acceptable	  outcome.239	  
	   The	  conditions	  of	  mutual	  acceptability	  apply	  not	  only	  to	  the	  outcome	  but	  the	  way	  the	  
outcome	  was	  achieved.	  	  Hence,	  deliberative	  consensus	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  process	  through	  which	  
it	  is	  achieved.	  	  Deliberation	  is	  a	  process	  of	  identifying	  common	  problems	  and	  finding	  common	  
solutions	  acceptable	  to	  all	  with	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  issue.	  	  This	  sort	  of	  provisional	  consensus	  is	  weaker	  
than	  unanimous	  agreement,	  but	  stronger	  than	  mere	  tolerance.	  	  It	  is	  somewhere	  between	  the	  
stringent	  demands	  of	  fixed	  resolution	  and	  the	  laxity	  of	  supple	  accommodation.	  Deliberative	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  Ibid.,	  22.	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  Cohen,	  “Procedure,"	  113.	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  Benhabib,	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  73.	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consensus	  does	  not	  require	  unanimity	  or	  subordinating	  the	  interests	  of	  one	  individual	  to	  
another,	  or	  to	  the	  majority.	  	  	  
	   Barber	  describes	  consensus	  as	  agreement	  on	  the	  common	  ends	  forged	  through	  public	  
deliberations.240	  	  This	  is	  a	  much	  stronger	  notion	  of	  consensus	  than	  I	  will	  argue	  is	  necessary	  in	  
minority	  rights	  dialogues	  but	  even	  Barber’s	  stringent	  consensual	  demands	  escape	  the	  charge	  of	  
unitarian	  implications.	  	  The	  conflicts	  endemic	  of	  a	  pluralist	  society	  are	  central	  to	  deliberation	  
through	  which	  conflict	  is	  not	  merely	  accommodated	  or	  minimized,	  it	  is	  transformed	  through	  
the	  process	  into	  cooperation.241	  	  The	  civic	  bond,	  Barber	  argues,	  generated	  by	  participatory	  
engagement	  is	  not	  hierarchal	  (between	  citizen	  and	  state)	  nor	  is	  it	  lateral	  (between	  citizens	  as	  in	  
a	  unitary	  system);	  in	  contrast,	  the	  bond	  is	  circular	  and	  dialectical	  (a	  web	  of	  relations)	  which	  
promotes	  consensus	  through	  empathy	  and	  respect.242	  	  The	  process	  of	  give	  and	  take	  extends	  to	  
and	  from	  state	  and	  citizen	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  bonds	  are	  not	  horizontal	  or	  vertical,	  relations	  take	  
on	  a	  web-­‐like	  character.	  	  In	  hierarchical	  arrangements	  consensus	  is	  generic	  and	  usually	  
sustained	  through	  contracts.	  	  In	  unitary	  arrangements	  consensus	  is	  substantive	  and	  achieved	  
through	  mutual	  identification.	  	  Through	  deliberative	  processes	  consensus	  is	  creative,	  
agreements	  arise	  from	  discussion,	  which	  is	  the	  activity	  of	  decision-­‐making.243	  	  	  
While	  the	  aim	  of	  deliberating	  minority	  rights	  claims	  is	  to	  make	  a	  decision,	  consensus	  is	  
not	  sought	  only	  on	  the	  most	  basic	  principles	  that	  govern	  the	  association;	  in	  contrast,	  consensus	  
is	  sought	  on	  any	  issue	  deemed	  worthy	  of	  deliberation	  by	  the	  members	  of	  an	  association.	  
Participants	  agree	  that	  the	  decision	  is	  binding	  unless	  the	  decision	  is	  re-­‐examined	  through	  
further	  deliberative	  processes.	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  the	  fluid	  nature	  of	  proximate,	  provisional	  
consensus	  supports	  the	  freedom	  of	  deliberative	  processes	  from	  external	  constraints.	  	  Hence,	  
deliberative	  consensus	  is	  an	  agreement	  regarding	  a	  decision	  that	  has	  come	  about	  as	  the	  result	  
of	  reasoned	  discussion	  between	  equals.	  	  However,	  some	  argue	  the	  consensus	  requirement	  
threatens	  the	  autonomy	  and	  basic	  freedoms	  of	  the	  individual	  participants.	  	  In	  what	  follows	  I	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suggest	  that	  consensus	  need	  not	  legitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes;	  instead,	  legitimacy	  is	  tied	  to	  
the	  freedom	  and	  equality	  of	  the	  deliberative	  participants.	  	  	  
Freedom	  
The	  first	  concern	  is	  that	  consensus	  in	  deliberative	  processes	  may	  threaten	  basic	  freedoms	  
because	  basic	  freedoms	  may	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  deliberation.	  	  Consequently,	  a	  decision	  that	  
called	  for	  constraints	  on	  basic	  freedoms	  could	  be	  legitimized	  through	  a	  deliberative	  process.	  	  
Deliberating	  minority	  claims	  to	  sovereignty,	  then,	  could	  end	  up	  supporting	  the	  kind	  of	  intra-­‐
cultural	  hegemony	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one.	  	  However,	  the	  presumption	  here	  is	  that	  consensus	  
is	  hierarchal—that	  constraints	  upon	  basic	  freedoms	  could	  be	  imposed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  process.	  	  
In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  type	  of	  inclusive	  deliberation	  required	  in	  dialogues	  about	  minority	  rights,	  
basic	  freedoms	  are	  what	  legitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes.	  	  Deliberation	  cannot	  contravene	  the	  
conditions	  that	  make	  legitimate	  deliberation	  possible	  without	  delegitimizing	  the	  outcome.244	  	  	   	  
While	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  existing	  political	  arrangements,	  including	  rights,	  are	  subject	  to	  
scrutiny	  through	  deliberative	  processes,	  I	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  deliberation	  
threatens	  basic	  liberties.	  	  The	  concern	  is	  that	  deliberation	  might	  produce	  a	  decision	  that	  would	  
limit	  basic	  freedoms,	  such	  as	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  in	  cases	  where	  certain	  types	  of	  expression	  
are	  perceived	  as	  harmful	  to	  the	  community.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  small	  community,	  reeling	  from	  the	  
abduction	  and	  rape	  of	  a	  teenage	  girl	  by	  a	  group	  of	  young	  men,	  is	  deliberating	  the	  legality	  of	  
pornography.	  	  They	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  swayed	  by	  research	  demonstrating	  the	  harmful	  socialization	  
that	  occurs	  when	  young	  people	  are	  exposed	  to	  certain	  types	  of	  sexual	  imagery.	  	  Consequently,	  
the	  outcome	  of	  that	  deliberation	  is	  likely	  to	  call	  for	  limits	  on	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  	  In	  fact,	  
Sunstein	  argues,	  it	  is	  more	  than	  likely.	  	  The	  statistical	  regularities	  of	  group	  polarization	  clearly	  
show	  that	  “members	  of	  a	  deliberating	  group	  predictably	  move	  toward	  a	  more	  extreme	  point	  in	  
the	  direction	  indicated	  by	  the	  members’	  pre-­‐deliberation	  tendencies.”245	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244	  There	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  some	  circularity	  here,	  the	  conditions	  of	  deliberation	  are	  the	  result	  of	  deliberation	  that	  
couldn’t	  occur	  unless	  the	  conditions	  of	  deliberation	  were	  in	  place.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  that	  the	  act	  of	  deliberation	  is	  
under	  threat;	  it	  is	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  outcome	  that	  is	  jeopardized	  when	  certain	  conditions	  are	  not	  met.	  	  As	  a	  
result,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  deliberation	  can	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  deliberation	  without	  matter	  and	  anti-­‐matter	  
colliding.	  
245	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  "The	  Law	  of	  Group	  Polarization,"	  Debating	  Deliberative	  Democracy,	  ed.	  James	  S.	  Fishkin	  and	  
Peter	  Laslett,	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  2003),	  81.	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There	  are	  two	  main	  reasons	  why	  group	  polarization246	  occurs	  with	  such	  regularity	  in	  
small	  deliberating	  groups.	  	  First,	  participants	  are	  aware	  and	  concerned	  about	  what	  other	  people	  
think	  about	  them.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  circumstances	  that	  brought	  about	  the	  deliberation	  make	  
identification	  as	  pro-­‐pornography	  unappealing.	  	  Second,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  in	  this	  scenario	  that	  
anyone	  will	  stand	  up	  and	  defend	  pornography	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  opposing	  or	  even	  alternative	  
arguments	  exerts	  a	  sort	  of	  confirmation	  bias	  on	  the	  participants.	  	  Hence,	  the	  deliberation	  
moves	  towards	  extremes	  and	  in	  the	  pornography	  case	  the	  outcome	  calls	  for	  censorship,	  a	  limit	  
on	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  another	  side	  to	  this	  coin.	  	  Deliberation	  in	  small	  
like-­‐minded	  groups	  with	  similar	  pre-­‐deliberation	  tendencies	  can	  sometimes	  raise	  an	  issue	  of	  
injustice	  experienced	  by	  an	  oppressed	  or	  minority	  group	  that	  would	  otherwise	  remain	  hidden.	  	  
Sunstein	  sees	  enclave	  deliberation	  as	  both	  potentially	  destabilising,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  
pornography	  case,	  but	  it	  also	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  “safeguard	  against	  injustice”.247	  
	   Deliberations	  that	  occur	  in	  small	  groups	  often	  recognize	  the	  weak	  and	  unheard	  voices	  of	  
those	  with	  restricted	  access	  to	  political	  influence.	  	  Women,	  African	  Americans	  and	  Indigenous	  
peoples,	  persons	  with	  disabilities	  just	  to	  name	  a	  few	  groups,	  have	  benefited	  from	  the	  
alternative	  discourse	  brought	  about	  by	  challenging	  the	  status	  quo	  in	  small	  groups.	  	  The	  
opportunity	  to	  re-­‐define	  self-­‐understandings	  and	  self-­‐identifications	  in	  enclaves	  of	  like-­‐minded	  
people	  deliberating	  about	  similar	  problems	  revealed	  the	  injustice	  of	  social	  oppression.	  	  In	  these	  
cases,	  free	  expression,	  the	  expression	  of	  ideas	  that	  run	  contrary	  to	  majority	  opinion	  or	  
institutional	  arrangements	  is	  necessary	  to	  engage	  the	  deliberation.248	  	  As	  Cohen	  puts	  it,	  
deliberation	  is	  a	  framework	  that	  requires	  free	  expression	  to	  advance	  the	  common	  good.	  	  Free	  
expression	  is	  a	  constituent	  of	  deliberative	  capacities	  and	  consequently	  is	  necessary	  to	  facilitate	  
deliberation.	  	  Free	  expression	  is,	  in	  effect,	  what	  makes	  deliberation	  possible.249	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246	  Group	  polarization	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  situations	  where	  there	  is	  a	  split	  between	  opposing	  groups.	  	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  
tendency	  of	  a	  group	  to	  move	  toward	  one	  extreme	  in	  the	  course	  of	  deliberations.	  
247	  Ibid.,	  82.	  
248	  Most	  critics	  do	  not	  deny	  the	  value	  of	  enclave	  deliberation.	  However,	  a	  purely	  procedural	  account	  of	  
deliberation	  offers	  little	  safeguard	  against	  enclaves	  deliberating	  to	  undesirable	  outcomes,	  advocating	  slavery	  or	  
racism	  for	  example.	  	  The	  response	  runs	  like	  this—the	  outcome	  of	  a	  deliberation	  cannot	  contravene	  the	  conditions	  
necessary	  to	  support	  future	  deliberations	  and	  as	  a	  result	  a	  deliberation	  could	  not	  legitimately	  reach	  a	  decision	  that	  
denied	  the	  equality	  and	  freedom	  of	  all	  participants	  who	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  issue.	  	  
249	  Cohen,	  “Legitimacy,”	  29.	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If	  so,	  what	  about	  the	  pornography	  example?	  	  The	  exercise	  of	  free	  expression,	  it	  seems,	  
results	  in	  a	  deliberating	  that	  restricts	  free	  expression;	  however,	  a	  deliberation	  comprised	  of	  
grief	  stricken	  participants	  does	  not	  entirely	  meet	  the	  conditions	  of	  freedom.	  	  According	  to	  
Cohen,	  deliberation,	  as	  a	  process,	  is	  free	  under	  two	  conditions.	  	  First,	  participants	  are	  bound	  
only	  to	  the	  preconditions	  for,	  and	  the	  results	  of,	  the	  deliberation	  in	  which	  they	  are	  
participating.	  	  Second,	  when	  consensus	  on	  a	  decision	  is	  reached	  deliberatively	  it	  gives	  sufficient	  
reason	  to	  act	  upon	  the	  outcome.250	  	  In	  the	  pornography	  case,	  the	  passionate	  discourse	  
produces	  an	  outcome	  concomitant	  with	  the	  participant’s	  pre-­‐deliberation	  tendencies;	  however,	  
the	  force	  of	  those	  pre-­‐deliberation	  tendencies,	  rather	  than	  deliberation,	  function	  as	  the	  reason	  
to	  act.	  	  Hence,	  the	  deliberation	  is	  not	  free	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense	  because	  the	  pre-­‐deliberation	  
tendencies,	  not	  the	  deliberation	  itself,	  are	  the	  reasons	  upon	  which	  action	  is	  taken.	  	  In	  such	  a	  
case,	  further	  deliberations	  are	  necessary	  and,	  it	  is	  argued,	  would	  eventually	  serve	  to	  correct	  the	  
original	  decision.	  	  A	  year	  later,	  the	  pre-­‐deliberation	  tendencies	  have	  changed.	  	  A	  deliberation	  in	  
response	  to	  a	  call	  to	  ban	  literature	  may	  generate	  a	  multi-­‐faceted	  discussion	  through	  which	  the	  
harms	  of	  censorship	  are	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  issue.	  
This	  may	  seem	  overly	  an	  overly	  optimistic	  view	  of	  deliberation	  in	  practice.	  	  What	  is	  to	  
prevent	  a	  community	  from	  deliberating	  all	  sorts	  of	  constraints	  on	  individual	  freedom?	  	  How	  
does	  a	  deliberative	  process,	  dependent	  upon	  the	  freedom	  of	  participants,	  prevent	  its	  
participants	  from	  deliberating	  their	  own	  freedom	  away?	  	  There	  is	  a	  notion	  of	  progress,	  a	  
prediction,	  that	  over	  time	  deliberation	  allows	  for	  a	  process	  of	  reflection	  and	  refinement	  that	  is	  
inextricably	  tied	  to	  supporting	  the	  conditions	  necessary	  to	  deliberate.	  	  As	  freedom	  and	  equality	  
are	  the	  supporting	  conditions	  of	  deliberation,	  the	  freedom	  and	  equality	  of	  participants	  is	  the	  
corrective	  force	  in	  this	  case.	  	  Basic	  freedoms	  are	  necessary	  constituents	  of	  the	  deliberative	  
process	  that	  is	  an	  ongoing	  association.	  	  Consequently,	  knee	  jerk	  decisions	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  
self-­‐corrective	  element	  of	  deliberation	  and	  succumb	  to	  the	  moderating	  influence	  of	  the	  
continuum	  of	  political	  arrangements.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The	  second	  worry	  is	  that	  a	  deliberative	  process	  threatens	  individual	  autonomy251	  because	  it	  
requires	  a	  shift	  to	  general	  interests	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  individual	  interests.	  	  Hence	  general,	  
rather	  than	  individual,	  interests	  shape	  individual	  identities.	  	  However,	  the	  presumption	  here	  is	  
that	  deliberative	  consensus	  is	  unitary—that	  citizens	  identify	  with	  the	  collective	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
coming	  to	  consensus.	  	  The	  non-­‐unitary	  nature	  of	  deliberative	  consensus	  promotes	  individual	  
autonomy	  because	  self-­‐legislation	  is	  a	  key	  element	  of	  the	  capacity	  to	  engage	  fellow	  participants	  
in	  deliberative	  activity.	  	  
In	  a	  unitary	  democracy,	  divisive	  issues	  must	  be	  resolved	  unanimously	  such	  that	  the	  
community	  embodies	  a	  homogeneous	  will.	  	  Individuals	  merge	  with	  the	  collective	  in	  a	  civic	  
identity,	  as	  a	  result	  the	  government	  is	  the	  collective	  will	  and	  institutions	  reflect	  the	  peoples'	  
will.	  	  Although	  individuals	  voluntarily	  identify	  their	  interests	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  collective,	  
Barber	  suggests	  that	  in	  a	  unitary	  democracy	  individual	  choice	  is	  subordinated	  to	  an	  
independent	  ground—the	  collective	  seeks	  the	  absolute	  certainty	  of	  unitary	  aims.252	  	  Hence,	  the	  
collectivist	  and	  conformist	  arrangements	  of	  a	  unitary	  democracy	  serve	  equality	  but	  severely	  
impede	  individual	  autonomy,	  which	  is	  made	  subordinate	  to	  the	  absolutism	  of	  collective	  
interests.253	  	  	  
The	  capacity	  for	  autonomous	  choice	  is	  presupposed	  in	  any	  theory	  of	  democracy.	  	  Rather	  
than	  threaten	  autonomy,	  Barber	  argues	  that	  the	  individual	  will	  of	  participants	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  
of	  deliberative	  choice.254	  	  Deliberations	  occur	  between	  socially	  constituted	  individual	  wills.	  	  
When	  Rousseau	  said	  “man	  is	  born	  free	  and	  is	  everywhere	  in	  chains”255	  he	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  
humans	  are	  free	  until	  society	  enchains	  him,	  he	  meant	  that	  freedom	  is	  an	  abstraction	  while	  
dependency	  is	  a	  concrete	  human	  reality.256	  	  If	  humans	  are	  social,	  then	  Barber	  argues	  the	  role	  of	  
citizen	  is	  not	  a	  choice;	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  an	  unavoidable	  role.	  	  It	  is	  voluntary	  and	  shared	  in	  common	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251	  Autonomy	  in	  used	  in	  the	  most	  general	  sense	  of	  self-­‐governance,	  rather	  than	  subordinating	  decisions	  to	  an	  
external	  authority.	  
252	  Barber,	  Strong,	  150.	  
253	  Ibid.,	  149.	  
254	  Ibid.,	  134.	  
255	  Jean-­‐Jacques	  Rousseau,	  The	  Social	  Contract,	  (New	  York:	  Cosimo,	  2008),	  14.	  	  
256	  Barber,	  Strong,	  216.	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with	  the	  community.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  road	  to	  autonomy	  runs	  through	  commonality;257	  
consequently,	  deliberative	  participation	  liberates	  wills	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  abstracted	  exile.	  	  
“Freedom	  is	  what	  comes	  out	  this	  process,	  not	  what	  goes	  into	  it.”258	  	  Deliberation,	  for	  Barber,	  
frees	  the	  individual	  through	  the	  dependency	  of	  sharing,	  in	  common	  with	  the	  community,	  the	  
burden	  of	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  
Other	  theorists	  agree	  that	  deliberative	  processes	  promote	  individual	  autonomy	  in	  
several	  ways.	  	  Cohen,	  for	  example,	  points	  to	  two	  types	  of	  external	  determinants	  that	  threaten	  
autonomy	  salient	  to	  minority	  groups	  recovering	  from	  historical	  injustice	  and	  oppression.	  	  First,	  
adaptive	  preferences,	  identified	  by	  Elster,	  are	  preferences	  that	  shift	  according	  to	  circumstances	  
such	  that	  the	  individual	  has	  not	  deliberately	  chosen	  to	  shift	  preferences.	  	  Second,	  
accommodationist	  preferences	  are	  those	  preferences	  that	  limit	  a	  person’s	  choices	  to	  those	  
which	  they	  deem	  possible,	  e.g.	  persons	  socialized	  into	  slavery	  may	  chose	  slavery	  because	  they	  
see	  it	  as	  the	  only	  viable	  alternative.	  	  Deliberative	  processes	  can	  overcome	  both	  external	  
determinants	  by	  neutralizing	  power	  relations	  thereby	  promoting	  preference	  formation	  free	  of	  
entrenched	  oppressive	  determining	  influences.	  	  	  While	  deliberation	  works	  toward	  consensus,	  
individual	  horizons	  expand	  through	  collective	  reason	  in	  a	  way	  that	  promotes	  autonomous	  
choice.259	  	  	  
One	  might	  argue	  that	  the	  emphasis	  on	  finding	  consensus	  through	  social	  solidarities	  
threatens	  autonomy	  because	  persons	  must	  sacrifice	  their	  opinions	  or	  interests	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  
agreement	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  these	  interests	  may	  reflect	  the	  exercise	  of	  self-­‐legislative	  
capacities.	  	  However,	  the	  process	  of	  deliberation	  promotes	  the	  exercise	  of	  virtues	  that	  are	  
necessary	  conditions	  for	  autonomy.	  	  Through	  engaging	  a	  plurality	  of	  viewpoints,	  deliberation	  
enlarges	  thought	  and	  extends	  the	  epistemic	  resources	  brought	  to	  bear	  in	  the	  decision.	  	  	  
The	  relationship	  between	  consensus,	  freedom	  and	  autonomy	  in	  political	  deliberation	  
can	  be	  summed	  up	  like	  this:	  	  The	  proximate	  and	  provisional	  nature	  of	  deliberative	  consensus	  
requires	  that	  participants	  are	  free	  and	  as	  such	  could	  not	  threaten	  the	  basic	  freedoms	  or	  
autonomy	  of	  constituents	  on	  pain	  of	  contradiction.	  	  In	  contrast,	  basic	  freedoms	  and	  autonomy	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are	  features	  needed	  to	  reach	  a	  decision	  in	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making.	  	  Citizens	  are	  required	  
to	  actively	  engage	  one	  another	  in	  a	  dialogue	  aimed	  at	  making	  a	  decision	  by	  coming	  to	  
consensus;	  however,	  consensus	  does	  not	  legitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes;	  instead,	  legitimacy	  
is	  tied	  to	  the	  freedom	  and	  autonomy	  of	  the	  deliberative	  participants.	  	  	  
3.3	  	  Conclusions	  
I	  began	  this	  chapter	  by	  examining	  the	  features	  of	  a	  dialogue	  that	  make	  a	  political	  dialogue	  a	  
deliberative	  dialogue.	  	  The	  procedural	  requirements	  of	  publicity,	  equality,	  reasonableness,	  
dynamic	  revision	  and	  transformation	  along	  with	  the	  substantive	  requirements	  of	  decision,	  
consensus	  and	  legitimacy	  are	  constitutive	  of	  an	  inclusive	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  	  
Inclusive	  deliberative	  processes	  constitute	  a	  constructivist	  dialogue	  and	  as	  such	  are	  able	  to	  
accommodate	  the	  pluralist	  nature	  of	  associations	  between	  alternative	  worldviews	  and	  as	  a	  
result	  constitute	  an	  important	  step	  in	  overcoming	  problems	  thrown	  up	  by	  the	  minority	  rights	  
paradox.	  	  	  	  
Deliberation	  requires	  that	  citizens	  actively	  engage	  one	  another	  in	  a	  dialogue	  aimed	  at	  
making	  a	  decision	  by	  coming	  to	  consensus.	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  consensus	  raises	  the	  concern	  that	  
committing	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  deliberation	  threatens	  basic	  freedoms	  and	  the	  autonomy	  of	  
individuals.	  	  However,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  consensus	  need	  not	  legitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes;	  
instead,	  legitimacy	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  freedom	  and	  autonomy	  of	  the	  deliberative	  participants.	  	  This	  is	  
not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  consensus,	  freedom	  and	  autonomy	  captures	  the	  full	  
range	  of	  features	  and	  their	  relationship	  required	  to	  legitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes.	  	  I	  now	  
turn	  to	  public	  reason,	  which	  encompasses	  the	  related	  themes	  of	  reason,	  reasonableness	  and	  
reasoning	  styles,	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  equality	  in	  deliberative	  dialogue.	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Chapter	  4:	  	  Public	  Reason	  
Cultural,	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  minority	  groups	  often	  claim	  that	  their	  worldview	  and	  the	  way	  they	  
reason	  about	  the	  world	  is	  unique.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  when	  they	  engage	  political	  institutions	  or	  
attempt	  to	  participate	  in	  policy	  decisions,	  they	  have	  to	  translate	  their	  claims	  into	  a	  paradigm	  of	  
majority	  reasoning.	  	  This	  is	  problematic,	  it	  is	  argued,	  in	  at	  least	  two	  ways.	  	  First,	  when	  the	  
reasoning	  style	  of	  the	  minority	  differs	  significantly	  from	  the	  majority,	  key	  elements	  of	  the	  
minority	  claim	  can	  be	  lost	  in	  translation.	  	  Second,	  majoritarian	  decision-­‐making	  procedures	  are	  
characterised	  as	  rational	  procedures;	  as	  a	  result,	  procedures	  shaped	  by	  alternative	  reasoning	  
styles,	  such	  as	  minority	  conceptions	  of	  rationality,	  are	  often	  misrecognized,	  undermined	  or	  
overlooked.	  	  If	  all	  citizens	  have	  the	  right	  to	  engage	  the	  political	  authority	  to	  which	  they	  are	  
subject,	  what	  is	  needed	  is	  a	  method	  of	  political	  engagement	  that	  can	  accommodate	  alternative	  
modes	  of	  reason.	  
Deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  seeks	  coherence	  between	  different	  reasoning	  styles	  
without	  bringing	  arguments	  under	  a	  homogenous	  ideal	  of	  reason,	  and	  as	  such,	  does	  not	  favour,	  
or	  preference,	  the	  reasoning	  of	  one	  participant	  over	  another.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  divergent	  modes	  of	  
reason	  may	  be	  given	  equal	  recognition	  in	  a	  deliberation.	  	  However,	  deliberative	  theorists	  
disagree	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  reason	  and	  equality	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  For	  
some,	  political	  dialogue	  must	  be	  grounded	  on	  substantive	  (albeit	  imperfectly	  specified)	  criteria	  
of	  equality	  among	  participants;	  for	  others,	  substantive	  equality	  is	  subordinate	  to	  norms	  of	  
public	  reason.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  minority	  groups,	  whose	  worldview	  differs	  significantly	  from	  the	  
majority,	  may	  be	  unjustly	  excluded	  from	  deliberative	  processes	  when	  equality	  is	  subordinate	  to	  
norms	  of	  character	  and	  standards	  of	  reasonableness.	  	  Inclusive	  public	  reason,	  if	  it	  is	  public,	  
must	  make	  room	  for	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  character	  types,	  alternative	  forms	  of	  argument	  and	  
divergent	  reasoning	  styles.	  	  	  
Recall	  from	  chapter	  one,	  that	  a	  positivist	  approach	  to	  meaning	  may	  in	  practice	  exert	  a	  
cultural	  confirmation	  bias.	  	  When	  we	  encounter	  reasoning	  very	  different	  from	  our	  own,	  we	  are	  
not	  likely	  to	  recognize	  it	  as	  systematic	  process	  of	  problem	  solving,	  constructing	  meaning	  or	  
imparting	  ideas.	  	  When	  European	  anthropologists	  first	  encountered	  the	  Indigenous	  peoples	  of	  
the	  Americas,	  in	  many	  cases,	  they	  interpreted	  the	  languages	  and	  practices	  as	  uncivilized—
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closer	  to	  animal	  than	  to	  human.260	  	  A	  few	  hundred	  years	  later,	  the	  differences	  between	  
Indigenous	  cultures	  and	  European	  cultures	  are	  attributed	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  like	  degrees	  of	  
technological	  development	  rather	  than	  degrees	  of	  civilization.261	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  Indigenous	  
peoples	  are	  still	  waiting	  for	  political	  arrangements	  to	  catch	  up	  to	  ideas	  now	  taken	  for	  granted	  in	  
contemporary	  anthropology—that	  recognition	  requires	  accepting,	  to	  a	  certain	  degree,	  
alternative	  modes	  of	  reasoning	  as	  equally	  valid	  (sound,	  reasonable)	  to	  what	  is	  familiar	  or	  
dominant.	  	  This	  idea,	  of	  course,	  poses	  all	  sorts	  of	  questions	  about	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  equal	  and	  
reasoning.	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  unpack	  the	  relationship	  between	  equality	  and	  reason	  in	  political	  
deliberation	  in	  order	  to	  flesh	  out	  the	  dialogical	  features	  necessary	  to	  get	  around	  the	  charge	  of	  
paradox.	  
In	  4.1,	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  equality	  and	  reason	  and	  argue	  that	  when	  
reasonableness	  sets	  limits	  on	  the	  character	  of	  deliberative	  participants,	  individuals	  may	  be	  
unjustly	  excluded.	  	  In	  some	  accounts	  of	  deliberation,	  standards	  of	  reasoning	  constrain	  the	  way	  
claims	  can	  be	  structured,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  minority	  groups	  may	  be	  unjustly	  denied	  equal	  status,	  
access	  and	  influence.	  	  When	  a	  particular	  conceptual	  framework	  restricts	  the	  allowable	  content	  
of	  political	  deliberation,	  the	  influence	  of	  deliberations	  in	  the	  social	  and	  civil	  spheres	  of	  society	  
may	  be	  unjustly	  excluded.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation,	  I	  will	  suggest	  it	  is	  equality,	  
not	  reasonableness,	  which	  limits	  deliberation	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  tied	  to	  one	  
particular	  idiom,	  particular	  argument	  form	  or	  conceptual	  framework.	  	  Through	  the	  equality	  of	  
participants,	  the	  inclusive	  public	  reason	  of	  deliberative	  processes	  makes	  room	  for	  alternative	  
worldviews,	  reasoning	  styles	  and	  content	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  	  
Then,	  in	  4.2	  I	  look	  at	  the	  conditions	  of	  deliberation.	  	  Some	  argue	  that	  without	  the	  
background	  conditions	  of	  liberalism	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  would	  be	  a	  non-­‐starter.	  	  
However,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  while	  liberal	  principles	  such	  as	  freedom	  and	  equality	  and	  the	  
standards	  of	  reasonableness	  they	  imply	  play	  a	  role	  in	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making,	  deliberative	  
claims	  are	  not	  constrained	  by	  those	  standards	  of	  reasonableness.	  	  Hence,	  a	  deliberative	  process	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  This	  misrecognition	  justified	  all	  sorts	  of	  injustice	  from	  genocide	  to	  slavery,	  e.g.	  the	  Three-­‐Fifths	  Compromise	  
(1787)	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  United	  States	  famously	  apportioned	  representation	  of	  African	  American	  slaves	  as	  
equal	  to	  three-­‐fifths	  of	  a	  free	  man.	  	  	  
261	  Clifford	  Geertz	  talks	  at	  length	  about	  the	  shift	  from	  moral	  superiority	  toward	  the	  burden	  of	  white	  guilt	  in	  
Available	  Light,	  47.	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(shaped	  by	  the	  ordering	  of	  features	  suggested	  in	  4.1)	  can	  be	  functionally	  independent	  of	  liberal	  
principles	  and	  the	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  they	  imply	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  liberal	  principles	  
do	  not	  function	  to	  exclude	  claims	  made	  from	  alternative	  frameworks	  before	  the	  thrust	  of	  the	  
claim	  can	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  	  Hence,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  deliberating	  the	  
rights	  claims	  of	  minority	  groups,	  under	  the	  relevant	  circumstances,	  renders	  important	  features	  
of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  moot.	  
4.1	  Reason	  and	  Equality	  
There	  is	  a	  close	  relationship	  between	  deliberative	  reason	  and	  equality,	  so	  close	  in	  fact,	  that	  it	  
can	  be	  expressed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  undermines	  the	  need	  for	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  all	  
together.	  	  In	  a	  reasonable	  deliberation	  persons	  must	  recognize	  other	  participants	  as	  formally	  
and	  substantively	  equal.	  	  Further,	  unless	  participants	  are	  procedurally	  equal	  the	  deliberation	  
and	  its	  outcomes	  are	  considered	  illegitimate.	  	  However,	  if	  participants	  were	  actually	  formally,	  
substantively	  and	  procedurally	  equal,	  then	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  why	  deliberation	  would	  be	  necessary	  
at	  all—there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  formally	  or	  procedurally	  equalize	  participants	  who	  are	  already	  
politically	  equal.262	  	  An	  aggregative	  procedure	  would	  be	  more	  than	  sufficient	  to	  secure	  an	  
equitable	  result	  in	  a	  society	  comprised	  of	  such	  equals.	  	  On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  it	  may	  seem	  that	  this	  
type	  of	  equality	  renders	  reasoned	  deliberation	  unnecessary;	  however,	  this	  aggregative	  idea	  of	  
equality	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  deliberative	  equality.	  	  	  
Aggregative	  equality	  is	  satisfied	  as	  long	  as	  each	  person	  is	  recognized	  as	  the	  best	  judge	  of	  
his	  or	  her	  own	  interests	  and	  as	  such	  each	  individual	  has	  equal	  influence,	  by	  a	  vote	  for	  example,	  
in	  decision-­‐making.	  	  Deliberationists	  argue	  that	  aggregation	  reinforces	  other	  types	  of	  inequality,	  
unequal	  access	  to	  agenda	  setting	  for	  example,	  precisely	  because	  public	  reason	  does	  not	  play	  a	  
role	  in	  aggregative	  decision-­‐making.	  	  If	  reason	  is	  the	  means	  by	  which	  citizens	  become,	  in	  one	  
respect,	  equals,	  then	  the	  capacity	  to	  participate	  in	  public	  reasoning,	  what	  I	  will	  call	  
reasonableness,	  is	  a	  necessary	  constituent	  of	  deliberative	  participants.	  	  This	  raises	  questions	  
about	  the	  relationship	  between	  reason	  and	  equality:	  	  Is	  it	  reasonableness	  that	  equalizes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  equals	  do	  not	  disagree.	  	  Equals	  may	  disagree	  and	  deliberation	  might	  be	  a	  means	  through	  
which	  those	  disagreements	  could	  be	  settled.	  	  The	  criticism	  is	  aimed	  at	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  deliberation	  is	  better	  
than	  other	  political	  systems	  because	  it	  puts	  participants	  at	  an	  equal	  footing.	  	  The	  various	  facets	  of	  deliberative	  
equality	  and	  the	  advantages	  they	  bring	  to	  minority	  rights	  dialogues	  will	  be	  explored	  further	  in	  this	  section.	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participants	  in	  deliberation?	  	  If	  so,	  then	  participants	  deemed	  unreasonable	  cannot	  be	  viewed	  as	  
equals	  and	  as	  such	  may	  be	  excluded	  from	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  However,	  this	  makes	  it	  far	  
too	  easy	  to	  exclude	  marginalized	  minorities	  who	  are	  viewed	  as	  unreasonable	  simply	  because	  
their	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  world	  does	  not	  harmonize	  with	  the	  majority.	  	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  
illegitimate	  exclusion,	  Young	  argues	  that	  a	  legitimate	  deliberation	  must	  equalize	  access	  to	  
political	  influence	  between	  members	  of	  an	  association	  by	  extending	  inclusion	  to	  
disenfranchised	  individuals	  and	  groups	  as	  equals.263	  	  Equality	  plays	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  
inclusion	  of	  groups	  with	  alternative	  worldviews	  and	  alternative	  reasoning	  styles;	  as	  a	  result,	  I	  
will	  argue	  that	  the	  priority	  of	  reasonableness	  over	  equality	  may	  unjustly	  exclude	  some	  minority	  
groups.	  	  Hence,	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  equality	  
of	  participants	  and	  therefore,	  if	  the	  conditions	  of	  equality	  are	  not	  met,	  deliberation	  is	  not	  a	  
reasonable	  process.	  	  
To	  begin,	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  package	  of	  concepts	  that	  fall	  under	  the	  ‘equality’	  umbrella.	  	  
Deliberative	  equality	  focuses	  not	  only	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  individual	  but	  on	  relational	  equality	  
and	  relational	  consistency	  between	  members	  of	  an	  association	  as	  well.	  	  Consequently,	  
deliberative	  equality	  requires	  recognition	  of	  deeply	  divergent	  worldviews.	  	  Second,	  deliberation	  
distinguishes	  itself	  from	  existing	  paradigms	  of	  rationality	  and	  consequently	  critiques	  have	  
dubbed	  deliberation	  the	  politics	  of	  unreason.	  	  However,	  I	  contend	  that	  public	  reason,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  
be	  public,	  must	  make	  room	  for	  alternative	  forms	  of	  argument	  and	  reasoning	  styles	  that	  do	  not	  
fit	  traditional	  Western	  paradigms	  of	  rationality.	  	  Finally,	  if	  reasonableness	  sets	  limits	  on	  the	  
character	  of	  deliberative	  participants	  or	  constrains	  what	  claims	  are	  acceptable	  in	  deliberative	  
processes,	  minority	  groups	  and	  individuals	  may	  be	  denied	  equal	  status,	  access	  and	  influence.	  	  
As	  a	  result,	  inclusive	  public	  reason	  rests	  on	  the	  recognition	  and	  realization	  of	  equality	  in	  
deliberative	  processes.	  	  	  
Equality	  of	  What?	  
There	  is	  a	  close	  relationship	  between	  freedom,	  equality	  and	  reason	  in	  the	  sort	  of	  deliberative	  
process	  I	  have	  in	  mind—the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  deliberative	  outcome	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  
freedom	  and	  equality	  of	  participants.	  	  Recall	  from	  3.2	  that	  individuals	  are	  free	  when	  they	  are,	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and	  are	  recognized	  as,	  self-­‐legislating	  political	  actors.	  	  However,	  freedom	  alone	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  
legitimate	  authority.	  	  Young	  observes	  that	  there	  is	  often	  a	  cycle	  between	  social	  and	  economic	  
equality	  and	  political	  equality	  that	  marginalizes	  disadvantaged	  groups	  from	  policy	  decisions.264	  	  
Consequently,	  in	  addition	  to	  freedom,	  citizens	  must	  be	  equal	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  	  Equal	  rights	  
attach	  to	  the	  individual;	  however,	  concepts	  involving	  equal	  recognition	  and	  influence	  express	  
relational	  equalities,	  that	  is,	  equalities	  that	  can	  only	  be	  made	  sense	  of	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  social	  
context	  of	  the	  deliberation.	  	  This	  sort	  of	  equality,	  I	  will	  suggest,	  demands	  more	  than	  mere	  
toleration	  of	  alternative	  worldviews,	  it	  requires	  the	  substantive	  and	  procedural	  inclusion	  of	  
alternative	  worldviews	  into	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  the	  deliberation.	  	  	  
The	  list	  of	  deliberative	  equalities	  is	  extensive	  including,	  but	  not	  limited	  to,	  political	  
equality	  in	  that	  certain	  political	  rights	  must	  be	  held	  equally;	  the	  equal	  recognition	  of	  
participants’	  preferences,	  interests	  and	  capacity	  to	  deliberate;	  equal	  access	  to,	  and	  equal	  
influence	  in,	  decision-­‐making;	  equal	  rights	  of	  voting,	  association	  and	  expression;	  and,	  political	  
issues	  must	  be	  equally	  available	  for	  public	  deliberation.	  	  Deliberative	  equality,	  then,	  
incorporates	  three	  features:	  	  Formal,	  substantive	  and	  procedural	  equality	  are	  necessary	  to	  
facilitate	  just	  deliberations.	  
Given	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  three	  features	  of	  deliberative	  equality,	  it	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  
begin	  with	  a	  brief	  sketch	  of	  the	  conceptual	  territory.	  	  Formal	  equality	  is	  exemplified	  by	  
arguments	  against	  the	  gender	  pay	  gap	  such	  as	  ‘equal	  pay	  for	  equal	  work’.	  	  It	  is	  simply	  the	  idea	  
that	  when	  two	  individuals	  are	  equal	  in	  one	  relevant	  aspect	  (their	  employment	  position),	  they	  
should	  receive	  equal	  treatment	  with	  regard	  to	  that	  aspect	  (their	  level	  of	  pay).	  	  The	  problem	  
with	  formal	  equality	  is	  that	  it	  may	  not	  address	  circumstances	  outside	  the	  relevant	  aspect.	  	  For	  
example,	  women,	  simply	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  female,	  may	  not	  have	  the	  same	  access	  to	  education	  
or	  apprenticeships	  as	  males	  and	  therefore	  are	  unable	  to	  achieve	  an	  equal	  level	  of	  qualification.	  	  
If	  women	  are	  consistently	  less	  qualified	  than	  men,	  it	  is	  substantive	  evidence	  that	  women	  do	  not	  
have	  the	  same	  access	  to	  achieve	  those	  qualifications.	  	  Substantive	  equality,	  then,	  is	  concerned	  
with	  outcomes.	  	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  outcomes,	  procedural	  equality	  addresses	  social,	  
systemic	  and	  practical	  barriers	  that	  women	  may	  face	  when	  seeking	  equality	  of	  access	  and	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  Ibid.,	  17.	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opportunity.	  	  Although	  this	  tripartite	  notion	  of	  equality	  is	  common	  to	  accounts	  of	  deliberative	  
politics,	  not	  all	  accounts	  are	  equal	  about	  equality,	  in	  some	  cases	  reasonableness	  is	  a	  condition	  
of	  equality	  and	  as	  a	  result	  persons	  or	  groups	  deemed	  unreasonable	  are	  not	  recognized	  as	  
equals,	  nor	  do	  they	  have	  equal	  access	  to,	  or	  influence	  in,	  decision-­‐making.	  	  	  
	   Deliberative	  politics,	  for	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  for	  example,	  rests	  on	  a	  set	  of	  
principles	  that	  support	  accommodation	  based	  on	  mutual	  respect.	  	  The	  principle	  of	  reciprocity	  is	  
satisfied	  when	  participants	  seek	  points	  of	  convergence	  that	  make	  agreement	  possible	  despite	  
deeply	  different	  worldviews.265	  	  Deliberative	  participants	  are	  not	  required	  to	  abandon	  their	  
deep	  convictions	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  agreement;	  however,	  participants	  cannot	  expect	  their	  doctrine	  
in	  its	  comprehensive	  form	  to	  play	  a	  determining	  role	  in	  deliberations.	  	  In	  a	  public	  deliberation,	  
only	  those	  reasons	  that	  meet	  the	  publicity	  requirement	  carry	  the	  political	  force	  necessary	  to	  
support	  claims.	  	  Reasons	  that	  meet	  the	  conditions	  of	  publicity	  are	  “mutually	  acceptable	  
reasons”	  that	  serve	  a	  “similar	  moral	  purpose.”266	  	  They	  are	  reasons	  that	  are	  recognized	  by	  all	  
participants	  as	  moral	  in	  form,	  and	  mutually	  acceptable	  in	  content.267	  	  Hence,	  appeals	  made	  to	  
principles	  that	  are	  not	  recognized	  as	  moral	  in	  form	  or	  acceptable	  in	  content	  are	  excluded	  from	  
the	  deliberation.	  	  If	  fundamentalists,	  for	  example,	  appeal	  to	  biblical	  principles,	  or,	  if	  the	  reasons	  
fundamentalists	  give	  are	  inaccessible	  to	  those	  with	  a	  secular	  worldview,	  then	  their	  reasons	  
cannot	  be	  made	  public,	  and	  therefore	  they	  are	  excluded	  from	  deliberation.268	  	  	  
While	  I	  agree	  that	  there	  are	  cases	  where	  religious	  reasoning	  fails	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  
of	  publicity,	  I	  am	  concerned	  that	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson’s	  criteria	  may	  also	  exclude	  religious	  
reasoning	  that	  fulfills	  the	  publicity	  requirement.	  	  Appeals	  to	  biblical	  laws	  that	  condemn	  certain	  
types	  of	  secular	  lifestyles	  cannot	  be	  made	  public	  in	  a	  secular	  context;	  however,	  the	  form	  and	  
content	  of	  appeals	  to	  reasoning	  with	  a	  form	  akin	  to	  something	  like	  the	  golden	  rule269	  find	  
acceptability	  across	  religious/secular	  boundaries.	  	  The	  problem	  I	  see	  with	  Gutmann	  and	  
Thompson’s	  principle	  of	  reciprocity	  is	  that	  it	  may	  illegitimately	  exclude	  religious	  reasons	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson,	  Disagreement,	  85.	  
266	  Ibid.,	  55.	  
267	  Ibid.,	  57.	  
268	  Ibid.,	  57.	  
269	  In	  its	  most	  basic	  articulation:	  Do	  unto	  others	  as	  you	  would	  have	  them	  do	  unto	  you.	  
	  129	  
	  
second	  type	  by	  setting	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  that	  cannot	  recognize	  a	  religious	  worldview	  
as	  a	  reasonable	  worldview.	  
	   	  Reasonableness,	  for	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson,	  is	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  reciprocity.	  	  
Reciprocal	  thinking	  is,	  on	  their	  account,	  thinking	  reasonably.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  principle	  of	  
reciprocity	  makes	  demands	  on	  the	  character	  of	  deliberative	  participants.	  	  Gutmann	  and	  
Thompson	  argue	  that	  deliberation	  rests	  on	  there	  being	  reasons	  or	  principles	  that	  can	  be	  shared	  
and	  therefore	  it	  cannot	  deal	  with	  persons	  who	  reject	  the	  aim	  of	  finding	  “fair	  terms	  of	  social	  
cooperation.”270	  	  In	  response	  to	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins,271	  for	  example,	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  
argue	  that	  the	  skills	  taught	  in	  the	  critical	  thinking	  course	  are	  the	  basis	  for	  making	  reciprocal	  
claims.272	  	  By	  opposing	  the	  course,	  the	  fundamentalists	  are	  unable	  to	  satisfy	  the	  principle	  of	  
reciprocity	  because	  they	  do	  not	  recognize	  the	  form	  of	  secular	  morality.	  	  Further,	  if	  
fundamentalist	  children	  were	  denied	  the	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  the	  skills	  of	  critical	  thinking,	  
the	  future	  of	  reciprocity	  would	  be	  in	  jeopardy	  because	  the	  children	  would	  not	  develop	  as	  
reasonable	  democratic	  citizens.273	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  critical	  thinking	  course	  actually	  produces	  
better	  citizens—reasonable	  citizens—is	  an	  interesting,	  and	  certainly	  debatable	  question.274	  	  
What	  is	  important	  to	  note	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  reciprocity	  and	  reason.	  	  The	  
fundamentalists	  demonstrate	  an	  inability	  to	  be	  reasonable	  because	  they	  do	  not	  recognize	  
reciprocity,	  the	  form	  of	  secular	  morality,	  as	  an	  acceptable	  form	  of	  morality.	  	  Justifying	  exclusion	  
in	  this	  way	  shows	  how	  stringent	  the	  demands	  of	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson’s	  reciprocity	  are	  for	  
citizens,	  but	  what	  about	  the	  state?	  	  	  
The	  tacit	  implication	  of	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  state	  is	  under	  no	  similar	  obligation	  to	  
the	  fundamentalists,	  the	  school	  board	  and	  the	  courts	  can	  impose	  the	  secular	  moral	  form	  and	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  Ibid.,	  55.	  
271	  The	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins	  case	  was	  presented	  in	  full	  in	  chapter	  1.3.	  
272	  In	  "Undemocratic	  Education,"	  Liberalism	  and	  the	  Moral	  Life,	  ed.	  Nancy	  L.	  Rosenblum,	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  
University	  Press,	  1991),	  77,	  Gutmann	  argues	  “A	  state	  of	  democratic	  education	  is	  minimally	  objectionable	  insofar	  as	  
it	  leaves	  maximum	  room	  for	  citizens	  deliberately	  to	  shape	  their	  society,	  not	  in	  their	  own	  image	  but	  in	  an	  image	  
that	  they	  can	  legitimately	  identify	  with	  their	  informed,	  moral	  choices.”	  
273	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson,	  Disagreement,	  65.	  
274	  Attempts	  to	  construct	  a	  religious	  enclave	  cut-­‐off	  from	  the	  surrounding	  society	  seem	  as	  impossible	  as	  escaping	  
Google,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  education	  seems	  a	  bit	  out-­‐dated.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  ‘making	  citizens’	  suggests	  a	  
level	  of	  environmental	  control	  that	  does	  seem	  possible	  in	  the	  information	  age.	  	  See	  Galston	  “Civic	  Education	  in	  the	  




content	  of	  their	  position	  on	  the	  fundamentalists	  as	  public	  reasons	  even	  though	  the	  
fundamentalists	  articulate	  an	  argument	  consistent	  with	  the	  beliefs	  and	  values	  of	  their	  
(different)	  worldview.	  	  Hence,	  the	  relationship	  is	  one	  of	  negative	  reciprocity;	  the	  
fundamentalists	  and	  their	  reasons	  are	  not	  afforded	  equal	  status	  in	  the	  deliberation.	  	  This	  sort	  of	  
inequality,	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  runs	  contrary	  to	  the	  promise	  of	  pluralism.	  	  Kukathas	  describes	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  liberal	  state	  as	  follows:	  
The	  liberal	  view	  of	  the	  state	  is	  of	  an	  umpire,	  whose	  task	  is	  not	  to	  make	  these	  subjects	  
alike	  in	  their	  thinking,	  or	  even	  to	  bring	  them	  to	  a	  common	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  
of	  their	  (supposedly)	  collective	  enterprise,	  but	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  pursuit	  of	  their	  
various	  enterprises	  is	  possible	  in	  a	  reasonably	  peaceful	  way.275	  
In	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson’s	  response	  to	  the	  Mozert	  case	  they	  suggest	  the	  opposite,	  that	  
citizens	  must	  think	  alike	  in	  certain	  respects	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  reasonable	  associations	  and	  as	  
a	  result,	  the	  state	  is	  justified	  in	  filtering	  out	  claims	  that	  fail	  to	  meet	  specific	  requirements.276	  	  	  
However,	  I	  am	  not	  convinced	  that	  this	  type	  of	  inequality	  can	  be	  deliberatively	  justified.	  	  If	  the	  
equality	  of	  a	  participant	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  the	  participant—that	  is—a	  
standard	  of	  reasonableness	  shaped	  by	  a	  particular	  worldview,	  then	  individuals	  or	  groups	  who	  
have	  a	  different	  conception	  of	  reasonable,	  or,	  who	  work	  in	  different	  conceptual	  frameworks	  
may	  be	  excluded.	  	  This	  sort	  of	  exclusion	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  deliberative	  equality.277	  	  	  
One	  of	  the	  features	  of	  a	  deliberative	  theory,	  i.e.	  a	  feature	  that	  makes	  a	  theory	  a	  
deliberative	  theory,	  is	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  equality.	  	  Deliberatively	  speaking,	  citizens	  
are	  equal	  when	  each	  individual	  is	  recognized	  as	  equally	  capable	  of	  making	  decisions	  regarding	  
the	  exercise	  of	  power.	  	  This	  is	  a	  capacity	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  a	  requirement	  of	  the	  deliberative	  
process.	  	  Each	  participant	  is	  recognized	  as	  having,	  and	  recognizes	  others	  as	  having,	  equal	  
deliberative	  capacities	  and	  participants	  have	  equal	  standing,	  voice	  and	  access	  to	  deliberation	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275	  Chandran	  Kukathas,	  “Education,”	  323.	  
276	  Gutmann	  argues	  that	  preventing	  repressive	  practices,	  such	  as	  a	  myopic	  education,	  prevents	  “practices	  that	  
stifle	  rational	  understanding	  and	  inquiry.”	  	  Consequently,	  “It	  is	  reductio	  ad	  absurdum	  to	  claim	  that	  preventing	  such	  
prevention	  itself	  constitutes	  repression,”	  “Undemocratic,”	  84.	  	  The	  presumption	  here,	  is	  that	  reciprocity,	  
understood	  in	  what	  non-­‐liberals	  call	  liberal	  terms,	  is	  the	  measure	  of	  rationality	  and	  therefore	  the	  state	  is	  justified	  
in	  imposing	  the	  non-­‐neutral	  contents	  of	  a	  liberal	  education	  on	  citizens.	  	  	  
277	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  inconsistency	  would	  be	  settled	  with	  a	  robust	  account	  of	  reasonableness;	  however,	  




well	  as	  equal	  opportunity	  in	  agenda	  setting.278	  	  Recall	  Cohen’s	  picture	  of	  equality:	  	  Participants	  
are	  both	  formally	  and	  substantively	  equal.	  	  Formal	  equality	  is	  satisfied	  when	  the	  rules	  of	  
deliberation	  apply	  to	  all	  participants	  equally.	  	  Substantive	  equality	  is	  realized	  when	  existing	  
inequalities	  in	  power	  relations	  are	  neutralized.	  	  Power	  relations	  are,	  in	  part,	  neutralized	  
because	  the	  existing	  political	  system	  and	  its	  institutional	  arrangements	  are	  subject	  to	  
deliberation.279	  	  On	  Cohen’s	  view,	  then,	  the	  state	  would	  not	  be	  justified	  in	  imposing	  a	  secular	  
form	  of	  morality	  on	  fundamentalists	  unless	  the	  justification	  came	  about	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
legitimate	  deliberation.	  	  	  
Within	  Cohen’s	  deliberative	  principles	  are	  three	  elements	  of	  equality—equal	  
recognition,	  substantive	  equality	  and	  equal	  rights.	  	  First,	  the	  principle	  of	  deliberative	  inclusion	  
ensures	  that	  it	  is	  not	  merely	  the	  interests	  of	  persons	  that	  are	  given	  equal	  consideration;	  it	  
requires	  that	  reasons	  are	  given	  for	  the	  interests,	  reasons	  that	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  acceptable	  by	  
others.280	  	  Second,	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  common	  good	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  good	  of	  all	  is	  served	  
when	  no	  individual	  is	  left	  with	  less	  than	  anyone	  needs	  to	  have.	  	  This	  principle	  attends	  to	  
substantive	  equality	  because	  there	  is	  a	  presumption	  of	  equality,	  which	  is	  equally	  desirable	  to	  all	  
participants,	  that	  emerges	  within	  a	  deliberative	  framework.	  	  Finally,	  because	  the	  link	  between	  
deliberative	  justification	  and	  the	  exercise	  of	  public	  power	  is	  institutionalized,	  the	  principle	  of	  
participation	  ensures	  equal	  rights	  of	  participation	  such	  as	  voting,	  association,	  expression,	  the	  
right	  to	  hold	  office,	  and	  opportunities	  for	  effective	  influence.281	  	  These	  principles,	  Cohen	  claims,	  
work	  together	  to	  reduce	  inequalities	  and	  by	  reducing	  inequalities	  of	  power	  fair	  outcomes	  are	  
achieved.282	  	  Freedom,	  political	  equality	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  common	  good	  integrate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278	  The	  importance	  of	  equal	  participation	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making	  is	  more	  than	  sufficient	  opportunity	  to	  
participate.	  	  The	  formal	  and	  substantive	  equality	  of	  participants	  requires	  equal	  recognition	  of	  participation.	  
Waldron	  describes	  it	  this	  way:	  “the	  right	  to	  participate	  has	  less	  to	  do	  with	  a	  certain	  minimum	  prospect	  of	  decisive	  
impact	  and	  more	  to	  do	  with	  avoiding	  the	  insult,	  dishonour	  or	  denigration	  that	  is	  involved	  when	  one	  person’s	  views	  
are	  treated	  as	  of	  less	  account	  than	  the	  views	  of	  others	  on	  a	  matter	  that	  affects	  him	  as	  well	  as	  the	  others.”	  Law	  and	  
Disagreement,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  238.	  
279	  Cohen,	  “Legitimacy,”	  22.	  
280	  Cohen,	  “Procedure,”	  102.	  
281	  Ibid.,	  105-­‐106.	  
282	  Ibid.,	  107.	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procedural	  and	  substantive	  values	  into	  deliberative	  processes;	  however,	  Cohen	  acknowledges	  
that	  these	  features	  do	  nothing	  to	  prevent	  conflict	  in	  deliberative	  practice.283	  	  	  
For	  example,	  the	  politics	  of	  identity,284	  which	  often	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  self	  
governance	  of	  minority	  groups,	  may	  reinforce	  group	  affiliation	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  promote	  conflict	  
through	  the	  factionalized	  politics	  of	  group	  bargaining285	  instead	  of	  a	  good-­‐faith	  deliberation.286	  	  
However,	  justifications	  based	  on	  supposedly	  justified	  unequal	  identities	  of	  race,	  gender	  or	  
religious	  affiliations	  would	  not	  stand	  as	  good	  reasons	  in	  a	  deliberation	  precisely	  because	  those	  
views	  fail	  to	  recognize	  equality.287	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  religious	  justifications,	  the	  concern	  is	  that	  
it	  is	  not	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  state,	  but	  fundamentalists,	  for	  example,	  who	  cannot	  recognize	  
secular	  worldviews	  as	  politically	  equal	  to	  their	  own	  and	  therefore	  they	  cannot,	  nor	  are	  they	  
willing	  to	  deliberate	  with	  secular	  persons	  or	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  secular	  institutions.	  	  	  
However,	  as	  a	  politics	  of	  association	  Cohen	  argues,	  deliberation	  can	  bring	  together	  people	  with	  
very	  different	  identities	  and	  worldviews	  in	  order	  to	  address	  shared	  concerns.	  	  The	  regulatory	  
function	  of	  deliberation	  offers	  an	  expectation	  of	  fair	  and	  equal	  conditions	  for	  the	  participants	  as	  
a	  problem	  solving	  process	  (requiring	  active	  engagement	  of	  citizens),	  rather	  than	  a	  solution	  
finding	  procedure	  (citizens	  looking	  to	  the	  state	  to	  resolve	  the	  issue	  for	  them).288	  	  	  
The	  distinction	  between	  ‘solution	  finding’	  and	  ‘problem	  solving’	  is	  subtle	  but,	  I	  suggest,	  
has	  important	  implications	  for	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  First,	  when	  solutions	  come	  from	  the	  
state,	  state	  institutions	  are	  expected	  to	  mediate	  conflicting	  interests	  to	  find	  solutions.	  	  In	  other	  
words,	  citizens	  facing	  a	  common	  problem	  do	  not	  engage	  each	  other	  directly,	  but	  engage	  each	  
other	  indirectly	  through	  the	  state.	  	  This	  distance	  facilitates	  disharmony	  as	  parties	  with	  
conflicting	  interests	  attempt	  to	  sway	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state	  against	  the	  opposition.	  	  In	  the	  
Proposition	  8	  case,	  for	  example,	  advocates	  and	  protesters	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  marched,	  side	  
by	  opposing	  side,	  to	  the	  state	  legislature.	  	  The	  focus	  was	  not	  on	  engaging	  the	  opponent,	  but	  
rather	  on	  getting	  the	  attention	  of	  what	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  the	  seat	  of	  power.	  	  It	  falls	  to	  the	  state,	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  Ibid.,	  108.	  
284	  An	  extended	  discussion	  of	  identity	  can	  be	  found	  in	  chapter	  5.2.	  
285	  Bargaining,	  as	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game,	  is	  a	  type	  of	  dialogue	  that	  does	  not	  require	  good	  faith.	  	  It	  is	  competitive	  and	  it	  is	  
expected	  that	  the	  winner	  wins	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  loser.	  
286	  Ibid.,	  111.	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  Ibid.,	  108.	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  Ibid.,	  113.	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then,	  to	  ensure	  that	  parties	  and	  their	  interests	  are	  given	  equal	  consideration	  in	  the	  solution	  
finding	  procedure.	  	  	  
In	  contrast,	  problem	  solving	  occurs	  in	  multiple	  levels	  of	  association,	  which	  consequently	  
brings	  together	  persons	  from	  different	  social,	  economic	  or	  cultural	  backgrounds	  with	  a	  
common	  purpose—to	  overcome	  a	  shared	  concern	  or	  common	  problem.	  	  Town	  hall	  style	  
debates	  over	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  question	  put	  proponents	  and	  protesters	  in	  direct	  contact	  
with	  each	  other.	  	  Direct	  engagement	  eliminates	  appeals	  to	  third	  party	  power	  and	  thereby	  
promotes	  procedural	  equality	  between	  parties	  with	  conflicting	  interests.	  	  In	  a	  Cohen	  style	  
deliberation,	  procedural	  equality	  need	  not	  be	  the	  result	  of	  state	  intervention,	  nor	  is	  it	  enforced	  
by	  a	  third	  party.	  	  Instead,	  equal	  recognition	  makes	  possible	  cooperative	  enterprise	  and	  
therefore	  procedural	  equality	  is	  promoted	  by	  the	  activity	  of	  problem	  solving.	  	  	  
Second,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  there	  is	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  placing	  constraints	  on	  
the	  character	  of	  deliberative	  participants	  toward	  regulating	  relations	  between	  participants.	  	  
Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  argue	  that	  reciprocal	  thinking	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  as	  a	  
result,	  persons	  who	  lack	  reciprocal	  thought289	  are	  not	  reasonable.	  	  Failure	  to	  meet	  the	  
reasonableness	  condition	  justifies	  the	  unequal	  treatment	  of	  individuals	  and	  groups.	  	  Solutions,	  
then,	  come	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  constraining	  the	  character	  of	  participants.	  	  However,	  the	  Mozert	  
case	  illustrates	  the	  tensions	  that	  arise	  from	  dictating	  character.  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  school	  
board	  argues	  that	  exposing	  a	  child	  to	  ideas	  is	  different	  than	  indoctrinating	  the	  child.	  	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson’s	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  state	  has	  a	  compelling	  interest	  in	  
teaching,	  not	  merely	  alternative	  ideas,	  but	  how	  to	  approach	  alternative	  ideas	  through	  the	  
doctrine	  of	  reciprocity.	  	  	  “Reciprocity...prescribes	  accommodation	  based	  on	  mutual	  respect.”290	  	  
On	  their	  view,	  children	  cannot	  be	  exempt	  from	  the	  critical	  thinking	  course	  because	  reciprocal	  
thinking	  is	  necessary	  to	  develop	  the	  character	  of	  a	  good	  citizen.	  If	  the	  fundamentalist	  parents	  
disagree,	  it	  is	  because	  they	  are	  not	  thinking	  reciprocally	  and	  therefore,	  they	  do	  not	  have	  equal	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  Recall	  The	  Principle	  of	  Reciprocity:	  	  It	  requires	  that	  the	  reasons	  given	  are	  recognized	  by	  all	  participants	  as	  moral	  
in	  form	  and	  mutually	  acceptable	  in	  content.	  
290	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson,	  Disagreement,	  56.	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deliberative	  capacities.	  	  Hence,	  this	  sort	  of	  inequality	  results	  in	  exclusion,	  exclusion	  that	  cannot	  
be	  justified	  in	  deliberative	  terms.291	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  idea	  of	  problem	  solving	  calls	  for	  constraining	  relational	  inequalities	  
between	  participants.	  	  Unlike	  the	  principle	  of	  reciprocity,	  which	  places	  constraints	  on	  the	  
reasonableness	  of	  the	  deliberative	  participants,	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  common	  good,	  inclusion	  
and	  participation	  equalize	  power	  relations	  and	  ensure	  deliberative	  participants	  equal	  access	  to,	  
and	  influence	  in,	  decision-­‐making.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  Cohen’s	  account	  of	  deliberation	  incorporates	  
substantive	  requirements	  in	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  democracy.	  	  The	  background	  idea	  of	  citizens	  as	  
equals	  is	  supported	  when	  anyone	  who	  bears	  a	  burden	  of	  social	  responsibility	  is	  given	  equal	  
opportunity	  for	  influence.	  	  Consequently,	  deliberation	  demands	  more	  than	  mere	  toleration	  of	  
alternative	  worldviews;	  it	  requires	  the	  substantive	  and	  procedural	  inclusion	  of	  alternative	  
worldviews	  into	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  the	  deliberation.	  
Deliberative	  Reason	  
Reason	  is	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  deliberation.	  	  All	  participants	  equally	  share	  the	  burden	  and	  
responsibility	  of	  providing	  reasons,	  and	  responding	  to	  reasons,	  for	  claims.	  	  The	  strength	  or	  
weakness	  of	  participants’	  reasons	  is	  not	  pre-­‐determined	  or	  measured	  according	  to	  a	  pre-­‐
deliberation	  standard;	  instead,	  the	  strength	  or	  weakness	  of	  reasons,	  or	  a	  line	  of	  reasoning	  
employed	  to	  support	  claims,	  is	  subject	  to	  evaluation	  by	  deliberation.	  	  Participants	  put	  forward	  
their	  own	  claims	  with	  sincerity	  and	  in	  good	  faith,	  and	  respond	  in	  kind	  to	  the	  reasons	  and	  
reasoning	  of	  others.	  	  	  
The	  necessity	  of	  inclusion	  means	  that	  deliberative	  reason	  is	  not	  pre-­‐determined	  in	  
relation	  to	  a	  standard	  of	  rational	  thought	  or	  a	  set	  of	  fixed	  principles.	  	  To	  set	  a	  standard	  of	  
reasonableness	  and	  then	  exclude	  participants	  who	  do	  not	  meet	  that	  standard	  runs	  contrary	  to	  
inclusion.	  	  In	  contrast,	  deliberative	  reason	  is	  a	  dialogical	  construction	  that	  occurs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291	  It	  is	  the	  case	  that	  tolerance	  is	  necessary	  in	  a	  pluralist	  state	  and	  as	  such	  tolerance	  toward	  different	  ways	  of	  life	  
should	  be	  a	  part	  of	  a	  public	  education.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  leap	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  requirement	  will	  be	  
fulfilled	  if	  children	  are	  educated	  to	  think	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  about	  different	  ways	  of	  life.	  	  Galston	  argues	  “Civic	  
tolerance	  of	  deep	  differences	  is	  perfectly	  compatible	  with	  unswerving	  belief	  in	  the	  correctness	  of	  one’s	  own	  way	  of	  
life.”	  "Civic	  Education,"	  99.	  	  How	  citizens	  come	  to	  understand	  the	  correctness	  of	  their	  choice	  to	  pursue	  a	  way	  of	  life	  




equal	  recognition	  and	  publicity.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  existing	  models	  of	  rationality,	  logical	  
consistency	  or	  argumentation	  strategies	  do	  not	  play	  a	  role	  in	  deliberative	  reasoning;	  instead,	  it	  
is	  merely	  to	  suggest	  that	  no	  one	  methodology	  or	  reasoning	  style	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  superior	  to	  
another	  in	  a	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  	  Existing	  standards	  are	  subject	  to	  scrutiny	  during	  the	  
process	  of	  deliberation.	  
The	  problem	  with	  an	  aggregative	  model	  of	  democracy	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  process	  of	  
aggregating	  preferences	  in	  order	  to	  make	  policy	  decisions	  but	  it	  requires	  no	  public	  interaction	  
between	  voters	  and	  consequently	  there	  may	  be	  no	  way	  to	  adjudicate	  between	  preferences.	  	  
Those	  who	  share	  the	  same	  private	  interests	  may	  come	  together	  in	  a	  spirit	  of	  political	  
cooperation	  but	  it	  is	  still	  individual	  rationality	  rather	  than	  public	  reason	  that	  supports	  
aggregative	  choices.	  	  If	  reasons	  remain	  private	  then	  the	  possibility	  of	  reasonable	  public	  choice	  is	  
undermined.	  	  Deliberation,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  a	  process	  of	  reasoning	  publicly;	  however,	  different	  
theorists	  seem	  to	  have	  different	  ‘publics’	  in	  mind.	  
Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  argue	  that	  deliberation	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  a	  dialogue	  of	  
reasons	  and	  then	  go	  on	  to	  articulate	  a	  specific	  portrait	  of	  the	  reasonable	  public	  they	  have	  in	  
mind.	  	  “In	  a	  democracy,	  leaders	  should...give	  reasons	  for	  their	  decisions,	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  
reasons	  that	  citizens	  give	  in	  return.”292	  	  Because	  these	  reasons	  have	  to	  be	  understood	  and	  
mutually	  acceptable	  to	  other	  deliberative	  participants,	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  argue	  that	  
deliberations	  are	  conducted	  according	  to	  standards	  of	  logical	  consistency	  and	  the	  most	  
“reliable	  methods	  of	  inquiry”	  available.293	  	  Citizens	  and	  their	  representatives	  should	  reason	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  principles	  that	  “individuals	  who	  are	  trying	  to	  find	  fair	  terms	  of	  cooperation	  cannot	  
reasonably	  reject.”294	  	  These	  principles,	  held	  in	  common	  by	  deliberative	  participants,	  function	  
as	  premises	  in	  deliberations,	  premises	  that	  undergird	  reasons	  put	  forward	  in	  support	  of	  claims.	  
Appeals	  to	  reason	  responsiveness	  and	  acceptability	  are	  common	  features	  in	  deliberative	  
theory;	  however,	  suggesting	  that	  participants	  have	  to	  find	  agreement	  on	  premises	  can	  be	  
problematic	  for	  minorities.  	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Seeking	  agreement	  at	  the	  level	  of	  foundational	  principle	  may	  exclude	  groups	  or	  
individuals	  who	  hold	  different	  principles	  or	  for	  whom	  principles	  are	  not	  functionally	  equivalent.	  	  
In	  her	  critique	  of	  deliberative	  theory,	  Young	  argues	  that	  accounts	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  
that	  privilege	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  argument	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  participants	  have	  to	  find	  
agreement	  on	  premises	  are	  problematic.	  	  Seeking	  agreement	  at	  the	  level	  of	  foundational	  
principle	  can	  sometimes	  function	  to	  exclude	  groups	  or	  individuals	  for	  whom	  principles	  are	  not	  
functionally	  equivalent	  in	  argumentative	  strategies.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  privileging	  a	  particular	  idiom	  
can	  unjustly	  silence	  some	  participants.295	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Aboriginal	  justice	  strategies	  
outlined	  in	  1.3296	  continue	  to	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  from	  a	  legal	  system	  shaped	  by,	  what	  is	  to	  
them,	  a	  foreign	  concept	  of	  justice.	  	  The	  problem	  of	  integrating	  Aboriginal	  justice	  and	  European	  
style	  legal	  systems	  suggests	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  different	  worldviews	  in	  deliberations	  requires	  
that	  reasonableness	  is	  a	  construction	  of	  the	  process.	  	  One	  might	  argue	  that	  without	  shared	  
standards	  of	  reason,	  deliberation	  between	  different	  worldviews	  would	  be	  a	  non-­‐starter—that	  
shared	  standards	  of	  reason	  are	  the	  scaffolding	  of	  thought	  without	  which	  meaning	  and	  concepts	  
cannot	  be	  constructed.	  	  	  
It	  depends,	  of	  course,	  on	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  standards.	  	  The	  worry	  is	  that	  certain	  
entrenched	  standards	  are	  taken	  to	  hold	  across	  cultural	  boundaries	  when	  in	  fact	  they	  serve	  to	  
privilege	  the	  powerful	  and	  oppress	  the	  weak.	  	  Unless	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  are	  subject	  
to	  revision,	  there	  is	  the	  risk	  of	  re-­‐enforcing	  oppressive	  political	  arrangements.	  	  Barber	  argues	  
that	  the	  need	  for	  political	  activity	  is	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  agreement	  about	  
principles,	  standards	  or	  norms	  of	  reasoning.297	  	  Disagreements	  are	  not	  settled	  by	  coming	  to	  
agreement	  about	  a	  set	  of	  abstract	  principles,	  but	  rather	  are	  overcome	  through	  the	  recognition	  
of	  difference.	  	  For	  Barber,	  “reasonableness	  is	  not	  an	  abstract	  pre-­‐condition	  of	  politics”	  but	  an	  
attitude	  instead.298	  	  Deliberate	  choice	  is	  practical,	  non-­‐impulsive,	  thoughtful	  and	  fair;	  as	  a	  
result,	  reasonableness	  is	  “implicit	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  deliberate	  choice.”299	  	  In	  contrast,	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deliberationists	  like	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  appeal	  to	  norms	  of	  reasonableness,	  and	  in	  doing	  
so,	  constrain	  the	  allowable	  content	  of	  deliberations.	  
The	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  style	  deliberation	  rests	  on	  a	  set	  of	  principles—the	  
principle	  of	  reciprocity	  justifies	  excluding	  individuals	  or	  groups	  who	  do	  not	  reason	  reciprocally.	  	  
However,	  Young	  argues	  that	  deliberative	  theories	  that	  contain	  norms	  of	  order	  constrain	  the	  
content	  of	  deliberation	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  key	  actors	  are	  denied	  access	  or	  influence.	  	  For	  
example,	  those	  labelled	  extreme	  or	  radical	  are	  excluded	  because	  they	  are,	  for	  all	  intents	  and	  
purposes,	  unreasonable.300	  	  Reasonable	  may	  entail	  non-­‐violent;	  however,	  groups	  should	  not	  be	  
excluded	  on	  this	  narrow	  and	  dispassionate	  conception	  of	  civility.	  	  Struggle	  and	  engagement	  are	  
not	  always	  polite,	  nor	  are	  the	  polite	  participants	  always	  right.301	  	  Rather	  than	  an	  established	  
arbitrary	  standard,	  reasonableness	  is	  a	  disposition	  to	  listen	  to	  others	  and	  respond	  to	  reasons	  in	  
order	  to	  reach	  agreement.302	  	  Norms	  that	  privilege	  the	  cold	  light	  of	  reason	  pit	  reason	  in	  
opposition	  to	  emotion,	  Young	  argues,	  unfairly	  limiting	  the	  resources	  of	  expression	  available	  to	  
individuals	  from	  some	  cultural	  contexts.303	  	  Inclusive	  political	  deliberations	  dismiss	  these	  norms	  
in	  favour	  of	  a	  discursive	  activity;	  a	  reasonable	  discussion	  aimed	  at	  mutual	  understanding.304	  	  	  
Rather	  than	  appeal	  to	  a	  particular	  standard	  of	  reasonableness,	  inclusion	  requires	  that	  
alternative	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  are	  acceptable	  to	  the	  deliberative	  participants.	  	  There	  
are	  alternatives	  to	  existing	  argument	  models—Young	  identifies	  three,	  greeting,	  rhetoric	  and	  
narrative.	  	  First,	  greeting	  or	  public	  acknowledgment	  makes	  explicit	  the	  equal	  value	  of	  each	  
participant	  and	  their	  contribution	  because	  the	  greeter	  takes	  responsibility	  for	  the	  vulnerability	  
of	  the	  greeted.305	  	  Second,	  contrary	  to	  the	  dominant	  discourse	  of	  Western	  rationality,	  there	  are	  
affirmative	  uses	  of	  rhetoric.	  The	  rational/rhetoric	  distinction	  is	  misleading	  because	  all	  
communication	  has	  rhetorical	  outlets	  therefore	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  privilege	  so-­‐called	  rational	  
arguments	  over	  other	  rhetorical	  approaches.306	  	  Rhetoric	  is	  a	  source	  of	  motivation,	  it	  promotes	  
action	  by	  getting	  political	  actors	  out	  of	  the	  theoretical	  sandbox	  and	  facilitates	  "the	  move	  from	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reason	  to	  judgment".307	  	  Third,	  narrative	  and	  situated	  knowledge	  foster	  understanding	  between	  
deeply	  different	  groups.308	  	  Public	  testimony	  bridges	  gaps	  between	  idioms	  by	  identifying	  
commonalities	  through	  narrative.309	  	  Social	  knowledge	  enlarges	  thought	  by	  transforming	  the	  
individual	  story	  or	  individual	  thought	  into	  the	  shared	  experience	  of	  many	  stories,	  which	  
generates	  public	  reason.310	  	  The	  acceptability	  of	  alternative	  argument	  models	  extends	  
deliberative	  inclusion	  by	  constructing	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  through	  the	  process	  of	  
deliberation.	  
Once	  room	  is	  made	  for	  divergent	  reasons	  and	  alternative	  reasoning	  styles	  in	  
deliberation,	  it	  is	  the	  better	  argument	  that	  prevails—not	  the	  argument	  that	  best	  suits	  the	  
majority	  paradigm.	  	  The	  better	  argument	  may	  appeal	  to	  uncontroversial	  concepts	  but	  not	  
harmonize	  with	  majority	  preference.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  Mozert	  case,	  the	  fundamentalists	  
present	  a	  reasonable	  concern	  about	  discursive	  influence.	  	  They	  argued	  that	  reading	  from	  a	  
secular	  curriculum	  would	  influence	  how	  their	  children	  see	  the	  world.	  	  Forcing	  their	  children	  to	  
read	  about	  things	  like	  magic	  and	  telepathy,	  things	  that	  run	  contrary	  to	  their	  religious	  beliefs,	  
was	  imposing	  a	  secular	  worldview	  on	  their	  children.311	  	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  first	  suggest	  
that	  the	  content	  of	  the	  reading	  materials	  is	  inconsequential	  because	  the	  primary	  concern	  is	  that	  
the	  children	  learn	  the	  skills	  of	  critical	  thinking,	  i.e.	  how	  to	  reason	  reciprocally.	  	  The	  program,	  
they	  argue,	  does	  not	  indoctrinate	  a	  specific	  worldview;	  it	  merely	  influences	  how	  the	  children	  
approach	  new	  ideas.	  	  However,	  they	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  children	  should	  be	  compelled	  to	  go	  
through	  the	  course	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  influence	  that	  reading	  materials	  from	  an	  
alternative	  worldview	  will	  have	  on	  them.	  	  The	  inconsistency	  here,	  I	  think,	  arises	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
presumptions	  that	  discount	  the	  fundamentalists	  because	  they	  appeal	  to	  religious	  reasons,	  
presumptions	  that	  discount	  their	  premises,	  not	  their	  arguments.	  	  	  	  
The	  argument	  for	  discursive	  influence	  is	  not	  controversial	  in	  this	  context,	  what	  is	  
controversial	  are	  the	  religious	  premises	  on	  which	  the	  argument	  rests.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307	  Ibid.,	  69-­‐70.	  
308	  Ibid.,	  71.	  
309	  Ibid.,	  73.	  
310	  Ibid.,	  76.	  
311	  Peter	  Suber,	  “Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins	  City	  Board	  of	  Education.”	  Earlham	  College.	  1999	  November	  1999.	  
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/mozert.htm	  (accessed	  October	  10,	  2009).	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uncontroversial	  to	  say	  that	  the	  reading	  materials	  will	  influence	  how	  the	  children	  see	  the	  world;	  
their	  parents	  want	  them	  to	  see	  it	  one	  way,	  the	  state	  has	  a	  compelling	  interest	  in	  having	  them	  
see	  it	  another	  way—a	  way	  that	  is	  liberal	  and	  the	  parents	  argue,	  antithetical	  to	  their	  beliefs.	  	  To	  
dismiss	  the	  fundamentalist	  argument	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  premises	  is	  to	  impose	  the	  principles	  
of	  a	  worldview	  contrary	  to	  their	  own.	  	  However,	  inclusion	  requires	  that	  all	  participants,	  citizens	  
and	  state,	  be	  obligated	  to	  provide	  public	  reasons	  for	  their	  positions.	  	  Not	  reasons	  preordained	  
as	  the	  right	  premises	  or	  the	  right	  way	  to	  reason	  about	  those	  premises,	  instead,	  reasons	  that	  
construct	  the	  scaffolding	  of	  the	  process.	  	  In	  a	  reasonable	  deliberation,	  it	  is	  reasons,	  not	  power,	  
that	  settle	  disagreements.	  	  Deliberatively	  speaking,	  then,	  religious	  premises	  are	  no	  less	  
reasonable	  than	  liberal	  premises	  and	  consequently,	  are	  equally	  subject	  to	  deliberative	  
evaluation	  by	  all	  parties	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  issue	  under	  deliberation.	  	  	  
Inclusive	  Public	  Reason	  
So	  far,	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  when	  reasonableness	  sets	  limits	  on	  the	  character	  of	  deliberative	  
participants,	  minority	  groups	  and	  individuals	  may	  be	  denied	  equal	  status,	  access	  and	  influence.	  	  
Some	  members	  of	  an	  association	  are	  unable	  to	  earn	  equality	  through	  meeting	  a	  particular	  
standard	  of	  reasonableness—not	  because	  they	  are	  without	  reason,	  but	  because	  the	  standard	  
applied	  to	  their	  way	  of	  thinking	  runs	  contrary	  to	  their	  worldview.  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  when	  
constraints	  are	  placed	  on	  the	  reasoning	  used	  to	  structure	  claims	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
Hence,	  some	  members	  of	  an	  association	  are	  not	  equal	  when	  participants	  are,	  because	  of	  their	  
worldview,	  unable	  earn	  equality	  through	  meeting	  a	  particular	  standard	  of	  reason.	  	  When	  the	  
allowable	  content	  of	  claims	  is	  constrained	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  particular	  conceptual	  framework,	  
groups	  arguing	  from	  an	  alternative	  worldview	  may	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  dialogue.	  	  Inclusive	  
public	  reason,	  then,	  rests	  on	  the	  recognition	  and	  realization	  of	  equality	  in	  deliberative	  
processes	  prior	  to	  standards	  that	  pre-­‐determine	  the	  acceptability	  of	  character,	  reasoning	  styles	  
and	  the	  allowable	  content	  of	  claims.	  
Deliberative	  inclusion,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  facilitate	  a	  political	  dialogue	  that	  can	  get	  around	  the	  
minority	  rights	  paradox,	  requires	  more	  than	  formal	  or	  abstract	  equality—more	  than	  merely	  a	  
seat	  at	  the	  table.	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  example	  of	  formal	  inclusion.	  	  In	  1872,	  miners	  
accidentally	  torched	  a	  Gitxsan	  village	  in	  what	  is	  known	  as	  the	  “Kitsegukla	  incident”.	  	  The	  Gitxsan	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responded	  by	  initiating	  a	  blockade	  along	  the	  Skeena	  River	  trade	  route.	  	  The	  blockade	  got	  the	  
attention	  of	  the	  colonial	  authority	  and	  rather	  than	  settle	  the	  issue	  with	  force,	  the	  two	  parties	  
agreed	  to	  meet	  and	  discuss	  the	  issue.	  	  After	  meeting,	  the	  colonial	  contingent	  reported	  that	  they	  
allowed	  the	  Gitxsan	  three	  (long	  and	  boring)	  days	  to	  present	  their	  grievance	  about	  the	  
destruction	  of	  the	  village,	  then	  listened	  to	  (inexplicable)	  songs	  and	  stories	  before	  paying	  a	  
token	  sum	  to	  negotiate	  an	  agreement	  that	  ended	  the	  blockade.	  	  This	  agreement,	  it	  was	  
understood,	  ensured	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  further	  interference	  with	  the	  rightful	  transport	  of	  
goods.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Gitxsan	  chiefs	  reported	  participating	  in	  a	  three-­‐day	  ritual	  feast	  that	  
including	  contextualizing	  the	  incident	  through	  the	  sharing	  of	  oral	  histories,	  necessary	  to	  fully	  
understand	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  	  The	  payment	  was	  understood	  as	  part	  acknowledgement	  and	  
part	  compensation	  for	  the	  wrongdoing	  of	  the	  miners.	  	  The	  agreement,	  or	  so	  the	  chiefs	  thought,	  
recognized	  the	  Gitxsan	  as	  a	  governing	  authority	  over	  their	  territory,	  equal	  to	  that	  of	  the	  colonial	  
government	  of	  the	  colonial	  territory.312	  	  	  
These	  negotiations	  included	  all	  interested	  parties,	  included	  divergent	  cultural	  content	  
and	  even	  included	  alternative	  reasoning	  styles;	  however,	  the	  resulting	  outcome	  does	  not	  reflect	  
agreement	  at	  all.	  	  There	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  understanding	  that	  supports	  presumptions	  of	  authority	  on	  
either	  side,	  presumptions	  that	  undermine	  the	  substantive	  recognition	  of	  equality.	  	  This	  type	  of	  
mis-­‐recognition	  has	  fuelled	  all	  sorts	  of	  contemporary	  political	  conflicts	  and	  minority	  rights	  
disputes	  in	  postcolonial	  nations	  such	  as	  Canada,	  the	  United	  States,	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand.	  	  
To	  be	  public,	  the	  content	  of	  deliberations	  must	  be	  expressed	  and	  understood	  by	  all	  
participants.	  	  Young	  explains: 
Inclusion	  ought	  not	  to	  mean	  simply	  the	  formal	  and	  abstract	  equality	  of	  all	  members	  of	  
the	  polity	  as	  citizens.	  	  It	  means	  explicitly	  acknowledging	  social	  differentiations	  and	  
divisions	  and	  encouraging	  differently	  situated	  groups	  to	  give	  voice	  to	  their	  needs,	  
interests,	  and	  perspectives	  on	  the	  society	  in	  ways	  that	  meet	  conditions	  of	  
reasonableness	  and	  publicity.313	  	  
	  
The	  Gitxsan	  chiefs	  and	  the	  colonial	  settlers	  both	  expressed	  themselves	  in	  their	  own	  terms,	  but	  
they	  both	  failed	  to	  come	  to	  understand	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  other	  party	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  
reasoning	  of	  the	  process	  failed	  to	  meet	  the	  conditions	  of	  publicity.	  	  Misunderstandings	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  Natalie	  Oman,	  "Intercultural,"	  70-­‐72.	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  Inclusion,	  119.	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between	  deliberating	  parties	  are	  reduced	  when	  the	  recognition	  of	  difference	  is,	  in	  part,	  what	  
shapes	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  	  	  
As	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  conditions	  of	  reasonableness	  are	  not	  abstract	  pre-­‐
conditions	  of	  deliberation.	  	  The	  conditions	  of	  publicity	  are	  similarly	  unconstrained	  in	  that	  the	  
content	  of	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation	  is	  not	  limited	  by	  any	  particular	  idiom.	  Deliberative	  
participants	  are	  burdened	  with	  the	  joint	  responsibility	  to	  make	  explicit	  divergent	  conceptual	  
frameworks	  and	  also	  the	  influence	  those	  differences	  have	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.  The	  
content	  of	  deliberations	  emerges	  through	  public	  reason	  and	  therefore	  the	  allowable	  content	  of	  
deliberations	  cannot	  be	  constrained	  to	  a	  pre-­‐deliberative	  agenda.	  	  Deliberations,	  according	  to	  
Habermas,	  take	  place	  between	  citizens	  in	  an	  ethical	  and	  political	  discourse	  through	  which	  will	  
formation	  takes	  place.314	  	  	  
...Practical	  reason	  withdraws	  from	  universal	  human	  rights,	  or	  from	  the	  concrete	  ethical	  
substance	  of	  a	  specific	  community,	  into	  the	  rules	  of	  discourse	  and	  forms	  of	  
argumentation.	  	  In	  the	  final	  analysis,	  the	  normative	  content	  arises	  from	  the	  very	  
structure	  of	  communicative	  actions.315	  
	  
In	  discourse	  theory,	  it	  is	  not	  political	  activity	  or	  any	  activity	  of	  the	  citizenry	  that	  determines	  
deliberative	  success	  or	  failure;	  success	  or	  failure	  is	  measured	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  institutional	  
conditions	  that	  make	  political	  communication	  possible	  between	  equal	  citizens.316	  	  "Subjectless	  
forms	  of	  communication"	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  offers	  space	  for	  will	  formation	  and	  opinion	  
formation,	  which	  generates	  influence.	  	  Habermas	  argues	  this	  influence	  is	  transformed	  into	  
administrative	  power	  when	  it	  has	  legislative	  impact.	  	  Will	  formation	  does	  not	  function	  
exclusively	  to	  legitimize	  political	  power	  (the	  liberal	  view)	  nor	  does	  it	  function	  to	  constitute	  
society	  as	  a	  political	  community	  (the	  Republican	  view);317	  in	  contrast,	  "the	  public	  opinion	  that	  is	  
worked	  up	  via	  democratic	  procedures	  in	  true	  communicative	  power	  cannot	  'rule'	  of	  its	  self”,	  it	  
merely	  points	  the	  use	  of	  administrative	  power	  in	  specific	  directions."318	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The	  liberal	  and	  republican	  views	  conceive	  of	  the	  state	  and	  society	  as	  constituted	  by	  a	  
sovereign	  citizenry	  or	  a	  sovereign	  state	  constitution.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Habermas	  argues	  that	  politics	  
does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  defined	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  state.	  	  In	  the	  conception	  of	  a	  decentered	  society,	  
the	  self-­‐organizing	  community	  dissolves	  into	  forms	  of	  communication	  through	  which	  
intersubjective	  interests	  are	  institutionalized	  according	  to	  subjectless	  deliberations.319	  	  Unlike	  
Rawls,	  who	  points	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  as	  an	  example	  of	  public	  reason,320	  Habermasian	  public	  
reason	  occurs	  in	  multiple	  levels	  of	  association.	  	  In	  the	  decentered	  society,	  successful	  
deliberations	  occur	  when	  citizens	  have	  equal	  access	  to	  and	  influence	  on	  public	  policy	  through	  
institutions	  that	  facilitate	  communications.	  	  	  
Drawing	  upon	  Habermas,	  Young	  favours	  a	  discursive	  notion	  of	  reciprocal	  influence	  
between	  pluralities	  of	  public	  spheres—the	  political,	  the	  institutional,	  the	  civil,	  the	  social,	  etc.	  	  
This	  system	  of	  relations	  is	  embedded	  in	  democratic	  communication	  that	  strengthens	  the	  
connections	  between	  the	  governed	  and	  the	  governing.321	  	  Exposing	  powerful	  political	  actors	  
and	  institutions	  through	  public	  reason	  can	  break	  cycles	  that	  promote	  social	  and	  economic	  
inequality.322	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  public	  reason	  produces	  the	  conditions	  of	  
equality,	  or	  that	  public	  reason	  equalizes	  participants	  in	  deliberations.	  	  	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  system	  of	  communicative	  relations	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  equality	  of	  
deliberative	  participants.	  	  Individual	  interests	  are	  treated	  equally	  when	  common	  interests	  are	  
determined	  as	  the	  result	  of	  deliberative	  processes	  between	  equal	  citizens.	  	  This	  sort	  of	  
collective	  decision-­‐making	  is	  presumed	  legitimate	  and	  reasonable,	  Benhabib	  argues,	  because	  
the	  collective	  process	  recognizes	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  equally.323	  	  The	  requirement	  of	  acceptable	  
reasons	  is	  what	  Cohen	  calls	  an	  expression	  of	  equality	  and	  shared	  responsibility	  by	  politically	  
autonomous	  citizens	  for	  the	  exercise	  of	  political	  power.324	  	  	  To	  put	  forward	  reasons	  that	  
somehow	  diminish,	  devalue,	  or	  undermine	  the	  reasons	  of	  others	  ultimately	  challenges	  what	  is	  
fundamental	  to	  democratic	  association—the	  notion	  that	  all	  members	  should	  have	  equal	  access	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to	  the	  democratic	  process.	  	  This	  sort	  of	  constraint,	  on	  what	  counts	  as	  allowable	  content	  or	  a	  
legitimate	  reason,	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  substantive	  outcome	  of	  the	  deliberation.325	  	  	  
What	  this	  brief	  survey	  of	  deliberative	  reason	  shows	  is	  that	  inclusive	  public	  reason	  
cannot	  uphold	  a	  particular	  standard	  of	  reasonableness	  (except	  provisionally);	  it	  cannot	  exclude	  
participants	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  character	  or	  worldview;	  it	  cannot	  exclude	  alternative	  
reasoning	  styles	  or	  conceptual	  frameworks;	  nor	  can	  it	  constrain	  the	  allowable	  content	  of	  
political	  deliberations.	  	  To	  constrain	  a	  deliberative	  process	  in	  this	  way	  would	  violate	  the	  equality	  
of	  citizens	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  	  Inclusive	  public	  reason,	  then,	  rests	  on	  the	  recognition	  
and	  realization	  of	  equality	  in	  deliberative	  processes	  prior	  to	  particular	  standards	  of	  character,	  
reasoning	  styles	  or	  the	  allowable	  content	  of	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  	  
To	  deny	  inclusion	  to	  citizens	  who	  bear	  civic	  burdens	  and	  have	  compelling	  reasons	  for	  
their	  point	  of	  view	  is	  to	  deny	  their	  equality.	  	  A	  deliberation,	  then,	  that	  fails	  to	  meet	  the	  
conditions	  of	  equality	  cannot	  be	  a	  reasonable	  process	  because	  the	  exclusion	  of	  participants	  on	  
the	  basis	  that	  they	  are	  unequal	  cannot	  be	  justified.	  	  Deliberative	  equality	  focuses	  not	  only	  on	  
the	  rights	  of	  the	  individual	  but	  on	  relational	  equalities	  as	  well.	  	  Consequently,	  deliberative	  
equality	  requires	  recognition	  of	  deeply	  different	  worldviews	  in	  three	  ways.	  	  	  
First,	  when	  reasonableness	  sets	  limits	  on	  the	  character	  of	  deliberative	  participants,	  
individuals	  may	  be	  unjustly	  excluded.	  	  Second,	  when	  standards	  of	  reasoning	  constrain	  the	  way	  
in	  which	  claims	  can	  be	  structured,	  minority	  groups	  may	  be	  unjustly	  denied	  equal	  status,	  access	  
and	  influence.	  	  Third,	  when	  a	  particular	  conceptual	  framework	  restricts	  the	  allowable	  content	  
of	  political	  deliberation,	  the	  influence	  of	  deliberations	  in	  the	  social	  and	  civil	  spheres	  of	  society	  is	  
unjustly	  excluded.	  	  Equality	  limits	  deliberation	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  tied	  to	  one	  
particular	  idiom	  nor	  is	  a	  particular	  argument	  form,	  reasoning	  style	  or	  conceptual	  framework	  
privileged	  by	  the	  constitution	  of	  deliberative	  communications.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  inclusive	  public	  
reason	  of	  deliberative	  processes	  makes	  room	  for	  alternative	  worldviews,	  reasoning	  styles	  and	  
content	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  In	  casting	  the	  net	  of	  inclusion	  wide	  enough	  to	  include	  
citizens	  who	  may	  disagree	  with	  core	  liberal	  principles	  many	  questions	  are	  raised.	  	  In	  what	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follows,	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  somewhat	  troubled	  relationship	  between	  inclusive	  deliberative	  reason	  and	  
liberalism.	  	  	  
4.2	  	  Deliberation,	  Reasonableness	  and	  Liberalism	  
In	  chapter	  two	  I	  focused	  on	  problems	  that	  are	  brought	  about	  when	  different	  standards	  of	  what	  
is	  considered	  to	  be	  reasonable	  generate	  political	  conflict	  and	  challenge	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  any	  
one	  criterion	  of	  public	  reason.	  	  Although	  there	  are	  undoubtedly	  unreasonable	  claims	  that	  can	  
be	  legitimately	  denied,	  the	  question	  of	  reasonableness	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  fallibility	  of	  
standards	  of	  reasonableness	  that	  renders	  those	  standards	  subject	  to	  revision.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  
suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strand	  of	  liberalism,	  perhaps	  the	  dominant	  strand	  of	  liberalism,	  which	  
exerts	  a	  confirmation	  bias	  about	  what,	  and	  more	  specifically	  who,	  is	  or	  is	  not	  reasonable.	  	  This	  
bias	  poses	  a	  problem	  for	  minority	  groups	  whose	  worldview	  is	  other	  than	  liberal	  because	  there	  
is	  a	  tendency,	  when	  dealing	  with	  claims	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  in	  liberal	  terms,	  for	  
liberals	  to	  simply	  give	  up	  and	  dismiss	  the	  claim	  before	  the	  thrust	  of	  the	  claim	  has	  been	  properly	  
understood.	  	  	  
The	  relationship	  between	  liberalism	  and	  deliberative	  democracy	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear.	  	  If	  a	  
line	  was	  drawn	  between	  Rawls	  and	  Habermas,	  deliberative	  theories	  could	  be	  found	  at	  several	  
points	  along	  that	  continuum.	  	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  by	  this	  point	  that	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson,	  
with	  their	  repeated	  emphasis	  on	  fair	  terms	  of	  cooperation,	  are	  situated	  closer	  to	  the	  Rawlsian	  
end	  of	  the	  scale,	  while	  others	  like	  Iris	  Marion	  Young,	  who	  favour	  a	  discursive	  approach,	  are	  
closer	  to	  Habermas.	  	  It	  can	  be	  said,	  then,	  that	  accounts	  that	  promote	  inclusion	  seem	  to	  be	  
closer	  to	  the	  Habermasian	  side,	  while	  those	  on	  the	  Rawlsian	  side	  seem	  to	  support	  the	  idea	  of	  
legitimate	  exclusion.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  either	  belong	  on	  opposite	  ends	  of	  the	  
continuum	  but	  just	  to	  notice	  these	  tendencies	  and	  to	  notice	  that	  deliberations	  cast	  in	  
Habermasian	  terms	  have	  greater	  potential	  to	  get	  around	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  than	  those	  
cast	  in	  Rawlsian	  terms.	  	  Why?	  	  The	  answer,	  I	  think,	  might	  be	  found	  in	  the	  connection	  between	  
exclusion	  and	  reasonableness.	  
	   Recall	  from	  chapter	  one	  that	  a	  confirmation	  bias	  is	  simply	  a	  cognitive	  tendency	  to	  
choose	  a	  course	  of	  action	  that	  will	  confirm	  a	  hypothesis,	  rather	  than	  to	  choose	  options	  that	  
might	  challenge	  the	  hypothesis.	  	  When	  a	  hypothesis	  is	  a	  normative	  account	  of	  reasonableness,	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the	  cognitive	  tendency	  manifests	  itself	  as	  a	  criterion	  of	  reasonableness.	  	  The	  confirmation	  bias	  
functions	  to	  determine	  which	  citizens	  are	  reasonable	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  only	  citizens	  who	  share	  
a	  particular	  way	  of	  thinking	  are	  considered	  reasonable.	  	  Such	  is	  the	  case,	  I	  will	  argue,	  with	  the	  
contemporary	  liberal	  picture	  of	  reasonableness	  in	  which	  the	  ideals	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality	  are	  
considered	  to	  be	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  free	  use	  of	  practical	  reason.	  	  The	  confirmation	  bias	  
buttresses	  a	  normative	  account	  of	  reasonableness	  that	  emerges	  through	  the	  free	  use	  of	  
practical	  reason,	  about	  which	  there	  can	  be	  no	  normatively	  reasonable	  disagreement.	  	  This	  
doctrine	  of	  reasonableness	  is	  a	  central	  idea	  that	  is	  confirmed,	  in	  some	  cases,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
minority	  groups	  whose	  claims	  require	  the	  recognition	  of	  genuine	  pluralism	  in	  liberal	  democratic	  
institutional	  arrangements.	  	  	  
While	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  liberal	  principles	  and	  the	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  they	  
imply	  play	  a	  role	  in	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making,	  deliberative	  claims	  are	  not	  necessarily	  
constrained	  by	  those	  standards	  of	  reasonableness.	  	  Hence	  I	  will	  argue,	  an	  inclusive	  deliberative	  
process	  can	  be	  functionally	  independent	  of	  liberal	  principles	  and	  the	  standards	  of	  
reasonableness	  they	  imply	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  liberal	  principles	  do	  not	  function	  to	  exclude	  
claims	  made	  from	  alternative	  frameworks	  before	  the	  thrust	  of	  the	  claim	  can	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  
on	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  a	  deliberative	  process	  shaped	  by	  the	  ordering	  of	  features	  I	  
put	  forward	  in	  4.1	  offers	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  
relationship	  between	  liberal	  principles	  and	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  in	  the	  second	  section	  
but	  first	  I	  wish	  to	  flesh	  out	  the	  problem	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  exclusion.	  
Demarcating	  the	  Reasonable	  
Reasonableness	  is	  often	  delineated	  in	  opposition	  to	  its	  counterpart,	  unreasonableness.	  	  That	  is	  
simply	  to	  say	  that	  the	  class	  of	  things	  that	  are	  reasonable	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  class	  of	  things	  that	  
are	  unreasonable.	  	  Things	  deemed	  reasonable,	  or	  not,	  are	  things	  like	  people,	  a	  line	  of	  thought	  
or	  practices.	  	  Political	  theorists	  tend	  to	  focus,	  understandably,	  on	  determinations	  of	  
reasonableness	  with	  regard	  to	  practices.	  	  Separating	  out	  a	  practice	  from	  the	  person	  engaging	  in	  
the	  practice	  or	  defending	  the	  practice	  works	  well	  in	  theory	  but	  the	  distinction	  seems	  far	  less	  
clear	  when	  looking	  at	  particular	  cases.	  	  There	  are	  many	  examples	  of	  demands	  that	  were	  
considered	  unreasonable	  in	  certain	  circumstances	  while	  being	  considered	  exceedingly	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reasonable	  in	  other	  circumstances,	  e.g.	  abolition	  of	  segregation,	  equality	  of	  women.	  	  	  The	  line	  
between	  reasonable	  ideas,	  persons,	  practices,	  etc.	  demarcates	  those	  things	  that	  are	  worth	  
engaging,	  from	  the	  unreasonable,	  that	  are	  neither	  worth	  engaging	  nor	  worthy	  of	  recognition.	  	  
Those	  lines	  often,	  over	  the	  course	  of	  time,	  change.	  	  The	  change;	  however,	  is	  not	  so	  much	  in	  the	  
reasonableness	  of	  the	  claim	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  claim	  is	  made.	  	  It	  would	  be	  
very	  strange	  indeed	  to	  class	  suffragettes	  as	  both	  unreasonable	  in	  their	  own	  time	  and	  
reasonable	  from	  a	  contemporary	  perspective.	  	  Hence,	  these	  types	  of	  changes	  are	  commonly	  
characterised	  as	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  construct	  that	  is	  the	  social	  reality	  of	  a	  given	  time	  and	  place.	  	  	  
There	  are	  a	  great	  many	  philosophers	  in	  the	  western	  tradition	  who	  were	  not	  writing	  for,	  
or	  about,	  the	  unwashed	  masses,	  which	  usually	  included	  slaves,	  women	  and	  children.	  	  Until	  
quite	  recently,	  Western	  intelligentsia’s	  views	  on	  women	  were	  notoriously	  patriarchal,	  
pigeonholing	  female	  as	  the	  weaker,	  irrational	  and	  unreasonable	  sex.	  	  John	  Dunn	  observed	  that	  
the	  one	  piece	  of	  Aristotle’s	  ethical	  thought	  that	  is	  most	  widely	  shared	  today	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  
the	  lack	  of	  reasonableness	  in	  women	  renders	  them	  less	  capable	  of	  virtue	  than	  men.326	  	  There	  is	  
a	  great	  deal	  of	  division	  amongst	  feminist	  theorists	  about	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  statements.	  	  
Were	  Western	  thinkers	  thoughtlessly	  endorsing	  mores	  prevalent	  in	  their	  society	  at	  that	  time,	  or	  
do	  these	  comments	  fit	  with	  their	  own	  theoretical	  and	  ideological	  convictions?	  	  Either	  way,	  
there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  this	  question	  could	  not	  be	  taken	  seriously	  by	  a	  society	  that	  failed	  to	  
recognize	  women	  as	  being	  as	  capable	  of	  reason	  as	  men.	  	  Women	  were,	  and	  perhaps	  still	  are,	  
considered	  to	  be	  unreasonable,	  and	  therefore	  were	  not	  worth	  engaging,	  not	  worthy	  of	  equal	  
recognition.	  	  
These	  thinkers	  were	  writing	  about,	  and	  for,	  their	  compatriots—others	  of	  similar	  sex	  and	  
station	  in	  the	  world	  whom	  they	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  other	  reasonable	  men	  of	  the	  world.	  	  This	  
sort	  of	  group	  solipsism	  is	  not	  only	  apparent	  in	  the	  direct	  statements	  made	  about	  ‘others’	  but	  
also	  influenced	  the	  philosophical	  approach.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  philosophical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326	  See	  John	  Dunn,	  The	  Cunning	  of	  Unreason:	  Making	  Sense	  of	  Politics,	  (London:	  Harper	  Collins,	  2000),	  Chapter	  1.	  
Carol	  Gilligan	  famously	  observed	  a	  striking	  bias	  in	  models	  of	  moral	  maturity.	  	  Stages	  of	  development	  were	  
measured	  according	  to	  a	  traditionally	  masculine	  understanding	  and	  approach	  to	  moral	  conflict	  such	  that	  women	  
could	  not	  reach	  moral	  maturity.	  	  Rather	  than	  recognise	  gender	  bias	  in	  the	  model,	  the	  response	  was	  to	  “consider	  
women	  as	  either	  deviant	  or	  deficient	  in	  their	  development.”	  “In	  a	  Different	  Voice:	  Women's	  Conceptoins	  of	  Self	  
and	  of	  Morality.”	  Harvard	  Educational	  Review	  47,	  no.	  4	  (November	  1977):	  481-­‐517.	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approaches	  are	  determined	  by	  social	  factors,	  it	  is	  merely	  to	  recognize	  that	  there	  is	  a	  connection	  
between	  political	  theory	  and	  the	  polis	  about	  which,	  and	  for,	  it	  is	  written.	  	  Said’s	  Orientalism,	  for	  
example,	  exposes	  Western	  intelligentsia’s	  false	  assumptions	  about	  East	  Asia—assumptions	  
which	  set	  the	  limits	  of	  reasoning	  about	  all	  things	  Asian.	  	  	  
Inoue	  examines	  traditional	  assumptions	  about	  rights	  in	  light	  of	  Orientalist	  perspectives.	  	  
The	  Western	  academic	  tradition	  carries	  with	  it	  a	  history	  of	  cultural	  domination	  which	  reinforces	  
presuppositions	  about	  what	  Inoue	  calls	  the	  West-­‐centric	  rights	  paradigm;	  that	  the	  achievement	  
of	  rights	  is	  the	  result	  of	  superior	  reasoning327—reasoning	  that	  determines	  the	  passage	  from	  
principle	  to	  functional	  norm	  with	  logical	  precision.	  	  The	  presumption	  is	  that	  the	  rationale	  
supporting	  a	  Western	  articulation	  of	  rights	  is	  one	  that	  every	  reasonable	  human	  deems	  the	  
appropriate	  way	  to	  legitimate	  political	  arrangements.	  	  To	  suggest	  that	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  
justifying	  political	  practices	  is	  the	  reasonable	  way	  suggests	  unanimity	  of	  agreement	  that	  simply	  
is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  Rather	  than	  recognize	  the	  disagreement	  as	  expressions	  of	  alternative	  
worldviews,	  some	  attribute	  the	  disagreement	  to	  ignorant	  or	  erroneous	  reasoning—not	  merely	  
a	  different	  type	  of	  reasoning—an	  incorrect	  and	  therefore	  inferior	  type	  of	  reasoning.	  
Nagel,	  for	  example,	  characterised	  a	  reasonable	  line	  of	  thought	  in	  this	  way:	  “To	  reason	  is	  
to	  think	  systematically	  in	  ways	  anyone	  looking	  over	  my	  shoulder	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  recognize	  
as	  correct.”328	  	  The	  prescription	  here	  is	  quite	  strong—everyone	  should	  be	  able	  to	  see	  that	  a	  
good	  line	  of	  reasoning	  is	  a	  good	  line	  of	  reasoning.	  	  It	  is	  certainly	  appealing	  to	  think	  that	  
disagreement	  is	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  mistaken	  reasoning.	  	  It	  is	  appealing	  to	  think	  that	  liberalism	  
is	  the	  most	  reasonable	  alternative	  because	  it	  is	  the	  shared	  framework	  of	  all	  reasonable	  
people—reasoning	  that	  others	  can	  follow	  and	  is	  thereby	  accessible	  to	  others.	  	  Barry	  
unabashedly	  proclaims	  the	  aim	  of	  liberalism	  is	  “to	  construct	  gradually	  a	  point	  of	  view	  that	  all	  
reasonable	  people	  can	  be	  asked	  to	  share.”329	  	  When	  Nussbaum	  talks	  about	  adaptive	  
preferences	  she	  suggests	  that	  under	  certain	  conditions	  all	  reasonable	  people	  will	  accept	  
liberalism.330	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327	  Inoue,	  “Orientalism,”	  42.	  
328	  Thomas	  Nagel,	  The	  Last	  Word	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  5.	  
329	  Barry,	  Culture,	  262.	  
330	  Martha	  Nussbaum,	  "Women	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  Peoples,"	  Politics,	  Philosophy	  and	  Economics,	  (2002):	  283-­‐306.	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However,	  the	  move	  from	  liberalism	  as	  a	  reasonable	  means	  to	  approach	  coordination	  
problems	  in	  politics	  toward	  liberal	  thinking	  as	  a	  criterion	  of	  reasonableness,	  I	  argue,	  imposes	  a	  
confirmation	  bias	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  citizens.	  	  The	  confirmation	  appears	  in	  
various	  ways:	  	  Agreement	  makes	  it	  so—to	  be	  politically	  reasonable	  is	  to	  agree	  to	  be	  reasonable	  
about	  what	  sort	  of	  standards	  should	  govern	  determinations	  of	  political	  reasonableness.	  	  From	  
the	  general	  to	  the	  particular—all	  reasonable	  people	  will	  agree	  what	  a	  reasonable	  person	  would	  
agree	  to.	  	  Or	  the	  conclusion	  is	  in	  the	  premise—reasonable	  people,	  then,	  are	  people	  who	  agree	  
about	  what	  is	  reasonable.	  	  These	  articulations	  of	  the	  bias	  are,	  strictly	  speaking,	  fallacious;	  
however,	  they	  can	  be	  easily	  rescued	  from	  the	  throws	  of	  bad	  logic	  with	  an	  externally	  justified	  
account	  of	  the	  reasonable.	  	  The	  presuppositional	  content	  of	  liberalism	  would	  then	  be	  
confirmed	  by	  a	  reasonable	  and	  legitimate	  bias.	  	  However,	  I	  am	  not	  convinced	  that	  the	  bias	  
exerted	  is	  supported	  by	  an	  external	  criterion	  of	  reasonableness	  about	  which	  there	  is	  sufficient	  
agreement.	  The	  notion	  of	  bias	  carries	  with	  it	  a	  negative	  connotation;	  to	  exert	  a	  bias	  is	  to	  be	  
prejudiced	  or	  to	  take	  sides	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  fair.	  	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  discussion,	  I	  begin	  with	  the	  
idea	  of	  a	  confirmation	  bias,	  that	  is	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  neither	  good	  nor	  bad,	  neither	  reasonable	  nor	  
unreasonable.	  	  It	  is	  simply	  a	  way	  of	  describing	  a	  cognitive	  process.	  	  The	  way	  that	  process	  
functions,	  however,	  might	  help	  to	  explain	  why	  some	  minority	  groups	  find	  themselves	  the	  victim	  
of	  biases	  in	  modern	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  
I	  am	  going	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  liberalism	  and	  the	  standards	  of	  
reasonableness	  certain	  liberal	  theories	  impose	  is	  a	  relationship	  that	  exerts	  a	  confirmation	  bias	  
on	  citizens.	  	  Since	  the	  60’s,	  theorists	  have	  applied	  Wason’s	  confirmation	  bias	  in	  various	  ways	  
and	  multiple	  fields	  including	  politics.	  	  Philip	  Tetlock	  took	  this	  idea	  and	  applied	  it	  to	  political	  
forecasting.	  	  For	  18	  years	  he	  accumulated	  the	  predictions	  of	  284	  political	  experts,	  
approximately	  28	  000	  predictions,	  and	  examined	  them	  in	  light	  of	  their	  ideological	  commitments	  
to	  see	  if	  their	  commitments	  played	  a	  confirmatory	  role	  in	  the	  way	  experts	  assess	  politics	  and	  
predict	  outcomes	  of	  political	  processes,	  arrangements,	  decisions,	  etc.	  	  One	  might	  expect	  that	  
certain	  types	  of	  theoretical	  convictions	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  accuracy	  than	  others.	  	  
A	  constructivist,	  for	  example,	  might	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  produce	  better	  predictions	  than	  a	  
metaphysical	  realist,	  or	  vice	  versa.	  	  What	  he	  found	  was	  something	  unexpected.	  	  Statistically,	  the	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ideological	  or	  theoretical	  convictions	  of	  participants	  did	  not	  correlate	  at	  all	  with	  their	  accuracy.	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  realists	  were	  no	  more	  accurate	  than	  institutionalists—optimists,	  pessimists,	  
boomsters,	  doomsters,	  conservatives	  and	  liberals	  all	  shared	  a	  remarkably	  similar	  level	  of	  
accuracy,	  or	  inaccuracy.	  	  However,	  there	  was	  a	  standard	  that	  separated	  the	  experts	  with	  a	  
higher	  degree	  of	  accuracy	  than	  the	  rest;	  it	  was	  found	  in	  the	  way	  they	  approached	  the	  process	  
of	  analysis	  and	  forecasting.	  	  Foxes,	  to	  a	  remarkably	  consistent	  degree,	  were	  better	  forecasters	  
than	  hedgehogs.331	  
	   Berlin’s	  distinction	  between	  the	  fox,	  who	  knows	  many	  things,	  and	  the	  hedgehog	  who	  
knows	  one	  big	  thing,332	  captured	  the	  key	  difference	  between	  those	  political	  experts	  who	  were	  
better	  able	  to	  predict	  political	  outcomes	  than	  those	  who	  were	  not.	  	  Tetlock	  classified	  
hedgehogs	  as	  a	  those	  experts	  who	  related	  “everything	  to	  a	  single	  central	  vision	  in	  terms	  of	  
which	  all	  that	  they	  say	  has	  significance.”333	  	  Hedgehogs,	  in	  most	  cases,	  were	  very	  confident	  
about	  their	  predictions	  and	  enthusiastic	  about	  their	  ability	  to	  accurately	  forecast	  outcomes,	  
whereas	  foxes	  tended	  to	  be	  reticent	  about	  their	  predictive	  abilities.	  	  Foxes	  expected	  
unpredictability	  and	  therefore	  tended	  to	  cast	  their	  predictions	  in	  a	  qualified	  or	  provisional	  way.	  	  
Foxes	  were	  sceptical	  of	  big	  theories	  and	  tended	  to	  “pursue	  many	  ends	  often	  unrelated	  and	  
even	  contradictory,	  they	  entertain	  ideas	  that	  are	  centrifugal	  rather	  than	  centripetal	  without	  
seeking	  to	  fit	  them	  in	  to	  or	  exclude	  them	  from	  any	  one	  all	  embracing	  inner	  vision.”334	  	  	  
Hedgehogs	  scored	  lowest	  on	  long-­‐term	  predictions	  within	  their	  area	  of	  expertise	  while	  
foxes	  scored	  highest	  on	  short-­‐term	  predictions	  within	  their	  area	  of	  expertise.	  	  When	  long-­‐term	  
and	  short-­‐term	  outcomes	  were	  combined,	  foxes	  scored	  significantly	  higher	  than	  hedgehogs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331	  Philip	  Tetlock,	  "Why	  Foxes	  Are	  Better	  Forecasters	  Than	  Hedgehogs."	  The	  Long	  Now	  Foundation-­‐Seminars	  on	  
Long-­‐Term	  Thinking.	  January	  26,	  2007.	  http://longnow.org/seminars/02007/jan/26/why-­‐foxes-­‐are-­‐better-­‐
forecasters-­‐than-­‐hedgehogs/	  (accessed	  October	  22,	  2011),	  6.	  
332	  From	  Isaiah	  Berlin’s,	  The	  hedgehog	  and	  the	  Fox:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Tolstoy's	  View	  of	  History,	  (London:	  Weidenfeld	  and	  
Nicolson,	  1967),	  9.	  	  Berlin’s	  essay	  explores	  the	  paradox	  that	  complicate	  Tolstoy’s	  view	  of	  history—Tolstoy’s	  outlook	  
is	  demonstrably	  foxy	  and	  yet	  he	  believed	  in	  being	  a	  hedgehog.	  	  He	  believes	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  historical	  truth	  and	  yet	  
everywhere	  he	  see’s	  evidence	  that	  history	  is	  a	  fiction,	  as	  malleable	  and	  susceptible	  to	  the	  historian’s	  point	  of	  view	  
as	  any	  literary	  effort	  not	  aimed	  at	  ‘getting	  it	  right.’	  “For	  there	  exists	  a	  great	  chasm	  between	  those,	  on	  one	  side,	  
who	  relate	  everything	  to	  a	  single	  central	  vision,	  …a	  single,	  universal,	  organizing	  principle	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  alone	  all	  
that	  they	  are	  and	  say	  has	  significance—and	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  those	  who	  pursue	  many	  ends,	  often	  unrelated	  and	  
even	  contradictory…these	  last	  lead	  lives,	  perform	  acts,	  and	  entertain	  ideas	  that	  are	  centrifugal	  rather	  than	  
centripetal…”	  Berlin,	  Hedgehog,	  1.	  	  	  
333	  Philip	  Tetlock,	  quoting	  Berlin,	  Foxes,	  6.	  
334	  Ibid.,	  6.	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across	  the	  board.335	  	  The	  experts	  classified	  as	  foxes,	  like	  hedgehogs,	  were	  not	  confined	  to	  any	  
one	  ideological	  conviction	  or	  theoretical	  standpoint.	  	  Both	  foxes	  and	  hedgehogs	  were	  found	  to	  
be	  Marxists,	  libertarians,	  conservatives,	  realists	  or	  idealists.	  	  One	  explanation	  for	  the	  
hedgehog’s	  lack	  of	  accuracy	  was	  a	  tendency	  to	  relate	  everything	  to	  their	  one	  big	  idea,	  their	  
predictions	  were	  predicated	  on	  a	  confirmation	  bias	  to	  predict	  outcomes	  in	  line	  with	  what	  that	  
one	  idea	  would	  suggest.	  	  Tetlock	  argued	  that	  hedgehogs	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  adapt	  their	  thinking	  
to	  new	  information	  when	  it	  contradicted	  their	  settled	  convictions	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  look	  for	  
information	  that	  confirmed	  their	  one	  central	  idea.336	  	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  political	  theory,	  a	  confirmation	  bias	  is	  more	  than	  simply	  a	  tendency	  to	  
make	  choices	  that	  are	  expected	  to	  confirm	  what	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  case	  rather	  than	  make	  
choices	  that	  are	  expected	  to	  challenge	  what	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  	  I	  use	  the	  term	  to	  
describe	  theoretical	  moves;	  valuations	  or	  assertions	  that	  tend	  to	  confirm	  a	  central	  idea,	  to	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  theoretical	  moves,	  valuations	  or	  assertions	  that	  might	  challenge	  the	  central	  idea.	  	  It	  
is	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  suggest	  that	  evidence	  of	  a	  confirmation	  bias	  is	  evidence	  of	  a	  failure	  in	  
reasoning;	  instead,	  my	  aim	  is	  much	  more	  modest	  than	  that.	  	  I	  simply	  hope	  to	  show	  how	  a	  
confirmation	  bias	  might	  function	  to	  determine	  which	  citizens	  are	  judged	  reasonable	  in	  such	  a	  
way	  that	  only	  citizens	  who	  share	  a	  particular	  point	  of	  view	  are	  considered	  reasonable	  and	  how	  
the	  recognition	  of	  such	  a	  bias	  might	  bring	  about	  a	  more	  just	  approach	  to	  deliberating	  minority	  
rights	  claims.	  
Reasonably	  Liberal	  
Comedian	  and	  social	  critic	  Lenny	  Bruce	  summed	  up	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  raised	  about	  liberalism	  
in	  chapter	  two	  when	  he	  said,	  “Liberals	  can	  understand	  everything	  but	  people	  who	  don’t	  
understand	  them.”337	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  political	  decision-­‐making,	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  
can	  weed	  out	  inappropriate,	  irrelevant	  or	  improper	  rights	  claims,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  those	  
standards	  can	  stifle	  legitimate	  claims	  before	  they	  are	  properly	  understood.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  
a	  need	  to	  establish	  boundaries	  of	  reasonableness	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  those	  boundaries	  serve	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335	  Ibid.,	  6.	  
336	  Philip	  Tetock,	  Philip.	  Expert	  Political	  Judgment:	  How	  Good	  Is	  It?	  How	  Can	  We	  Know?	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  2005),	  128.	  
337	  Lenny	  Bruce	  and	  John	  Cohen,	  “Politics,”	  The	  essential	  Lenny	  Bruce,	  (St	  Albans:	  Panther,	  1975),	  238.	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values	  of	  a	  liberal	  democracy,	  without	  unjustly	  excluding	  weaker	  or	  less	  influential	  citizens.	  	  
However,	  the	  relationship	  between	  liberal	  principles	  and	  the	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  they	  
imply	  is	  not	  at	  all	  straightforward.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  offer	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Rawls’	  political	  
liberalism	  that	  posits	  the	  following:	  	  A	  reasonable	  person	  is	  a	  person	  who	  prioritizes	  liberal	  
principles	  (freedom	  and	  equality)	  in	  political	  arrangements.	  	  An	  unreasonable	  person	  is	  a	  citizen	  
who	  rejects	  the	  ideals	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality	  as	  the	  appropriate	  ground	  on	  which	  to	  design	  
and	  implement	  fair	  terms	  of	  social	  cooperation.	  	  	  
	   As	  acknowledged	  in	  chapter	  two,	  liberalism	  is	  contentious	  and	  there	  is	  wealth	  of	  intra-­‐
liberal	  literature	  seeking	  to	  sort	  out	  even	  the	  most	  fundamental	  of	  concepts	  such	  a	  freedom,	  
equality,	  property,	  etc.	  	  As	  the	  demand	  for	  special	  rights	  considerations	  for	  persons	  with	  
disabilities,	  religious	  persons,	  and	  cultural	  or	  ethnic	  groups	  has	  increased,	  so	  has	  the	  literature	  
on	  the	  subject.	  	  Liberals	  stand	  divided	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  what	  should	  or	  should	  not	  be	  taught	  in	  
public	  schools	  or	  the	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  right	  to	  wear	  religious	  icons	  should	  be	  upheld	  in	  all	  
circumstances.	  	  The	  locus	  of	  disagreement	  is	  most	  often	  in	  the	  correct	  application	  of	  liberal	  
principles	  to	  the	  particular	  practice	  in	  question.	  	  In	  the	  cultural	  debate	  between	  Nussbaum	  and	  
Barry	  for	  example,	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  cultural	  and	  religious	  practices	  is	  front	  and	  center;	  
however,	  not	  much	  is	  explicitly	  said	  about	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  the	  persons	  engaging	  in	  these	  
practices.	  	  	  
	   There	  are	  some	  who	  would	  argue	  that	  political	  theory	  necessarily	  begins	  with	  an	  
account	  of	  persons.	  	  In	  a	  Kantian	  sense,	  we	  ought	  to	  treat	  each	  other	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  persons	  
because	  it	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  our	  nature	  as	  rational,	  free	  and	  equal	  beings.	  	  Our	  rational	  nature	  
is	  central	  to	  an	  objective	  account	  of	  our	  own	  good.	  	  In	  Political	  Liberalism,	  Rawls’	  concern	  with	  
this	  sort	  of	  justification	  is	  that	  a	  reasonable	  rejection	  of	  the	  Kantian	  account	  of	  persons	  
undermines	  the	  normative	  force	  of	  the	  theory.	  	  Freedom	  and	  equality,	  values	  grounded	  in	  a	  
Kantian	  doctrine,	  could	  result	  in	  citizens	  rejecting	  that	  grounding.	  	  Free	  from	  state	  power,	  the	  
social	  conditions	  guaranteed	  by	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  make	  space	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  views	  
regarding	  freedom	  and	  equality,	  hence,	  the	  free	  exercise	  of	  practical	  reason	  may	  not	  lead	  to	  
agreement	  about	  those	  values,	  but	  rather	  leads	  to	  a	  plurality	  of	  (reasonable)	  views	  on	  the	  
values,	  meaning	  and	  nature	  of	  persons.	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   Rawls	  works	  his	  way	  around	  this	  problem	  by	  eliminating	  the	  need	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  
doctrine	  to	  justify	  the	  values	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  	  Free	  from	  the	  metaphysical	  baggage	  (or	  
the	  rich	  metaphysical	  background	  depending	  on	  your	  point	  of	  view)	  the	  political	  is	  concerned	  
with	  persons	  only	  so	  far	  as	  they	  are	  citizens,	  not	  so	  far	  as	  the	  nature	  of	  persons.	  	  Rawls	  argues	  
that	  reasonable	  citizens	  recognize	  the	  burdens	  of	  judgment;	  reasonable	  citizens	  understand	  
why,	  when	  free,	  other	  citizens	  may	  come	  to	  hold	  divergent	  and	  even	  incompatible	  
comprehensive	  doctrines;	  reasonable	  citizens	  recognize	  pluralism	  as	  “the	  work	  of	  free	  practical	  
reason	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  free	  institutions.”338	  	  I	  think	  it	  is	  an	  unavoidable	  implication	  of	  
pluralism	  that	  liberal	  states	  must	  recognize	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  non-­‐liberal	  thinking;	  
however,	  in	  Rawlsian	  terms,	  recognition	  of	  the	  burdens	  of	  judgment	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  
reasonable	  citizens	  must	  endorse	  principles	  that	  other	  citizens	  can	  reasonably	  endorse.	  	  It	  is	  a	  
big	  idea	  which	  conjoins	  pluralism	  and	  reasonableness	  in	  a	  particular	  way,	  but	  is	  it	  the	  kind	  of	  big	  
idea	  that	  exerts	  a	  confirmation	  bias?	  
When	  citizens	  are	  treated	  as	  capable	  of	  directing	  their	  own	  lives	  through	  practical	  
reason,	  they	  will	  come	  to	  different	  conclusions	  about	  comprehensive	  doctrines.	  	  There	  may	  be	  
epistemic	  disagreement	  about	  comprehensive	  doctrines;	  however,	  the	  disagreement	  is	  
epistemically	  reasonable	  if	  it	  is	  tempered	  by	  the	  recognition	  that	  to	  impose	  a	  particular	  
doctrine	  on	  others	  is	  to	  deny	  their	  status	  as	  a	  free	  and	  equal	  person.	  	  The	  burdens	  of	  judgment	  
also	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  what	  sort	  of	  premises	  should	  be	  admissible	  in	  public	  argument.	  	  
The	  recognition	  of	  epistemically	  reasonable	  disagreement	  about	  comprehensive	  doctrines	  
“limits	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  reasonable	  persons	  think	  can	  be	  justified	  to	  others.”339	  	  In	  other	  
words,	  reasonable	  persons	  will	  not	  expect	  others	  to	  (epistemically)	  accept	  their	  comprehensive	  
doctrine;	  however,	  this	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  what	  sort	  of	  normative	  expectations	  reasonable	  
persons	  might	  have.	  	  The	  question	  arises:	  What	  if	  the	  free	  use	  of	  practical	  reason	  generates	  a	  
comprehensive	  doctrine	  that	  is	  normatively	  incompatible	  with	  freedom	  and	  equality?	  
	   This	  is	  a	  complicated	  problem.	  	  It	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  individual	  was	  epistemically	  
reasonable,	  recognizing	  the	  burdens	  of	  judgment,	  but	  normatively	  unreasonable	  in	  that	  she	  or	  
he	  is	  rejecting	  the	  values	  (freedom	  and	  equality)	  required	  for	  him	  or	  her	  to	  freely	  exercise	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  Political	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  37.	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practical	  reason	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  him	  or	  her	  to	  reject	  the	  values.	  	  As	  Rawls	  states,	  “Unless	  
we	  respect	  freedom	  and	  equality,	  we	  cannot	  exercise	  practical	  reason	  freely.”340	  	  Or,	  to	  put	  it	  in	  
more	  authentically	  Kantian	  terms,	  maxims	  of	  inequality	  and	  oppression	  are	  not	  maxims	  that	  
can	  be	  adopted	  by	  everyone.	  	  Hence,	  in	  Rawlsian	  terms,	  rejecting	  the	  role	  of	  freedom	  and	  
equality	  in	  political	  arrangements	  is	  paradoxical,	  which	  is	  not	  surprising	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  
following	  connection	  between	  the	  core	  liberal	  principles,	  freedom	  and	  equality,	  and	  the	  
standards	  of	  reasonableness	  they	  imply.	  
As	  I	  understand	  the	  Rawlsian	  view,	  there	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  distinction	  
between	  epistemic	  and	  normative	  reasonableness.	  	  A	  reasonable	  comprehensive	  doctrine	  has	  
both	  normative	  reasonableness	  through	  a	  commitment	  to	  freedom	  and	  equality	  and	  epistemic	  
reasonableness	  through	  the	  recognition	  of	  pluralism.	  	  However,	  epistemic	  reasonableness	  
alone	  is	  too	  weak	  to	  ground	  liberalism.	  	  	  
The	  notion	  of	  reasonable	  disagreement	  shows	  how	  the	  two	  dimensions	  function	  
together.	  	  The	  normative	  implications	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	  terms—unreasonable	  disagreement	  
is	  disagreement	  over	  something	  about	  which	  there	  should	  be	  no	  disagreement.	  	  To	  reject	  the	  
values	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality	  by	  endorsing	  slavery,	  for	  example,	  constitutes	  unreasonable	  
disagreement	  because	  the	  endorsement	  is	  epistemically	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  fact	  of	  pluralism	  
and	  normatively	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  values	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  	  There	  can	  be	  epistemically	  
reasonable	  disagreement	  about	  comprehensive	  doctrines	  but	  there	  can	  be	  no	  normatively	  
reasonable	  disagreement	  about	  the	  fair	  terms	  of	  social	  cooperation.	  	  “In	  framing	  a	  political	  
conception	  of	  justice	  so	  it	  can	  gain	  an	  overlapping	  consensus,	  we	  are	  not	  bending	  it	  to	  existing	  
unreason,	  but	  to	  the	  fact	  of	  reasonable	  pluralism,	  itself	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  free	  exercise	  of	  free	  
human	  reason	  under	  conditions	  of	  liberty.”341	  	  	  
	   On	  this	  reading,	  Rawls	  presents	  a	  picture	  of	  reasonableness	  in	  which	  the	  ideals	  of	  
freedom	  and	  equality	  are	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  free	  use	  of	  practical	  reason.	  	  It	  seems	  
unavoidable,	  then,	  that	  a	  reasonable	  doctrine	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  free	  use	  of	  practical	  
reason.	  	  If	  so,	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  looks	  something	  like	  this:	  	  There	  is	  a	  normative	  account	  of	  
reasonableness	  that	  emerges	  through	  the	  free	  use	  of	  practical	  reason,	  about	  which	  there	  can	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  37.	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be	  no	  normatively	  reasonable	  disagreement	  even	  though	  there	  can	  be	  epistemically	  reasonable	  
disagreement	  about	  the	  normative	  account	  of	  reasonableness	  itself.	  	  The	  confirmation	  bias	  
buttresses	  the	  normative	  force	  of	  this	  account	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  as	  such	  might	  shed	  some	  
light	  on	  who	  might	  be	  left	  out	  of	  this	  picture	  if	  we	  look	  at	  the	  idea	  of	  overlapping	  consensus.	  	  	  
The	  Partial	  Cover	  of	  Overlapping	  Consensus	  
The	  confirmation	  bias	  imposed	  on	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  
Rawlsian	  terms	  as	  a	  normative	  account	  of	  reasonableness.	  	  Citizens	  of	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  have	  
different	  comprehensive	  doctrines	  and	  as	  a	  result	  the	  liberal	  principles	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality	  
may	  be	  supported	  in	  different	  ways	  from	  within	  those	  various	  comprehensive	  doctrines.	  This	  
overlapping	  consensus	  comes	  about	  when	  free	  citizens	  successfully	  employ,	  and	  deploy,	  
practical	  reason.	  	  Without	  going	  into	  too	  much	  detail,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  this	  plays	  out.	  	  	  
Consider	  a	  citizen	  of	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  who	  believes	  that	  others	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  
free	  and	  equal.	  	  This	  belief	  is	  justified	  from	  within	  the	  package	  of	  convictions	  this	  citizen	  holds	  
about	  the	  good	  life.	  	  The	  thoughtful	  process	  of	  reflective	  equilibrium	  leads	  this	  citizen	  to	  believe	  
that	  treating	  others	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  is	  universally	  applicable—that	  is—freedom	  and	  equality	  
are	  values	  everyone	  should	  believe	  and	  practice.	  	  This	  citizen	  sees	  many	  other	  citizens	  in	  the	  
liberal	  democracy	  who	  believe	  in	  the	  same	  idea.	  	  They	  may	  have	  different	  ways	  of	  articulating	  
the	  contents	  of	  the	  idea,	  and	  even	  different	  reasons	  to	  uphold	  and	  practice	  the	  values,	  but	  they	  
do,	  nonetheless	  uphold	  the	  same	  idea.	  
	   Although	  citizens	  may	  have	  very	  different	  private	  reasons,	  they	  only	  need	  agree	  on	  
public	  reasons—that	  is,	  reasons	  that	  appeal	  to	  the	  shared	  values	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  	  
There	  is	  no	  need	  for	  convergence	  on	  all	  levels	  of	  association;	  this	  society	  has	  articulated	  a	  
political	  language	  that	  can	  cope	  with	  deep	  diversity	  without	  sacrificing	  stability—a	  language	  of	  
freedom,	  equality,	  fairness,	  social	  cooperation,	  and	  reasonableness.	  	  The	  citizens	  of	  this	  
political	  culture	  share	  normative	  convictions	  and	  can	  reason	  together	  as	  to	  how	  they	  might	  
focus	  abstract	  liberal	  ideals	  into	  a	  tangible	  conception	  of	  political	  normatively.	  	  The	  contents	  of	  
this	  concept	  become	  a	  subject	  about	  which	  individual	  citizens	  reflect	  and	  endorse	  or	  decry	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  their	  own	  convictions,	  but,	  given	  that	  the	  concept	  has	  arisen	  from	  the	  shared	  
values	  of	  the	  political	  culture,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  there	  will	  be	  widespread	  agreement.	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   This	  agreement	  is	  the	  great	  achievement	  of	  overlapping	  consensus.	  	  The	  problem	  of	  
comprehensive	  justification	  is	  supplanted	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  shared	  norms	  regarding	  political	  
arrangements,	  and	  these	  shared	  norms	  stabilize	  society	  despite	  differences	  between	  individual	  
citizen’s	  comprehensive	  doctrines.	  	  This	  allows	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  pluralism	  and	  diversity	  in	  which	  
multiple	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  life	  can	  flourish;	  however,	  not	  everyone	  fits	  under	  the	  blanket	  
of	  the	  overlapping	  consensus.	  	  There	  are	  some	  citizens	  who	  do	  not	  share	  the	  norms	  of	  the	  
majority.	  	  When	  these	  citizens	  say	  ‘given	  my	  comprehensive	  doctrine,	  I	  have	  no	  moral	  reason	  to	  
obey	  your	  laws’	  the	  legislator	  has	  only	  one	  response,	  ‘you	  must	  obey	  the	  laws	  because	  it	  is	  
what	  justice	  requires,	  because	  that	  is	  what	  it	  means	  to	  treat	  others	  as	  free	  and	  equal.’	  	  This	  
response	  cannot	  account	  for	  claims	  that	  do	  not	  share	  the	  same	  presuppositional	  content	  about	  
freedom	  and	  equality	  in	  the	  emergent	  overlapping	  consensus.	  	  Aboriginal	  groups	  claiming	  the	  
right	  to	  sovereignty,	  for	  example,	  press	  the	  matter	  when	  they	  ask	  ‘why	  should	  we	  treat	  people	  
as	  free	  and	  equal	  individuals	  when	  you	  do	  not	  recognize	  my	  group	  as	  free	  and	  equal?’	  There	  is	  
no	  justification	  to	  offer	  them.	  	  Political	  liberalism	  lacks	  the	  resources	  to	  justify	  the	  demand	  that	  
non-­‐liberal	  groups	  act	  according	  to	  values	  they	  do	  not	  recognize	  as	  superior	  to	  their	  own.	  	  
Except	  to	  say,	  you	  are	  obviously	  wrong.	  	  	  
	   Now,	  as	  I	  read	  Rawls,	  we	  cannot	  determine	  exactly	  what	  has	  gone	  wrong.	  	  There	  are	  as	  
many	  interpretations	  of	  what	  has	  gone	  wrong	  as	  there	  are	  comprehensive	  doctrines	  involved	  
and	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  adjudicate	  between	  them.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  normative	  valuation	  
going	  on	  with	  regard	  to	  what	  sort	  of	  comprehensive	  doctrines	  are	  reasonable	  and	  by	  fiat	  the	  
reasonableness	  of	  citizens.	  	  	  
Political	  liberalism	  assumes	  that,	  for	  political	  purposes,	  a	  plurality	  of	  reasonable	  yet	  
incompatible	  comprehensive	  doctrines	  is	  the	  normal	  result	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  human	  
reason	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  free	  institutions	  of	  a	  constitutional	  democratic	  
regime.	  	  Political	  liberalism	  also	  supposes	  that	  a	  reasonable	  comprehensive	  doctrine	  
does	  not	  reject	  the	  essentials	  [freedom	  and	  equality]	  of	  a	  democratic	  regime.342	  
	  
Reasonable	  citizens,	  in	  the	  Rawlsian	  sense,	  agree	  that	  liberal	  principles	  are	  universal,	  even	  
though	  they	  may	  disagree	  about	  what	  makes	  them	  universal.	  	  Reasonable	  citizens	  must	  uphold	  
the	  liberal	  principles	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality	  (liberal	  conceptions	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality)	  by	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  Political	  Liberalism,	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treating	  other	  individual	  citizens	  as	  free	  and	  equal.	  	  Any	  sort	  of	  deviation	  is	  an	  affront	  to	  justice.	  	  
The	  citizen	  who	  does	  not	  uphold	  the	  universality	  of	  liberal	  principles	  (understood	  in	  liberal	  
terms)	  is	  rejecting	  the	  ground	  on	  which	  they	  stand	  and	  therefore	  they	  are	  unreasonable,	  not	  a	  
part	  of	  the	  consensus	  that	  reflects	  the	  shared	  norms	  of	  the	  class	  of	  citizens	  who	  are	  reasonable.	  
Now,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  plenty	  of	  citizens	  in	  liberal	  democracies	  that	  do	  not	  
consider	  themselves	  liberal	  nor	  do	  they	  recognize	  the	  superiority	  of	  liberal	  principles.	  	  At	  the	  
very	  least,	  there	  are	  many	  who	  see	  themselves	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  liberal	  point	  of	  view	  and	  in	  
many	  cases	  disadvantaged	  politically	  by	  their	  non-­‐liberal	  worldview.	  	  The	  confirmation	  bias	  
imposes	  a	  construction	  of	  justice	  based	  on	  liberal	  principles	  that	  no	  reasonable	  citizen	  can	  
reject	  and	  therefore,	  imposes	  a	  decidedly	  liberal	  worldview	  onto	  all	  citizens.343	  	  Minority	  
groups,	  who	  espouse	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  worldview,	  are	  in	  some	  cases,	  unfairly	  misrecognized	  as	  
unreasonable,	  but	  there	  are	  unreasonable	  citizens	  who	  make	  unreasonable	  claims.	  	  The	  worry	  
is	  that	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  of	  political	  liberalism	  draws	  a	  line	  too	  unreflectively	  rigid	  and	  too	  
blunt	  to	  account	  for	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  modern	  pluralist	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  	  
The	  Deliberative	  Umbrella	  
To	  exclude	  citizens	  from	  the	  political	  decisions	  to	  which	  they	  are	  subject,	  and	  which	  
consequently	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  their	  lives,	  is	  unjust	  and	  there	  are	  many	  examples	  of	  
this	  sort	  of	  exclusion	  in	  modern	  liberal	  democracies.344	  	  But	  there	  is	  another	  type	  of	  exclusion	  
that	  occurs	  in	  situations	  where	  citizens	  are	  welcomed	  into	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  only	  to	  
be	  confronted	  by	  liberalism’s	  confirmation	  bias.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  they	  are	  confronted	  by	  a	  
decision-­‐making	  apparatus,	  institutional	  arrangement	  or	  discursive	  practice	  that	  systemically	  
upholds	  a	  standard	  of	  reasonableness	  that	  functionally	  excludes	  citizens	  deemed	  unreasonable	  
because	  their	  comprehensive	  doctrine	  is	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  overlapping	  consensus	  of	  the	  
liberal	  democracies.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343	  Chandran	  Kukathas	  articulates	  a	  similar	  idea	  in	  his	  response	  to	  Kymlicka’s	  liberal	  individualist	  approach	  to	  
cultural	  rights.	  “If	  liberalism	  describes	  a	  nation-­‐state	  governed	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  liberal	  justice,	  then	  the	  liberal	  
state	  cannot	  condone	  deep	  cultural	  diversity.	  	  For	  many,	  the	  cultural	  rights	  it	  can	  offer	  are	  not	  worth	  having.”	  From	  
“Multiculturalism	  as	  Fairness:	  Will	  Kymlicka's	  Multicultural	  Citizenship,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philsophy	  5,	  no.	  4	  
(1997),	  426.	  




	   The	  confirmation	  bias	  informs	  democratic	  processes	  and	  institutional	  arrangements	  
such	  that	  the	  claims	  of	  minority	  groups	  are,	  in	  some	  cases,	  cast	  as	  illiberal	  and	  unreasonable.	  	  
The	  contemporary	  liberal	  picture	  of	  reasonableness	  in	  which	  the	  ideals	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality	  
are	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  free	  use	  of	  practical	  reason	  functions,	  in	  some	  cases,	  to	  exclude	  the	  
claims	  of	  cultural	  and	  religious	  minority	  groups’	  who	  frame	  their	  claims	  in	  terms	  other	  than	  
liberal	  modes	  of	  reasoning.	  	  The	  confirmation	  bias	  functions	  to	  determine	  which	  citizens	  are	  
reasonable	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  only	  citizens	  who	  share	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  thinking,	  liberal	  
thinking,	  are	  considered	  reasonable.	  	  This	  doctrine	  of	  reasonableness	  is	  a	  central	  idea	  that	  is	  
confirmed,	  in	  some	  cases,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  minority	  groups	  whose	  claims	  require	  the	  
recognition	  of	  genuine	  pluralism	  in	  liberal	  democratic	  processes	  and	  institutional	  
arrangements.	  	  Recognizing	  the	  liberal	  confirmation	  bias,	  as	  a	  bias,	  rather	  than	  a	  universally	  
acceptable	  mechanism	  of	  justice,	  offers	  a	  means	  to	  re-­‐examine	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  in	  
light	  of	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  ethnicities,	  cultures	  and	  ways	  of	  life	  embodied	  by	  the	  citizenry	  of	  
modern	  liberal	  democracies.	  
Earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  I	  suggested	  that	  an	  inclusive	  deliberative	  process	  rests	  on	  the	  
recognition	  and	  realization	  of	  equality	  in	  deliberative	  processes	  prior	  to	  standards	  that	  
determine	  the	  acceptability	  of	  character,	  reasonableness	  and	  the	  allowable	  content	  of	  claims.	  	  
This	  might	  appear	  to	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Rawls	  I	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  previous	  
section;	  however,	  unlike	  Rawls	  I	  am	  not	  concerned	  with	  a	  comprehensive	  theory	  of	  justice.	  	  I	  
am	  concerned	  with	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  injustice	  that	  occurs	  when	  the	  claims	  of	  minority	  groups	  
are	  illegitimately	  dismissed	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  are	  unreasonable;	  cases	  where	  the	  claims	  are	  
reasonable	  within	  the	  minority	  worldview	  and	  perhaps	  would	  be	  viewed	  as	  reasonable	  if	  
properly	  understood.	  	  When	  minority	  claims	  are	  framed	  in	  terms	  that	  do	  not	  fall	  under	  the	  
umbrella	  of	  the	  overlapping	  consensus	  of	  the	  majority	  they	  may	  become	  cases	  where	  liberal	  
principles	  unjustly	  demarcate	  which	  citizens	  are	  reasonable	  and	  which	  are	  not.	  	  
Liberals	  like	  Kymlicka	  recognize	  cultural	  difference	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  alternative	  modes	  
of	  reasoning	  may	  carry	  substantial	  weight	  in	  political	  dialogues.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  minority	  
groups,	  in	  many	  cases,	  are	  not	  objecting	  to	  liberal	  ideals	  or	  principles,	  in	  fact	  they	  often	  endorse	  
the	  ideals	  of	  individual	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  	  By	  observing	  the	  difference	  between	  the	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concerns	  minorities	  have	  about	  liberal	  institutions	  and	  their	  concerns	  about	  liberal	  values,	  it	  
becomes	  apparent	  that	  it	  is	  often	  the	  application	  of	  liberal	  values	  is	  questioned,	  not	  the	  values	  
themselves.	  	  This	  might	  offer	  an	  insightful	  way	  out	  of	  the	  paradox	  because	  their	  objection	  is	  
aimed	  at	  particular	  practices	  such	  as	  projects	  of	  nation	  building	  or	  political	  institutions	  that	  may	  
very	  well,	  in	  application,	  fail	  to	  uphold	  the	  spirit	  of	  liberalism.345	  	  	  
	   This,	  of	  course,	  depends	  on	  what	  the	  spirit	  of	  liberalism	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  and	  as	  I	  pointed	  
out	  in	  chapter	  two,	  liberalism	  is	  a	  complicated	  and	  internally	  contested	  idea.	  	  Perhaps	  that	  is	  
precisely	  the	  point,	  liberalism	  itself	  should	  be	  open	  to	  examination	  in	  light	  of	  the	  type	  of	  
objections	  that	  arise	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  application	  of	  its	  practices.	  	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  
deliberation	  offers	  a	  means	  by	  which	  the	  practices	  of	  liberalism	  and	  the	  spirit	  of	  liberalism	  can	  
be	  brought	  to	  bear	  in	  discussions	  over	  minority	  rights.	  	  Rather	  than	  exclude	  citizens	  who	  object	  
to	  features	  of	  liberalism	  that	  are	  seen	  or	  experienced	  as	  oppressive,	  by	  opening	  up	  agenda	  
setting	  and	  offering	  an	  equal	  forum	  to	  those	  who	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  issue	  under	  scrutiny,	  
deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  serves	  a	  corrective	  purpose	  and	  can	  also	  serve	  a	  maieutic	  
purpose—the	  dialogue	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  give	  birth	  to	  new	  and	  innovative	  ideas.	  
Deliberation	  is	  a	  constructivist	  dialogue	  and	  as	  such	  can	  deal	  with	  the	  pluralist	  nature	  of	  
associations	  between	  alternative	  worldviews.	  	  But	  it	  is	  not	  only	  constructivist;	  it	  is	  also	  foxy,	  in	  
that	  deliberation	  need	  not	  be	  governed	  by	  a	  rubric	  oriented	  to	  one	  big	  idea.	  	  In	  an	  inclusive	  
deliberation,	  it	  is	  public	  reasons	  and	  reasoning	  rather	  than	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  deliberative	  
participants	  that	  determines	  the	  strength	  or	  weakness	  of	  claims	  and	  support.	  	  Legitimacy	  rests	  
on	  the	  conditions	  of	  equality	  in	  deliberative	  processes,	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  boundaries	  of	  
overlapping	  consensus.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  liberal	  principles	  play	  a	  role	  in	  deliberative	  decision-­‐
making;	  however,	  those	  principles	  or	  the	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  they	  imply	  need	  not	  
function	  to	  exclude	  groups	  who	  find	  themselves	  outside	  the	  umbrella	  of	  overlapping	  consensus,	  
or	  their	  claims	  before	  they	  have	  been	  given	  a	  proper	  hearing	  and	  have	  been	  understood	  by	  
others	  participating	  in	  the	  deliberation.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  is	  a	  political	  process	  that	  seeks	  coherence	  between	  different	  
worldviews	  without	  bringing	  arguments	  under	  a	  homogenous	  ideal	  of	  reason.	  	  However,	  in	  a	  
deliberation	  where	  substantive	  equality	  is	  subordinate	  to	  norms	  of	  public	  reason,	  some	  
individuals	  and	  groups	  may	  be	  excluded	  from	  political	  dialogue.	  	  Minority	  groups,	  whose	  
worldview	  differs	  significantly	  from	  the	  majority,	  may	  be	  unjustly	  excluded	  from	  decision-­‐
making	  when	  equality	  is	  subordinate	  to	  norms	  of	  character	  and	  standards	  of	  reasonableness.	  	  
Inclusive	  public	  reason,	  if	  it	  is	  public,	  must	  make	  room	  for	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  character	  types,	  
alternative	  forms	  of	  argument	  and	  divergent	  reasoning	  styles.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  recognition	  and	  
realization	  of	  procedural	  and	  substantive	  equality	  is	  necessary	  to	  facilitate	  reasonable	  
deliberative	  decision-­‐making.	  	  	  
Deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  bridge	  intercultural	  divides	  and	  
thereby	  offers	  a	  means	  to	  deliver	  on	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  genuinely	  pluralist	  society.	  	  I	  have	  argued,	  
however,	  that	  when	  a	  deliberation	  fails	  to	  meet	  the	  conditions	  of	  equality	  it	  cannot	  be	  a	  
process	  of	  public	  reason	  because	  the	  exclusion	  of	  participants	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  are	  
unequal	  cannot	  be	  justified.	  	  To	  deny	  inclusion	  to	  citizens	  who	  bear	  civic	  burdens	  and	  have	  
compelling	  reasons	  for	  their	  point	  of	  view	  is	  to	  deny	  their	  equality.	  	  When	  reasonableness	  sets	  
limits	  on	  the	  character	  of	  deliberative	  participants,	  individuals	  may	  be	  unjustly	  excluded.	  	  When	  
a	  particular	  conceptual	  framework	  restricts	  the	  allowable	  content	  of	  political	  deliberation,	  
those	  arguing	  from	  an	  alternative	  worldview	  may	  be	  illegitimately	  disadvantaged.	  	  When	  
standards	  of	  reasoning	  constrain	  the	  way	  in	  which	  claims	  can	  be	  structured,	  minority	  groups	  
may	  be	  unjustly	  denied	  equal	  status,	  access	  and	  influence	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
One	  does	  not	  have	  to	  look	  far	  to	  find	  times	  and	  places	  where	  the	  reasons	  of	  slaves,	  
migrant	  workers,	  disability	  groups,	  ethnic	  groups,	  women	  and	  other	  marginalized	  groups	  were,	  
and	  are	  still	  in	  some	  cases,	  characterized	  as	  unreasonable	  or	  irrelevant	  and	  therefore	  not	  
worthy	  of	  political	  recognition.	  	  Procedural	  and	  substantive	  equality	  shapes	  deliberative	  
processes	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  tied	  to	  one	  particular	  idiom,	  a	  particular	  argument	  
form,	  reasoning	  style	  or	  conceptual	  framework	  privileged	  by	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  deliberative	  
dialogue.	  	  Deliberative	  equality	  focuses	  not	  only	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  individual	  but	  on	  relational	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equalities	  as	  well.	  	  Consequently,	  deliberative	  equality	  requires	  the	  procedural	  recognition	  of	  
deeply	  divergent	  worldviews.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  inclusive	  public	  reason	  of	  deliberative	  processes	  
makes	  room	  for	  alternative	  worldviews,	  reasoning	  styles	  and	  content	  in	  political	  decision-­‐
making.	  	  	  
	   	  
	  161	  
	  
Chapter	  5:	  	  Political	  Identity	  
One	  of	  the	  more	  controversial	  elements	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  deliberating	  
public	  issues	  not	  only	  produces	  the	  most	  just	  outcomes	  possible	  under	  a	  given	  set	  of	  
circumstances,	  but	  also	  that	  deliberating	  public	  issues	  produces	  better	  citizens.	  	  In	  the	  simplest	  
terms,	  it	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  deliberating	  with	  fellow	  citizens	  tempers	  self-­‐interest	  by	  encouraging	  
a	  civically	  responsible	  outlook.	  	  Through	  the	  process	  of	  reasoning	  together,	  citizens	  are	  more	  
inclined	  to	  orient	  their	  thinking	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  group	  deliberating	  rather	  than	  their	  own	  
individually	  constituted	  interests.	  	  This	  process,	  of	  changing	  minds,	  is	  what	  I	  call	  the	  
transformative	  feature	  of	  deliberative	  processes.	  	  	  
	   For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  discussion,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  citizens	  are	  transformed	  through	  
political	  dialogue.	  	  I	  consider	  it	  uncontroversial	  to	  say	  that	  reasoning	  together	  does	  have	  an	  
effect	  on	  the	  way	  citizens	  see	  the	  world	  and	  each	  other.	  	  What	  is	  controversial	  is	  what	  sort	  of	  
change	  might	  occur;	  to	  what	  degree	  minds	  might	  be	  changed	  and	  how	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  
change	  that	  occurs	  is	  positive	  or	  negative.	  	  Also	  at	  issue	  are	  questions	  about	  the	  depth	  of	  the	  
change:	  	  Is	  it	  merely	  a	  change	  that	  occurs	  at	  the	  level	  of	  political	  association,	  or	  is	  the	  individual	  
fundamentally	  altered	  in	  the	  process?	  	  With	  regard	  to	  minority	  rights,	  the	  transformative	  
feature	  poses	  questions	  with	  regard	  to	  identity.	  	  For	  some,	  certain	  beliefs	  and	  values	  that	  may	  
play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  their	  political	  convictions	  are	  constitutive	  of	  their	  identity.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  
they	  are	  reluctant	  to	  commit	  to	  a	  deliberative	  process	  if	  that	  process	  requires	  key	  facets	  of	  their	  
identity	  are	  subject	  to	  revision	  according	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  dialogue.	  	  When	  a	  deliberative	  
process	  makes	  such	  demands	  on	  participants,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  the	  transformative	  
requirement	  may	  function	  to	  exclude	  certain	  groups	  from	  participating	  in	  the	  dialogue.	  
To	  begin	  this	  chapter	  in	  5.1,	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  transformation	  and	  
legitimacy	  and	  argue	  that	  certain	  groups	  or	  individuals	  are	  illegitimately	  excluded	  when	  
legitimacy	  is	  dependent	  on	  a	  comprehensive	  notion	  of	  transformation.	  	  A	  lesser	  degree	  of	  
transformation	  occurs	  in	  reasonable	  deliberations,	  but	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  legitimate	  
deliberative	  outcomes.	  	  Independent	  of	  transformative	  necessity,	  deliberative	  legitimacy	  is	  tied	  
to	  the	  social	  and	  institutional	  conditions	  which	  facilitate	  free	  dialogue	  between	  equal	  citizens	  
who	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  issue	  under	  deliberation.	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Then,	  in	  5.2	  I	  look	  at	  the	  question	  of	  identity.	  	  In	  the	  preceding	  section,	  I	  argued	  that	  
deliberative	  legitimacy	  should	  be	  tied	  to	  the	  relational	  equalities	  of	  participants	  rather	  than	  the	  
character	  of	  participants,	  their	  capacity	  for	  transformation	  or	  their	  reasonableness.	  	  While	  5.1	  is	  
primarily	  concerned	  with	  making	  it	  possible	  to	  deliberate	  without	  putting	  demands	  on	  features	  
associated	  with	  the	  identity	  of	  participants,	  the	  worry	  addressed	  in	  5.2	  will	  be	  that	  by	  taking	  
character	  and	  disposition	  out	  of	  the	  process,	  there	  is	  inadequate	  recognition	  of	  identity	  in	  
decision-­‐making.	  	  However,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  identity	  reaches	  deep	  resources	  that	  are	  
indispensible	  to	  a	  successful	  deliberation;	  resources	  including	  the	  package	  of	  traditions,	  values	  
and	  beliefs	  that	  have	  shaped	  the	  participants	  identity	  and	  informed	  their	  character	  and	  
disposition.	  	  If	  a	  deliberative	  process	  is	  to	  facilitate	  the	  type	  of	  dialogue	  that	  can	  overcome	  the	  
minority	  rights	  paradox,	  it	  must	  include	  identity	  as	  an	  explanatory	  mechanism	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
inter-­‐participant	  recognition,	  which	  supports	  requirements	  such	  as	  respect	  and	  understanding,	  
rather	  than	  a	  criterion	  of	  exclusion.	  	  
5.1	  Transformation	  and	  Legitimacy	  
In	  deliberative	  politics,	  transformation	  occurs	  in	  various	  ways.	  	  An	  individual’s	  preferences	  or	  
interests	  may	  change,	  or	  it	  may	  be	  that	  only	  the	  representation	  of	  a	  participant’s	  beliefs	  or	  
values	  is	  altered,	  or	  in	  some	  cases,	  self-­‐understanding	  undergoes	  a	  radical	  shift.	  	  Barber	  argues	  
that	  deliberation	  is	  a	  politics	  of	  transformation	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  deliberative	  
outcome	  is	  dependent	  upon	  this	  transformative	  feature.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  argue	  that	  when	  
legitimacy	  is	  dependent	  upon	  a	  comprehensive	  notion	  of	  transformation,	  it	  is	  bound	  to	  exclude	  
some	  individuals	  and	  groups.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  inclusion	  in	  dialogues	  about	  minority	  rights	  
suggests	  that	  transformation	  is	  better	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  deliberative	  activity	  rather	  
than	  central	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  deliberative	  outcomes.	  	  Independent	  of	  transformative	  
necessity,	  deliberative	  legitimacy	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  social	  and	  institutional	  conditions	  which	  
facilitate	  free	  dialogue	  between	  equal	  citizens	  who	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  issue	  under	  
deliberation.	  	  	  
	   The	  role	  of	  transformation	  in	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  is	  particularly	  problematic	  in	  
intercultural	  dialogues.	  	  Complications	  arise	  not	  only	  because	  cultural	  differences	  can	  
complicate	  communications	  by	  generating	  misunderstandings	  and	  misrecognition,	  but	  also	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because	  the	  role	  cultural	  difference	  should	  play	  in	  political	  dialogue	  is	  not	  clear.	  	  For	  example,	  
Turner	  calls	  for	  a	  critical	  Indigenous	  philosophy,	  one	  that	  is	  as	  distinct	  from	  European	  traditions	  
as	  the	  philosophy	  of	  the	  Upanishads	  is	  from	  the	  Kantian	  tradition.	  	  The	  degrees	  of	  difference	  
present	  in	  Western	  intelligentsia	  suggest	  that	  Indigenous	  philosophy	  need	  not	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  
something	  radically	  distinct.	  	  Instead,	  Indigenous	  thought	  and	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  thought	  
should	  have	  the	  intellectual	  space	  to	  contest	  its	  own	  presuppositions	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  
schools	  of	  thought.346	  	  	  
This	  process	  requires	  that	  Aboriginal	  intellectuals	  become	  educated	  in	  the	  European	  
philosophical	  tradition	  before	  they	  can	  give	  voice	  to	  distinctly	  Aboriginal	  worldviews	  and	  ways	  
of	  thinking.	  	  These	  ‘word	  warriors’	  bring	  about	  intercultural	  understanding	  through	  coming	  to	  
know	  both	  the	  uniquely	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  own	  Aboriginal	  standpoint	  in	  order	  
to	  bridge	  the	  philosophical	  divide	  in	  deliberations	  with	  majority	  culture.347	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  First	  
Nations	  come	  to	  understand	  the	  history	  of	  cultural	  domination	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  both	  
the	  oppressed	  and	  their	  oppressors.	  	  Increasing	  understanding	  in	  this	  way,	  Turner	  suggests,	  will	  
have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  understandings	  of	  self	  and	  other	  for	  both	  Aboriginals	  and	  majority	  
culture.	  
Unique	  and	  distinct,	  each	  participant	  is	  transformed	  by	  coming	  to	  understand	  the	  
reasons	  and	  reasoning	  of	  alternative	  worldviews	  through	  the	  course	  of	  a	  deliberation.	  	  This	  
raises	  an	  interesting	  question	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  legitimacy	  and	  transformation.	  	  If	  
transformation	  is	  necessary	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  deliberation,	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  deliberation	  
might	  endanger,	  rather	  than	  protect,	  minority	  culture.	  	  Turner’s	  ‘word	  warriors’	  might	  be	  
transformed	  such	  that	  their	  interests	  harmonize	  with	  other	  participants	  at	  the	  expense,	  rather	  
than	  benefit,	  of	  the	  culture	  for	  which	  they	  are	  meant	  to	  speak.	  	  In	  seeking	  intercultural	  
consensus,	  the	  farther	  apart	  participants	  are,	  the	  farther	  they	  both	  have	  to	  come.	  	  
Deliberationists	  like	  Barber	  suggest	  that	  transformation	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  dialogue	  to	  
produce	  a	  legitimate	  outcome.	  	  In	  contrast,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  when	  legitimacy	  is	  dependent	  upon	  
transformation,	  the	  result	  is	  an	  exclusive,	  rather	  than	  inclusive,	  political	  dialogue.	  	  Although	  the	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  Dale	  Turner,	  Peace	  Pipe,	  100.	  
347	  There	  is	  also	  a	  burden	  on	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  thinkers	  to	  become	  educated	  in	  Aboriginal	  modes	  of	  thought.	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relationship	  between	  transformation	  and	  legitimacy	  may	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  
deliberation,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  transformation	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  deliberative	  legitimacy.	  
From	  the	  core	  features	  of	  deliberation	  outlined	  in	  3.1,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  deliberation	  must	  
include	  all	  interested	  parties	  regardless	  of	  social	  or	  economic	  status	  or	  position;	  it	  must	  include	  
reasons	  for	  claims,	  even	  those	  from	  divergent	  worldviews	  or	  cultural	  contexts;	  and	  it	  must	  
include	  divergent	  reasoning	  styles,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  making	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  claims	  
equally	  available	  for	  critical	  review	  through	  the	  dialogical	  process.	  	  This	  sort	  of	  inclusion	  is	  not	  
merely	  formal;	  it	  is	  a	  robust	  recognition	  of	  differences	  in	  communication	  practices,	  value	  
systems	  and	  reasoning	  styles.	  	  Hence,	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  tension	  
between	  transformation,	  inclusion	  and	  legitimacy.	  	  If	  transformation	  is	  necessary,	  then	  those	  
unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  be	  transformed	  are	  excluded;	  however,	  if	  those	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  be	  
transformed	  are	  included,	  they	  may	  very	  well	  be	  unable	  to	  participate	  in	  good	  faith	  and	  as	  a	  
result	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  dialogue	  is	  called	  into	  question.	  	  A	  great	  deal	  hinges,	  I	  will	  contend,	  
on	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  transformation	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  minds	  must	  be	  changed	  to	  legitimate	  a	  
deliberative	  process.	  	  	  
Transformation	  and	  Exclusion	  
When	  legitimacy	  is	  dependent	  upon	  transformation,	  I	  will	  argue	  the	  transformative	  feature	  can	  
become	  a	  device	  of	  exclusion	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  a	  deliberation	  so	  constituted	  poses	  significant	  
problems	  for	  minority	  claims.	  	  In	  order	  to	  show	  the	  link	  between	  transformation	  and	  legitimacy,	  
I	  first	  look	  at	  Stokes’	  account	  of	  deliberative	  pathologies.	  	  These	  pathologies	  arise,	  I	  will	  argue,	  
because	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  the	  way	  preferences	  are	  transformed.	  	  Rather	  than	  undermine	  
the	  legitimacy	  of	  deliberative	  processes,	  these	  pathologies	  are	  symptomatic	  of	  an	  illegitimate	  
deliberative	  process.	  	  The	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  deliberative	  outcome	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  
legitimate	  transformation	  of	  preferences.	  	  	  	  
Stokes	  characterizes	  deliberation	  as	  "the	  endogenous	  change	  of	  preferences	  resulting	  
from	  communication."348	  	  If	  so,	  then	  how	  those	  preferences	  are	  transformed	  is	  inextricably	  
linked	  with	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  deliberation.	  	  On	  this	  point	  I	  agree,	  the	  illegitimate	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  Susan	  C.	  Stokes,	  "Pathologies	  of	  Deliberation,"	  Deliberative	  Democracy,	  ed.	  Jon	  Elster,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1998),	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transformation	  of	  preferences	  results	  in	  illegitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes.	  	  Legitimacy,	  then,	  
comes	  about	  when	  preferences	  have	  been	  legitimately	  altered.	  	  Stokes	  looks	  at	  the	  results	  of	  
political	  dialogues	  in	  mass	  communications	  which	  influence	  what	  people	  believe	  is	  good	  for	  
themselves	  individually,	  good	  for	  other	  individuals	  and	  good	  for	  everyone	  collectively.	  	  These	  
beliefs	  are	  also	  informed	  by	  our	  expectations—the	  effects	  we	  expect	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  our	  
decisions.	  	  Hence,	  mass	  communication	  influences	  not	  only	  what	  we	  believe	  is	  good	  but	  also	  
what	  we	  believe	  will	  bring	  about	  the	  good.349	  	  Public	  deliberation,	  then,	  can	  potentially	  
influence	  beliefs	  on	  two	  levels.	  	  The	  concern	  is	  that	  some	  participants	  may	  exercise	  this	  
influence	  and	  deliberately	  mislead	  citizens	  for	  their	  own	  personal	  gain.	  	  Consequently,	  
deliberation	  "may	  induce	  people	  to	  hold	  causal	  beliefs	  that	  are	  both	  inaccurate	  and	  promote	  
the	  interest	  of	  the	  sender	  of	  the	  message."350	  	  Stokes	  identifies	  several	  ways	  that	  citizen’s	  
preferences	  are	  illegitimately	  transformed	  through	  this	  kind	  of	  public	  deliberation.	  
First,	  the	  preferences	  of	  voters	  should	  frame	  political	  debate;	  however,	  politicians	  are	  
not	  beholden	  to	  public	  opinion;	  instead,	  some	  politicians	  wilfully	  shape	  public	  opinion.	  	  Public	  
opinion	  is	  often	  swayed	  by	  an	  elite	  few	  who	  shape	  mass	  communications.	  	  Elite	  debate	  
transforms	  public	  opinion,	  which	  in	  turn	  shapes	  government	  policy.	  	  Politicians	  draw	  upon	  the	  
values	  and	  preferences	  of	  citizens	  in	  order	  to	  frame	  the	  debate	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  can	  lead	  
citizens	  to	  the	  preferences	  that	  serve	  their	  political	  aims	  in	  two	  ways.	  In	  some	  cases,	  legislators	  
deliberately	  mislead	  the	  public	  for	  their	  own	  interests.	  	  For	  example,	  they	  intervene	  in	  public	  
debate	  to	  insert	  false	  beliefs	  about	  a	  policy	  they	  do	  not	  support.	  	  In	  other	  cases,	  legislators	  may	  
be,	  in	  some	  cases,	  simply	  wrong	  about	  public	  preferences.	  	  They	  take	  action	  on	  these	  perceived	  
pseudo-­‐preferences	  and	  that	  action	  affects	  the	  public's	  preferences.	  
Second,	  special	  interest	  groups	  sway	  communication	  against	  a	  policy,	  which	  influences	  
citizen’s	  preferences,	  which	  in	  turn	  undermine	  the	  policy.	  	  This	  commonly	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
lobby	  representing	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  either	  a	  politician	  or	  industry.	  	  The	  lobby	  supports	  
a	  politician	  who	  furthers	  their	  interests	  by	  swaying	  public	  perceptions	  about	  voter	  preferences.	  	  
In	  other	  cases,	  special	  interest	  groups	  oppose	  a	  policy	  and	  political	  representatives	  mistakenly	  
perceive	  this	  opposition	  as	  public	  opinion	  and	  consequently	  take	  action	  against	  the	  policy.	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Stokes	  argues	  that	  these	  examples	  of	  action	  taken	  on	  perceived	  pseudo-­‐interests	  
transforming	  the	  debate	  (when	  the	  public's	  preferences	  are	  misinterpreted	  as	  a	  result	  of	  special	  
interest	  intervention	  and	  the	  media's	  response	  to	  that	  intervention)	  give	  an	  impression	  of	  
public	  deliberation	  as	  a	  process	  of	  chasing	  shadows.351	  	  She	  may	  be	  right;	  such	  a	  deliberation	  is	  
conducted	  at	  a	  level	  that	  seems	  far	  from	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  issue.	  	  However,	  I	  am	  not	  convinced	  
that	  these	  examples	  are	  anything	  but	  examples	  of	  deliberation	  gone	  wrong.	  	  These	  pathologies	  
give	  us	  examples	  of	  un-­‐deliberative	  publicity	  and	  un-­‐deliberative	  reason	  precisely	  because	  the	  
reasons	  and	  interests	  of	  participants	  must	  be	  available	  for	  public	  scrutiny	  in	  order	  to	  garner	  
public	  approval.	  	  There	  is	  a	  burden	  of	  participating	  in	  good	  faith	  that	  limits	  the	  legitimacy	  claims	  
made	  purely	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  self-­‐interest.	  	  When	  the	  transformation	  of	  preferences	  occurs	  by	  
un-­‐deliberative	  means,	  the	  outcome	  is	  illegitimate.	  	  Hence,	  what	  these	  examples	  give	  us	  is	  a	  
picture	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  transformation	  and	  deliberative	  legitimacy,	  or	  in	  this	  case,	  
illegitimacy.	  	  If	  the	  preferences	  of	  citizens	  are	  transformed	  illegitimately,	  (as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  self-­‐
interested	  influence	  exerted	  by	  politicians	  or	  special	  interest	  groups)	  then	  the	  outcome,	  the	  
resulting	  policy	  decision	  is	  illegitimate.	  	  	  
	   If	  this	  were	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  transformation	  and	  legitimacy,	  there	  
would	  be	  no	  tension	  between	  the	  transformative	  feature	  and	  inclusion.	  	  However,	  on	  some	  
accounts,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  deliberation	  is	  not	  only	  dependent	  on	  the	  legitimate	  
transformation	  of	  preferences.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  preferences,	  on	  Barber’s	  
account,	  deliberative	  participants	  must	  be	  willing	  to	  be	  transformed	  by	  the	  deliberative	  
process.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  individuals	  or	  groups	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  adopt	  the	  appropriate	  
disposition,	  i.e.	  a	  willingness	  to	  be	  transformed	  by	  the	  process,	  are	  excluded	  from	  deliberations.	  	  
According	  to	  Barber,	  deliberative	  processes	  are	  genuinely	  independent	  of	  external,	  pre-­‐
political	  grounds.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  argues,	  transformation	  is	  not	  merely	  possible	  but	  instead	  is	  
unavoidable—it	  is	  a	  politics	  of	  transformation	  through	  public	  participation.352	  	  For	  some	  liberal	  
democrats,	  politics	  is	  about	  rational	  choice	  and	  consequently	  voting	  is	  the	  central	  activity.	  	  In	  
contrast,	  deliberative	  democrats	  like	  Barber	  do	  not	  recognize	  the	  centrality	  of	  quantified	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351	  Ibid.,	  132.	  
352	  Barber,	  Strong,	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choice.353	  	  Rather	  than	  choice,	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  is	  predicated	  on	  will	  and	  will	  
formation—on	  judgment	  rather	  than	  selection.	  	  Consequently,	  deliberation	  is	  the	  language	  of	  
legitimate	  willing	  rather	  than	  the	  language	  of	  right	  choosing.354	  	  Preferences	  are	  not	  merely	  
chosen,	  they	  are	  not	  merely	  changed,	  they	  are	  actively	  transformed.	  
To	  better	  understand	  transformative	  demands	  Barber	  expects	  from	  deliberators,	  it	  is	  
helpful	  to	  look	  at	  his	  view	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  individuals.	  	  Individuals	  are	  socially	  constructed	  
and	  as	  such	  have	  a	  dialectical	  character	  shaped	  by	  social	  relations	  and	  the	  social	  world	  they	  
construct.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Barber	  argues	  that	  "human	  self-­‐realization	  through	  mutual	  
transformation	  [is]	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  democratic	  process."355	  	  In	  the	  following	  quote,	  Barber	  
defines	  deliberation	  in	  terms	  of	  transformation:	  
Strong	  democracy	  in	  the	  participatory	  mode	  resolves	  conflict	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  
independent	  ground	  through	  a	  participatory	  process	  of	  ongoing,	  proximate	  self-­‐
legislating	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  political	  community	  capable	  of	  transforming	  dependent	  
private	  individuals	  into	  free	  citizens	  and	  partial	  and	  private	  interests	  into	  public	  
goods.356	  	  	  
	  	  
There	  are	  several	  elements	  in	  this,	  what	  I	  call,	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  transformation;	  
however,	  Barber	  does	  not	  give	  an	  account	  of	  what	  he	  means	  by	  transformation.	  	  At	  first	  blush,	  
it	  seems	  the	  word	  ‘change’	  would	  be	  an	  adequate	  substitute	  for	  ‘transformation’	  in	  all	  its	  
forms.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case;	  there	  are	  at	  least	  three	  transformative	  elements	  at	  work	  
in	  this	  definition.	  	  	  	  
First,	  individuals	  are	  transformed.	  	  By	  developing	  deliberative	  capacities,	  private	  
individuals	  identify	  more	  with	  their	  roles	  as	  citizens	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  become	  free	  citizens.357	  	  In	  
this	  case,	  transformation	  indicates	  a	  change	  in	  the	  individual	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  or	  her	  former	  
self,	  which	  is	  brought	  about	  by	  deliberative	  activity.	  	  The	  thought	  process	  of	  individuals	  is	  freed	  
from	  the	  shackles	  of	  isolation;	  constituents	  are	  transformed	  into	  citizens	  through	  the	  processes	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of	  ‘common	  seeing’	  and	  ‘common	  work’.358	  	  The	  ‘commons’	  here	  is	  more	  than	  merely	  the	  
rhetoric	  of	  teamwork;	  it	  takes	  on	  the	  character	  of	  an	  empathetic	  and	  shared	  understanding.	  	  
For	  Barber	  'citizen'	  is	  a	  title	  not	  conferred	  by	  a	  political	  system	  but	  rather,	  it	  is	  earned	  by	  the	  
private	  individual	  through	  deliberative	  activity.	  	  Through	  engaging	  in	  political	  activity,	  
individuals	  grow	  less	  concerned	  about	  their	  private	  preferences	  and	  interests	  as	  they	  come	  to	  
understand	  their	  political	  disposition	  toward	  fellow	  citizens.	  	  	  
Second,	  private	  interests	  that	  are	  in	  conflict	  are	  transformed	  into	  public	  goods	  and	  there	  
is	  deliberative	  consensus	  about	  the	  best	  way	  to	  bring	  about	  those	  public	  goods.	  	  Hence,	  conflict	  
is	  transformed	  into	  cooperative	  enterprise.	  	  However,	  this	  stops	  short	  of	  suggesting	  that	  private	  
interests	  are	  fundamentally	  changed,	  or	  that	  the	  conflict	  itself	  is	  altered.	  	  It	  seems	  to	  suggest	  
that	  private	  interests	  and	  conflict	  are	  merely	  represented	  differently	  to	  facilitate	  cooperation.	  	  	  
Deliberation	  begins	  at	  the	  point	  of	  conflict;	  if	  there	  were	  consensus	  then	  deliberation	  
would	  be	  redundant	  and	  unnecessary.	  	  Young	  explains	  that	  deliberation	  is	  not	  an	  attempt	  to	  
gain	  support	  by	  drawing	  upon	  shared	  values	  and	  traditions	  nor	  does	  deliberation	  require	  a	  
commonality	  like	  nationalism	  to	  get	  off	  the	  ground.	  	  If	  there	  is	  already	  sufficient	  agreement	  on	  
a	  range	  of	  concepts	  pertaining	  to	  the	  citizen,	  then	  the	  transformative	  function	  of	  the	  
deliberation	  is	  unnecessary.	  	  Appeals	  need	  not	  draw	  upon	  pre-­‐existing	  shared	  uncontested	  
concepts;	  in	  contrast,	  concepts	  are	  transformed	  through	  deliberative	  exchange.359	  	  Participants	  
enter	  into	  a	  deliberation	  in	  good	  faith,	  not	  to	  abandon	  their	  interests,	  not	  to	  dissolve	  conflict,	  
but	  to	  overcome	  the	  paralyzing	  effects	  of	  conflict	  by	  representing	  their	  private	  interests	  
publicly.	  	  	  
Finally,	  Barber	  suggests	  that	  partial	  and	  private	  interests	  are	  transformed	  into	  public	  
goods.	  	  In	  this	  formulation	  of	  transformation,	  realizing	  public	  goods	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  
transformation	  of	  participant's	  interests,	  not	  merely	  a	  difference	  in	  representation,	  but	  a	  deep	  
transformation	  of	  the	  individual	  from	  ‘atom’	  to	  citizen.	  	  The	  politics	  of	  participation	  is	  
transformed	  and	  transforms	  participants	  as	  the	  preferences,	  values	  and	  opinions	  of	  individuals	  
are	  legitimized	  only	  through	  public	  deliberation.360	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The	  relationship	  between	  transformation	  and	  legitimacy	  we	  get	  from	  Barber	  can	  be	  
summed	  up	  as	  follows:	  	  The	  interests,	  preferences,	  will,	  deliberative	  capacities,	  values,	  opinions	  
and	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  deliberative	  participants	  and	  the	  issue	  under	  deliberation	  must	  be	  
subject	  to	  transformation	  to	  legitimate	  the	  deliberative	  outcome.	  	  In	  order	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  
deliberative	  process,	  then,	  one	  must	  be	  willing	  to	  be	  transformed,	  quite	  deeply	  transformed.	  	  
Similarly,	  Young	  argues	  that	  inclusion	  motivates	  this	  kind	  of	  deep	  transformation	  by	  enlarging	  
thought	  through	  the	  exchange	  of	  a	  plurality	  of	  viewpoints.361	  	  	  
But	  it	  isn’t	  clear	  to	  me	  how	  the	  plurality	  of	  viewpoints	  would	  carry	  any	  weight	  in	  a	  
deliberation	  when	  transformation	  as	  so	  closely	  linked	  with	  legitimacy	  as	  Young	  (and	  perhaps	  in	  
a	  much	  stronger	  way	  Barber)	  suggest.	  	  Substantive	  inclusion,	  on	  Young’s	  account,	  requires	  a	  
disposition	  of	  the	  deliberative	  participants;	  they	  must	  deliberate	  with	  an	  "open	  mind."362	  	  
Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  similarly	  argue	  that	  deliberation	  requires	  that	  participants	  adopt	  a	  
“disposition	  toward	  openness.”363	  	  I	  concede	  that	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  openness	  is	  vital	  to	  
successful	  deliberation;	  however,	  openness	  to	  comprehensive	  transformation	  requires	  a	  
disposition	  that	  poses	  a	  significant	  problem	  for	  individuals	  or	  groups	  who	  hold	  fast	  to	  what	  they	  
consider	  certain	  un-­‐revisable	  beliefs	  or	  values.	  	  The	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins	  case	  from	  chapter	  one	  is	  
a	  good	  example.364	  	  The	  open-­‐mindedness	  necessary	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  deliberation,	  Fish	  
argues,	  excludes	  the	  fundamentalist	  parents	  because	  they	  cannot	  commit	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  
deliberation	  if	  the	  process	  requires	  that	  their	  values	  or	  beliefs	  are	  transformed,	  or	  that	  they	  
make	  their	  deeply	  felt	  values	  or	  beliefs	  available	  for	  transformation	  during	  the	  process.365	  	  	  
Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  respond	  that	  exclusion	  is	  not	  always	  bad;	  on	  the	  contrary	  in	  
some	  cases	  exclusion	  is	  well	  justified.	  	  Appeals	  to	  biblical	  precepts	  that	  support	  racial	  
discrimination,	  for	  example,	  are	  excluded	  from	  policy	  deliberations	  because	  institutionalized	  
racial	  discrimination	  violates	  the	  basic	  civil	  liberties	  of	  parties	  who	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  the	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deliberation.366	  	  Reasons	  that	  violate	  the	  freedoms	  of	  others	  in	  a	  deliberation	  are	  subject	  to	  
evaluation	  as	  good	  or	  bad	  reasons	  by	  all	  parties	  concerned.	  	  If	  participants	  are	  unwilling	  to	  
subject	  their	  reasons	  to	  transformation	  through	  public	  dialogue	  they	  are	  simply	  not	  
deliberating,	  and	  in	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson’s	  view	  are	  legitimately	  excluded.	  	  Hence,	  the	  
transformative	  necessity	  excludes	  participants	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  inability	  or	  unwillingness	  to	  
adopt	  the	  appropriate	  disposition—a	  disposition	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  transformation	  of	  a	  
participants	  self-­‐understanding.	  	  	  
In	  sum,	  if	  deliberation	  is	  what	  Barber	  (and	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  Young)	  say	  it	  is—it	  is	  a	  
politics	  of	  transformation	  and	  transformation	  is	  unavoidable;	  and	  deliberation	  only	  occurs	  
where	  there	  is	  conflict;	  and	  this	  conflict	  is	  the	  result	  of	  divergent	  preferences,	  beliefs,	  self-­‐
understanding,	  etc.;	  and	  those	  preferences,	  beliefs,	  self-­‐understanding,	  etc.	  must	  be	  
transformed	  to	  reach	  deliberative	  consensus;	  and	  outcomes	  are	  only	  legitimate	  when	  
individuals	  reach	  a	  point	  of	  consensus;	  then	  a	  legitimate	  deliberative	  outcome	  is	  only	  possible	  
when	  comprehensive	  transformation	  occurs.	  	  Consequently,	  participants	  must	  adopt	  the	  
appropriate	  disposition	  toward	  openness	  that	  will	  allow	  for	  the	  transformative	  requirement.	  	  	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  excluding	  individuals	  who	  are	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  adopt	  the	  disposition	  
toward	  openness,	  comprehensive	  transformation	  may	  subvert	  the	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  
individuals	  as	  socially	  constructed	  citizens.	  	  Proponents	  of	  deliberation	  who	  suggest	  that	  the	  
participants’	  self-­‐understanding	  is	  transformed	  through	  the	  process	  often	  neglect	  the	  potential	  
for	  a	  negative	  transformation.	  	  According	  to	  Stokes,	  a	  citizen's	  beliefs	  about	  his	  or	  her	  
capacities,	  needs	  and	  interests	  could	  in	  fact	  be	  corrupted	  and	  undermined	  through	  deliberation	  
just	  as	  easily	  as	  they	  could	  be	  improved	  and	  refined.367	  	  Political	  parties	  strategically	  attempt	  to	  
influence	  identity	  formation	  through	  carefully	  crafted	  narratives.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  political	  
strategy	  is	  so	  effective	  that	  citizens	  believe	  the	  societal	  narrative	  they	  are	  taught	  to	  believe	  
even	  when	  it	  runs	  contrary	  to	  their	  own	  intuitions	  and	  experience.	  
For	  example,	  there	  are	  two	  narratives	  about	  welfare	  recipients	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  
liberal	  narrative	  suggests	  that	  poverty	  is	  a	  cycle,	  one	  that	  is	  very	  hard	  to	  break	  out	  of	  without	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366	  Amy	  Gutmann	  and	  Dennis	  Thompson,	  "Democratic	  Disagreement,"	  Deliberative	  Politics:	  Essays	  on	  Democracy	  
and	  Disgreement,	  ed.	  Stephen	  Macedo,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  258.	  
367	  Stokes,	  “Pathologies,”	  124.	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government	  programs.	  	  The	  conservative	  narrative	  suggests	  that	  poor	  people	  are	  not	  trying	  
hard	  enough	  because	  they	  are	  getting	  handouts	  from	  the	  government.368	  	  Although	  these	  
narratives	  are	  intended	  for	  middle-­‐class	  voters,	  they	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  welfare	  recipients	  and	  
how	  they	  see	  themselves	  and	  others	  in	  their	  community.	  	  Many	  want	  to	  disassociate	  
themselves	  from	  other	  welfare	  recipients,	  who	  they	  presume	  are	  lazy	  even	  though	  in	  their	  day-­‐
to-­‐day	  experience	  most	  of	  the	  other	  welfare	  recipients	  they	  know	  are	  very	  much	  like	  
themselves,	  working	  hard	  toward	  a	  better	  life.369	  	  This	  self-­‐understanding	  excludes	  welfare	  
recipients	  from	  their	  immediate	  community,	  which,	  on	  Barber’s	  view	  makes	  the	  deliberative	  
processes	  of	  common	  seeing	  and	  common	  work,	  which	  are	  necessary	  to	  realize	  citizenship,	  
unavailable.	  	  The	  tension	  here	  is	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  presumption	  that	  transformation	  is,	  in	  
itself,	  a	  good	  and	  necessary	  to	  legitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes.	  	  	  However,	  the	  welfare	  case	  
shows	  that	  deliberation	  may	  prove	  harmful	  to	  individuals	  and	  run	  contrary	  to	  deliberative	  aims	  
because	  the	  transformation	  of	  self-­‐understanding	  subverts,	  rather	  than	  promotes,	  deliberative	  
processes.	  	  
	  So	  far,	  I	  have	  questioned	  the	  idea	  that	  deliberation	  transforms	  individuals	  into	  better	  
citizens	  and	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  when	  legitimacy	  is	  dependent	  on	  a	  comprehensive	  notion	  of	  the	  
transformative	  feature,	  it	  can	  function	  as	  a	  device	  of	  exclusion.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  
features	  of	  a	  deliberation	  are	  such	  that	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  those	  claims	  and	  deliberative	  
outcomes	  may	  be	  determined	  independently	  of	  this	  comprehensive	  notion	  of	  transformation.	  	  	  
Legitimacy	  Independent	  of	  Transformation	  
Given	  the	  obstacles	  thrown	  up	  by	  a	  comprehensive	  transformative	  requirement,	  it	  stands	  to	  
reason	  that	  a	  deliberative	  process	  shaped	  by	  a	  subtler	  picture	  of	  the	  transformative	  feature	  
would	  be	  better	  suited	  to	  dialogues	  about	  minority	  rights—a	  type	  of	  deliberation	  without	  the	  
legitimacy	  of	  the	  process	  hanging	  in	  the	  balance.	  	  Transformation,	  I	  will	  argue,	  is	  better	  thought	  
of	  as	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  process	  rather	  than	  central	  to	  legitimacy.	  	  Legitimate	  decision-­‐making	  
is	  instead	  constituted	  by	  a	  free	  dialogue	  between	  equal	  members	  of	  an	  association.	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  Ibid.,	  134.	  
369	  Ibid.,	  135.	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In	  a	  deliberation,	  individual	  preferences	  do	  not	  stand	  as	  good	  reasons—the	  mere	  fact	  
that	  an	  individual	  prefers	  option	  X	  cannot	  be	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  adopting	  option	  X.	  	  Good	  
reasons,	  Cohen	  argues,	  must	  be	  public	  and	  persuasive	  to	  all	  participants.	  	  If	  a	  participant’s	  
reasons	  are	  not	  persuasive,	  their	  preferences	  and	  convictions	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  transformed	  into	  
something	  that	  carries	  more	  public	  force.370	  	  Hence,	  private	  desires	  are	  transformed	  into	  the	  
public	  interest	  (advancing	  the	  common	  good).371	  	  Transformation,	  in	  this	  sense,	  is	  more	  
instrumental	  and	  far	  less	  comprehensive.	  	  The	  transformation	  of	  preferences	  comes	  about	  as	  
the	  result	  of	  reasonableness;	  however,	  transformation	  is	  not	  the	  aim,	  nor	  is	  it	  necessary	  feature	  
of	  a	  reasonable	  deliberation.	  	  Cohen	  explains:	  
Though	  a	  deliberative	  view	  must	  assume	  that	  citizens	  are	  prepared	  to	  be	  moved	  by	  
reasons	  that	  may	  conflict	  with	  their	  antecedent	  preferences	  and	  interests,	  and	  that	  
being	  so	  moved	  may	  change	  those	  antecedent	  preferences	  and	  interests,	  it	  does	  not	  
suppose	  that	  political	  deliberation	  takes	  as	  its	  goal	  the	  alteration	  of	  preferences.372	  
	  
Similarly,	  transformation	  in	  Nino’s	  account	  has	  a	  limited	  role.	  	  A	  participant’s	  interests	  and	  
preferences	  are	  transformed	  in	  a	  dialogue,	  which	  promotes	  impartial	  positions	  while	  
constraining	  partial	  positions.	  	  Partial	  preferences	  are	  either	  transformed	  into	  impartial	  
preferences	  or	  have	  a	  limited	  place	  in	  the	  dialogue,	  i.e.	  partial	  preferences	  do	  not	  stand	  on	  
their	  own	  as	  good	  reasons	  for	  a	  position.373	  	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  participants	  must	  be	  open	  to	  
comprehensive	  transformation;	  participants	  do	  not	  find	  consensus	  by	  adopting	  a	  morally	  
neutral	  stance	  toward	  beliefs,	  values	  or	  different	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  life.374	  	  Deliberative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370	  This	  is	  obviously	  a	  controversial	  point,	  one	  that	  Christopher	  Hookway	  disagrees	  with	  in	  “Fallibilism	  and	  
Objectivity.”	  	  Hookway	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  securing	  consensus	  is	  of	  greater	  value	  than	  
maintaining	  one’s	  own	  substantive	  outlook	  when	  confronted	  by	  ethical	  inquirers.	  	  His	  concern	  seems	  relevant	  to	  
the	  concerns	  I	  raised	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  about	  the	  comprehensive	  transformation	  requirement.	  	  If	  deliberation	  
required	  that	  deeply	  felt	  moral	  principles	  be	  available	  for	  transformation,	  then	  individuals	  with	  strong	  moral	  
convictions	  would	  probably	  value	  their	  convictions	  more	  than	  proselytizing	  about	  those	  convictions.	  	  What	  Cohen	  
has	  in	  mind	  here	  however,	  is	  a	  simple	  instrumentally	  motivated	  idea.	  	  If	  you	  want	  to	  convince	  other	  people	  that	  
your	  way	  of	  thinking	  is	  correct,	  you	  talk	  to	  them	  in	  a	  way	  that	  they	  can	  understand,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  might	  persuade	  
them.	  	  The	  underlying	  presumption	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  moral	  convictions	  of	  the	  participants	  under	  deliberation;	  it	  
is	  the	  issue	  under	  discussion.	  	  The	  goal	  is	  not	  to	  convince	  others	  that	  your	  moral	  convictions	  are	  correct,	  the	  goal	  is	  
to	  make	  a	  decision.	  
371	  Cohen,	  “Legitimacy,”	  23-­‐24.	  
372	  Cohen,	  “Procedure,”	  100.	  
373	  Nino,	  Constitution,	  101.	  
374	  The	  reference	  to	  neutrality	  might	  seem	  somewhat	  loaded	  given	  Sandel’s	  reading	  (or	  mis-­‐reading)	  of	  Rawls,	  
which	  I	  realize,	  is	  controversial.	  	  In	  this	  case	  neutral	  is	  just...neutral.	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participants	  are	  not	  neutral;	  their	  preferences	  become	  impartial	  because	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  
what	  is	  good	  at	  play.	  	  What	  is	  good	  is	  that	  the	  conditions	  for	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  are	  
secure	  such	  that	  members	  of	  an	  association	  can	  expect	  to	  influence	  public	  policies	  that	  affect	  
them.	  	  Hence,	  participants	  are	  committed	  to	  norms	  that	  make	  deliberation	  possible	  because,	  as	  
Cohen	  puts	  it,	  “free	  deliberation	  among	  equals	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  legitimacy.”375	  	  	  
Recall	  from	  3.2,	  the	  relationship	  between	  freedom,	  equality	  and	  legitimacy	  shapes	  a	  
political	  dialogue	  that	  is	  inclusive	  enough	  to	  make	  a	  difference	  for	  minority	  groups.	  	  Recall	  from	  
4.1,	  part	  of	  what	  makes	  citizens	  equal	  is	  that	  each	  individual	  is	  recognized	  as	  equally	  capable	  of	  
making	  decisions	  regarding	  the	  exercise	  of	  power.	  	  Part	  of	  what	  makes	  citizens	  free,	  
deliberatively	  speaking,	  is	  that	  membership	  in	  an	  association	  is	  not	  dependent	  upon	  a	  particular	  
comprehensive	  moral	  doctrine	  nor	  is	  that	  doctrine	  the	  source	  of	  legitimacy.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  
citizens	  are	  free	  to	  choose	  and	  pursue	  multiple	  visions	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  	  Some	  have	  argued	  that	  
in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  moral	  doctrine	  legitimacy	  becomes	  entirely	  procedural—
that	  institutional	  design	  secures	  the	  freedom	  and	  equality	  of	  everyone	  regardless	  of	  their	  
values	  or	  beliefs.	  	  This	  deficiency	  fuels	  what	  Cohen	  calls	  the	  democratic	  dilemma.	  	  On	  one	  hand,	  
democracy	  is	  too	  procedural	  to	  account	  for	  legitimacy.	  	  Democratic	  choices	  are	  not	  necessarily	  
the	  right	  choices	  just	  because	  the	  procedure	  was	  followed.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  democracy	  does	  
not	  appear	  to	  allow	  any	  substantive	  content	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  legitimacy.376	  	  In	  a	  deliberative	  
conception,	  Cohen	  argues,	  "we	  can	  accommodate	  the	  fact	  of	  reasonable	  pluralism377	  without	  
endorsing	  a	  wholly	  procedural	  conception	  of	  democracy."378	  
Cohen	  puts	  forward	  three	  deliberative	  principles,	  of	  which	  the	  principle	  of	  deliberative	  
inclusion	  is	  salient	  to	  the	  transformative	  issue.	  	  It	  is	  not	  merely	  the	  interests	  of	  persons	  that	  are	  
given	  equal	  consideration;	  inclusion	  requires	  that	  reasons	  be	  given	  for	  those	  interests—reasons	  
that	  are	  acceptable	  to	  others.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  religious	  person	  does	  not	  see	  the	  obligations	  of	  
their	  religion	  as	  self-­‐imposed;	  in	  contrast,	  the	  believer	  takes	  the	  content	  of	  their	  intense	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375	  Cohen,	  “Legitimacy,”	  21-­‐22.	  
376	  Cohen,	  “Procedure,”	  96-­‐99.	  
377	  The	  fact	  of	  reasonable	  pluralism:	  The	  good-­‐faith	  exercise	  of	  practical	  reason,	  by	  people	  who	  are	  reasonable	  in	  
being	  concerned	  to	  live	  with	  others	  on	  terms	  that	  those	  others	  can	  accept,	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  convergence	  on	  one	  
particular	  philosophy	  of	  life.	  Cohen,	  “Procedure,”	  96.	  
378	  Ibid.,	  99.	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convictions	  to	  be	  true.	  	  The	  believer	  considers	  laws	  or	  institutional	  arrangements	  that	  
contravene	  those	  convictions	  unreasonable.	  	  Nonbelievers	  often	  dismiss	  religious	  convictions	  as	  
unreasonable	  but	  this	  sort	  of	  dismissal	  does	  not	  recognize	  the	  believer	  as	  an	  equal	  citizen	  with	  
equal	  deliberative	  capacities.379	  	  	  
	  If	  we	  revisit	  the	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins	  case	  in	  light	  of	  this	  principle,	  the	  difference	  between	  
legitimacy	  dependent	  on	  comprehensive	  transformation	  and	  legitimacy	  dependent	  on	  freedom	  
and	  equality	  becomes	  clear.	  	  When	  legitimacy	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  transformative	  feature,	  
the	  fundamentalists,	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  fundamentalists,	  are	  unable	  to	  adopt	  the	  disposition	  
toward	  openness	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  enter	  the	  deliberation	  in	  good-­‐faith.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  
fundamentalists	  fall	  into	  the	  same	  paradox	  as	  racists.	  	  Their	  claim	  is	  based	  on	  the	  right	  to	  
religious	  freedom;	  however,	  freedom	  of	  religion	  is	  jeopardized	  when	  the	  tenet	  of	  any	  one	  
religion	  is	  institutionalized	  by	  the	  state.	  	  If	  the	  reasons	  of	  any	  one	  religion	  stand	  as	  good	  
reasons	  in	  support	  of	  public	  policy,	  the	  resulting	  policy	  would	  jeopardize	  the	  freedom	  of	  
religions	  with	  different	  reasons.	  	  Religious	  fundamentalists,	  for	  example,	  believe	  in	  the	  truth	  of	  
their	  convictions	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  commit	  to	  a	  deliberative	  outcome	  if	  the	  outcome	  might	  
require	  that	  their	  most	  deeply	  held	  beliefs	  and	  values	  be	  available	  for	  transformation.	  	  
Therefore,	  they	  are	  excluded	  from	  a	  deliberation,	  even	  though	  they	  are	  civically	  responsible	  
citizens.	  	  
In	  contrast,	  when	  legitimacy	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  freedom	  and	  equality	  of	  participants,	  
there	  is	  a	  burden	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  non-­‐believer	  to	  recognize	  the	  believer	  as	  an	  equal	  citizen	  
with	  equal	  capacity	  to	  deliberate.	  	  It	  is	  the	  claim,	  or	  reasoning	  about	  the	  claim	  that	  determines	  
its	  political	  force	  in	  a	  deliberative	  framework,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  disposition	  of	  fundamentalists	  that	  
disqualifies	  them	  from	  participating.	  	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  
fundamentalist	  parents	  cannot	  be	  objecting	  to	  the	  very	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  on	  which	  they	  are	  
basing	  their	  claim.	  	  They	  petitioned	  the	  school	  board	  to	  have	  their	  own	  children	  excused	  from	  
the	  course	  to	  work	  from	  alternative	  materials;	  they	  did	  not	  petition	  the	  state	  to	  have	  critical	  
thinking	  removed	  from	  the	  curriculum.	  	  Even	  though	  they	  probably	  believe	  that	  critical	  thinking	  
is	  wrong	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  in	  everyone’s	  best	  interest	  to	  take	  the	  course	  out	  of	  the	  schools,	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  Ibid.,	  102-­‐103.	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they	  only	  asked	  for	  an	  exemption	  for	  their	  children.	  	  Hence,	  they	  appealed	  to	  religious	  freedom,	  
not	  to	  impose	  their	  religion	  on	  everyone,	  but	  to	  exercise	  their	  right.	  	  Inclusion	  requires	  that	  
they	  be	  afforded	  the	  social	  and	  political	  space	  to	  put	  forward	  their	  reasons;	  i.e.	  fundamentalists	  
cannot	  be	  excluded	  because	  they	  are	  fundamentalists.	  	  Cohen	  explains,	  the	  aim	  of	  inclusion	  is	  
not	  to	  enable	  participation,	  or	  to	  improve	  the	  scope	  of	  voices	  included;	  instead,	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  
extend	  political	  inclusion	  to	  all	  citizens	  who	  have	  reasons	  for	  their	  point	  of	  view.	  	  To	  deny	  
inclusion	  would	  be	  to	  deny	  their	  equal	  capacity	  to	  deliberate.380	  
The	  ideal	  of	  political	  justification	  is	  realized	  when	  political	  power	  is	  exercised	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  reasoned	  discussion	  between	  free	  and	  equal	  citizens.	  	  Legitimate	  decisions,	  in	  a	  
democracy,	  are	  authorized	  by	  a	  collective.	  	  More	  specifically,	  the	  members	  of	  a	  political	  
association	  who	  are	  subject	  to	  state	  power	  authorize	  the	  exercise	  of	  that	  power	  through	  
collective	  decision-­‐making.381	  	  A	  deliberative	  decision	  is	  legitimate	  when	  the	  members	  of	  an	  
association	  successfully	  deliberate	  to	  reach	  consensus	  (at	  least	  provisionally)	  and	  therefore	  are,	  
in	  effect,	  a	  self-­‐legislating	  body.382	  	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  I	  am	  neither	  defending	  deliberation	  as	  the	  best	  
description	  of	  modern	  liberal	  democratic	  arrangements,	  nor	  am	  I	  defending	  it	  as	  a	  prescription	  
for	  political	  decision-­‐making	  across	  the	  board.	  	  I	  am	  suggesting	  that	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation	  is	  
a	  type	  of	  political	  dialogue	  that	  offers	  minority	  claimants	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  
paradox.	  	  Deliberative	  inclusion	  requires	  the	  equal	  recognition	  of	  the	  preferences,	  interests	  and	  
deliberative	  capacities	  of	  citizens.	  	  When	  legitimacy	  is	  dependent	  on	  a	  comprehensive	  notion	  of	  
transformation,	  certain	  groups	  or	  individuals	  are	  excluded	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  inability	  or	  
unwillingness	  to	  adopt	  the	  appropriate	  disposition	  toward	  openness.	  	  	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  
features	  of	  deliberation	  are	  such	  that	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  claims	  and	  deliberative	  outcomes	  can	  be	  
determined	  independently	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  notion	  of	  transformation.	  	  A	  lesser	  degree	  of	  
transformation	  occurs	  in	  reasonable	  deliberations,	  but	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  legitimate	  
deliberative	  outcomes.	  	  Independent	  of	  transformative	  necessity,	  deliberative	  legitimacy	  is	  tied	  
to	  the	  social	  and	  institutional	  conditions	  which	  facilitate	  free	  dialogue	  between	  equal	  citizens	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  Ibid.,	  104.	  	  
381	  Ibid.,	  95.	  
382	  Ibid.,	  99.	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who	  have	  an	  interest	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  issue	  under	  deliberation.	  	  A	  deliberative	  process,	  thus	  
constructed,	  can	  accommodate	  deep	  difference	  and	  therefore	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  process	  that	  can	  
get	  minority	  claimants	  out	  of	  the	  paradox.	  
	  
5.2	  Pluralism	  and	  Identity	  
I	  have	  argued	  that	  in	  a	  deliberation	  sufficiently	  inclusive	  to	  offer	  a	  means	  to	  overcome	  the	  
minority	  rights	  paradox,	  deliberative	  legitimacy	  is	  not	  reliant	  on	  transformation	  and	  is	  distanced	  
from	  assessments	  about	  the	  character	  and	  reasonableness	  of	  participants.	  	  It	  has	  been	  a	  
recurring	  theme	  in	  part	  two	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  idea	  that	  excluding	  citizens	  from	  political	  
dialogue	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  worldview	  or	  the	  role	  they	  believe	  that	  worldview	  should	  play	  in	  
political	  arrangements	  poses	  significant	  problems	  for	  minority	  groups.	  	  The	  particular	  problem	  I	  
am	  concerned	  with	  is	  the	  charge	  of	  paradoxical	  reasoning	  and	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  getting	  
around	  the	  paradox	  requires	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  inclusion	  with	  regard	  to	  reasons,	  reasoning	  
styles	  and	  identity.	  	  This	  generates	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  tension:	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  there	  is	  the	  
need	  to	  distance	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  from	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  
particular	  criterion	  of	  reasonableness	  or	  what	  should	  or	  should	  not	  count	  as	  a	  reasonable	  way	  
of	  making	  decisions	  that	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  all	  participants;	  this	  is	  in	  response	  to	  the	  illegitimate	  
privileging	  of	  majority	  norms	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  less	  influential	  groups.	  	  However,	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  many	  minority	  groups	  expect	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  recognition	  for	  their	  minority	  
worldview	  and	  identity	  in	  political	  dialogues.	  	  	  
The	  worry	  turns	  around	  on	  itself;	  by	  taking	  character	  and	  disposition	  out	  of	  the	  process	  
there	  is	  inadequate	  recognition	  of	  identity	  in	  decision-­‐making—the	  worry	  being	  that	  individuals	  
and	  groups	  must	  relegate	  their	  worldview	  to	  the	  backbenches	  in	  order	  to	  participate	  in	  such	  a	  
deliberation.	  	  Such	  a	  deliberation	  would	  functionally	  exclude	  reasons	  based	  on	  identity	  claims	  
and	  consequently	  subvert	  the	  degree	  of	  inclusion	  necessary.	  	  However,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  
identity,	  understood	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  package	  of	  traditions,	  values	  and	  beliefs,	  is	  very	  
much	  a	  part	  of	  the	  deliberative	  process	  I	  have	  put	  forward.	  	  Not	  as	  a	  fixed	  ‘reason’	  to	  support	  
claims	  but	  as	  an	  explanatory	  standpoint	  indispensable	  to	  expanding	  the	  epistemic	  resources	  of	  
the	  deliberative	  process	  to	  include	  alternative	  worldviews.	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Identity	  is	  far	  from	  uncontroversial	  in	  contemporary	  political	  theory.	  	  Both	  what	  is	  
meant	  by	  ‘identity’	  and	  also	  what	  role	  identity	  should	  play	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  I	  begin	  
this	  section	  with	  the	  first	  problem,	  and	  then	  move	  on	  to	  the	  use	  of	  identity	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  
support	  claims	  before	  looking	  at	  the	  role	  of	  identity	  in	  deliberations	  about	  minority	  rights	  
claims.	  	  Deliberating	  rights	  claims	  gives	  recognition	  to	  identity	  because	  it	  is	  a	  process	  that	  calls	  
upon	  all	  the	  relevant	  resources	  available	  regarding	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  
identity	  in	  minority	  rights	  claims	  becomes	  apparent	  when	  we	  look	  at	  the	  type	  of	  reasons	  that	  
are	  put	  forward	  in	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  in	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation,	  attributes	  
of	  identity	  such	  as	  character,	  reasonableness	  and	  disposition	  are	  considered	  resources	  rather	  
than	  features	  of	  an	  individual	  or	  group	  that	  determine	  their	  suitability	  to	  participate	  in	  political	  
dialogue.	  
What	  is	  Identity?	  
Identity	  can	  be	  framed	  as	  a	  description.	  	  Groups	  or	  individuals	  are	  described	  or	  describe	  
themselves	  as	  having	  a	  set	  of	  attachments	  to	  their	  community,	  their	  worldview	  and	  its	  
attendant	  beliefs,	  traditions,	  values	  and	  practices.	  	  This	  package	  shapes	  their	  self-­‐understanding	  
and	  the	  understandings	  others	  have	  about	  them.	  	  Taylor	  described	  identity	  as	  “the	  background	  
against	  which	  our	  tastes	  and	  desires	  and	  opinions	  and	  aspirations	  make	  sense.”383	  	  Beliefs	  or	  
activities	  are	  described	  as	  important	  to	  identity	  when	  they	  tell	  us	  something	  about	  who	  a	  
person	  is,	  or	  what	  a	  group	  is	  about	  in	  a	  way	  that	  other	  aspects	  of	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life	  may	  not.	  	  
Characteristics	  like	  race	  or	  gender	  are	  a	  part	  of	  how	  an	  individual’s	  or	  a	  group’s	  identity	  is	  
constructed,	  along	  with	  less	  tangible	  elements	  of	  their	  way	  of	  life.	  	  Hence,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  
see	  how	  an	  identity	  ascribed	  from	  outside	  the	  group	  or	  individual	  may	  be	  quite	  different	  from	  
the	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  identity.	  	  As	  individuals,	  we	  need	  access	  to	  certain	  things	  in	  order	  to	  
understand	  ourselves;	  similarly,	  the	  interior	  features	  of	  a	  group	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  identity	  
formation,	  things	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  obvious	  externally.	  
	   Within	  a	  group,	  individual	  identity	  may	  vary	  greatly	  in	  some	  ways,	  but	  not	  much	  in	  
others.	  	  Appiah	  suggests	  that	  collective	  identities	  structure	  narratives	  of	  their	  individual	  
character.	  	  Through	  a	  process	  of	  collectively	  sequencing	  events	  and	  understanding,	  what	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383	  Taylor,	  “Recognition,”	  33-­‐34.	  
	  178	  
	  
calls	  the	  formation	  of	  ‘scripts’,	  social	  mores	  are	  shaped	  according	  to	  a	  shared	  narrative.	  	  These	  
patterns	  inform	  collective	  understandings	  and	  provide	  a	  framework	  within	  which	  individuals	  
come	  to	  self-­‐understanding	  through	  organizing	  and	  making	  sense	  of	  their	  lives	  in	  relation	  to	  
these	  scripts.384	  	  	  
When	  people	  describe	  their	  own	  identity,	  they	  often	  attach	  themselves	  to	  a	  set	  of	  moral	  
commitments	  and	  social	  conventions.	  	  However,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  most	  people	  seem	  to	  
recognize	  that	  identity	  is	  not	  fixed.	  	  Despite	  an	  ascribed	  political	  identity	  as	  a	  citizen	  with	  a	  
name	  and	  holding	  certain	  rights	  and	  obligations	  etc.,	  the	  individual	  identity	  is	  variable.	  	  The	  
distinction	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  psychic	  and	  the	  discursive	  aspects	  of	  
identity,	  what	  Hall	  described	  through	  the	  metaphor	  of	  a	  “suture.”385	  	  The	  instability	  of	  points	  of	  
contact	  between	  the	  self	  and	  discourse	  is	  a	  process	  of	  positioning	  and	  re-­‐positioning	  one’s	  self	  
contextually	  rather	  than	  process	  of	  solidifying	  self-­‐understanding.	  	  Sen	  draws	  the	  distinction	  
another	  way.	  	  Questions	  of	  identity	  are	  the	  type	  of	  questions	  that	  call	  upon	  the	  capacity	  for	  
reason.	  	  Identity,	  then,	  is	  not	  identical	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  reason	  about	  identity.386	  	  The	  
processes	  of	  reflection	  and	  reasoning	  inevitably	  play	  a	  role	  in	  identity	  formation;	  hence,	  there	  is	  
a	  distinction	  between	  the	  identity	  as	  it	  is	  currently	  understood,	  and	  the	  potential	  identity	  which	  
we	  come	  to	  understand	  through	  the	  capacity	  for	  reason.	  	  
	   The	  notion	  of	  identity	  relevant	  to	  issues	  of	  minority	  rights	  claims	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  
description	  generated	  by	  or	  about	  an	  individual	  or	  group	  that	  has	  the	  following	  features.	  	  It	  is	  a	  
description	  of	  attachments,	  associations,	  traditions,	  beliefs,	  values	  and	  practices	  that	  are	  
essential	  to	  self-­‐understanding.	  	  Identity	  is	  not	  identical	  with	  the	  group	  or	  individual	  it	  
describes,	  it	  is	  a	  provisional	  understanding	  of	  self-­‐identification	  but	  not	  the	  self	  per	  se.387	  	  
Identity,	  in	  this	  sense,	  is	  not	  fixed,	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  reason,	  rather	  than	  the	  object	  of	  reason.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384	  Anthony	  Appiah,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Identity.	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  21-­‐25.	  
385	  Stuart	  Hall,	  “Who	  Needs,	  "identity"?”	  In	  Questions	  of	  Cultural	  Identity,	  eds.	  Stuart	  Hall	  and	  Paul	  Du	  Gay.	  
(London:	  Sage,	  1996),	  16.	  
386	  Amartya	  Sen,	  Identity	  and	  Violence:	  The	  Illusion	  of	  Destiny.	  (New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton	  and	  Co.,	  2006).	  
387	  This	  raises	  all	  sorts	  of	  questions	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  “self	  per	  se”	  or	  whether	  the	  ‘self’	  transcends	  
identity.	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  discussion,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  there	  is	  an	  object	  that	  is	  described	  in	  identity	  claims.	  	  
The	  ontological	  status,	  or	  transcendental	  capacities	  of	  that	  object	  is	  certainly	  worthy	  of	  further	  research,	  but	  are	  
questions	  that	  are	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  discussion.	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The	  sort	  of	  identity	  that	  has	  a	  role	  in	  deliberative	  processes	  goes	  beyond	  the	  level	  of	  a	  
political	  entity,	  of	  rights	  bearing	  citizen.	  	  Identity	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  relational	  as	  it	  is	  in	  part	  
described	  by	  the	  social	  context	  of	  an	  entity’s	  identity	  and	  the	  description	  of	  an	  identity	  reaches	  
the	  level	  of	  meaning	  shaped	  by	  a	  way	  of	  life—a	  worldview.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  minority	  rights	  
claims,	  a	  minority	  worldview	  is	  one	  that	  stands	  prior	  to	  the	  role	  of	  citizen.	  	  It	  is	  the	  priority	  of	  an	  
identity	  that	  does	  not	  harmonize	  with	  the	  dominant	  paradigm	  that,	  in	  some	  cases,	  becomes	  
problematic.	  	  The	  features	  of	  non-­‐liberal	  identities	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two	  pose	  a	  significant	  
problem	  for	  political	  dialogues	  in	  pluralist	  associations,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  critics	  argue	  that	  
identity	  itself	  as	  too	  variable	  and	  problematic	  to	  have	  a	  place	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  It	  is	  
to	  those	  critics	  I	  now	  turn.	  
Identity	  as	  Reason	  
Cultural	  and	  religious	  groups	  often	  appeal	  to	  identity	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  protect	  distinctive	  practices	  
in	  minority	  rights	  claims.388	  	  Groups	  make	  public	  an	  explanation	  of	  their	  identity,	  and	  these	  
explanations	  are	  used	  to	  justify	  claims.	  	  Similarly,	  public	  institutions,	  in	  various	  ways,	  accept	  
considerations	  of	  identity	  salient	  to	  adjudicating	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  However,	  identity	  
ascription	  by	  a	  public	  institution	  is	  not	  evidence	  of	  understanding.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  James	  
Bay	  Hydro	  Electric	  project389	  for	  example,	  the	  explanation	  of	  identity	  is	  successfully	  brought	  
into	  the	  process	  and	  identity	  plays	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  decision.	  	  In	  other	  cases,	  minorities	  
are	  not	  able	  to	  fully	  articulate	  the	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  their	  identity;	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  level	  of	  
intercultural	  understanding	  is	  inadequate	  to	  prevent	  misrecognition.	  	  In	  her	  exhaustive	  
research,	  Avigail	  Eisenberg	  found	  that,	  
Decisions	  which	  involve	  assessing	  group	  identity	  claims	  are	  often	  made	  in	  an	  arbitrary	  
manner,	  according	  to	  the	  unfounded	  presumptions	  and	  stereotypes	  held	  by	  dominant	  
cultural	  groups,	  or	  based	  on	  opaque	  and	  otherwise	  unjustified	  criteria.390	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388	  Recall	  the	  role	  of	  identity	  from	  examples	  in	  chapter	  1.	  	  The	  Mormon	  identity	  is	  shaped	  by	  a	  worldview	  that	  
cannot	  abide	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  In	  contrast,	  proponents	  argue	  that	  a	  ban	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  prevents	  couples	  
from	  realizing	  the	  truth	  of	  their	  identity.	  	  The	  identity	  of	  the	  animal	  rights	  activist	  is	  described	  through	  a	  set	  of	  
moral	  prescriptions.	  	  The	  Aboriginal	  sealer	  describes	  their	  right	  to	  hunt	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  cultural	  identity.	  	  The	  
fundamentalist	  parents	  in	  the	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins	  case	  are	  concerned	  that	  the	  education	  system	  is	  attempting	  to	  
shape	  their	  children’s	  identity	  in	  a	  way	  that	  runs	  contrary	  to	  their	  beliefs.	  
389	  Case	  presented	  in	  2.1,	  Feit,	  “Hunting,”	  171-­‐207.	  
390	  From	  the	  introduction	  of	  Avigail	  Eisenberg’s,	  Reasons	  of	  Identity,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009).	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The	  inability	  of	  a	  group	  to	  successfully	  explain	  their	  identity	  and	  its	  justificatory	  role	  in	  their	  
claim	  may	  be	  brought	  about	  in	  various	  ways,	  from	  intra-­‐group	  di-­‐sensus	  to	  lack	  of	  the	  
appropriate	  language	  to	  mobilize	  concepts	  foreign	  in	  the	  public	  institution	  they	  wish	  to	  engage.	  	  
Disentangling	  the	  legitimate	  explanation	  of	  a	  group’s	  identity	  from	  an	  illegitimate	  explanation	  
becomes	  a	  task	  so	  arduous	  that	  the	  common	  response	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  assessments	  of	  
identity	  claims	  should	  have	  little	  or	  no	  influence	  on	  public	  policy	  decisions.	  	  	  
	   Eisenberg	  surveys	  the	  arguments	  raised	  against	  identity	  politics,	  which	  are	  varied.	  	  
When	  identity	  is	  claimed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  self-­‐understanding,	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  group	  is	  so	  difficult	  
to	  pin	  down;	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  minority	  groups	  will	  generate	  an	  explanation	  of	  identity	  that	  suits	  
their	  cause	  rather	  than	  endeavour	  to	  produce	  an	  accurate	  representation.	  	  If	  accuracy	  is	  the	  
aim,	  then	  it	  brings	  the	  identity,	  of	  what	  is	  often	  a	  minority	  group	  who	  already	  feels	  
disadvantaged	  and	  overburdened,	  under	  the	  harsh	  light	  of	  public	  scrutiny.	  	  The	  integrity	  of	  the	  
group	  may	  become	  bound	  up	  with	  its	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐description.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  identity	  may	  
actually	  weaken	  the	  minority	  group’s	  self-­‐understanding	  because	  it	  leads	  to	  cultural	  
essentialism	  and	  ethnocentrism.	  	  When	  institutions	  that	  covertly	  exert	  a	  cultural	  bias	  make	  
assessments	  about	  the	  identity	  in	  question,	  identity	  politics	  can	  actually	  support	  assimilation	  
rather	  than	  cultural	  accommodation.	  	  Most	  troubling,	  and	  problematic,	  are	  cases	  where	  
cultural	  identity	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  support	  anti-­‐liberal	  practices	  such	  as	  the	  
subjugation	  of	  women	  or	  complicate	  issues	  of	  racism.391	  	  	  
Critics	  argue	  that	  identity	  politics	  enhances	  the	  conditions	  of	  disagreement	  to	  such	  a	  
degree	  that	  democratic	  institutions	  are	  strained	  to	  the	  breaking	  point	  under	  the	  weight	  of	  
simply	  assessing	  the	  identity	  claim	  itself,	  before	  addressing	  the	  issue	  in	  which	  the	  identity	  claim	  
has	  been	  brought	  to	  bear.	  	  The	  underlying	  presupposition	  of	  all	  these	  arguments	  is	  that	  the	  
public	  institution	  is	  free	  from	  its	  own	  culture	  and	  as	  such	  is	  able	  to	  adjudicate	  identity	  claims	  in	  
a	  way	  that	  minority	  groups,	  dependent	  on	  identity,	  are	  not.	  	  If	  institutions	  were	  exerting	  a	  bias,	  
then	  there	  would	  have	  to	  be	  reasons,	  justifications	  that	  the	  group	  bearing	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  bias	  
could	  understand	  and	  would	  accept.	  	  As	  noted	  in	  chapter	  two,	  many	  minority	  groups	  do	  not	  
accept	  liberal	  reasons	  as	  the	  only	  right	  reasons	  and	  therefore	  see	  the	  liberal	  bias	  of	  democratic	  




institutions	  as	  an	  arbitrary	  imposition.	  	  This	  is	  not	  something	  that	  comes	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
deliberate	  oppression,	  as	  Eisenberg	  notes,	  biases	  can	  just	  as	  easily	  be	  sustained	  by	  
complacency.	  
Widely	  used	  public	  discourses	  by	  which	  disputes	  have	  been	  conventionally	  settled	  are	  
biased	  either	  because	  they	  purposively	  exclude	  and	  disadvantage	  some	  groups,	  or	  for	  
the	  more	  benign	  and	  inevitable	  reason	  that	  they	  have	  been	  shaped	  by	  the	  
preoccupations	  of	  majority	  groups	  in	  light	  of	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  historical,	  cultural,	  and	  
religious	  experiences	  and	  values.392	  	  
	  
Either	  way,	  from	  the	  minority	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  institution,	  through	  the	  process	  of	  decision-­‐
making,	  is	  putting	  forward	  an	  explanation	  of	  identity,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  imposing	  the	  
presuppositions	  of	  majority	  identity	  on	  the	  process.	  
The	  central	  idea	  put	  forward	  by	  Tully,	  Young	  and	  others	  in	  the	  ‘politics	  of	  difference’393	  
is	  simply	  that	  public	  institutions	  tend	  to	  privilege	  dominant	  groups.	  	  When	  talking	  about	  
systemic	  injustice,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  problem	  with	  institutional	  arrangements	  for	  groups,	  such	  
as	  Indigenous	  peoples,	  women,	  or	  persons	  with	  disabilities,	  is	  not	  so	  much	  ‘identity’	  as	  such	  
that	  is	  the	  problem;	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  certain	  identities	  fit	  the	  dominant	  frame	  better	  than	  
others.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  bias	  supports	  that	  idea	  that	  some	  minority	  ‘identities’	  are	  the	  problem,	  
not	  that	  identity	  itself	  is	  the	  problem.	  	  Rather	  than	  suggest	  that	  ‘identity’	  be	  left	  out	  of	  the	  
public	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  it	  is	  the	  suggestion	  that	  certain	  ‘identities’	  should	  be	  left	  out	  of	  
the	  public	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  not	  that	  identity	  is	  excluded;	  it	  is	  that	  
certain	  identities	  are	  excluded.	  
Changing	  attitudes	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  Indigenous	  peoples	  have	  mobilized	  
minority	  identities	  in	  public	  discourse,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  institutional	  bias	  
to	  social	  consciousness.	  	  Deliberation,	  as	  an	  inclusive	  process,	  is	  suited	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  
negotiating	  the	  complicated	  issues	  of	  identity	  and	  recognition	  non-­‐liberal	  minorities	  are	  calling	  
for.	  	  It	  is	  a	  decision-­‐making	  process	  through	  which	  a	  plurality	  of	  viewpoints	  can	  bring	  relevant	  
social	  mores	  and	  conventions	  under	  publicly	  scrutiny	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  private	  internal	  contest	  
of	  an	  issue	  may	  not.	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  identity	  understood	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  self-­‐
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understandings	  shaped	  by	  the	  values,	  practices	  and	  beliefs	  of	  a	  group	  seems	  essential	  to	  the	  
process	  of	  deliberating	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  
Identity	  in	  Deliberation	  
It	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  a	  pluralist	  society	  that	  did	  not	  have	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  minority	  
identity,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  Eisenberg	  argues	  that	  assessing	  
identity	  in	  claims	  brought	  forward	  in	  legal	  and	  political	  institutions	  is	  nothing	  new	  and,	  in	  many	  
cases,	  unavoidable.	  	  A	  society	  that	  protects	  minority	  rights,	  will,	  in	  some	  way	  or	  another	  find	  
itself	  dealing	  with	  identity	  claims.	  	  In	  some	  cases	  those	  claims	  will	  facilitate	  a	  process	  of	  
reflection	  that	  raises	  both	  minority	  identity	  and	  dominant	  identity	  questions.	  	  However,	  
attempting	  to	  remove	  identity	  from	  the	  equation	  seems	  to	  disadvantage	  the	  minority,	  and	  their	  
claims,	  by	  translating	  the	  content	  of	  minority	  identity	  into	  the	  normative	  and	  discursive	  
framework	  of	  the	  institution	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  producing	  a	  neatly	  abstracted,	  yet	  distorted,	  
version	  of	  the	  original	  claim.	  	  
I	  argued	  in	  chapter	  two	  that	  liberal	  institutions,	  and	  even	  some	  accounts	  of	  deliberation,	  
tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  argument	  and	  the	  character/reasonableness	  of	  the	  
participants	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  coming	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  rights	  claims	  put	  forward	  by	  
minority	  groups.	  	  Eisenberg	  puts	  it	  this	  way:	  
[The	  problem]	  is	  not	  that	  rights,	  democratic	  procedures,	  or	  legal	  tests	  are	  unhelpful	  to	  
sorting	  out	  disputes	  which	  involve	  minority	  claims.	  Rather,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  often	  
these	  discourses	  are	  informed	  by	  implicit	  and	  unfounded	  assumptions	  about	  what	  is	  of	  
value	  or	  important	  to	  the	  identities	  of	  those	  advancing	  claims.394	  
To	  overcome	  this	  problem,	  Eisenberg	  argues	  that	  identity	  has	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  public	  institutions	  
and	  produces	  three	  reasons	  in	  support	  of	  developing	  a	  means	  of	  assessing	  identity	  claims,	  each	  
of	  which	  I	  will	  argue	  support	  deliberation	  as	  a	  means	  to	  negotiate	  the	  concept	  and	  content	  of	  
minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  
First,	  public	  institutions	  must	  respect	  the	  people	  they	  service.	  	  Dismissing	  identity	  claims	  
has	  the	  unfortunate	  side	  effect	  of	  alienating	  minority	  groups	  for	  whom	  their	  self-­‐understanding	  
is	  not	  easily	  abstracted	  from	  identity.	  	  Respecting	  those	  citizens	  requires	  that	  public	  institutions	  
have	  the	  capacity	  to	  reason	  about	  identity	  in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  deliberations	  over	  the	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allocation	  of	  entitlements	  or	  resources.	  	  Giving	  recognition	  to	  identity	  validates	  various	  ways	  of	  
life	  and	  ensures	  that	  those	  ways	  of	  life	  are	  afforded	  the	  opportunity	  to	  perpetuate	  
themselves.395	  	  The	  concern	  is	  that	  minority	  identity	  is	  not	  necessarily	  one	  that	  inspires	  respect	  
from	  the	  dominant	  majority.	  	  Groups	  who	  have	  developed	  self-­‐understandings	  in	  light	  of	  
previous	  confrontations	  with	  the	  state	  may	  suffer	  as	  a	  result	  of	  public	  scrutiny.	  	  African	  
Americans	  for	  example,	  have	  inherited	  a	  tradition	  such	  that	  their	  identity	  is	  bound	  up	  with	  
policies	  and	  programs,	  like	  affirmative	  action,	  that	  came	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  
movement.	  	  Simon	  notes	  that	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  mere	  suggestion	  that	  these	  policies	  be	  put	  up	  
for	  deliberation	  is	  an	  affront	  to	  the	  suffering	  of	  their	  predecessors.396	  
The	  civil	  rights	  movement	  has	  become	  a	  symbol	  of	  overcoming	  adversity,	  gaining	  self-­‐
respect	  and	  empowering	  a	  people	  in	  a	  way	  that	  has	  shaped	  a	  particular	  history.	  	  African	  
Americans	  are	  not	  so	  much	  concerned	  that	  an	  affirmative	  action	  policy	  is	  put	  under	  
deliberation;	  the	  concern	  is	  that	  those	  elements	  so	  crucial	  to	  African	  American	  identity	  will	  not	  
play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  deliberation.	  	  As	  long	  as	  the	  deliberation	  is	  not	  governed	  by	  institutional	  
arrangements	  that	  constrain	  the	  allowable	  agenda	  and	  content	  of	  the	  deliberation,	  then	  if	  the	  
recognition	  of	  identity	  is	  deemed	  significant	  to	  the	  issue	  at	  hand,	  e.g.	  affirmative	  action	  policies,	  
it	  will	  have	  a	  place	  in	  the	  dialogue.	  	  By	  recognizing	  identity,	  the	  deliberation	  gives	  recognition	  to	  
what	  is	  at	  stake	  for	  those	  who	  will	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  deliberative	  outcome.	  
	   Second,	  a	  public	  institution	  should	  be	  humbled	  by	  the	  burden	  of	  fairness	  required	  of	  its	  
own	  processes.	  	  Being	  confronted	  with	  identity	  claims	  engenders	  “institutional	  humility”	  
precisely	  because	  minorities	  often	  uncover	  inequalities	  and	  biases	  in	  what	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  
fair	  principles.397	  	  The	  notion	  of	  institutional	  neutrality	  has	  a	  stultifying	  effect.	  	  It	  leaves	  the	  
institution	  abstracted	  from	  real	  politics	  but	  demands	  that	  it	  be	  fair	  to	  the	  polity.	  	  In	  a	  pluralist	  
society	  the	  polity	  is	  comprised	  of	  many	  different	  groups,	  whose	  values	  have	  been	  shaped	  by	  
divergent	  histories	  and	  experiences.	  	  To	  inculcate	  institutions	  with	  the	  burden	  of	  assessing	  
identity	  claims	  is	  to	  imbue	  the	  institution	  with	  scepticism	  about	  neutrality	  and	  the	  recognition	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of	  its	  own	  limits.398	  	  In	  a	  deliberation,	  neutrality	  is	  a	  non-­‐starter	  because	  it	  rests	  on	  
presuppositions	  of	  a	  neutral	  ground.	  	  If	  participants	  were	  indeed	  neutral	  there	  would	  be	  
nothing	  to	  deliberate	  about.	  	  In	  contrast,	  participants	  in	  an	  institutional	  deliberation	  such	  as	  a	  
deliberation	  about	  minority	  rights	  are	  given	  equal	  opportunity	  to	  reveal	  their	  current	  
relationship	  with	  the	  institution	  and	  shape	  institutional	  developments.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  identity	  is	  probably	  one	  of	  the	  most	  overused	  devices	  in	  
contemporary	  political	  discourse.	  	  Special	  interest	  groups	  construct	  public	  identities	  to	  suit	  
specific	  purposes	  because,	  quite	  simply,	  they	  are	  effective.	  	  The	  disingenuous	  nature	  of	  these	  
strategically	  perfected	  entities	  encourages	  a	  healthy	  distrust	  of	  the	  role	  of	  identity.	  	  It	  is	  
understandable	  that	  for	  some,	  the	  best	  solution	  is	  to	  just	  jettison	  identity	  claims	  all	  together,	  
on	  the	  grounds	  that	  they	  are	  usually	  false,	  or	  that	  they	  are	  quite	  often	  complicated	  and	  change	  
over	  time	  so	  they	  are	  not	  very	  helpful	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  decision-­‐making.	  	  However,	  as	  
Eisenberg	  notes,	  there	  are	  still	  laws	  and	  public	  policies	  that	  seem	  to	  beg	  for	  arguments	  in	  terms	  
of	  identity.399	  	  	  
Minority	  rights	  claims	  are	  often	  the	  sort	  of	  claim	  that	  is	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  identity.	  	  It	  
may	  not	  be	  the	  best	  way	  to	  argue	  the	  claim,	  but	  it	  happens,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  institutions	  need	  
some	  way	  of	  assessing	  these	  claims.	  	  Deliberative	  processes	  avoid	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  failing	  to	  show	  
the	  appropriate	  respect	  toward	  citizens,	  or	  failing	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  thrust	  of	  the	  
minority	  claim	  by	  allowing	  participants	  to	  construct	  a	  dialogue	  that	  includes	  all	  information	  
deemed	  relevant	  by	  the	  participants	  with	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  issue,	  and	  by	  making	  institutional	  
arrangements	  available	  for	  deliberative	  scrutiny.	  	  If	  there	  are	  reasons	  for	  limiting	  the	  influence	  
of	  identity	  claims	  in	  a	  deliberation,	  those	  reasons	  must	  be	  transparent	  and	  available	  to	  the	  
participants,	  rather	  than	  systemic	  and	  opaque.	  
In	  a	  pluralist	  society,	  there	  are	  multiple	  group	  identities	  at	  play	  and	  as	  a	  result	  it	  seems	  
that	  identity	  claims	  are	  unavoidable	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  resolving	  coordination	  problems	  in	  
political	  arrangements.	  	  It	  is	  not	  only	  minority	  groups	  that	  express	  identity	  through	  political	  
activity,	  state	  institutions	  are	  similarly	  imbued	  with	  a	  political	  identity	  that	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  how	  
institutions	  function;	  hence,	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  assessing	  identity	  claims	  is	  not	  good	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399	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  chapter	  2,	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reason	  to	  deny	  the	  significance	  of	  identity	  claims.	  	  Liberal	  institutions	  and	  deliberative	  
processes	  that	  focus	  too	  much	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  claims	  and	  on	  the	  character	  of	  the	  claimants	  
often	  misunderstand	  and	  misrecognize	  minority	  claims.	  	  The	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  I	  have	  
identified	  is	  just	  one	  expression	  of	  the	  political	  exclusion	  that	  is	  brought	  about	  when	  the	  thrust	  
of	  the	  claim	  is	  not	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  issue	  under	  deliberation.	  	  Identity,	  understood	  as	  an	  
explanation	  of	  the	  fluid	  package	  of	  traditions,	  values	  and	  beliefs	  that	  shape	  the	  self-­‐
understanding	  of	  a	  group	  is	  indispensible	  to	  deliberating	  the	  claims	  of	  minority	  groups	  whose	  
worldview	  differs	  significantly	  from	  the	  society	  in	  which	  they	  find	  themselves.	  	  	  
5.3	  Conclusions	  
The	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  is	  reinforced	  by	  circumstances	  where	  there	  is	  agreement	  about	  
what	  sort	  of	  standards	  can	  be	  legitimately	  imposed	  on	  dialogical	  participants.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  I	  
have	  argued	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  getting	  out	  of	  the	  paradox	  requires	  that	  pre-­‐deliberation	  
standards	  be	  available	  for	  deliberation.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  deliberative	  process	  are	  free	  
from	  standards;	  it	  is	  instead	  a	  means	  through	  which	  participants	  can	  deliberate	  about	  those	  
standards.	  	  However,	  some	  accounts	  of	  deliberation	  impose	  requirements	  that	  threaten	  to	  
exclude	  certain	  participants	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  disposition	  toward	  openness—their	  
willingness	  to	  be	  transformed,	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  through	  the	  process.	  	  	  
I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  claims	  and	  deliberative	  outcomes	  need	  not	  be	  
determined	  by	  this	  comprehensive	  notion	  of	  transformation.	  	  A	  lesser	  degree	  of	  transformation	  
occurs	  in	  reasonable	  deliberations,	  but	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  legitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes.	  	  In	  
this	  way,	  the	  net	  of	  inclusion	  is	  extended	  to	  those	  groups	  who	  are	  wary	  of	  the	  transformative	  
requirement	  but	  willing	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  good	  faith	  dialogue	  with	  others	  in	  order	  to	  come	  to	  a	  
decision	  regarding	  the	  issue	  under	  deliberation.	  	  By	  distancing	  legitimacy	  from	  the	  
transformative	  feature,	  all	  that	  is	  required	  of	  participants	  is	  that	  they	  are	  open	  to	  deliberating	  
the	  issue	  and	  accept	  that	  their	  thoughts	  on	  that	  issue	  (not	  their	  whole	  package	  of	  beliefs,	  values	  
and	  ideals)	  might	  be	  changed	  through	  the	  process.	  	  Deliberative	  legitimacy	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  social	  
and	  institutional	  conditions,	  which	  facilitate	  free	  dialogue	  between	  equal	  citizens	  who	  have	  an	  
interest	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  issue	  under	  deliberation.	  	  A	  deliberative	  process	  thus	  constructed,	  I	  have	  
argued,	  can	  accommodate	  deep	  difference	  and	  therefore	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  process	  that	  can	  get	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minority	  claimants	  out	  of	  the	  paradox.	  	  However,	  by	  distancing	  important	  features	  of	  character	  
and	  disposition	  from	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  deliberation,	  the	  worry	  is	  that	  there	  is	  inadequate	  
recognition	  of	  identity	  in	  deliberative	  processes.	  	  Such	  a	  deliberation	  could	  functionally	  exclude	  
reasons	  based	  on	  identity	  claims	  and	  consequently	  subvert	  the	  degree	  of	  inclusion	  necessary	  to	  
get	  around	  the	  paradox.	  
In	  response,	  I	  suggested	  that	  identity,	  understood	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  package	  of	  
traditions,	  values	  and	  beliefs,	  is	  very	  much	  a	  part	  of	  the	  deliberative	  process	  I	  have	  put	  forward.	  	  
Not	  as	  a	  fixed	  ‘reason’	  to	  support	  claims	  but	  as	  an	  explanatory	  standpoint	  indispensable	  to	  
expanding	  the	  epistemic	  resources	  of	  the	  deliberative	  process	  to	  include	  alternative	  
worldviews.	  	  Deliberating	  rights	  claims	  appropriately	  recognizes	  identity	  because	  it	  is	  a	  process	  
that	  calls	  upon	  all	  the	  relevant	  resources	  available	  regarding	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  	  Attributes	  of	  
identity	  such	  as	  character,	  reasonableness	  and	  disposition	  are	  considered	  resources	  rather	  than	  
features	  of	  an	  individual	  or	  group	  that	  determine	  their	  suitability	  to	  participate	  in	  political	  
dialogues,	  or	  the	  suitability	  of	  their	  reasons	  or	  reasoning	  styles.	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Chapter	  6:	  	  The	  Minority	  Rights	  Paradox	  Revisited	  
In	  the	  preceding	  three	  chapters	  I	  have	  examined	  some	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  accounts	  of	  
deliberative	  democracy	  in	  light	  of	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  minority	  groups	  who	  are	  considered	  
and	  consider	  themselves	  to	  hold	  worldviews	  other	  than	  liberal.	  	  Examining	  questions	  raised	  
about	  minority	  rights	  issues	  shows	  that	  not	  all	  accounts	  of	  deliberation	  are	  the	  same.	  	  Some	  are	  
more	  inclusive	  than	  others	  with	  regard	  to	  who	  or	  what	  is	  a	  candidate	  for	  deliberation.	  	  I	  have	  
argued	  that	  groups	  caught	  in	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  are	  facing	  a	  level	  of	  misrecognition	  
that	  might	  be	  overcome	  in	  a	  functionally	  inclusive	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  
Although	  there	  are	  many	  differences	  in	  the	  accounts	  of	  deliberation	  surveyed,	  they	  
share	  a	  commitment	  to	  inclusion;	  however,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  different	  features	  has	  
an	  effect	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  inclusion.	  	  I	  have	  identified	  three	  types	  of	  exclusion	  that	  occur	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  prioritizing	  one	  feature	  over	  another.	  	  In	  chapter	  three	  I	  argued	  that	  an	  emphasis	  on	  
consensus	  in	  determining	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  deliberative	  outcomes	  might	  undermine	  the	  self-­‐
legislative	  capacities	  of	  deliberative	  participants	  and	  therefore	  exclude	  those	  individuals	  or	  
groups	  who	  are	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  sacrifice	  their	  deeply	  felt	  opinions	  or	  interests	  for	  the	  
sake	  of	  comprehensive	  agreement.	  	  In	  chapter	  four	  I	  suggested	  that	  when	  standards	  of	  
reasonableness	  set	  limits	  on	  the	  character	  of	  deliberative	  participants,	  individuals	  might	  be	  
unjustly	  excluded.	  	  In	  chapter	  five	  I	  argued	  that	  when	  the	  transformation	  of	  participants	  is	  
deemed	  necessary	  to	  legitimate	  deliberative	  outcomes,	  certain	  individuals	  and	  groups	  might	  be	  
unjustly	  excluded	  because	  they	  are	  not	  able	  or	  willing	  to	  adopt	  the	  disposition	  required	  to	  
participate.	  	  In	  response,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  deliberative	  inclusion	  requires	  that	  legitimacy	  is	  
tied	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality;	  that	  equality	  of	  access	  and	  influence	  requires	  
that	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  be	  determined	  publicly;	  and	  that	  deliberative	  legitimacy	  is	  not	  
dependent	  upon	  the	  transformation	  of	  participants.	  	  Deliberation,	  understood	  in	  this	  way,	  
makes	  room	  for	  alternative	  worldviews,	  reasoning	  styles	  and	  content	  in	  political	  decision-­‐
making.	  	  	  
To	  begin	  this	  final	  chapter,	  in	  6.1,	  I	  put	  the	  deliberative	  process	  I	  have	  proffered	  to	  the	  
test	  by	  revisiting	  the	  most	  problematic	  examples	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  	  An	  analysis	  of	  
the	  criminal	  justice	  paradox	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  deliberative	  consensus	  in	  intercultural	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dialogues	  about	  justice.	  	  It	  will	  be	  shown	  how	  inclusive	  deliberative	  processes	  constitute	  a	  
constructivist	  dialogue	  and	  as	  such	  can	  deal	  with	  the	  pluralist	  nature	  of	  associations	  between	  
alternative	  justice	  systems.	  	  Next,	  the	  reasonableness	  paradox	  looks	  at	  the	  nature	  of	  
deliberative	  reason	  and	  how	  it	  can	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  alternative	  reasoning	  styles.	  	  In	  an	  
inclusive	  deliberation,	  it	  is	  public	  reasons	  and	  reasoning	  rather	  than	  the	  character	  or	  disposition	  
of	  deliberative	  participants	  that	  determines	  the	  strength	  or	  weakness	  of	  claims	  and	  support.	  
The	  emphasis	  on	  public	  reasons	  relevant	  to	  the	  issue	  under	  deliberation	  fosters	  a	  dialogue	  of	  
accommodation	  and	  as	  such	  is	  functionally	  inclusive.	  	  Finally,	  the	  collectivist	  paradox	  takes	  up	  
the	  problem	  of	  political	  individualism	  through	  questions	  of	  identity	  and	  transformation	  in	  
deliberative	  decision-­‐making.	  	  Legitimacy	  rests	  on	  the	  conditions	  of	  equality	  in	  deliberative	  
processes,	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  transformation	  of	  character.	  	  Consequently,	  inclusion	  is	  extended	  
to	  participants,	  even	  when	  they	  argue	  in	  alternative	  frameworks	  or	  from	  alternative	  
worldviews.	  	  However,	  extending	  inclusion	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  presents	  an	  account	  of	  deliberation	  
that	  seems	  either	  too	  ideal	  to	  be	  practicable.	  	  	  
In	  6.2	  I	  respond	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  utopian	  irrelevance.	  	  Many	  argue	  that	  deliberation	  is	  
more	  a	  process	  of	  inquiry	  than	  decision-­‐making,	  that	  it	  takes	  much	  more	  time	  and	  effort	  than	  
citizens	  want	  to	  contribute,	  and	  consequently	  it	  is	  really	  only	  appealing	  to	  political	  theorists	  and	  
has	  very	  little	  to	  offer	  real	  politics.	  	  To	  a	  certain	  degree,	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  critics.	  	  Deliberation	  is	  
not	  easy,	  not	  quick	  and	  may	  be	  more	  appealing	  to	  people	  with	  an	  aptitude	  and	  predilection	  for	  
decision-­‐making	  by	  inquiry.	  	  However,	  I	  am	  not	  offering	  an	  account	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  
as	  a	  description	  of,	  or	  prescription	  for,	  society	  at	  large;	  I	  am	  suggesting	  that	  deliberation,	  as	  
difficult	  and	  time	  consuming	  as	  it	  may	  be,	  shows	  promise	  as	  a	  means	  to	  overcome	  
misrecognition	  and	  misunderstanding	  in	  political	  dialogues	  about	  minority	  rights.	  	  	  
Finally,	  in	  6.3,	  I	  wrap	  it	  up.	  	  I	  disagree	  with	  those	  who	  are	  content	  to	  dismiss	  the	  claims	  
of	  minorities	  as	  paradoxical	  before	  the	  thrust	  of	  the	  claim	  has	  even	  made	  it	  to	  the	  table.	  	  
Questions	  about	  the	  rights	  of	  non-­‐liberal	  minority	  groups	  situated	  in	  liberal	  democracies	  are	  
not	  easy.	  	  Coming	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  content	  of	  claims	  made	  from	  worldviews	  with	  a	  different	  
set	  of	  beliefs,	  values,	  traditions	  and	  practices	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  task,	  but	  it	  is,	  I	  think,	  a	  necessary	  
one	  if	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  is	  to	  deliver	  on	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  pluralist	  society.	  	  I	  contend	  that	  a	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deliberative	  process	  (shaped	  by	  the	  ordering	  of	  features	  I	  have	  put	  forward)	  is	  a	  type	  of	  political	  
dialogue	  that	  can	  negotiate	  the	  concept	  and	  content	  of	  minority	  rights	  claims	  framed	  in	  
alternative	  worldviews	  and	  as	  such	  offers	  a	  way	  out,	  an	  instructive	  way	  out,	  of	  the	  minority	  
rights	  paradox.	  
6.1	  Deliberating	  the	  Paradox	  
It	  is	  the	  inclusive	  nature	  of	  deliberation	  that	  makes	  it	  a	  good	  candidate	  for	  dialogues	  about	  
minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  An	  inclusive	  deliberation,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  include	  claims	  based	  on	  non-­‐liberal	  
worldviews,	  poses	  significant	  and	  worrisome	  problems	  for	  a	  nation	  built	  upon	  and	  stabilized	  by	  
liberal	  principles.	  	  However,	  I	  argued	  in	  chapter	  two	  that	  the	  threats	  posed	  by	  alternative	  
worldviews	  are	  often	  based	  on	  misrepresentations	  of	  difference	  as	  opposition	  rather	  than	  
innocuous	  or	  complementary	  difference.	  	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  show	  how	  the	  account	  of	  deliberation	  I	  have	  put	  forward	  can	  
respond	  to	  the	  issues	  raised	  in	  the	  exposition	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  	  In	  chapter	  one,	  I	  
looked	  at	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  relativism	  and	  how	  that	  translates	  into	  political	  scepticism	  
about	  the	  degree	  of	  difference	  between	  worldviews.	  	  When	  the	  degree	  of	  difference	  
considered	  possible	  is	  negligible	  the	  concept	  of	  minority	  rights	  is	  similarly	  limited	  so	  that	  special	  
rights	  considerations	  are	  similarly	  limited.	  	  Accepting	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  cultural	  difference	  in	  
political	  dialogue	  promotes	  the	  kind	  of	  recognition	  necessary	  for	  a	  more	  robust	  conception	  of	  
minority	  rights.	  	   	  
Chapter	  two	  focused	  on	  issues	  brought	  about	  by	  biases	  of	  liberal	  institutions	  shaped	  by	  
certain	  strands	  of	  liberalism.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  chief	  concerns	  raised	  by	  minority	  groups	  is	  the	  
individualist	  orientation	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  institutions.	  	  This	  orientation,	  it	  was	  shown	  in	  
chapter	  two,	  has	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  what	  sorts	  of	  claim	  are	  considered	  legitimate	  and	  as	  
result	  imposes	  constraints	  on	  the	  content	  of	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  The	  types	  of	  claims	  that	  fall	  
outside	  what	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  scope	  of	  political	  liberalism	  are,	  in	  important	  cases,	  
erroneously	  cast	  as	  illiberal	  and	  paradoxical.	  	  In	  contrast,	  I	  have	  cast	  these	  claims	  in	  a	  different	  
light,	  rather	  than	  illiberal—non-­‐liberal,	  rather	  than	  paradoxical—reasonable.	  	  An	  inclusive	  
deliberation	  is	  the	  type	  of	  political	  dialogue	  that	  can	  bring	  to	  fruition	  the	  promise	  of	  pluralism.	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Revisiting	  key	  examples	  shows	  how	  reflecting	  on	  the	  concept	  and	  content	  of	  minority	  rights	  in	  
an	  inclusive	  deliberative	  dialogue	  offers	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  
Deliberative	  Consensus	  and	  the	  Criminal	  Justice	  Paradox	  
The	  distinction	  between	  forms	  of	  Aboriginal	  justice	  and	  European	  style	  legal	  systems	  discussed	  
in	  chapters	  one	  and	  two	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  two	  distinct	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  justice	  and	  
these	  distinct	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  justice	  inform	  two	  distinct	  justice	  strategies;	  one	  liberal,	  
one	  other	  than	  liberal.	  	  Legal	  systems	  in	  the	  European	  tradition	  simply	  do	  not	  recognize	  
elements,	  such	  as	  ‘heart	  thinking’	  or	  ‘perceived	  facts’	  (which	  are	  key	  to	  Aboriginal	  justice	  
strategies)	  as	  equally	  relevant	  to	  determinations	  of	  justice	  as	  ‘rationality’	  and	  ‘evidentiary	  
support’.	  	  These	  differences	  strain	  the	  dialogue	  between	  liberal	  nations	  and	  self-­‐proclaimed	  
non-­‐liberal	  communities	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  best	  way	  to	  address	  challenges	  specific	  to	  the	  
members	  of	  that	  minority	  group.	  	  The	  paradox,	  in	  this	  type	  of	  case,	  is	  something	  like	  this:	  
	  
The	  minority	  claim:	  
I	  claim	  that	  the	  majority	  legal	  system	  is	  culturally	  biased.	  
As	  a	  member	  of	  a	  minority	  culture,	  I	  am	  unfairly	  disadvantaged	  in	  the	  majority	  legal	  
system.	  
Therefore,	  my	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial	  is	  unjustly	  constrained	  by	  the	  majority	  legal	  system.	  
	  
The	  response:	  
The	  majority	  legal	  system	  is	  necessary	  to	  protect	  your	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial.	  
Therefore,	  by	  opposing	  the	  majority	  legal	  system,	  you	  paradoxically	  oppose	  what	  is	  
necessary	  to	  exercise	  your	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial.	  
	  
At	  issue	  in	  this	  articulation	  of	  the	  paradox	  are	  fairness	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  culturally	  relative	  
systems	  of	  justice;	  as	  a	  result,	  getting	  around	  the	  paradox	  requires	  acceptance	  that	  alternatives	  
to	  the	  majority	  legal	  system	  are	  legitimate	  in	  their	  own	  terms	  and	  that	  denying	  the	  legitimacy	  
of	  alternatives	  to	  the	  majority	  justice	  system	  is	  unfair	  to	  the	  members	  of	  minority	  groups.	  	  
Presuppositions	  that	  diminish	  the	  import	  of	  cultural	  difference	  serve	  to	  reinforce	  the	  paradox	  
and	  undermine	  the	  minority	  claim.	  	  In	  chapter	  three,	  I	  looked	  at	  accounts	  of	  deliberation	  that	  
function	  exclusively	  with	  regard	  to	  cultural	  difference	  in	  political	  discourse.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  
features	  of	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation	  and	  those	  of	  alternative	  justice	  strategies	  share	  a	  certain	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amount	  of	  structural	  complicity	  which	  suggests	  that	  deliberation	  may	  serve	  to	  narrow	  the	  
conceptual	  and	  ideological	  gaps	  between	  majority	  legal	  systems	  and	  minority	  justice	  strategies.	  	  	  
Peacemaking	  and	  Circles	  share	  several	  features	  with	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation.	  	  First,	  
they	  share	  a	  common	  purpose,	  consensual	  decision-­‐making	  in	  which	  consensus	  does	  not	  
require	  a	  unanimity	  of	  opinions,	  beliefs	  or	  values.	  	  Second,	  both	  dialogues	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  
contributions	  of	  the	  participants.	  	  Third,	  in	  neither	  case	  does	  legitimacy	  rest	  on	  timeless	  
principles,	  an	  independent	  ground	  or	  a	  universal	  methodology.	  	  In	  both	  cases	  legitimacy	  and	  
confidence	  in	  the	  dialogue	  are	  built	  upon	  the	  equality	  of	  participants	  who	  make	  sincere	  
contributions	  and	  sincerely	  commit	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  dialogue.	  	  	  
Deliberative	  consensus	  on	  the	  best	  course	  of	  action	  is	  found	  not	  by	  diminishing	  the	  
degree	  of	  difference,	  but	  through	  the	  recognition	  of	  difference.	  	  Participants	  in	  a	  deliberation	  
have	  something	  at	  stake,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  there	  is	  a	  burden	  to	  ‘get	  it	  right’.	  	  It	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  
consensus-­‐at-­‐any-­‐price;	  there	  is	  a	  notion	  of	  what	  is	  ‘good’	  at	  play.	  	  The	  common	  good	  is	  public	  
debate,	  the	  substantive	  realization	  of	  the	  formal	  concept	  of	  deliberation	  aimed	  at	  advancing	  
what	  is	  good	  for	  all	  who	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  issue.	  	  Deliberatively	  speaking,	  to	  seek	  consensus	  
with	  unlike	  minds	  through	  dialogue	  is	  better	  than	  a	  course	  of	  political	  isolationism.	  	  	  
The	  shared	  goal	  of	  participants	  in	  a	  deliberation	  is	  consensus	  on	  what	  are	  the	  most	  just	  
policies,	  practices	  and	  institutions	  emerges	  from	  the	  deliberative	  procedure,	  of	  which,	  fairness	  
is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  to	  advance	  what	  is	  best	  for	  all	  participants	  in	  a	  climate	  of	  pluralism.	  The	  
importance	  of	  consensus	  is	  not	  agreement,	  not	  the	  unification	  of	  opinion;	  it	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  
consensus	  that	  brings	  people	  of	  divergent	  opinions	  together	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  the	  purpose—
to	  make	  a	  decision	  despite	  the	  divergence	  of	  opinion.	  	  Decisions	  are	  the	  result	  of	  a	  multifaceted	  
dialogue	  that	  does	  not	  prioritize	  the	  judicious	  study	  and	  weighing	  of	  the	  facts	  in	  the	  case,	  over	  
the	  thoughts,	  feelings	  and	  experiences	  of	  those	  effected	  by	  the	  issue	  under	  deliberation.	  	  
Similarly,	  reasoning	  together	  is	  a	  key	  component	  of	  Aboriginal	  justice	  strategies—dialogues	  
open	  to	  heart-­‐thinking,	  head-­‐thinking	  and	  facts	  both	  real	  and	  perceived.	  	  Respect	  for,	  and	  




The	  self-­‐design	  of	  an	  Aboriginal	  Circle	  requires	  that	  the	  community	  and	  the	  
particularities	  of	  each	  individual	  case	  shape	  the	  process.	  	  The	  needs	  of	  each	  case	  determine	  
how	  the	  Circle	  proceeds,	  and	  this	  attention	  to	  the	  idiosyncrasies	  of	  individual	  cases	  is	  deemed	  
necessary	  to	  build	  confidence	  in,	  and	  commitment	  to,	  the	  process.	  	  Similarly,	  deliberation	  is	  a	  
dynamic	  process	  of	  give	  and	  take	  in	  an	  extended	  dialogue	  that	  responds	  to	  critical	  review	  of	  
previous	  decisions	  and	  new	  information	  as	  it	  comes	  to	  light.	  	  A	  debate	  constituted	  by	  moral	  
disagreement	  for	  example,	  is	  accepted	  as	  an	  on-­‐going	  dialogue	  that	  may	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  and	  
definite	  end	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  participants	  do	  not	  always	  expect	  agreement.	  	  Participants	  agree	  to	  
respect	  alternative	  moral	  frameworks	  and	  to	  actively	  seek	  common	  ground,	  wherever	  that	  
common	  ground	  may	  be,	  in	  order	  to	  move	  the	  dialogue	  forward.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  deliberation	  
serves	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  self-­‐reflective	  activity	  necessary	  to	  sustain	  political	  stability	  without	  a	  
natural	  order	  or	  universally	  applicable	  principles.	  
This	  sort	  of	  flexibility	  generates	  the	  kind	  of	  cultural	  sensitivity	  that,	  Aboriginals	  argue,	  is	  
lacking	  in	  the	  adversarial	  system.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  legal	  system	  that	  does	  not	  
recognise	  and	  accommodate	  divergent	  values	  appears	  suspicious	  to	  Aboriginals.	  	  Legitimacy,	  in	  
a	  deliberation,	  is	  neither	  conferred	  by	  the	  state	  nor	  a	  product	  of	  majority	  decision-­‐making.	  	  To	  
impose	  a	  decision,	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  decision	  must	  be	  understood	  and	  accepted	  by	  those	  
subject	  to	  the	  decision.	  	  Deliberative	  reasoning	  is	  public,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  reasons	  given	  must	  
meet	  a	  standard	  of	  public	  approval.	  	  In	  order	  to	  receive	  public	  approval,	  the	  reasons	  must	  make	  
sense	  for	  the	  dialogical	  participants.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  process	  of	  deliberation	  includes	  the	  critical	  
review	  of	  hidden	  biases	  in	  the	  dialogical	  structure	  itself.	  	  Fairness,	  then,	  is	  not	  an	  abstraction;	  it	  
is	  embedded	  in	  the	  process	  of	  seeking	  justice.	  	  Seeking	  justice	  through	  an	  inclusive	  deliberative	  
process	  gets	  around	  the	  criminal	  justice	  paradox	  because	  participants	  are	  bound	  to	  respect	  
cultural	  difference	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness.	  
Deliberative	  Reason	  and	  the	  Reasonableness	  Paradox	  
The	  reasonableness	  paradox,	  examined	  closely	  in	  chapter	  four,	  focused	  on	  institutional	  biases	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  claims	  and	  claimants.	  	  In	  both	  the	  Mozert	  and	  the	  
McFarlane	  cases,	  religious	  claims	  are	  interpreted	  as	  paradoxical;	  their	  claim	  is	  based	  on	  the	  
right	  to	  religious	  freedom;	  however,	  freedom	  of	  religion	  is	  jeopardized	  when	  the	  tenet	  of	  any	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one	  religion	  is	  institutionalized	  by	  the	  state.	  	  The	  reasonableness	  paradox	  directly	  addresses	  the	  
self-­‐referential	  implications	  of	  such	  a	  claim.	  
The	  minority	  claim:	  
I	  claim	  that	  liberal	  institutions	  (educational	  or	  legal)	  impose	  a	  secular	  worldview	  on	  
citizens	  and	  this	  bias	  violates	  my	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  religion.	  
Therefore,	  my	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  religion	  is	  unjustly	  constrained	  by	  liberal	  institutions.	  
	  
The	  response:	  
Liberal	  institutions	  are	  required	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  citizens.	  
Therefore,	  by	  opposing	  liberal	  institutions,	  you	  paradoxically	  oppose	  what	  is	  necessary	  
to	  exercise	  rights.	  
	  
This	  articulation	  shows	  a	  slightly	  broader	  articulation	  of	  the	  paradox,	  one	  in	  which	  rights	  are	  
protected	  by	  liberal	  institutions	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  to	  oppose	  liberal	  institutions	  is	  to	  oppose	  the	  
very	  rights	  on	  which	  the	  minority	  group	  is	  making	  their	  claim.	  The	  self-­‐referential	  mistake	  is	  
interpreted	  as	  both	  a	  failure	  of	  reasoning	  and	  an	  improper	  orientation	  toward	  one’s	  own	  
worldview—only	  an	  unreasonable	  person	  would	  expect	  the	  state	  to	  uphold	  the	  tenets	  of	  one	  
religion	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  all	  other	  religions.	  	  The	  paradox	  is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  
standards	  of	  reasonableness	  are	  very	  closely	  connected	  to	  political	  liberalism.	  	  	  
In	  chapters	  two	  and	  four,	  I	  looked	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	  reasonableness	  and	  
liberalism.	  	  Reasonable	  citizens	  agree	  that	  liberal	  principles	  are	  universal,	  even	  though	  they	  may	  
disagree	  about	  what	  makes	  them	  universal.	  	  Reasonable	  citizens	  must	  uphold	  liberal	  principles	  
by	  treating	  other	  individual	  citizens	  as	  free	  and	  equal.	  	  Any	  sort	  of	  deviation	  is	  an	  affront	  to	  
justice.	  	  A	  citizen,	  who	  does	  not	  uphold	  the	  universality	  of	  liberal	  principles,	  is	  rejecting	  the	  
ground	  on	  which	  they	  stand	  and	  therefore	  they	  are	  unreasonable,	  not	  a	  part	  of	  the	  overlapping	  
consensus	  that	  reflects	  the	  shared	  norms	  of	  the	  class	  of	  citizens	  who	  are	  reasonable.	  	  There	  are	  
accounts	  of	  deliberation	  that	  rest	  on	  a	  substantive	  notion	  of	  what	  sort	  of	  citizen	  is	  reasonable	  
and	  they	  give	  priority	  to	  the	  character	  and	  disposition	  of	  the	  participants	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
equality	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  might	  function	  to	  illegitimately	  exclude	  citizens	  from	  a	  dialogue.	  	  	  
In	  cases	  like	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins,	  for	  example,	  the	  parents	  argued	  that	  the	  courts’	  
decision	  was	  framed	  in	  the	  very	  terms	  to	  which	  they	  objected	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  terms	  that	  
presuppose	  a	  rational	  capacity	  for	  analytical	  detachment	  not	  recognized	  in	  the	  fundamentalist	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frame.	  	  The	  court	  excluded	  the	  salient	  points	  of	  the	  fundamentalist	  argument,	  not	  only	  by	  
denying	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  premises	  and	  principles	  upon	  which	  the	  argument	  rests,	  but	  also	  by	  
failing	  to	  recognize	  the	  fundamentalists’	  reasoning	  process.	  	  In	  contrast,	  an	  inclusive	  
deliberation	  is	  a	  decision-­‐making	  dialogue	  in	  which	  all	  participants	  equally	  share	  the	  burden	  
and	  responsibility	  of	  providing	  good	  reasons,	  and	  responding	  to	  good	  reasons,	  for	  claims.	  	  
Deliberative	  procedures	  are	  not	  justified	  by	  liberal	  values,	  but	  rather,	  deliberation	  itself	  is	  a	  
public	  good.	  	  Rather	  than	  reasoning	  from	  within	  one	  theoretical	  or	  conceptual	  framework,	  
deliberation	  is	  public	  and	  thereby	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  frameworks	  of	  all	  participants.	  	  	  
The	  idea	  of	  publicly	  constituted	  reason	  is	  a	  very	  liberal	  idea;	  my	  concern	  is	  particular	  
articulations	  of	  that	  idea	  that	  have	  the,	  perhaps	  unintended,	  effect	  of	  excluding	  certain	  
misrecognized	  groups	  or	  individuals.	  	  In	  contrast,	  in	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation	  public	  reason	  
shapes	  the	  bonds	  between	  citizens.	  	  The	  common	  bond	  that	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  
share	  is,	  according	  to	  Habermas,	  that	  they	  are	  seeking	  to	  understand	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  
liberal	  democracy.	  	  Understanding	  is	  commonly	  sought	  through	  critically	  interpreting	  the	  
constitutional	  affairs	  such	  as	  minority	  rights	  and	  religious	  freedoms.	  	  Historically,	  a	  common	  
religion,	  a	  common	  language,	  and	  a	  nationalist	  identity	  shaped	  abstract	  public	  solidarity.	  	  Now,	  
solidarity	  is	  found	  in	  a	  shared	  problem—coming	  to	  grips	  with	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  citizen	  in	  a	  
pluralist	  state.400	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  reasons	  put	  forward	  in	  support	  of	  claims,	  Aboriginal	  
groups	  have	  something	  in	  common	  with	  religious	  groups,	  they	  both	  appeal	  to	  something	  
beyond	  value-­‐neutral	  rationality	  in	  their	  reasoning	  strategies.	  	  Habermas	  described	  the	  
something	  beyond	  as	  ‘other’,	  which	  is	  the	  most	  basic	  foundation	  for	  reason.	  	  For	  some,	  the	  
other	  is	  some	  sort	  of	  natural	  order,	  for	  others	  it	  is	  a	  deity,	  and	  for	  many	  an	  enlightenment	  
philosopher	  it	  is	  reason.	  	  Habermas	  argues	  that	  reason	  comes	  to	  an	  end	  not	  in	  itself	  but	  in	  some	  
sort	  of	  other.	  	  Reason	  must	  be	  subject	  to	  this	  other,	  because	  reason	  requires	  an	  orientation	  
outside	  of	  itself.	  	  Modern	  philosophy	  insists	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  secular	  modes	  of	  
speaking,	  “which	  requires	  itself	  to	  be	  generally	  accessible”	  and	  cosmological	  modes	  of	  speaking	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  Habermas,	  "On	  the	  Relations	  Between	  the	  Secular	  Liberal	  State	  and	  Religion."	  In	  Political	  Theologies:	  
Public	  Religions	  in	  a	  Post-­‐Secular	  World,	  eds.	  Hent	  de	  Vries	  and	  Lawrence	  Eugene	  Sullivan,	  (New	  York:	  Fordham	  
University	  Press,	  2006),	  254.	  
	  195	  
	  
which	  “depend	  upon	  the	  truths	  of	  revelation.”	  According	  to	  Habermas,	  post	  Kant	  and	  Hegel,	  
philosophy	  came	  to	  recognize	  its	  own	  fallibility	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  grammar	  of	  the	  
religious/secular	  distinction	  does	  not	  require	  that	  philosophy	  determine	  what	  of	  religion	  is	  true	  
or	  false,	  nor	  should	  it	  merely	  be	  content	  to	  refrain	  from	  judging	  those	  who	  derive	  meaning	  
from	  deep	  religious	  convictions.	  	  “Philosophy	  has	  reasons	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  learn	  from	  religious	  
traditions.”401	  	  
	   Similarly,	  through	  political	  engagement,	  citizens	  engage	  in	  the	  project	  of	  coming	  to	  
understand	  one	  another	  in	  the	  pluralist	  state.	  	  Habermas	  shifted	  the	  locus	  of	  rationality	  away	  
from	  both	  the	  cosmos	  and	  the	  knowing	  subject;	  rationality	  is	  found	  in	  the	  everyday	  act	  of	  
communication	  in	  linguistic	  practices	  aimed	  at	  interpersonal	  understanding.	  	  In	  his	  work	  on	  the	  
relation	  between	  religion	  and	  the	  liberal	  state,	  he	  characterizes	  the	  dialogue	  as	  taking	  place	  
between	  believers	  and	  non-­‐believers;	  however,	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  many	  groups	  may	  have	  
worldviews	  that	  render	  reasons	  opaque	  to	  each	  other	  and	  to	  the	  liberal	  secular	  rationalist.	  	  As	  a	  
result,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  limit	  the	  question	  to	  only	  religious	  v.	  secular	  dialogues.402	  	  An	  
inclusive	  deliberation	  is	  a	  process	  of	  rendering	  the	  opaque	  transparent	  and	  as	  a	  result	  offers	  a	  
way	  around	  the	  reasonableness	  paradox.	  	  The	  dialogue	  need	  not	  be	  ruled	  by	  any	  one	  tradition,	  
its	  participants	  shape	  a	  deliberative	  dialogue	  and	  as	  such	  its	  rationality	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  a	  
particular	  standard	  of	  reason,	  it	  is	  responsive	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  recognition	  and	  understanding	  of	  
the	  dialogical	  participants.	  	  	  
Identity,	  Transformation	  and	  the	  Collectivist	  Paradox	  
The	  collectivist	  paradox	  is,	  not	  surprisingly,	  rests	  on	  individualist	  presuppositions.	  	  In	  chapter	  
two,	  I	  examined	  concerns	  brought	  about	  by	  liberalism’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  individual.	  	  Turner	  
characterised	  it	  as	  the	  point	  of	  conflict	  over	  Aboriginal	  sovereignty	  in	  Canada—individualism	  is	  
a	  significant	  obstacle	  to	  Aboriginal	  groups	  seeking	  recognition	  as	  sovereign	  nations	  primarily	  
because	  sovereignty	  rights	  are	  group	  rights.	  	  When	  the	  individual	  is	  the	  fundamental	  moral	  unit	  
of	  a	  theory	  of	  justice,	  every	  individual	  is	  accounted	  for	  and	  consequently	  no	  one	  is	  outside	  the	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scope	  of	  minimal	  moral	  concern.403	  	  The	  fear	  is	  that	  special	  rights	  for	  self	  proclaimed	  non-­‐liberal	  
minorities	  threaten	  what	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  aims	  to	  protect—each	  individual.	  	  When	  a	  
minority	  is	  afforded	  rights	  as	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  collective	  rather	  than	  a	  collection	  of	  individuals	  who	  
happen	  to	  share	  group	  membership,	  power	  structures	  within	  that	  group	  may	  infringe	  on	  the	  
rights	  of	  individual	  members	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  runs	  contrary	  to	  the	  individual	  rights	  
guaranteed	  by	  a	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  The	  paradox	  in	  this	  case	  rests	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  liberal	  
project	  is	  legitimately	  oriented	  around	  the	  individual	  citizen.	  	  	  
	  
The	  minority	  claim:	  
I	  claim	  that	  a	  system	  of	  justice	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  is	  the	  rights	  bearing	  unit	  violates	  
our	  right	  to	  sovereignty.	  
Therefore,	  our	  right	  to	  sovereignty	  is	  unjustly	  constrained	  by	  a	  system	  of	  justice	  in	  which	  
the	  individual	  is	  the	  rights	  bearing	  unit.	  
	  
The	  response:	  
A	  system	  of	  justice	  in	  which	  the	  rights	  bearing	  unit	  is	  the	  individual	  is	  required	  to	  protect	  
the	  rights	  of	  all	  the	  individuals	  in	  your	  groups.	  
Therefore,	  by	  opposing	  a	  system	  of	  justice	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  is	  the	  rights	  bearing	  
unit,	  you	  paradoxically	  oppose	  what	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  individuals	  in	  your	  group	  to	  
exercise	  rights.	  
	  
The	  paradox	  here	  turns	  on	  a	  notion	  of	  individual	  justice—that	  the	  individual	  is	  the	  basic	  unit	  of	  
which	  all	  groups	  are	  comprised.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  group	  is	  not	  recognized	  as	  an	  entity	  but	  rather	  
simply	  an	  aggregate	  of	  individuals	  who	  happen	  to	  share	  certain	  features,	  ethnicity	  or	  historical	  
circumstances	  for	  example,	  in	  common.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two,	  some	  non-­‐liberal	  minority	  
groups	  object	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  individual,	  for	  political	  purposes,	  is	  abstracted	  from	  the	  
historical	  and	  social	  circumstances	  they	  share	  as	  a	  group.	  	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  features	  they	  
share	  in	  common	  are	  constitutive	  of	  an	  identity	  that	  should	  be	  included	  in	  any	  sort	  of	  dialogue	  
concerning	  special	  rights	  considerations	  affecting	  the	  members	  of	  their	  group.	  
	   As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  five,	  identity	  claims	  are	  at	  once	  problematic	  and	  very	  common	  
in	  pluralist	  societies.	  	  When	  rights	  claims	  are	  constrained	  to	  an	  individualist	  idiom,	  that	  is,	  the	  
individual	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  rights	  bearing	  unit,	  there	  is	  the	  risk	  that	  the	  claims	  minority	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groups	  whose	  self-­‐understanding	  is	  collectivist	  will	  be	  interpreted	  as	  paradoxical	  and	  dismissed	  
before	  the	  thrust	  of	  the	  claim	  has	  been	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  issue.	  	  Coming	  to	  terms	  with	  an	  
identity	  shaped	  by	  a	  collectivist	  worldview	  is	  necessary	  to	  escape	  the	  dialogue	  ending	  effect	  the	  
minority	  rights	  paradox	  has	  had	  on	  dialogues	  about	  sovereignty	  rights.	  	  A	  deliberation	  that	  
functions	  inclusively	  with	  regard	  to	  identity	  claims	  gets	  around	  the	  paradox	  because	  
participants	  are	  expected	  to	  bring	  forward	  the	  best	  possible	  reasons	  for	  their	  claim,	  and	  to	  
make	  those	  reasons	  public.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  reasoning	  shaped	  by	  a	  collectivist	  worldview	  cannot	  be	  
dismissed	  simply	  because	  it	  is	  collectivist.	  
Inclusion	  distributes	  the	  burden	  of	  public	  reasoning	  to	  all	  participants	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  all	  
participants	  share	  the	  burden	  of	  making	  their	  reasons	  public.	  	  Making	  identity	  claims	  public	  
may	  involve	  the	  kind	  of	  risks	  identified	  by	  Stokes	  and	  Young	  in	  chapter	  five—identity	  made	  
public	  is	  subject	  to	  scrutiny	  and	  may	  be	  altered	  in	  the	  process.	  	  However,	  the	  openness	  
required	  to	  deliberate	  in	  good	  faith	  does	  not	  require	  participants	  abandon	  their	  worldview.	  	  
Participants	  must	  be	  willing	  to	  agree	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  deliberation	  may	  not	  be	  
determined	  entirely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  worldview.	  	  Deliberation	  does	  not	  require	  that	  
participants	  abandon	  the	  whole	  package	  of	  values	  and	  beliefs	  that	  support	  their	  claims;	  on	  the	  
contrary,	  it	  is	  those	  reasons	  and	  reasoning	  styles	  that	  shape	  the	  form	  and	  content	  of	  a	  
deliberative	  dialogue.	  	  Hence,	  a	  minority	  group	  with	  an	  identity	  shaped	  by	  a	  particular	  
worldview	  may	  deliberate	  without	  threat	  of	  revision	  to	  that	  worldview	  as	  long	  as	  they	  can	  
exercise	  tolerance	  and	  recognize	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  outcome,	  even	  if	  the	  outcome	  does	  not	  
line	  up	  with	  their	  beliefs	  and	  values.	  	  	  
Deliberation	  should	  not	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  dialogue	  between	  entirely	  ‘open’	  groups	  
or	  individuals.	  	  The	  disposition	  toward	  openness	  and	  the	  revisability	  of	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  
life	  need	  not	  render	  participants	  blank	  slates.	  	  Quite	  the	  contrary,	  the	  necessity	  of	  good	  reasons	  
requires	  that	  participants	  mount	  the	  best	  argument	  possible	  from	  their	  own	  resources,	  
accepting	  that	  others	  will	  do	  the	  same.	  	  Evaluation	  then	  proceeds	  by	  recognizing	  what	  reasons	  
resonate	  with	  all	  who	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  claim	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  decision.	  	  The	  collectivist	  
paradox	  is	  overcome,	  not	  because	  the	  worldview	  of	  the	  collectivist	  minority	  is	  transformed	  into	  
an	  individualist	  frame;	  instead,	  the	  public	  institution	  is	  required	  to	  deliberate	  the	  relevance	  of	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its	  individualist	  orientation	  to	  the	  issue	  at	  hand	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  accepts	  reasons	  that	  may	  
challenge	  its	  application	  to	  specific	  circumstances.	  	  
6.2	  Political	  Process	  or	  Process	  of	  Inquiry?	  
I	  have	  characterized	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation	  as	  the	  best	  recommendation	  for	  the	  paradoxes	  
and	  puzzles	  thrown	  up	  by	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  Lest	  I	  be	  accused	  of	  wearing	  rose-­‐tinted	  
glasses,	  I	  wish	  to	  address	  a	  criticism	  that	  speaks	  broadly	  to	  deliberative	  democracy,	  and	  directly	  
to	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  	  Deliberation,	  it	  is	  argued,	  suffers	  from	  utopian	  irrelevance.404	  	  
Critics	  of	  deliberation	  suggest	  that	  deliberative	  theory	  asks	  too	  much	  of	  the	  citizenry;	  that	  
deliberation	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  political	  process	  as	  it	  is	  a	  theoretical	  ideal—an	  ideal	  that	  has	  little	  
to	  offer	  the	  practical	  reality	  of	  political	  arrangements	  in	  modern	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  It	  is	  not	  
my	  intention	  to	  defend	  the	  practical	  efficacy	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  or	  even	  to	  suggest	  that	  
deliberation	  is,	  in	  all	  cases,	  superior	  to	  aggregative	  or	  other	  democratic	  procedures.	  	  Like	  many	  
other	  deliberationists,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  deliberative	  processes	  are	  appropriate	  in	  all	  circumstances.	  	  	  
My	  primary	  concern	  is	  with	  how	  liberal	  democracies	  currently	  deal	  with	  issues	  that	  are	  
brought	  about	  by	  pluralism,	  specifically	  how	  the	  claims	  of	  minority	  groups	  whose	  worldview	  is	  
significantly	  different	  from	  the	  dominant	  majority	  are	  understood.	  	  The	  examples	  in	  chapter	  
one	  show	  how	  the	  charge	  of	  paradox	  occurs	  in	  rights	  discourse	  generally	  and	  more	  specifically	  
how	  the	  paradox	  functions	  to	  stifle	  political	  dialogue	  before,	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  claim	  has	  been	  
properly	  presented	  or	  understood.	  	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  an	  inclusive	  deliberative	  process	  is	  a	  type	  
of	  political	  dialogue	  that	  can	  negotiate	  the	  concept	  and	  content	  of	  minority	  rights	  claims	  
framed	  in	  alternative	  worldviews	  and	  as	  such,	  offers	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  	  
Why?	  	  Maybe	  it	  is	  because	  deliberation	  does	  what	  the	  critics	  say,	  deliberation	  asks	  a	  great	  deal	  
of	  both	  citizens	  and	  legislators.	  
Deliberation	  Asks	  too	  Much	  of	  Citizens	  
Citizens	  seem	  to	  appreciate	  expediency	  in	  political	  arrangements	  and	  the	  members	  of	  minority	  
groups	  are	  no	  exception.	  	  Critics	  have	  observed	  that	  deliberative	  theorists	  often	  operate	  under	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the	  assumption	  that	  minorities	  are	  anxious	  to	  deliberate	  their	  claims	  but	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  
case.	  	  The	  state,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  uphold	  the	  promise	  of	  individual	  rights,	  has	  a	  burden	  to	  hear	  the	  
claims	  of	  its	  citizens.	  	  Citizens	  have	  certain	  obligations	  to	  the	  state	  and	  toward	  each	  other,	  but	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  rights	  claims,	  there	  are	  some	  cases	  where	  the	  minority	  group	  making	  the	  
claim	  seems	  to	  care	  very	  little	  if	  the	  state	  or	  other	  citizens	  find	  their	  reasons	  palatable.	  	  What	  is	  
most	  salient	  to	  this	  discussion	  is	  that	  minority	  groups	  who	  find	  themselves	  in	  the	  paradox	  may	  
be	  the	  least	  likely	  to	  accept	  deliberation	  as	  an	  acceptable	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  
In	  cases	  such	  as	  Prop	  8,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Society	  for	  the	  Preservation	  of	  Marriage	  really	  
does	  not	  care	  if	  non-­‐Mormon	  citizens	  come	  to	  understand	  and	  accept	  why	  they	  object	  to	  same-­‐
sex	  marriage.	  	  If	  they	  wanted	  their	  reasons	  understood	  (and	  accepted),	  then	  they	  surely	  would	  
have	  presented	  the	  cosmology	  behind	  their	  objection	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  to	  the	  voters;	  
instead,	  they	  chose	  to	  frame	  their	  objections	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  rights.	  	  Even	  when	  a	  group	  believes	  
their	  reasons	  are	  just	  as	  good,	  or	  even	  better,	  than	  any	  other	  reasons,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  
frame	  claims	  in	  terms	  likely	  to	  gain	  acceptance,	  rather	  than	  terms	  that	  expand	  the	  epistemic	  
resources	  of	  the	  discourse.	  	  It	  is	  simply	  too	  much	  work,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  Harden	  argues	  that	  
“deliberative	  democracy	  has	  the	  same	  problem	  Oscar	  Wilde	  saw	  in	  socialism:	  It	  would	  require	  
too	  many	  evenings.”405	  	  Deliberation	  is	  politics	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  politics,	  and	  as	  such	  swallows	  up	  
too	  much	  time	  for	  the	  average	  citizen	  who	  is	  more	  interested	  in	  living	  in	  the	  polity	  than	  
governing	  it.	  	  	  
Deliberationists	  from	  Barber	  to	  Guttmann	  and	  Thompson	  see	  deliberation	  as	  a	  politics	  
of	  participation	  and	  as	  such	  it	  offers	  a	  prescription	  for	  an	  un-­‐engaged	  citizenry.	  	  In	  an	  ideal	  
world	  (ideal	  for	  the	  political	  theorist)	  all	  citizens	  would	  be	  politicians.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  real	  
world,	  it	  seems	  that	  not	  all	  citizens	  want,	  or	  indeed	  need,	  to	  be	  politicians.	  	  Critics	  argue	  that	  
deliberative	  constraints	  should	  apply	  to	  public	  officials	  but	  not	  to	  citizens,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  
vast	  run	  of	  citizens	  whose	  primary	  political	  activity	  is	  voting	  by	  secret	  ballot	  need	  not	  formally	  
deliberate	  their	  political	  decisions.406	  	  If	  citizens	  make	  claims	  against	  the	  government,	  then	  they	  
are	  public	  claims,	  and	  as	  such	  should	  be	  governed	  by	  deliberative	  constraints.	  	  Similarly,	  citizens	  
fulfilling	  civic	  duties	  like	  jury	  duty	  bear	  an	  exceptional	  burden	  of	  responsibility.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405	  Hardin,	  “Method,”	  112.	  
406	  Ibid.,	  113.	  
	  200	  
	  
In	  general,	  I	  agree	  with	  those	  who	  would	  say	  that	  the	  idea	  that	  all	  citizens	  must,	  or	  
ought	  to,	  participate	  in	  public	  deliberations	  strictly	  governed	  by	  discursive	  rules	  is	  a	  non-­‐starter.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  minority	  rights	  claims;	  however,	  it	  is	  a	  public	  issue	  and	  therefore	  the	  dialogue	  
does	  benefit	  from	  the	  structure	  offered	  by	  constitutional	  arrangements,	  legal	  processes	  and	  
special	  legislatures.	  	  When	  the	  processes	  of	  these	  institutions	  take	  on	  a	  deliberative	  character,	  
the	  dialogues	  promote,	  rather	  than	  thwart,	  understanding	  and	  recognition.	  	  Recall	  from	  chapter	  
two,	  the	  James	  Bay	  Cree	  successfully	  translated	  key	  cultural	  concepts	  and	  ideas	  in	  a	  legal	  
proceeding	  to	  make	  their	  case.	  	  Their	  success	  was	  not	  only	  that	  they	  were	  able	  to	  express	  these	  
ideas	  essential	  to	  their	  self-­‐understanding	  in	  court,	  but	  that	  they	  were	  able	  to	  do	  it	  in	  such	  a	  
way	  that	  the	  court	  came	  to	  understand	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  cultural	  content	  in	  the	  particular	  
case—they	  made	  their	  worldview	  understandable,	  public.	  	  
The	  most	  common	  reason	  presumed	  why	  minority	  groups	  enter	  into	  deliberations	  with	  
the	  state	  is	  that	  they	  simply	  have	  need	  of	  state	  assistance.	  	  Indigenous	  peoples	  need	  assistance	  
in	  overcoming	  the	  history	  of	  colonial	  oppression.	  	  Religious	  persons	  need	  help	  to	  protect	  their	  
way	  of	  life.	  	  Disability	  groups	  need	  help	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  public	  services	  and	  spaces.	  	  In	  order	  to	  
justify	  the	  need,	  these	  groups	  explain	  themselves	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  political	  identity	  and	  
relationship	  with	  the	  state,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  those	  explanations	  shape	  a	  political	  dialogue	  with	  
a	  deliberative	  character.	  	  The	  implicit	  suggestion	  is	  that	  minority	  groups	  need	  deliberation	  
whereas	  the	  state,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  its	  institutions	  actually	  function	  deliberatively,	  puts	  up	  with	  
arduous	  and	  inefficient	  deliberative	  processes.	  	  However,	  this	  may	  be	  an	  oversimplification	  of	  
the	  depth	  of	  minority	  rights	  disputes.	  	  	  
Minority	  rights	  disputes	  are	  not	  always	  simply	  the	  weak	  begging	  from	  those	  who	  govern	  
the	  arrangements	  that	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  their	  lives;	  in	  some	  cases	  minority	  rights	  claims	  raise	  
questions	  about	  the	  justice	  of	  democratic	  institutions	  that	  reach	  far	  beyond	  the	  original	  claim.	  	  
There	  is	  disagreement	  among	  deliberationists	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  deliberation.	  	  While	  Nino	  
argues	  that	  deliberation	  has	  epistemic	  advantages	  over	  other	  forms	  of	  normative	  democracy,407	  
others	  argue	  like	  Bell	  argue	  that	  deliberation	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  political	  process	  as	  it	  is	  a	  process	  
of	  inquiry,	  which	  is	  most	  appealing	  to	  political	  theorists	  who	  are	  predisposed	  to	  favour	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intellectual	  pursuits.408	  	  Guttmann	  and	  Thompson	  seem	  to	  offer	  up	  deliberation	  as	  a	  
prescription	  for	  ailing	  institutions.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Benhabib	  thinks	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  think	  that	  
deliberative	  democracy	  is	  a	  thought	  experiment	  or	  merely	  a	  way	  to	  improve	  democratic	  
arrangements.	  	  Deliberative	  theories	  are	  describing	  existing	  political	  processes	  and	  as	  a	  result	  it	  
is	  not	  a	  theory	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  realized	  in	  practice,	  it	  is	  a	  theory	  that	  accounts	  for	  democratic	  
processes	  better	  than	  others.409	  	  Deliberation,	  in	  this	  sense,	  offers	  a	  means	  to	  navigate	  and	  
evaluate	  the	  influence	  and	  efficacy	  of	  mass	  communications,	  social	  realities	  and	  cultural	  
contexts	  in	  political	  discourse.	  	  	  
Whether	  the	  theory	  is	  descriptive	  or	  prescriptive	  is	  an	  interesting	  question	  worthy	  of	  
further	  research,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  resolve	  that	  question	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other	  to	  look	  at	  
its	  efficacy	  in	  minority	  rights	  dialogues.	  	  It	  is	  my	  contention	  that	  deliberation,	  as	  arduous	  as	  it	  
may	  be,	  is	  a	  way	  to	  overcome	  the	  kind	  of	  dialogue-­‐ending	  misrecognitions	  and	  
misunderstandings	  that	  have,	  in	  some	  cases,	  illegitimately	  stifled	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  	  Cases	  
like	  the	  James	  Bay	  Cree	  case	  support	  this	  idea.	  	  When	  public	  institutions	  take	  on	  the	  problems	  
of	  cultural	  difference	  and	  identity	  when	  confronted	  by	  minority	  rights	  claims	  the	  process	  is	  
rarely	  quick,	  efficient	  or	  easy—the	  James	  Bay	  Cree	  case	  began	  a	  multi-­‐decade	  dialogue	  that	  
incurred	  economic	  costs	  that	  would	  have	  been	  avoided	  if	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  Cree	  and	  Inuit	  had	  
been	  summarily	  dismissed.	  	  However,	  if	  the	  case	  had	  been	  dismissed	  without	  a	  fair	  hearing,	  the	  
social	  costs	  would	  have	  been	  significant.	  	  Considering	  the	  tactics	  employed	  in	  other	  cases	  
where	  Aboriginal	  groups	  have	  been	  steamrollered	  by	  the	  system,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  an	  
overstatement	  to	  say	  the	  costs	  may	  have	  been	  catastrophic.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  minority	  rights	  
claims,	  deliberations	  may	  very	  well	  have	  to	  take	  on	  the	  character	  of	  inquiry	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  
contextual	  and	  conceptual	  elements	  of	  claims	  relevant	  to	  issue;	  however,	  deliberation	  has	  
come	  under	  fire	  as	  less	  a	  theory	  of	  politics	  and	  more	  a	  theory	  of	  theory.	  
Utopian	  Irrelevance	  	  
The	  deliberation	  as	  ‘inquiry	  rather	  than	  politics’	  critique	  has	  two	  fronts;	  one	  already	  discussed	  is	  
that	  democratic	  processes	  and	  citizens	  simply	  do	  not	  accept	  the	  time	  demands	  of	  such	  an	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exhaustive	  approach	  to	  decision-­‐making.	  	  Second,	  is	  that	  the	  ideal	  of	  inquiry	  has	  very	  little	  
practical	  purchase.	  	  Critics	  argue	  that	  the	  closer	  the	  deliberative	  ideal	  comes	  to	  practical	  reality	  
the	  less	  applicable	  it	  is,	  the	  less	  explanatory	  force	  it	  has,	  and	  the	  less	  it	  has	  to	  offer	  as	  a	  political	  
theory.	  	  Day	  to	  day	  political	  activity	  is	  competitive,	  often	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  winning	  or	  losing	  
trumps	  concerns	  about	  how	  individuals	  or	  groups	  go	  about	  winning	  or	  losing.	  	  Real	  politics	  are	  
not	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  strictly	  rule	  governed	  arena	  of	  an	  ideal	  speech	  situation.	  	  
Saunders	  argues	  that	  ordinary	  citizens	  simply	  do	  not	  like	  deliberation	  because	  they	  
know	  that	  the	  person	  with	  the	  best	  argument	  will	  prevail.	  	  Ordinary	  citizens	  know	  that	  some	  
people	  are	  more	  capable	  of	  articulating	  their	  claims	  and	  as	  a	  result	  would	  only	  agree	  to	  
deliberate	  if	  they	  have	  confidence	  that	  their	  argument	  will	  be	  the	  best.410	  	  The	  elitist	  style	  of	  
reasoning	  required	  to	  deliberate	  further	  disadvantages	  citizens	  who	  are	  already	  
marginalized.411	  	  Bell	  argues	  that,	  “talented	  elites	  with	  the	  motivation	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  
understand	  and	  apply	  moral	  principles	  to	  complex	  political	  controversies...are	  more	  likely	  to	  
engage	  in	  constructive	  deliberations”,	  and	  that	  deliberation	  requires	  “above	  average	  
intelligence.”412	  	  Harden	  sums	  it	  up	  this	  way,	  “It	  is	  hard	  to	  avoid	  the	  suspicion	  that	  deliberative	  
democracy	  is	  the	  ‘democracy’	  of	  elite	  intellectuals.”413	  	  I,	  however,	  am	  not	  so	  sure	  that	  elite	  
intellectuals	  are	  actually	  disposed	  to,	  or	  more	  adept	  at,	  the	  kind	  of	  inclusive	  deliberation	  
required	  to	  deal	  with	  minority	  rights	  claims.	  
Where	  does	  the	  idea	  that	  intellectuals	  are	  expert	  deliberators	  come	  from?	  	  Is	  it	  that	  
‘inquiry’	  is	  the	  profession	  of	  intellectual	  elites	  and	  therefore	  the	  preferred	  method	  of	  decision-­‐
making?	  	  Is	  it	  that	  intellectual	  elites	  are	  better	  at	  dealing	  with	  complex	  problems?	  	  Is	  it	  really	  
the	  case	  that	  applying	  principles	  to	  particulars	  is	  necessary	  to	  deliberate?	  	  Is	  it	  that	  intellectual	  
elites	  are	  better	  able	  to	  assume	  a	  more	  objective	  point	  of	  view?	  	  Is	  it	  that	  intellectual	  elites	  are	  
able	  to	  look	  beyond	  whatever	  stake	  they	  might	  have	  in	  the	  decision	  and	  therefore	  better	  able	  
to	  weigh	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  a	  given	  outcome?	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410	  Lynn	  Sanders,	  “Against	  Deliberation”	  Political	  Theory	  25,	  no.	  3	  (1997):	  348.	  
411	  Ibid.,	  375.	  	  
412	  Bell,	  “Implementation,”	  74.	  
413	  Hardin,	  “Method,”	  112.	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I	  concede	  that	  some	  citizens	  will	  be	  better	  deliberators	  than	  others.	  	  Intellectual	  elites	  
may	  be	  better	  equipped	  to	  state	  their	  case,	  to	  other	  experts	  in	  their	  field,	  but	  not	  very	  skilled	  at	  
making	  their	  case	  publicly	  accessible.	  	  In	  addition,	  intellectual	  elites	  are	  just	  as	  likely	  to	  not	  see	  
the	  value	  of	  deliberating	  issues	  about	  which	  they	  have	  settled	  ideas.	  	  Deliberations	  between	  
groups	  with	  different	  worldviews	  requires	  a	  willingness	  to	  come	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  
alternative	  ideas,	  consequently,	  elites	  may	  not	  be	  any	  more	  apt,	  skilled	  or	  able	  to	  achieve	  
critical	  distance	  from	  issues	  than	  any	  other	  citizens.	  	  And	  the	  lack	  of	  acumen,	  even	  amongst	  
those	  we	  might	  expect	  to	  be	  good	  at	  it,	  does	  not	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  no	  one	  is	  capable	  of	  
successfully	  deliberating	  anything.	  	  Deliberation	  is	  a	  method,	  and	  methods,	  like	  people,	  are	  not	  
perfect.	  
It	  is	  my	  contention	  that	  issues,	  like	  those	  brought	  forward	  by	  the	  Mozert	  parents	  are	  
essential	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  public	  debate	  endemic	  to	  a	  free	  society	  that	  recognizes	  the	  equality	  of	  
its	  citizens.	  	  Deliberation	  is	  not	  always	  easy	  or	  quick	  but	  overcoming	  systemic	  injustice	  rarely	  is	  
quick	  and	  easy.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  a	  minority	  group	  is	  unjustly	  coerced	  by	  the	  governing	  
institutions	  to	  which	  they	  are	  subject	  is	  surely	  worth	  more	  than	  a	  swift	  dismissal,	  it	  is	  surely	  a	  
question	  worth	  the	  time	  and	  effort	  it	  takes	  to	  deliberate	  an	  appropriate	  and	  just	  decision.	  	  
While	  the	  inquiry	  critique	  may	  pose	  a	  problem	  for	  theories	  of	  deliberation	  as	  a	  prescription	  or	  
description	  of	  modern	  liberal	  democracies;	  a	  process	  that	  shares	  features	  with	  inquiry	  is,	  I	  
think,	  an	  appropriate	  method	  for	  getting	  to	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  unjust	  coercion	  and	  other	  
problems	  thrown	  up	  in	  minority	  rights	  disputes.	  	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  although	  an	  inclusive	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  
process	  shows	  promise	  as	  a	  way	  to	  get	  out	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox,	  it	  is	  not	  without	  
problems.	  	  The	  criticisms	  I	  have	  explored	  help	  to	  clarify	  the	  difference	  between	  deliberation	  as	  
a	  grand	  political	  theory	  and	  deliberation	  as	  a	  process	  applicable	  to	  a	  particular	  problem	  facing	  
modern	  liberal	  democracies—that	  of	  negotiating	  the	  content	  and	  concept	  of	  minority	  rights.	  	  
Far	  from	  being	  an	  irrelevant	  utopian	  ideal,	  deliberation	  is	  a	  process	  through	  which	  the	  
relevance	  of	  issues	  can	  be	  determined,	  not	  by	  intellectual	  elites,	  but	  by	  those	  who	  have	  a	  stake	  
in	  the	  issue	  under	  scrutiny.	  	  The	  critics	  may	  be	  right,	  deliberation	  shares	  many	  features	  with	  
inquiry,	  it	  is	  not	  easy,	  it	  is	  not	  fast	  and	  it	  may	  not	  be	  the	  first	  choice	  of	  citizens	  or	  the	  state.	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However,	  an	  inclusive	  deliberative	  process	  has	  much	  to	  offer	  a	  liberal	  democracy,	  including	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  reflect	  and	  revise	  the	  concept	  and	  content	  of	  minority	  rights	  in	  light	  of	  rights	  
claims	  framed	  in	  alternative	  worldviews	  and	  as	  such	  is	  a	  way	  around	  the	  minority	  rights	  
paradox.	  
6.3	  Concluding	  Remarks	  
The	  complications	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  promise	  of	  pluralism	  are	  central	  to	  contemporary	  
political	  theory,	  particularly	  the	  literature	  of	  liberalism.	  	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  agreement	  on	  the	  
idea	  that	  communications	  and	  dialogue	  have	  supplanted	  voting	  as	  the	  central	  concern	  of	  
contemporary	  political	  theory;	  however,	  there	  is	  very	  little	  agreement	  on	  what	  the	  dialogue	  
should	  look	  like.	  	  I	  have	  focused	  on	  one	  small	  part	  of	  that	  problem—what	  I	  call	  the	  minority	  
rights	  paradox.	  	  In	  its	  most	  basic	  formulation	  it	  is	  simply	  an	  inconsistency	  argument.	  	  Minority	  
groups,	  it	  is	  argued,	  are	  paradoxically	  claiming	  purported	  rights	  that	  are	  unsupported	  by	  the	  
values	  upon	  which	  the	  claimants	  base	  their	  claim.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  minority	  claims	  are	  made	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  rights	  secured	  by	  a	  liberal	  democracy;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  claims	  undermine	  
the	  legitimacy	  of	  liberal	  reasoning—the	  same	  reasoning	  that	  legitimizes	  the	  rights	  on	  which	  the	  
claims	  are	  made.	  	  
The	  various	  cases	  explored	  have	  shown	  what	  sort	  of	  obstacle	  the	  charge	  of	  paradox	  is	  
for	  minority	  groups,	  and	  how	  it	  promotes	  misunderstanding	  and	  misrecognition	  by	  stifling	  
political	  dialogue.	  	  It	  is	  the	  pre-­‐emptive	  force	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  that	  I	  have	  argued	  
constitutes	  an	  injustice	  because,	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  dialogue	  ends	  before	  the	  full	  thrust	  of	  
minority	  rights	  claims	  has	  been	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  issue	  under	  discussion.	  	  There	  may	  be	  
cases	  where	  the	  claims	  are	  inconsistent	  and,	  upon	  further	  scrutiny,	  are	  justly	  dismissed.	  	  The	  
oft-­‐cited	  self-­‐defeating	  nature	  of	  claims	  requiring	  state	  sanctioned	  racism	  is	  a	  good	  example;414	  
however,	  to	  presume	  that	  all	  claims	  with	  a	  similar	  inconsistency	  (or	  more	  precisely	  apparent	  
inconsistency)	  are	  self-­‐defeating	  is	  to	  falsely	  attribute	  correlation	  to	  cause.	  	  The	  inconsistency	  
may	  not	  reflect	  a	  deeper	  irreconcilable	  contradiction.	  	  In	  the	  cases	  examined,	  it	  is	  a	  
misrepresentation	  or	  misinterpretation	  of	  the	  claim	  brought	  about	  by	  a	  type	  of	  worldview	  
confusion.	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  See	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson,	  “Democratic”,	  258.	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In	  order	  to	  successfully	  navigate	  the	  sometimes	  arduous	  seas	  of	  intercultural	  politics,	  it	  
is	  important	  to	  recognise	  that	  there	  are	  not	  only	  multiple	  visions	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  but	  also	  
multiple	  worldviews	  that	  give	  shape	  to	  those	  visions	  and	  inform	  the	  concepts	  deployed	  and	  
content	  of	  special	  rights	  claims.	  	  	  Minority	  groups	  argue	  that	  liberal	  institutions	  exert	  a	  cultural	  
bias	  on	  them	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  their	  culture,	  to	  which	  they	  have	  a	  right,	  at	  stake	  in	  their	  
claims.	  	  Evaluating	  the	  claims	  of	  minorities,	  then,	  requires	  an	  on-­‐going	  political	  dialogue	  that	  
can	  adapt	  to	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  dialogue;	  that	  is,	  an	  evaluation	  process	  that	  gives	  formal,	  
procedural	  and	  substantive	  recognition	  to	  the	  worldviews	  of	  minority	  cultures	  in	  political	  
decision-­‐making.	  	  This	  simple	  recommendation	  was	  the	  starting	  point,	  the	  point	  of	  the	  question	  
being:	  	  What	  would	  such	  a	  dialogue	  look	  like?	  	  
	   The	  first	  step	  was	  too	  look	  at	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  
occurred	  in	  theory	  and	  in	  practice.	  	  It	  became	  clear,	  after	  examining	  various	  articulations	  of	  the	  
paradox,	  that	  claims	  to	  culture	  are	  undermined	  when	  there	  is	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  scepticism	  about	  
cultural	  difference.	  	  If	  the	  discursive	  conditions	  severely	  limit	  the	  degree	  of	  understandable	  
difference	  possible	  between	  worldviews,	  then	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  scepticism	  about	  the	  
degree	  of	  difference	  and	  its	  import	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  The	  anti-­‐realist	  rejection	  of	  
relativism	  seems	  to	  support	  such	  scepticism.	  	  If	  the	  idea	  of	  conceptual	  relativism	  (i.e.	  cultural	  
relativism)	  is	  paradoxical,	  then	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  think	  that	  claims	  of	  significant	  difference	  
are	  just	  as	  internally	  inconsistent	  and	  therefore	  are	  easy	  to	  dismiss.	  	  I	  have	  argued,	  that	  a	  
conceptual	  framework	  that	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  is	  not	  adequate	  to	  capture	  
the	  full	  range	  and	  force	  of	  certain	  types	  of	  minority	  rights	  claims—i.e.	  claims	  that	  appeal	  to	  
cultural	  beliefs	  or	  values.	  	  Political	  institutions	  shaped	  by	  this	  type	  of	  idiom	  may	  functionally	  
exclude	  the	  claims	  of	  some	  groups	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  worldview.	  	  	  
By	  challenging	  the	  wholesale	  rejection	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  
understanding	  of	  relativism	  that	  functions	  on	  multiple	  levels	  we	  can	  allow	  for	  a	  greater	  degree	  
of	  intercultural	  difference.	  The	  on-­‐going	  processes	  of	  evaluating	  the	  results	  of	  interpretation	  
and	  extending	  resources	  as	  needed	  to	  facilitate	  intercultural	  understanding	  supports	  a	  much	  
greater	  degree	  of	  potentially	  understandable	  cultural	  difference	  and	  as	  such,	  I	  argued,	  makes	  
conceptual	  room	  for	  the	  level	  of	  cultural	  relativism	  necessary	  to	  support	  special	  rights	  claims.	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   The	  next	  step	  was	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  claimants,	  how	  they	  described	  themselves,	  how	  they	  
were	  described,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  those	  descriptions	  bolstered,	  or	  weakened,	  the	  charge	  of	  
paradox.	  	  In	  the	  cases	  examined,	  claimants	  fell	  under	  the	  umbrella	  description—non-­‐liberal.	  	  
However,	  this	  did	  not	  indicate	  anti-­‐liberal	  sentiments	  or	  values,	  nor	  was	  it	  a	  descriptor	  
employed	  to	  indicate	  diametric	  opposition.	  	  Non-­‐liberal	  is	  a	  term	  employed	  to	  denote	  
difference.	  	  When	  minorities	  make	  claims	  of	  non-­‐liberalness,	  they	  are	  not	  merely	  opposing	  
liberalism	  understood	  as	  a	  political	  system	  that	  places	  limits	  on	  state	  interference	  by	  protecting	  
the	  rights	  of	  individuals;	  they	  are	  positioning	  their	  worldview	  as	  distinct	  from	  a	  package	  of	  
traditions,	  beliefs,	  values	  and	  practices	  endemic	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  institutions.	  	  	  In	  the	  liberal	  
tradition,	  the	  concept	  of	  justice	  is	  oriented	  to	  the	  individual;	  in	  contrast,	  for	  the	  non-­‐liberal	  
groups	  I	  focused	  on,	  justice	  of	  the	  many	  is	  a	  social	  and	  relational	  concept.	  	  The	  institutional	  
biases	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  liberal	  package	  unjustly	  threaten	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  
freedoms	  they	  are	  meant	  to	  guarantee.	  	  Given	  that	  minority	  claims	  are	  often	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  a	  distinction	  between	  liberal/non-­‐liberal	  worldviews,	  getting	  around	  the	  paradox	  requires	  a	  
political	  process	  that	  can	  accommodate	  deeply	  different,	  even	  divergent,	  worldviews.	  	  This	  
requires	  re-­‐examining	  certain	  presumptions	  about	  liberalism	  and	  the	  superiority	  of	  its	  
attendant	  tradition	  of	  thinking	  about	  thought.	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  analysing	  the	  strength	  or	  weakness	  of	  an	  argument,	  a	  position	  or	  even	  
a	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  things,	  logical	  consistency	  has	  been	  and	  still	  is	  an	  essential	  mechanism	  of	  
evaluation.	  	  The	  presumption	  that	  liberal	  reasoning	  is	  somehow	  more	  correct	  than	  non-­‐liberal	  
forms	  of	  thought	  hampers	  the	  efforts	  of	  non-­‐liberal	  minorities	  seeking	  political	  recognition	  and	  
equality	  in	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  political,	  both	  theory	  and	  practice,	  paradoxes	  
abound.	  	  Liberalism	  cannot	  justify	  its	  ahistorical	  status	  as	  the	  product	  of	  reason;	  as	  a	  result,	  
liberalism	  is	  one	  theory	  among	  many	  and	  as	  such	  can	  be	  viewed	  in	  terms	  that	  reveal	  the	  
paradoxical	  nature	  of	  essentially	  liberal	  ideas.	  	  Minority	  claims,	  then,	  are	  unjustly	  expected	  to	  
meet	  a	  standard	  of	  logical	  consistency	  that	  not	  even	  liberal	  theory	  can	  boast.	  	  
What	  is	  needed	  is	  a	  political	  decision-­‐making	  process	  that	  can	  function	  inclusively	  with	  
regard	  to	  minority	  rights	  claims	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  offer	  not	  only	  substantive	  recognition	  of	  
worldviews,	  but	  also	  a	  process	  through	  which	  the	  contested	  nature	  of	  liberal	  political	  practice	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finds	  expression	  in	  political	  activity.	  	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  discussion	  was	  narrowed	  to	  a	  particular	  
problem	  facing	  minority	  groups	  in	  liberal	  democracies—the	  minority	  rights	  paradox.	  	  From	  part	  
one,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  getting	  around	  the	  paradox	  requires	  a	  deliberative	  process	  that	  
functions	  inclusively	  with	  regard	  to	  way	  claimants	  shape	  their	  claims	  (their	  reasoning)	  and	  the	  
reasonableness	  of	  the	  claimant	  (their	  political	  identity).	  	  
	   In	  part	  two,	  I	  began	  the	  deliberative	  recommendation	  by	  looking	  at	  some	  of	  the	  most	  
influential	  accounts	  of	  deliberative	  democracy.	  	  Inclusion	  is	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  deliberative	  
theories	  across	  the	  board	  and	  as	  such	  is	  necessary	  to	  legitimate	  the	  outcomes	  of	  political	  
processes;	  however,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  not	  all	  accounts	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  are	  
the	  same.	  	  Deliberative	  theories	  are	  importantly	  differentiated	  by	  the	  priority	  and	  relationship	  
between	  the	  various	  features	  of	  deliberation.	  	  In	  chapter	  three,	  I	  argued	  that	  an	  emphasis	  on	  
consensus	  might	  threaten	  the	  freedom	  and	  self-­‐legislative	  capacities	  of	  deliberative	  
participants.	  	  In	  contrast,	  an	  inclusive	  deliberation	  requires	  that	  citizens	  actively	  engage	  one	  
another	  in	  a	  dialogue	  aimed	  at	  making	  a	  decision	  by	  coming	  to	  consensus;	  however,	  consensus	  
is	  not	  what	  legitimates	  deliberative	  outcomes;	  instead,	  legitimacy	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  freedom	  and	  
autonomy	  of	  deliberative	  participants.	  
Overcoming	  the	  paradox	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  question	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  
various	  features	  of	  deliberation.	  	  In	  chapter	  four,	  I	  looked	  at	  accounts	  of	  deliberation	  that	  give	  
priority	  to	  reason	  and	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  claimants	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  substantive	  equality	  
and	  argued	  that	  this	  may	  raise	  significant	  problems	  for	  the	  minority	  groups	  affected	  by	  the	  
paradox.	  	  When	  reasonableness	  sets	  limits	  on	  the	  character	  of	  deliberative	  participants,	  
individuals	  may	  be	  unjustly	  excluded.	  	  When	  standards	  of	  reasoning	  constrain	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
claims	  can	  be	  structured,	  minority	  groups	  may	  be	  unjustly	  denied	  equal	  status,	  access	  and	  
influence.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  argued	  it	  is	  equality,	  not	  reasonableness,	  which	  limits	  an	  inclusive	  
deliberation	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  tied	  to	  one	  particular	  idiom,	  particular	  argument	  
form	  or	  conceptual	  framework.	  	  	  
Given	  the	  priority	  of	  freedom,	  autonomy	  (chapter	  three)	  and	  equality	  (chapter	  four)	  in	  
the	  type	  of	  deliberative	  process	  I	  am	  suggesting,	  there	  is	  the	  suggestion	  that	  deliberation	  is	  
itself	  a	  very	  liberal	  idea	  and	  some	  deliberationists	  discussed	  rely	  heavily	  on	  liberal	  ideals	  and	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principles.	  	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  think	  of	  deliberation	  as	  a	  liberalism-­‐dependent	  enterprise.	  	  
However,	  I	  argued	  that	  although	  principles	  of	  liberalism	  may	  underpin	  deliberative	  reason,	  
those	  principles	  do	  not	  function	  to	  exclude	  claims	  made	  from	  alternative	  frameworks	  or	  to	  
impose	  the	  content	  of	  liberal	  principles	  on	  deliberative	  participants.	  	  Liberal	  principles	  imply	  
standards	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  these	  standards	  play	  a	  role	  in	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making;	  
however,	  deliberative	  claims	  are	  not	  constrained	  by	  those	  standards	  of	  reasonableness.	  	  Hence,	  
a	  deliberative	  process	  can	  be	  functionally	  independent	  of	  liberal	  principles	  and	  the	  standards	  of	  
reasonableness	  they	  imply	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  liberal	  principles	  do	  not	  function	  to	  exclude	  
claims	  made	  from	  alternative	  frameworks	  before	  the	  thrust	  of	  the	  claim	  can	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  
on	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  	  A	  deliberative	  process	  can	  be	  functionally	  independent	  of	  liberalism	  and	  
offer	  a	  means	  to	  negotiate	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  dialogue	  between	  liberal	  states	  and	  
minority	  groups	  who	  espouse	  worldviews	  other	  than	  liberal.	  	  	  
Finally,	  I	  looked	  at	  one	  of	  the	  most	  controversial	  features	  of	  deliberation—its	  purported	  
transformative	  power.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  citizens	  will	  somehow	  become	  better	  citizens	  through	  the	  
process	  of	  deliberation	  is	  problematized	  in	  very	  different	  ways.	  	  Some	  suggest	  that	  deliberative	  
transformation	  threatens	  to	  coerce	  minority	  groups	  into	  majority	  thinking,	  while	  others	  are	  
sceptical	  the	  deliberating	  an	  idea	  will	  change	  minds	  at	  all—that	  deliberation	  serves	  to	  reinforce	  
divergence	  and	  inhibit	  convergence.	  	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  harmful	  effects	  of	  the	  transformative	  
feature	  occur	  when	  transformation	  becomes	  a	  requirement	  of	  the	  process	  such	  that	  a	  
deliberation	  is	  only	  legitimate	  if	  participants	  are	  transformed.	  	  A	  lesser	  degree	  of	  
transformation	  occurs	  in	  reasonable	  deliberations,	  but	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  legitimate	  
deliberative	  outcomes.	  	  Deliberative	  legitimacy,	  independent	  of	  transformation	  and	  distanced	  
from	  reasonableness,	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  equality	  of	  participants.	  	  However,	  by	  distancing	  
important	  features	  of	  character	  and	  disposition	  from	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  deliberation,	  the	  worry	  
is	  that	  there	  is	  inadequate	  recognition	  of	  identity	  in	  deliberative	  processes.	  	  Such	  a	  deliberation	  
would	  functionally	  exclude	  reasons	  based	  on	  identity	  claims	  and	  consequently	  subvert	  the	  
degree	  of	  inclusion	  necessary	  to	  get	  around	  the	  paradox.	  
In	  response,	  I	  argued	  that	  identity,	  understood	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  package	  of	  
traditions,	  values	  and	  beliefs,	  is	  very	  much	  a	  part	  of	  the	  deliberative	  process	  I	  have	  put	  forward;	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not	  as	  a	  fixed	  ‘reason’	  to	  support	  claims	  but	  as	  an	  explanatory	  standpoint	  indispensable	  to	  
expanding	  the	  epistemic	  resources	  of	  the	  deliberative	  process	  to	  include	  alternative	  
worldviews.	  	  Deliberating	  rights	  claims	  gives	  recognition	  to	  identity	  because	  it	  is	  a	  process	  that	  
calls	  upon	  all	  the	  relevant	  resources	  available	  regarding	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  	  Attributes	  of	  identity	  
such	  as	  character,	  reasonableness	  and	  disposition	  are	  considered	  resources	  rather	  than	  
features	  of	  an	  individual	  or	  group	  that	  determine	  their	  suitability	  to	  participate	  in	  political	  
dialogues,	  or	  the	  suitability	  of	  their	  reasons	  or	  reasoning	  styles.	  	  
Inclusion	  requires	  that	  deliberative	  legitimacy	  is	  independent	  of	  transformation;	  that	  
equality	  of	  access	  and	  influence	  requires	  that	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  be	  determined	  
publicly;	  and,	  that	  legitimacy	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  	  The	  very	  
conceptual	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  emerges	  are	  brought	  under	  scrutiny	  
through	  deliberative	  processes	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  those	  conditions	  become	  an	  object	  of	  the	  
deliberation	  rather	  than	  a	  dialogical	  constraint.	  	  The	  tensions	  of	  the	  minority	  rights	  paradox	  are	  
relieved	  by	  adopting	  this	  deliberative	  approach	  to	  political	  decision-­‐making	  by	  promoting,	  
rather	  than	  stifling,	  political	  dialogue	  between	  divergent	  worldviews.	  	  	  
When	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  is	  no	  longer	  predicated	  on	  presumptions	  of	  universal	  
correctness,	  alternative	  reasons,	  reasoning	  styles,	  and	  ways	  of	  understanding	  the	  world	  
become	  public	  and	  are	  able	  to	  carry	  political	  force	  through	  deliberative	  processes.	  	  
Deliberation,	  understood	  in	  this	  way,	  makes	  room	  for	  alternative	  worldviews,	  reasoning	  styles	  
and	  content	  in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  Inclusive	  political	  deliberation,	  as	  I	  have	  presented	  it,	  
generates	  the	  space	  necessary	  to	  recognize	  reasons	  and	  reasoning	  from	  divergent	  worldviews	  
in	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  The	  paradox,	  once	  reinforced	  by	  opposition,	  may	  be	  overcome	  by	  
first	  recognizing	  the	  pluralist	  nature	  of	  political	  association	  and	  second,	  engaging	  the	  content	  
and	  concept	  of	  minority	  rights	  claims	  through	  inclusive	  deliberations.	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